commerce, the learned Justice enumerates concrete instances in the following passage from his opinion: As we have stated, in international law and by the usage of European nations, Federal the terms' middle of the stream' and ' midchannel' of a navigable river are synony- statutes. mous and interchangeably used. The enabling act of April 18, 1818, (3 Stat. 428, c. 67,) under which Illinois adopted a constitution and became a State and was admitted into the Union, made the middle of the Mississippi River the western boundary of the State. The enabling act of March 6, 1820, (3 Stat. c. 22, § 2, p. 545,) under which Missouri became a State and was admitted into the Union, made the middle of the main channel of the Mississippi River the eastern boundary, so far as its boundary was conterminous with the western boundary of Illinois. The enabling act of August 6, 1846, (9 Stat. 56, c. 89,) under which Wisconsin adopted a constitution and became a State and was admitted into the Union, gives the western boundary of that State, after reaching the river St. Croix, as follows: Thence down the main channel of said river to the Mississippi, thence down the centre of the main channel of that' (Mississippi) 'river to the northwest corner of the State of Illinois.' The northwest corner of the State of Illinois must therefore be in the middle of the main channel of the river which forms a portion of its western boundary.1 The conclusion which Mr. Justice Field draws from these instances is very persuasive, and doubtless expressed the true meaning and intent of the legislation. Thus he says: It is very evident that these terms, ' middle of the Mississippi River,' and 'middle of the main channel of the Mississippi River', and 'the centre of the main channel of that river', as thus used, are synonymous. It is not at all likely that the Congress of the United States intended that those terms, as applied to the Mississippi River separating Illinois and Iowa, should have a different meaning when applied to the Mississippi River when separating Illinois from Missouri or a different meaning when used as descriptive of a portion of the western boundary of Wisconsin. They were evidently used as signifying the same thing.2 ments of After referring to and quoting from Dunlieth and Dubuque Bridge Company Conflictv. County of Dubuque (55 Iowa, 558, 565), in which the Supreme Court of Iowa ing judge. sustained the contention of the State, and the case of Buttenuth v. St. Louis Bridge State Co. (123 Illinois, 535, 548), in which the Supreme Court of Illinois sustained the courts. contention of its State, thus showing the advantage of a Supreme Court unaffected by local feeling, Mr. Justice Field thus comments upon them and thus announces the decision of the court in the first phase of the case under consideration: The opinions in both of these cases are able and present, in the strongest terms, the different views as to the line of jurisdiction between neighboring States, separated by a navigable stream; but we are of opinion that the controlling consideration in this matter is that which preserves to each State equality in the right of navigation in the river. We therefore hold, in accordance with this view, that the true line in navigable rivers between the States of the Union, which separates the jurisdiction of one from the other is the middle of the main channel of the river. Thus the jurisdiction of each State extends to the thread of the stream, that is, to the midchannel', Judgeand, if there be several channels, to the middle of the principal one, or rather, the one usually followed. ment that the boundary is the "middle It is therefore ordered, adjudged and declared that the boundary line between the State of Iowa and the State of Illinois is the middle of the main navigable channel of the Mississippi River. And, as the counsel of the two States both desire that this of the boundary line be established at the places where the several bridges mentioned in main the pleadings-nine in number- cross the Mississippi River, it is further ordered that navigable 1 State of Iowa v. State of Illinois (147 U.S. 1, 10–11). 2 Ibid. (147 U.S. 1, 11). channel'. sioners Commis- a commission be appointed to ascertain and designate at said places the boundary line between the two States, such commission, consisting of three competent persons, ap- to be named by the court upon suggestion of counsel, and be required to make the pointed. proper examination and to delineate on maps prepared for that purpose the true line as determined by this court, and report the same to the court for its further action.1. Claim for the proceeds of the sale of public lands. History of the facts. Act of 34. State of Indiana v. United States. The case of Indiana v. United States is of interest and importance to the cause of judicial settlement, not because of the facts involved in it or the principle of law applied, but because of the parties-for the United States, by virtue of its consent to be sued in the Court of Claims, appeared as a defendant before that court at the instance of one of the United States. The case, a very simple one, was filed in the Court of Claims in 1889 by the State of Indiana as plaintiff against the United States as defendant to recover the sum of $412,184.97, alleged to be due to the State of Indiana out of the moneys which the United States had received from sales of public lands situated in that State. The Court of Claims dismissed the petition, and the petitioner, to use a technical expression, appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States in order to secure a reversal of the court below. The record is replete with acts of Congress, more or less in point, and from the many only those will be mentioned upon which the Supreme Court based its judgement. The first is the act of April 30, 1802, for the admission of Ohio as a State of the Union, in which it was provided that five per cent. of the net proceeds of lands within the State, afterwards sold by Congress, should be applied to the laying out and making of public roads, leading from the navigable waters emptying into the Atlantic, to the Ohio, to the said State, and through the same, such roads to be laid out under the authority of Congress, with the consent of the several States through which the road shall pass'. By the act of March 3, 1803, it was provided that three per cent. of the proceeds thus raised should be paid, from time to time, to the State to be applied to the construction of roads within the State. By an act of March 29, 1806, the Congress provided for the construction of the road from Cumberland in Maryland, to the State of Ohio, known in history as the Cumberland or National road, and by subsequent acts, passed before the admission of Indiana as a State of the Union, appropriated for the building of that road sums amounting to $710,000, to be reimbursed out of the two per cent. fund; and it is a matter of history that the cost of the road during that period largely exceeded the moneys credited to the fund. For the first time the State of Indiana makes its appearance in the statutes relating to this matter. By act of April 19, 1816, for the admission of Indiana as Congress a State, it was provided that five per cent. of the net proceeds of the sale by Congress ordering of roads the con- of the lands situated within that State should be reserved for the construction of struction public roads and canals, of which three-fifths thereof should be applied to those out of the objects by the State itself and two-fifths thereof 'to the making of a road or roads proceeds. leading to the said State under the direction of Congress'. By the act of April II, 1 State of Iowa v. State of Illinois (147 U.S. 1, 13-14). For the succeeding phase of this case, 1848, the Secretary of the Treasury was directed to pay the three-fifths of the proceeds to the State of Indiana. The Cumberland road was eventually laid out and made a highway from the Ohio River opposite Wheeling, then in the State of Virginia, to the seat of government of the State of Missouri, and upon this road, open to the public and used by it, the Government mail was transported. By act of March 2, 1855, 'to settle certain accounts between the United States and the State of Alabama,' it was provided that the Commissioner of the General Land Office be, and he is hereby required to state an account between the United States and the State of Alabama, for the purpose of ascertaining what sum or sums of money are due to said State, heretofore unsettled under the sixth section of the act of March 2, 1819, for the admission of Alabama into the Union; and that he be required to include in said account the several reservations under the various treaties with the Chickasaw, Choctaw, and Creek Indians within the limits of Alabama, and allow and pay to the said State five per centum thereon, as in case of other sales'. Finally, for this is the last statute material to the present case, the act of March 3, 1857, 'to settle certain accounts between the United States and the State of Mississippi and other States,' directed the Commissioner of the General Land Office 'to state an account between the United States and the State of Mississippi, for the purpose of ascertaining what sum or sums of money are due to said State, heretofore unsettled, on account of the public lands in said State, and upon the same principles of allowance and settlement as prescribed in the act of March 2, 1855, c. 139, and to include in like manner the reservations under Indian treaties'. In the portion of this act by which Indiana profited, it was provided that 'the said commissioner shall also state an account between the United States and each of the other States upon the same principles, and shall allow and pay to each State such amount as shall thus be found due, estimating all lands and permanent reservations at one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre'. of the sale ab roadmaking. In 1872 the Commissioner of the General Land Office stated an account between the United States and the State of Indiana, by which the sum of $419,949.46 appeared to be due to that State because of the sales of the public and Indian lands thereof. He found, however, that the sums of money appropriated by Congress for the con- Proceeds struction of roads, and which were to be reimbursed out of the proceeds of the five per cent. fund, which, to quote the official report, from which the above statement sorbed in is paraphrased, 'would more than absorb the entire amount of the two per cent. which had accrued upon the sales of lands in Indiana; and that, therefore, in the absence of special legislation upon the subject, nothing would appear to be at present payable to the State of Indiana, except the sums of $47.12 on the three per cent. account and $6,333.73 for Indian reservations'. In 1874 the sum of $6,380.85 was paid to Indiana, but was only accepted by that State as a payment upon account, not as a final settlement of the debt between the State and the United States. In 1889 the State of Indiana, insisting upon payment in full, made a formal demand upon the Commissioner of the General Land Office to state an account in accordance with the act of March 3, 1857. No account was stated. The petition, therefore, was filed in the Court of Claims, and from the decision of the court, rejecting the 1 State of Indiana v. United States (148 U.S. 148, 152). Judge ment of petition, the suit was, as previously stated, carried on appeal to the Supreme Court. In simple terms, unembarrassed by acts of Congress and other detailed provisions, it therefore appears that Congress authorized the construction of certain roads from the Atlantic to the State of Ohio, and provided that the expenses incurred in their construction should be reimbursed by the proceeds of the sales of the public and Indian lands within the States through which the roads passed; and inasmuch as the sums expended in their construction exceeded the proceeds of the sales of such lands, nothing was due to Indiana as one of the States through which the roads passed. If a trifling illustration be permissible in the case of a suit between a State and the United States, it was the case of Mother Hubbard going to the cupboard and finding it bare. Mr. Justice Gray, delivering the unanimous opinion of the court affirming the the Court judgement of the Court of Claims, makes three preliminary statements, in the nature of a summary, which, as showing the question as it appeared to the Supreme Court, are quoted for the purpose of clearness: dismiss ing the claim. By each of the acts of Congress, successively admitting the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Missouri into the Union, Congress agreed that five per cent of the net proceeds of public lands within the States, sold by Congress, should be applied to the making of a road or roads leading to the State; and by those and other acts it was provided that, of this five per cent fund, three per cent should be disbursed by the States, and two per cent by the United States. The general purpose was to promote the construction of a national highway connecting the new States in the interior with the old States on the Atlantic seaboard. In the act for the admission of Indiana, the original obligation assumed by Congress in this respect did not define the termini of the road or roads to be built, or bind Congress to complete any road, or require the two per cent of the proceeds of the sales of lands in Indiana to be expended within the State; but the only obligation was to apply this two per cent fund to the making of a road or roads leading to the said State, under the direction of Congress'. It was for Congress to decide on what part of the road leading to Indiana this fund should be expended; and Congress had the right to treat the road as a whole, constructed for the benefit of all the States through which it passed. It is unnecessary to determine whether this obligation was in the nature of a contract only, or whether it can be considered as in any sense constituting a trust; because, in either aspect, the contract has been performed, or the trust executed, by applying the fund in question to the making of a road 'leading to the said State of Indiana. It appears by the statement of the account between the United States and the State of Indiana by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, (which there is nothing in the case to control,) that the sums appropriated to the construction of the Cumberland road leading to the State of Indiana greatly exceeded the whole amount of the two per cent fund from sales of lands in the State; and that, therefore, in the absence of special legislation upon the subject, nothing was payable to the State of Indiana on account of this fund.1 The learned Justice-and no Justice of the court was more learned than he, unless it be Justice Story-after this opening statement, entered upon a brief discussion of the act of 1857 taken in connexion with the act of 1855 as determinative of the case, and thus concluded his opinion, distinguishing the claim of Indiana from that of the States of Alabama and Mississippi, through which States the roads were not constructed, and thus announced the judgement of the court: ment for the United The principles of settlement are that the United States shall be charged with Judgethe sums due, treating Indian reservations as sales. They may not be limited to Indian reservations, and may well include any unpaid balance of the three per cent fund which Congress had agreed should be disbursed by the States, as well as any part States. of the two per cent fund which had not been applied by the United States to the making of a road or roads according to their original obligation. But there is nothing, in any of the acts, upon the subject, which warrants the inference that Congress intended that, because the United States held themselves to be liable to Alabama and Mississippi for the two per cent fund which they had never applied as they had agreed, they should therefore be liable to the other States for the like two per cent fund which had been fully appropriated and expended in accordance with their obligations to those States.1 35. State of Virginia v. State of Tennessee. (148 U.S. 503) 1893. With the first phase of Virginia v. Tennessee (148 U.S. 503), decided in 1893, the Commonwealth of Virginia appears in the Supreme Court for the second time as a litigant in a boundary dispute, the first being the case against West Virginia (11 Wallace 396), decided in 1870, which has already been considered; and the third and last to date being the second phase of the dispute with Tennessee (158 U.S. 267), decided in 1895. Fortunately the unanimous opinion of the court, delivered by Mr. Justice Field, is so full as to render superfluous an official statement on the part of the reporter and the arguments of counsel, and doubtless they were omitted by the reporter for this reason. The introductory statement of the learned Justice, not without interest in itself, has an added interest as stating that the jurisdiction of the court was so well established as not to be contested. Thus he says: This is a suit to establish by judicial decree the true boundary line between the States of Virginia and Tennessee. It embraces a controversy of which this court has original jurisdiction, and in this respect the judicial department of our government is distinguished from the judicial department of any other country, drawing to itself by the ordinary modes of peaceful procedure the settlement of questions as to boundaries and consequent rights of soil and jurisdiction between States, possessed, for purposes of internal government, of the powers of independent communities, which otherwise might be the fruitful cause of prolonged and harassing conflicts. A boun dary dispute. No The State of Virginia, as the complainant, summoning her sister State, Tennessee, objection to the bar of this court-a jurisdiction to which the latter promptly yields-sets raised forth in her bill the sources of her title to the territory embraced within her limits, jurisand also of the title to the territory embraced by Tennessee.2 In this simple and matter of fact way the learned Justice, speaking for the court, to the diction. |