ice, and of opinion as to the character and scope of desirable administrative or legislative remedies. It found that the agencies normally rely on civil service investigation to determine the loyalty of a prospective employee, and that as the Civil Service Commission can investigate only a limited number of applicants, "the agencies have relied almost exclusively on the veracity attributed to the oath of office and affidavit executed by the new appointee, and signature to these two instruments is taken as prima facie evidence of loyalty. . . . Several agencies in their replies stated that they had no established procedure designed to substantiate allegations of disloyalty."

The temporary commission, in addition to analyzing information from the intelligence service and from Government agencies, also heard testimony from Attorney General Tom C. Clark; Mr. D. Milton Ladd, Assistant Director of the FBI; and Mr. Herbert A. Gaston, Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Employee Investigations. Representative Edward R. Rees, of Kansas, chairman of the House Civil Service Committee, also appeared, as did Representative J. M. Combs, of Texas, former chairman. The views of Mr. Gaston, although not published at the time of the Commission's report, were submitted in 1955 to the Hennings Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Mr. Gaston declared that all who hold the responsibility of selecting loyal employees and excluding all others "must be alert to screen out the subversive, the dishonest, the incompetent, and the unambitious. Examinations and investigations intended to exclude advocates of violent revolution from employment by a Government they would overthrow are essential, but they need to be conducted with extreme care and wisdom lest they should have the effect of setting up bars against the employment of those who conscientiously advocate constitutional and peaceful changes in forms and methods of government."

Mr. Gaston found that to give to "a screening agency power to refuse candidates or to an investigating agency power to exclude from Federal service those who merely hold political views not consonant with those of the examiners and investigators would be to set up an intolerable tyranny comparable to that of the systems of government which we, as advocates of democracy and liberty, most strongly condemn. No screening or selecting agency should ever be given the power to bar citizens from service to their Government because of their political ideas. This is the way to totalitarianism and despotism." Mr. Gaston added that his views were wholly apart from the reasonable freedom that naturally belongs to the executive and to the heads of governmental departments and agencies to select employees sympathetic to and zealous for the government ideals and plans of the existing administration.

The temporary commission's report was dated March 22, 1947, although Executive Order 9835, which embodies substantially all the commission's recommendations, was announced one day earlier. The standard for re

fusal of employment in the executive departments or agencies on grounds relating to loyalty was that ". . . on all the evidence reasonable grounds exist for the belief that the person involved is disloyal to the Government of the United States."

Executive Order 9835 made a loyalty investigation mandatory for any person entering the civilian employ of any department or agency. When necessary, the investigation could be made after a person had entered service, but must have been completed within 18 months of a person's entry on duty or the mandatory condition would expire.

Incumbent employees were also made subject to loyalty investigation. The right to administrative hearing and appeal to the head of a department or agency was established, and a Loyalty Review Board set up within the Civil Service Commission.

Because Executive Order 9835 was limited by statutory authority to proof of actual disloyalty, President Truman amended it on April 28, 1951, to read as follows:

The standard for the refusal of employment or the removal from employment in an executive department or agency on grounds relating to loyalty shall be that on all the evidence, there is reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved.

On July 14, 1951, less than 3 months after he had made the amendment by Executive order, President Truman wrote to Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., executive secretary of the National Security Council, as follows:

DEAR MR. LAY: I have become seriously concerned by a number of reports I have heard recently concerning the administration of the provisions of existing law which authorize the heads of the various departments and agencies to discharge government employees, or to refuse Government employment to applicants, on the ground that they are poor security risks.

If these provisions of law are to achieve their purpose of protecting the security of the Government without unduly infringing on the rights of individuals, they must be administered with the utmost wisdom and courage. We must never forget that the fundamental purpose of our Government is to protect the rights of individual citizens and one of the highest obligations of the Government is to see that those rights are protected in its own operations.

The present situation does not make for good administration. There are no uniform standards or procedures to be followed in the different departments and agencies concerned. Neither is there any provision for review at a central point as there is in the case of the Government employee loyalty program. This is a problem that falls within the scope of the work which I have asked to have undertaken by the Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights. However, the work of that Commission has been delayed because of the failure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to report legislation which would exempt the members and staff of the Commission from the conflict-of-interest statutes.

I believe that the present problems involved in the administration of the Government employee security program are so acute that they should be given at least preliminary consideration without waiting further for the Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights. Consequently, I should like the National Security Council, utilizing its Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, and with the participation of the Civil Service Commission, to make an investigation of the way this program is being administered, and to advise me what changes are believed to be required. In

particular, I should like consideration given to whether provision should be made for uniform standards and procedures and for central review of the decisions made in the various departments and agencies.

When the Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights is able to resume its work, it would, of course, have the benefit of the work done pursuant to this request.

I am asking each of the departments and agencies concerned to cooperate fully in this study.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

Pursuant to the President's request, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) of the National Security Council, with the participation of the Civil Service Commission, prepared a report on the Government employee security program and forwarded it to the President on April 29, 1952. The ICIS report indicated that its recommendations were unanimous, except for certain changes which the Department of Defense desired. The Department of Defense disagreed with the standard which the ICIS report recommended. The ICIS standard was worded as follows:

The standard for the denial of employment, or the removal from employment, in an executive department or agency on security grounds shall be that, on all the evidence, there is reason to believe that the employment or retention of the individual in a sensitive position would be prejudicial to the national security.

The Department of Defense requested that the word "particular" be inserted before the phrase, "sensitive position," arguing that security determinations should be made on the basis of the fitness of the person to hold a specific position. Also, that recognition be given to the fact that access to classified information varied with the degree of sensitivity of the information, and that it was unrealistic to insist that all employees be cleared for the highest classification.

The dissent by the Department of Defense pointed out that the criteria recommended by the ICIS report were phrased in too general terms, and probably would not bring about the desired Government-wide uniformity in the administration of security programs.

The Department of Defense suggested instead that three categories of criteria be adopted as follows:

(a) Criteria which would create a prima facie case of reason to believe that the employment or retention of the individual in a particular sensitive position would be prejudicial to the national security;

(b) Criteria which would not create a prima facie case but which might properly be considered in making the contemplated security consideration; and

(c) Those personal characteristics which, while they might indicate that the individual's employment in a particular sensitive position might be dangerous, would normally justify removal on grounds of character or suitabiliy and not on grounds of security.

The other departments represented on ICIS and the Civil Service Commission did not agree with the dissent by the Department of Defense, but forwarded the dissent as an appendix to their report to the President on April 29, 1952.

The report pointed out that there were several Federal statutes which authorized the removal, or prohibited the employment of persons because they are so-called security risks. ". . . Some of the statutes give direct authority to agency heads to remove employees in the interest of national security. Other statutes prohibit access by employees to information or property unless they are determined to be of unquestionable reliability for security purposes. Still other statutes prohibit the continued employment or hiring of persons unless there has been an FBI investigation and an evaluation of the information contained as a result of such investigation."

The report declared that the one general statute authorizing suspensions and removals of security risks was Public Law 733, 81st Congress, specifically applicable to 11 Federal departments and agencies.

The agencies within the scope of 733 have authority to remove employees in the interests of national security, and yet the employee has the additional right of a written statement of charges, a hearing, and in the event of an adverse decision, a review of his case by the agency head or official designated by him. Further, it gives him the right to go to the Civil Service Commission to determine his eligblity for employment in other agencies of the Government . .

...

"Furthermore," the report continues, "even in those departments and agencies which have need of an employee security program, not all positions . . . will necessarily be concerned with the national security, and therefore not all employees will be in a position to compromise or endanger the national security. The program must be applicable only with respect to those positions which may be designated as 'sensitive positions,' whose incumbents might be in a position to endanger the national security

"The committee believes that those agencies which have need of an employee security program should each have the same basic legal authority upon which to establish such a program. . . to insure such uniformity in the administration of the programs as may be desirable."

The report considered creating a new appellate body to review appeals in security cases, but concluded "that the Civil Service Commission would be the most logical body to accept employee appeals from removal actions on security grounds for the following reasons":

(a) Public Law 733 provides that termination of employment shall not affect the right of an officer or employee to seek or accept employment in any other department or agency of the Government. It further provides that the Civil Service Commission shall have the authority to determine whether such person is eligible for employment by any other department or agency . . . It is therefore contemplated by Public Law 733 that in cases in which individuals have been removed under that law for security reasons the Commission will review the case and determine whether the affected employee may be employed elsewhere in the Government. Such determination cannot be made by any other department, agency, or body, and it is prerequisite to employment of any such individual by any other department or agency.

(b) Some departments and agencies operating under Public Law 733 are now processing loyalty cases simultaneously as both loyalty and security cases. The charges given the individual are under both Public Law 733 and Executive Order 9835, as amended,

and the hearing is joint, serving both for adjudication of loyalty and security. Separate determinations are made with respect to loyalty and security. There is, however, a right of appeal from an adverse loyalty finding to the Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission. It would therefore seem unwise to provide a new and different body to which an appeal could be taken from an adverse security finding, thereby multiplying the avenues of appeal. It would seem more logical to afford an employee an appeal from an adverse finding on security simultaneously with his appeal from an adverse finding on loyalty; or, where there is no adverse finding on loyalty, to the same body which would handle a loyalty appeal. In this manner, where both loyalty and security are involved, each of these matters could be disposed of in one appeal, and, in addition, a finding could be made as to the individual's eligibility for other Federal employment.

The committee recommended that ". . . Decision to take any adverse action should be reached only after there has been a judicious evaluation of all available information, favorable as well as unfavorable, by a responsible official or officials of the department or agency. Investigations which form the basis for any such action should be made by competent investigators and should include all pertinent facts, favorable as well as unfavorable, together with information on which to base a decision as to the credibility of confidential informants. The fullest practicable use should be made of supplemental investigations, including interviews with the employee when appropriate, in order to clear up doubtful points which are material and thus avoid the stigma of formal charges based upon an incomplete record."

Lastly, the committee stated that, "In no event should any official make a commitment or a promise of employment to an applicant for a sensitive position, subject to completion of the required investigation. When it is considered that an applicant's services are so urgently needed as to make it desirable that he be given such commitment or promise, the head of the department or agency concerned should provide for his actual appointment to the position in question, subject to the necessary investigation and with the employee being fully informed of the limited nature of such appointment. Such appointment will assure him all of the procedural and other rights accorded an employee and, at the same time, will not serve to modify or change established minimum requirements for access to classified security information."

Following the receipt of the ICIS report, President Truman wrote a letter to the Honorable Robert Ramspeck, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. This letter, dated August 8, 1952, said in part:

I have given considerable thought to the recommendations contained in this report. I have concluded that the most desirable action at this time would be to merge the loyalty, security, and suitability programs, thus eliminating the overlapping, duplication, and confusion which apparently now exist. It is my understanding that the status of the incumbent employees loyalty program is now so advanced that there would be little or no obstacle in accomplishing this from the standpoint of the future needs of that phase of the loyalty program. Accordingly, I should like for the Civil Service Commission to take the necessary steps to provide me with a plan for combining the