affecting the property rights and interests of a State. But such cases manifestly do not cover the entire field in which such controversies may arise, and for which the Constitution has provided a remedy; and it would be objectionable, and, indeed, impossible, for the court to anticipate by definition what controversies can and what cannot be brought within the original jurisdiction of this court.1 Mr. Justice Shiras now comes to the case of Missouri v. Illinois as made out by the pleadings, and his careful statement of the purposes of the court and his detailed analysis of the causes was to establish once and for all the jurisdiction of this Supreme Court of the States in the class of cases of which Louisiana v. Texas and Missouri v. Illinois might be taken as types, and indeed in other cases in which States of the more perfect Union might be interested. Coming to the case in hand, he had no doubt as to the jurisdiction of the court, saying in the very opening sentence of this part of his opinion: in this An inspection of the bill discloses that the nature of the injury complained of No other is such that an adequate remedy can only be found in this court at the suit of the remedy State of Missouri. It is true that no question of boundary is involved, nor of direct available property rights belonging to the complainant State. But it must surely be conceded case. that, if the health and comfort of the inhabitants of a State are threatened, the State is the proper party to represent and defend them. If Missouri were an independent and sovereign State all must admit that she could seek a remedy by negotiation, and, that failing, by force. Diplomatic powers and the right to make war having been surrendered to the general government, it was to be expected that upon the latter would be devolved the duty of providing a remedy and that remedy, we think, is found in the constitutional provisions we are considering.2 To make good his statement, he analyses briefly the grievances whereof Missouri complained, before taking up the objections primarily made and earnestly urged by Illinois : souri in The allegations of the bill plainly present such a case. The health and comfort General of the large communities inhabiting those parts of the State situated on the Mississippi interest River are not alone concerned, but contagious and typhoidal diseases introduced of Misin the river communities may spread themselves throughout the territory of the State. Moreover substantial impairment of the health and prosperity of the towns and cities of the State situated on the Mississippi River, including its commercial metropolis, would injuriously affect the entire State. That suits brought by individuals, each for personal injuries, threatened or received, would be wholly inadequate and disproportionate remedies, requires no argument.3 Taking up the objections of Illinois he first says: It can scarcely be supposed, in view of the express provisions of the Constitution and of the cited cases, that it is claimed that the State of Illinois is exempt from suit because she is a sovereign State which has not consented to be sued.4 The contention of the State of Illinois appeared to be that the suit was really against State of Missouri v. State of Illinois (180 U.S. 208, 240-1). Ibid. (180 U.S. 208, 242). the bill. The action com But the learned Justice was unwilling to dispose of the case on this ground, as the Sanitary District was a corporation created by and was an agent of the State, plained of and therefore it was the State in the exercise of the power with which it was vested, is State apparently acting within, not in excess, of its power. 'It is', said the learned Justice, action. 'state action, and its results that are complained of-thus distinguishing this case from that of Louisiana v. Texas, where the acts sought to be restrained were alleged to be those of officers or functionaries proceeding in a wrongful and malevolent misapplication of the quarantine laws of Texas. The Sanitary District of Chicago is not a private corporation, formed for purposes of private gain, but a public corporation, whose existence and operations are wholly within the control of the State.' 'The object of the bill', he continued, is to subject this public work to judicial supervision, upon the allegation that the method of its construction and maintenance will create a continuing nuisance, dangerous to the health of a neighboring State and its inhabitants. Surely, in such a case, the State of Illinois would have a right to appear and traverse the allegations of the bill, and, having such a right, might properly be made a party defendant.' 1 Demurrer to the allega sidered. Having disposed of what may be called the formal objections to Missouri's complaint, Mr. Justice Shiras next turns his attention to the allegations stated by tions con- Missouri, which on demurrer are to be taken as facts, and which Illinois contended were not sufficient to grant the relief prayed for admitting them to be true. On this phase of the subject, which really was all that the court had to consider, as jurisdiction in law and jurisdiction in fact were alone involved, Mr. Justice Shiras said, and in so saying practically disposed of the case : Precedents exam ined. This proposition is sought to be maintained by several considerations. In the first place, it is urged that the drawing, by artificial means, of the sewage of the city of Chicago into the Mississippi River may or may not become a nuisance to the inhabitants, cities and towns of Missouri; that the injuries apprehended are merely eventual or contingent, and may, in fact, never be inflicted. Can it be gravely contended that there are no preventive remedies, by way of injunction or otherwise, against injuries not inflicted or experienced, but which would appear to be the natural result of acts of the defendant, which he admits or avows it to be his intention to commit? The bill charges that the acts of the defendants, if not restrained, will result in the transportation, by artificial means and through an unnatural channel, of large quantities of undefecated sewage daily, and of accumulated deposits in the harbor of Chicago and in the bed of the Illinois River, which will poison the water supply of the inhabitants of Missouri and injuriously affect that portion of the bed or soil of the Mississippi River which lies within its territory. In such a state of facts, admitted by the demurrer to be true, we do not feel it necessary to enter at large into a discussion of this part of the defendants' contention, but think it sufficient to cite one or two authorities.2 After citing in support of his views and the views of the court the following cases, Attorney General v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corporation (133 Massachusetts, 361), Mugler v. Kansas (123 U.S. 623, 673), Coosaw Mining Co. v. South Carolina (144 U.S. 550), Goldsmid v. Tunbridge Wells Commissioners (L. R. 1 Equity, 161), and Chapman v. Rochester (110 New York, 273), the learned Justice thus continued and concluded: The bill in this case does not assail the drainage canal as an unlawful structure, nor aim to prevent its use as a waterway. What is sought is relief against the pouring of sewage and filth through it, by artificial arrangements, into the Mississippi River, to the detriment of the State of Missouri and her inhabitants, and the acts are not merely those that have been done, or which when done cease to operate, but acts contemplated as continually repeated from day to day. The relief prayed for is against not merely the creation of a nuisance but against its maintenance. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the demurrers filed by the respective defendants cannot be sustained. We do not wish to be understood as holding that, in a case like the present one, where the injuries complained of grow out of the prosecution of a public work, authorized by law, a court of equity ought to interpose by way of preliminary or interlocutory injunction, when it is denied by answer that there is any reasonable foundation for the charges contained in the bill. We are dealing with the case of a bill alleging, in explicit terms, that damage and irreparable injury will naturally and necessarily be occasioned by acts of the defendants, and where the defendants have chosen to have their rights disposed of, so far as the present hearing is concerned, upon the assertions of this bill. We fully agree with the contention of defendants' counsel that it is settled that an injunction to restrain a nuisance will issue only in cases where the fact of nuisance is made out upon determinate and satisfactory evidence; that if the evidence be conflicting and the injury be doubtful, that conflict and doubt will be a ground for withholding an injunction; and that, where interposition by injunction is sought, to restrain that which is apprehended will create a nuisance of which its complainant may complain, the proofs must show such a state of facts as will manifest the danger to be real and immediate. But such observations are not relevant to the case as it is now before us. The demurrers are overruled, and leave is given to the defendants to file answers to the bill.1 Demur rers over ruled. The opinion of Mr. Justice Shiras was not, as has been stated on more than one occasion, the unanimous opinion of the court. Three of the members dissented, For the dissent of Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, in which Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice White Disconcurred, there is much to be said; and it was thus said by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller: opinion. Controversies between the States of this Union are made justiciable by the Constitution because other modes of determining them were surrendered; and before that jurisdiction, which is intended to supply the place of the means usually resorted to by independent sovereignties to terminate their differences, can be invoked, it must appear that the States are in direct antagonism as States. Clearly this bill makes out no such state of case. If, however, on the case presented, it was competent for Missouri to implead the State of Illinois, the only ground on which it can be rested is to be found in the allega tion that its Governor was about to authorize the water to be turned into the drainage. channel. The Sanitary District was created by an act of the General Assembly of Illinois, and the only authority of the State having any control and supervision over the channel is that corporation. Any other control or supervision lies with the lawmaking power of the State of Illinois, and I cannot suppose that complainant seeks. to coerce that. It is difficult to conceive what decree could be entered in this case which would bind the State of Illinois or control its action. The Governor, it is true, was empowered by the act to authorize the water to be let into the channel on the receipt of a certificate, by commissioners appointed by him to inspect the work, that the channel was of the capacity and character required. This was done, and the water was let in on the day when the application was made to this court for leave to file the bill. The Governor had discharged his duty, and no official act of Illinois, as such, remained to be performed. 1 State of Missouri v. State of Illinois (180 U.S. 208, 248–9) senting Assuming that a bill could be maintained against the Sanitary District in a proper case, I cannot agree that the State of Illinois would be a necessary or proper party, or that this bill can be maintained against the corporation as the case stands. The act complained of is not a nuisance, per se, and the injury alleged to be threatened is contingent. As the channel has been in operation for a year, it is probable that the supposed basis of complaint can now be tested. But it does not follow that the bill in its present shape should be retained. In my opinion both the demurrers should be sustained, and the bill dismissed, without prejudice to a further application, as against the Sanitary District, if authorized by the State of Missouri.i 48. State of Kansas v. State of Colorado. (185 U.S. 125) 1902. As often happens in controversies between the States of the Union, there are what may be called two phases, the first of which relates to the pleadings, the second to the merits. So in the controversy between Kansas and Colorado there are two phases, the first dealing with the pleadings, with the usual denial of jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit, and the further denial that the facts stated in the complaint constitute a cause of action. It is well to note the pertinacity with which the defendant contests every assertion of jurisdiction, so that the assumption of jurisdiction is over the protest of the defendant, thus affording an additional guarantee that the jurisdiction of the court is not extended beyond the letter, much less the spirit, of the Constitution. With this first phase the first case of Kansas v. Colorado (185 U.S. 125), decided in 1902, deals, and, as in the majority of instances since the question of jurisdiction was settled in the great and leading case of Rhode Island v. Massachusetts (12 Peters, 657), the demurrer to the jurisdiction of the court and the sufficiency of the facts was overruled. The case in hand is no exception. The facts of the case, however, make of it an interesting and memorable controversy, capable of supplying at once a rule and a precedent for an international court when established, and likewise cited as an authority in the second phase of Missouri v. Illinois (200 U.S. 496), shortly to be considered. The second and final phase of the controversy, Kansas v. Colorado (206 U.S. 46), decided in 1907, is interesting not only as the decision of the case upon its merits, but in that the United States intervenes, no longer hesitatingly, but with the confidence of one flushed with pride and conscious power, claiming an interest in the controversy, and confident of its right to be heard and to be considered in the decision-which, however, it may be said in passing, was contrary to all of its contentions, showing again that a court of limited jurisdiction may be trusted to interpret the Constitution or convention creating it without bending the knee to a majestic or imperial litigant. And the case is of further interest in that it attempts to lay down a rule and a standard, applicable to the claim and the conduct of every nation bordering upon a river flowing through more than one country in its descent to the sea. By leave of the court the State of Kansas filed its bill of complaint against the State of Colorado on May 20, 1901, stating what would not ordinarily be stated in 1 State of Missouri v. State of Illinois (180 U.S. 208, 249–50). For the succeeding phase of about the use of the this connexion, that the plaintiff was admitted into the Union January 29, 1861, and Colorado August 1, 1876, inasmuch as these facts were known to the court, which is held to have judicial notice of them. They are important, however, in that A dispute Kansas claimed certain rights to the waters of the Arkansas River, flowing through its territory, which were secured to it, according to its contention, by the common Arkansas law before Colorado became a State and sought, according to a narrow and different principle of law, to appropriate to the purposes of irrigation the waters of the Arkansas before it entered the State of Kansas. This is, briefly stated, the case and the cause of the controversy; but for its correct understanding it is necessary to go somewhat into detail. River. Kansas Colorado The complaint sets forth the cause of action with great fullness, stating that the ComArkansas River rises in the Rocky Mountains in the State of Colorado; that it plaint of flows through certain counties of that State and thence into the State of Kansas; that that its tributaries have their rise and entire flow in that State; that the length of diverts the river within the State is approximately 280 miles, and the river and its tribu- the taries drain approximately 22,000 square miles; that this entire area is east of and water, largely in the Rocky Mountains, where the accumulation of snow in the winter is very great, and the waters formed from the melting of the snow flow into the river directly and in great volume, from early in the Spring until August; that the river 'is a navigable stream under the laws and departmental rules and regulations of the United States'; that the volume of water in the bed of the river, flowing into Kansas, was, would and should be very great but for the wrongful diversion thereof by the authorities of the State of Colorado. So much for Colorado. The bill next states that the length of the river in Kansas is about 310 miles; that in the latter State it flows through a broad valley, and that along its entire length in the State there are alluvial deposits of great depth, amounting in the aggregate to about 2,500,000 acres, lying for the most part in the western part of the State; that in this part of the State the rainfall is very light, and by reason of the porous nature of the soil throughout that area the greater portion of the water so falling sinks into the earth, so that only a small portion thereof finds its way into the river; that the water flowing in the bed of the river, as it passes through the State of Kansas, flows under the surface, hence called the thus imunderflow, and fertilizes the land of the valley, rendering it productive, which would the fertinot be the case if the State of Colorado could divert the waters from the river before lity of it reaches the State of Kansas; and that the diversion of the waters by Colorado for the purposes of irrigation had already greatly decreased the flow, and, in consequence, the productivity of the lands depending upon the river was decreased and their value lessened. Kansas, property of the State. The bill alleged ownership, vested in the State, of some 126 acres watered by including the river, granted by the Congress of the United States to be used for a soldiers' land the home in accordance with the terms of the act of March 2, 1889; and the complaint further alleged that, since 1885, the State had been the owner of some 640 acres, used for purposes of an industrial reformatory, and dependent upon the waters of the Arkansas, and that the State's grantor had acquired title to those lands in 1873, so that, to quote the language of the bill, evidently drawn with reference to the holding of the Supreme Court in the case of Louisiana v. Texas, the State of |