Introduction There are two types of industrial security programs: (1) those whose objective is the effective safeguarding of classified information and material in the hands of United States industry or foreign industry, and (2) those whose objective is the physical protection of defense-related facilities without classified contracts but which are deemed important to our national security. Industrial security programs for the safeguarding of classified information and material operate through policies and procedures affecting physical security (the identification, receipt, handling, and storage of classified information and material) as well as personnel security (limitation of access to classified information or material to those individuals who have been cleared for access). Many Federal departments and agencies operate such programs, but the major security programs are those of the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission. (The AEC program is discussed separately on pages 187-232.) The program of the Department of Defense includes 22,000 contractor facilities with some 3 million employees. The industrial security programs for the protection of defense-related facilities ("industrial defense programs") are primarily mobilization programs, i. e., setting up standards of physical protection (fire, trespass, vandalism, sabotage, and other acts) for those facilities without classified contracts which are presently on the standby list or otherwise of interest to our Government because of their importance to our Nation's productive capacity at a time of mobilization or war. The Office of Defense Mobilization, under Executive Order 10421, has policy formulation responsibility for the industrial security programs of approximately 13 authorized agencies, although only the Department of Defense currently has an operating industrial defense program. The Commission has not gone into the subject of physical security as a separate item. This report covers numerous areas of physical security, but only as related to other specific items. To study and review the great countrywide complex of facilities requiring physical security would have been almost impossible, but the Commission recommends to Congress that a thorough review be given this subject. HISTORY Introduction Although the term "industrial security" may be used in various senses, the regulations presently in force define it as "that portion of internal security which is concerned with the protection of classified information in the hands of United States industry." 1 On the other hand, industrial security has, in the past, been used in a broader sense, to include the protection of industrial facilities which are essential to support a wartime mobilization program from loss or damage by the elements, sabotage, or other dangers arising within the United States. At any rate, a survey of the evolution of the present program and the problems that have been encountered along the should lend a sense of perspective. way The World War II Period Some industrial security measures were in force even prior to World War II. For example, the employment of aliens in aircraft plants was regulated by the Air Corps Act of 1926, and the Sabotage and Espionage Acts of 1917 provided general protection under criminal law. During the decade immediately preceding World War II, various Army and Navy security regulations were imposed upon defense contractors. In 1934, defense contractors were required to sign an agreement to adhere to secrecy precautions upon assumption of work of a secret or confidential nature, and the prime contractor was made responsible for secrecy precautions by his subcontractors.3 In 1939, Army regulations required that classified information and material be so marked while in the hands of defense contractors. Inspectors at such defense facilities were directed to advise contractors as to their responsibilities for safeguarding classified material. After studying the British experience, the FBI conducted plant protection surveys in vital defense facilities during 1938-40. At the beginning of World War II, considerable confusion developed from the fact that both the Army and the Navy were engaged in administering the regulations dealing with industrial security. In order to avoid this confusion, the Navy agreed that the Army should assume responsibility for the handling of aliens, control of subversives, fingerprinting, and other procedures for the advancement of personnel security. Responsibility for 1 Armed Forces industrial security regulation, sec. 1–217 (Sept. 1956). 2 Memorandum of Secretary of Defense dated Oct. 12, 1949, Subject: Delineation of responsibility for industrial security. 3 Army policy No. 329, Dec. 1934. Army regulation 380-5, June 1939. supervising the industrial security program was delegated by the Secretary of War to the provost marshal general of the Army.5 The detailed implementation of the program included surveys and inspections of selected defense facilities as to such matters as armed guards, special alarm equipment, and other physical protection measures. A personnel security program was also instituted, although there was no requirement that individual clearances and letters of consent be issued. The personnel records of employees were checked. In addition, the internal security representative of the Army at the defense plant indicated that those suspected of disloyalty, those of questionable background, those in positions enabling them to acquire important classified information, and those in positions of particular trust should submit a personnel security questionnaire and thus become subject to possible investigation. Further, in order to identify those persons whose criminal records were definitely of such a nature as to endanger war production and impair the war effort, fingerprints were taken and checked. Early in 1942, the War Department instituted a program for the "Discharge of subversives from private plants and war department plants privately operated of importance to Army procurement." A strenuous effort was made to accomplish this program with the voluntary cooperation of management and labor. The Army regulations, administered by the provost marshal general, provided that when an adequate investigation revealed that there was good cause to suspect an employee of subversive activity (defined as sabotage, espionage, or any other willful activity designed to disrupt the national defense program), the military authorities could request the immediate removal of such individual from the defense project. It was not required that the nature or source of the evidence be revealed, but administrative instructions stated that no employee should be suspended as a result of idle rumor, normal labor activity, gossip, or anonymous communication. Prior to requiring a removal, Army representatives were instructed to try to get the approval of management and labor representatives. "Where there is no good reason to the contrary and if the project representatives of the employees so desire, they should be given the option of handling the removal of any such individual from the project.” 10 Το minimize any possible injustice, the instructions called for exploration with management and labor of the possibility of arranging for other employment in non-defense work. 5 Letter from the Secretary of War to the provost marshal general, War Department, Sept. 4, 1942. * Memorandum No. 10, internal security section, Army Air Force material center, Mar. 8, 1943. 7 War Department unnumbered circular, dated Feb. 5, 1942. This program was undertaken pursuant to the general authority of Executive Order 8972, dated Dec. 12, 1941, and was based on a joint memorandum. dated Jan. 10, 1942. 8 Letter from the Under Secretary of War to the provost marshal general, Nov. 20, 1942. "Joint memorandum", dated July 31, 1943, contained in War Department pamphlet 32-4 "Suspension of subversives from privately operated facilities of importance to the security of the Nation's Army and Navy programs", dated Dec. 10, 1946. 10 Ibid. |