comes from a man whose orthodoxy on the questions at issue is beyond all doubt-from a man who, above all others, understood and reverenced the whole Word of God, and held not only the immutability of moral law, but the perfection of the Decalogue as a summary of that law, that the testimony that has been adduced has the greatest weight. Coming from such a man, the greatest and wisest of all theologians, it has a value which this Assembly will best know how to appreciate. Assuming, then, that the explanatory statements are to be received as a clearer exhibition of the doctrine taught in the sermons, so that the sermons are to be read in the light of the commentary thus supplied, it remains to be seen how far the doctrine taught in both is in harmony with Scripture and the Confession of Faith. And as the whole doctrine involved in this case is comprehended under the two heads of the committee's first report, it will be unnecessary to refer to anything either in the sermons or explanatory statements that does not directly bear either upon the subject of the relation of the Old Testament Scriptures to the New, or to the subject of the moral law and the Decalogue. And, 1. As to the relation of the Old Testament Scriptures to the New. On this point there are indeed many extreme and startling statements made in the sermons. The author in his anxiety to clear the ground of false principles, has, in more than one instance, spoken unadvisedly, and has, throughout the greater part of the discussion of this branch of the subject, indulged in a free and easy way of handling the Old Testament Scriptures. The style in which the discussion is conducted has given great offence to many, and has excited a strong prejudice against the sermons as a whole. But, putting out of view all that may justly be objected to on this ground, there is no difficulty in ascertaining the precise import of the teaching of the sermons and of the relative explanatory statements. Mr Smith starts with the position that by the law and the prophets the Jews meant the whole of the Old Testament Scriptures, and that it was concerning these Scriptures that Christ was speaking when He said, "Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets; I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil." Having thus determined that Christ is speaking of the whole of the Old Testament Scriptures, the next thing to be ascertained is the meaning of the term “fulfil.” Viewing the fact that Christ's fulfilment of the ancient law led to its formal abrogation, Mr Smith reaches the conclusion that Christ in fulfilling the whole of the Old Testament Scriptures annulled them. of the Old is fulfilled in the New, and is by this very fact abrogated and annulled. Such a way of stating the case is fitted to alarm and mislead. It may easily be interpreted as a complete setting aside of the Old Testament Scriptures-as a denial of their now forming a component part of the one perfect Revelation of God. Yet this is not what Mr Smith ever intended to teach, as is manifest even from the sermons themselves. For (at page 20, letter B) he thus expresses himself" I do not indeed say-you would utterly misunderstand if you supposed me to mean that these Scriptures are not altogether useless. On the contrary, they remain, and ever shall remain, a most helpful commentary and illustration, profitable in a hundred ways for doctrine, and correction, and instruction, and reproof in righteousness." And, following up this statement, Mr Smith goes on to show how the bistories, laws, proverbs, psalms and prophetic writings of the Old Testament Scriptures will minister to the awakening, edification, and comfort of the Church

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in all ages. Manifestly, therefore, the doctrine that Christ, in fulfilling, has annulled all the ancient Scriptures, was meant to be understood by the author under certain restrictions. For he actually assigns a permanent place and importance to documents which he had described as being for ever abrogated and annulled. How is this to be accounted for, unless on the principle laid down by Mr Smith, in his third explanatory statement (p. 84, D.) He there says-"Let me remind you, therefore, that such words as annul' and ' abrogate,' if applied to books at all, can only be applied to books of law, or to those which contain illustrations of such law, claiming authority as examples. The use of our language imposes this limitation. If it be overlooked, we speak, not English, but nonsense. It is the law of those books, or their illustrations of law, which can alone be said to be annulled or abrogated." The sum of the explanation is this-that, while speaking of the old economy or dispensation, he spoke of it under the name of the Scriptures, containing the laws of that economy. The abrogation of the ancient dispensation was the abrogation of the documents containing the laws of that dispensation; and thus, in so far as an economy is abrogated, are the documents containing its special code of laws annulled. In the light of this explanation, one can easily see how Mr Smith was led to speak as he has done regarding the Scriptures of the Old Testament being fulfilled, and thereby annulled by those of the New. So far, then, as the general principle is concerned that the abrogation of a dispensation involves the abrogation of its regulative code-there is no difference of opinion. But the question immediately arises-How much of the ancient Scriptures come under the description of being the regulative documents of a dispensation that has passed away? How much of their teaching on matters of doctrine, worship, and duty is now binding on us? This question may be answered in two ways. Either, first, it may be said that all of the Old is binding that has not been formally or by implication abolished by the New ; or, second, it may be held that nothing in the Old is binding on us but what has been formally or by implication sanctioned by the New. The first of these canons of interpretation is that which has been generally held by theologians. The second, which is held by Mr Smith, though not generally accepted by theologians, is no new canon of interpretation, and has been held by some whose orthodoxy and piety were undoubted. Practically, it may matter little which canon of interpretation be adopted, for in both cases the appeal is equally made to the New Testament as the determining standard. To say with Calvin that the Old Testament is abolished, in so far as it is opposed to the gospel, differs very little from saying, with Mr Smith, that the Old Testament is abolished in so far as it is not reaffirmed in the gospel. For that which is opposed to the gospel is not reaffirmed or sanctioned by it; and that which it does sanction is that to which it is not opposed. Besides, as the Confession of Faith does not give any deliverance on the question raised by Mr Smith's canon of interpretation, his opinion on this point cannot be made a subject of review, unless it could be shown to involve practical consequences that would be in conflict with one or other of the doctrines of the Confession. But this has not been shown. Mr Smith's theory, if it had not been guarded by declarations as to the inspiration of the Old Testament Scriptures as to the equal authority of the Old Testament Scriptures

with the New, and as to the organic unity of the Scriptures Old and New, as forming together the one complete revelation of the divine will -might, in that case, have been regarded as virtually asserting that the Old Testament had ceased to be part of the rule of faith. But a theory that proclaims its harmony with the assertion of the equal inspiration, the co-ordinate authority, and the organic unity of the two parts of Scripture, cannot be suspected of any such tendency. Mr Smith over and over again asserts the sufficiency of the New Testament for all purposes alike of duty, faith, and worship. But, while doing this, he no less strenuously asserts, that "all the everlasting doctrine, and all the ever*lasting duty revealed in the old covenant, have been gathered up and expressed with greater clearness in the new covenant in Christ, so that not one jot or tittle of them is lost" (p. 86, C.) Omitting any further reference to Mr Smith's views regarding the relation of the Old Testament to the New, I now ask the attention of the Assembly to the second subject, on which the teaching of the sermons was regarded as erroneous, viz., the moral law and the Decalogue. 2. The view given by Mr Smith of the moral law and the Decalogue. Mr Smith's language on this, as on the other subject, is far from being very precise; yet it has far less of extremeness about it than is found in the other case. It is not so difficult, therefore, to get at Mr Smith's real meaning, although even that is not a little perplexed by some very unguarded assertions. Perhaps nothing has excited so strong a prejudice against his views on the moral law as the application to this law of his theory of fulfilling and thereby annulling. If fulfil means to abolish, what, it is asked, in alarm, comes of the moral law as the rule of life? In order to answer this question satisfactorily, it will be necessary to consider what precisely is meant by the abrogating or annulling of law. Men abrogate or annul laws, because it has either been found that the statute has been made in ignorance of the real facts of the case, or because experience has proved that the statute itself is not fitted to secure the end proposed. When, in either of these ways, it is discovered that the law does not secure the end for which it was called into existence, it is thrust out of existence, and is said to be abrogated or annulled. But in this sense no law of God, whether ceremonial, judicial, or moral, ever was, or can be, annulled. Whatever law God appoints is appointed in infinite wisdom and goodness. No want of knowledge or power leads Him to cancel any law that He has made. Whatever He ordains must run the course for which it was designed by Him. It must reach its appointed terminus ad quem. When therefore the Scripture speaks of an annulling, disannulling, and setting aside of laws which God had made, it can only be as expressing the fact that they had reached the end which the Lawgiver had appointed. In other words, the only way in which any law of God can be annulled is by its being fulfilled. Every divine law appointed as a provisional arrangement ceases when the end designed by it has been gained. It fulfils its destiny, and so it passes away. But moral law, being the reflection of God's moral nature, is as unchangeable as the divine attributes are unchangeable. Moral law is not a tentative or provisional code, but an everlasting expression of the relations which men sustain to God and to their fellow-men-or, as Edwards would say, to being in general. When, therefore, Mr Smith speaks of Christ fulfilling,

and by fulfilling annulling the moral law, he cannot possibly mean that the moral law as such is set aside. To fulfil types is to abolish them. To fulfil the end designed by preparatory institutions is to abolish them. But to fulfil moral law-to fill all its channels of duty up to the full, is only to surround the law thus fulfilled with higher sanctions. Our Lord declares that He came not to destroy the law or the prophets, but to fulfil. And on the principle already explained, in fulfilling typical, ceremonial, or temporary laws, He actually abolished them, because the end for which they had been appointed was realised in Him. But in fulfilling the moral law, He surrounded all its requirements with higher sanctions, and thus bound all its separate parts more firmly together, revealing its oneness of spirit-the exceeding length and breadth of its demands, and thereby supplying new and additional motives to obedience. Thus Christ, in fulfilling the law, magnified the law. He did not bring in a new law, but threw a new sacredness, by throwing a new light, around that law that is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever. And thus, through the power of this new light, and through the power of new motives, the authority of the law is exalted and man is blessed. I find nothing in Mr Smith's sermons or statements inconsistent with such principles as these, while there are several sentences that formally assert the very doctrines now stated. Thus (at p. 27, F) Mr Smith says: -"There is, of course, this difference between the proper moral law and the merely ceremonial, that while both alike are formally abolished, yet the special observances of the one are actually put an end to, while those of the other are really more binding than ever." It is right that this distinction should be kept clearly in view, as it keeps the moral law out of the category of things that can be abolished, and makes Christ's fulfilment of the law surround it with higher sanctions. On this point Mr Smith has never wavered. From first to last, he has held the immutability of all divine moral law, and has represented it as exalted through its fulfilment in Christ. The point on which Mr Smith's views have diverged from those of his brethren, is not as to the nature and immutability of moral law, but as to the identity of the moral law and the Decalogue. The whole question is narrowed to this single issue :—Are the Decalogue and the moral law convertible terms? Or is there something of a distinctly moral nature that cannot be referred to any of the ten categories of the Decalogue? Mr Smith holds that the New Testament law of forgiveness and the law of mercy do not find any expression in the Decalogue, and on this account he declares that there is a greater fulness, as well as a greater inwardness, in the New Testament law of duty than existed in the Old. But, in holding this opinion, Mr Smith asserts nothing more than is asserted by Calvin in the extracts that I have already read from his works. And neither the Westminster Confession of Faith, nor the Catechisms, commit any one who subscribes them to any doctrine opposed to this. These standards declare that the Decalogue is an inspired summary of moral law, but they do not assert that the moral law and the Ten Commandments are equivalent expressions. It will not do, therefore, to say, as has more than once been said in connexion with this case in the inferior court, that the law of mercy is not in the Decalogue, because mercy is a thing peculiar to an economy that contemplates man as a fallen being, and therefore can find no expression in the one everlasting rule of duty. For, according to Paul,

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the Decalogue, as a rule of righteousness, has as distinct a reference to man's fallen condition as the law of mercy can possibly have. But, apart from this explicit testimony of the apostle, it is manifest that if it be granted that the law of mercy is not found in the Decalogue, and yet that it is our duty to show mercy, there must be some sense in which it can be said that the unchanging moral law of God is of wider compass than the letter of the Ten Commandments. To admit that mercy is a duty, and to confess, at the same time, that it does not find expression in the Decalogue, because the Decalogue is the one immutable revelation of moral law, is unmistakably to surrender the citadel in the attempt to defend it. The statements in the Confession do not commit any one to a defence of this kind. All that they declare on this point is, that the moral law as given in the Decalogue is, for man in his present condition, a perfect rule of righteousness. The root-principles of all moral duty are there. But they are there in a form specially adapted to, and designed for, sinners. And this concession implies that the form in which the moral law is given in the Decalogue is not the form in which it was revealed to man in innocence, nor will it be the form in which the moral law will be revealed to the redeemed in heaven. It is perfectly consistent, therefore, with this view to say that the moral law and the Decalogue are not absolutely identical expressions. This interpretation receives additional confirmation from the words of the Catechisms bearing on this subject. Both Catechisms describe the moral law as summarily comprehended in the Ten Commandments. Now, if there is any meaning in words, a summary cannot be exactly co-extensive with the thing summarised; nor can a thing comprehending be exactly co-extensive with the thing comprehended. You cannot speak of two things that are exact equivalents being comprehended the one in the other. The compilers of our standards may be thus fairly held as declaring their belief in the greater fulness and inwardness of the New Testament revelation of duty, compared with what was given in the Old Testament. And while doing this, they could consistently speak of the Decalogue as a perfect rule of righteousness, because it is a perfect summary of that primeval revelation of duty that was stamped on man's nature. Professor Douglas (having concluded Mr Freer's paper) went on to say--In coming to a conclusion, I need not remind you that Mr Smith deserves some consideration on account of the frankness with which he has acted throughout, from the time that of his own accord he brought his sermons under our notice. But the Scriptures plainly teach that the object of Church power is edification and not destruction; and therefore I hold that our proceedings, to which we rightly give the name of discipline, are to be, if possible, of the nature of family training rather than of judicial trial and punishment. In this respect, I trust, it will be the opinion of this Assembly that enough has been done up to the point at which we continued unanimous. That unanimity among ourselves was a great matter, it might have been difficult of attainment, yet it was absolutely perfect; I believe it had a most blessed effect upon our Church members, and upon surrounding Churches. I think there is evidence enough that it had a happy effect upon Mr Smith, who submitted to our censure without appealing to the higher courts; and I should think that he himself will readily allow that his views upon these subjects are (to say the least) much clearer than when he first handled them in