had ventured to defend the Fourth Commandment and the Sabbathday without possessing the benefit of this new light. But I must say that I do wonder a little at the course he has pursued here. It is very well known, and might have occurred to Mr Smith, had he been lately refreshing his reading in any of those common books which combine some reference to the history of opinions with systematic divinity, that there was a very undesirable sort of genealogy of opinion in this direction with which any cautious man-but Mr Smith is not a cautious man(laughter) would not have been desirous to connect himself. It is very well known what were the views which the Socinians and the Antinomians and the Anabaptists held on this subject; and though Mr Smith did not hold these views, yet I think any man with any ordinary degree of caution might, with even the fever of his sermons on him, have paused. (Laughter and applause.) I think Mr Smith might have adverted, at all events, to the very substantial ground which in this matter is taken by our divines against Socinians and Anabaptists. I name these parties, but in doing so I do not mean to say that Mr Smith sympathises with the views which induced them to take up the ground they did with reference to the Decalogue. On the contrary, I believe that he has no sort of sympathy with them, and that he has an abhorrence of their principles on this point. I name these sects simply in order to state that this circumstance ought, I think, to have exercised a controlling influence upon him; but we know that when a sermon must be written it is very difficult to stop. (A laugh.) Mr Smith seems to have made up his mind, then, that there was a sense in which he could say that the Decalogue was so fulfilled as to be at the same time annulled. Well, on what ground did he find himself able to say so? I confess that in going through the case it occurred to me to wonder why Mr Smith should not have got over the difficulty by saying that the Decalogue was simply reproduced and reinstated, as it were, by the New Testament. There are very good grounds for saying that it was so ever from Mr Smith's point of view, from the way in which the Decalogue is cited and referred to in the New Testament. That, therefore, might occur as solution. But then you must observe how extremely odd it would be to say that it was annulled and reproduced in terms at the very same moment. The thing was ridiculous, and therefore it was absolutely essential that Mr Smith should find another way of stating the matter. He thought he could maintain his position by having recourse to two distinctions-a distinction of form and a distinction of measure—that in the form there is a difference in the New Testament revelation of law, and in the measure there is a greater fulness. Now, with regard to one of these, that of form, I don't think there is a great deal to be said, when one takes a reasonable view of Mr Smith's meaning. There is, I mean, no material difficulty arising from this quarter in the way of accepting his ultimate statement on that head. Mr Smith has referred to another form which the revelation of law assumed, and that under the Old Testament, namely, the great law of love he owns that to have been revealed, though he was inclined, at one time at any rate, to think that this law is in some sense more comprehensive than the Decalogue. I wonder whether if it never occurred to him that the one did not supersede or abrogate the other. Did these not stand together, throwing light upon each other, the one entering into the matter by the side of virtue, and the other by the side of

duty! I don't greatly object to a man saying that you have the law in the one form in the Decalogue, and in another and even in a certain sense in a higher form in the New Testament, if you mean that there it comes before us more amply and luminously clothed with gospel. But the great principles which regulated our divines all along in taking up their position were such as these-that when God created man, man was created the subject of an eternal law, and that this duty which pertains to man stands before us immutable and eternal. We hold that this being so, God has been dealing with man under that law, and according to it, and that he has never consented to deal with man otherwise than as according to the glorious law of duty, nor given man reason to think that he would deal with him according to any lower standard. And when God eime in a special manner to place his people under a dispensation in which law was to be heard and take place as it never had done before, we believe that it was the glorious form of that same eternal law which rose from amid the thunders of Sinai, looking back to the original of man as God had made him and had placed him in relation to the various beings around him-looking forth upon the sinners whom it condemned for their transgressions—and looking forward to the glorious fulfilment which it was to find in the coming Saviour, and the love and obedience with which it should be cherished by all that are redeemed in Him. I believe Mr Smith never meant to deny that: Moderator, I am most willing to believe it; but I do wish he had found a place for it in his sermon, along with whatever crotchets he liked to start. But as I say he resorted to this distinction, "form and measure." Now, with regard to "measure," what Mr Smith means is quite clear. As far on as to his third statement we still find him clinging, in a certain sense, to this fuller revelation of the moral law. When you look at the duties he refers tomissions and forgiveness, and things of that kind-it is perfectly clear what the idea in his mind was. Sometimes I have thought it would have been cleared up to him if any one had said to him-We are not bound to deny by our principles anything historically true. We grant that the law of nature was not in man's heart before the fall as a set of detailed maxims applicable to all relations into which he might come; but he was to enter into the fulness of the law as the meaning of life developed its fulness and variety, and multiplied into fresh relatives, and so doing he would find that the law which he already had was being multiplied for him all along his daily life. In the same way with the Decalogue. It is not a law that you can circumscribe and measure with a "thus far and no farther." If the duties of certain relations have a prominent place in it, yet it is very far from being a mere catalogue of duties, to be set over against another catalogue of virtues, or a third catalogue of goods, according to the division of ethics which some espouse. Simple as its structure is, and its order-yet through that structure and order it proves very deep and complex, going down far under foot -spreading out wonderfully as you walk by it. It contains the eternal law: contains it in this sense, that entering into it you will find it ever expanding and growing on you; but not in the sense that it expounds or enumerates in detail the duties of all possible relations. Whatever respect it manifestly has to the fallen state of man, and to the fact that God was carrying on a scheme of grace, yet, it is the primitive nature and duty of man that is especially regarded. That, as Professor Gibson very well

showed, is the key-note, the law of nature is reproduced. But man was to be brought into other relations. He was, for instance, to be brought into relations with a Redeemer. Well, I believe all duty to a Redeemer does on a certain side fall under law, the law of love, the law of the Decalogue ; but manifestly that rendering one's self to the Redeemer, and cleaving to Him, is a thing not on the surface of the Decalogue, but to be opened up as the divine principles unfold and the duty of man evolves in connexion with the experiences into which man was to be brought and the course he was to accomplish. That does not interfere at all with the position we have always taken up with regard to the essential unity, perpetuity, and permanence of the one moral law that rises between God and man, as soon as God has made man in the image of God. That being so, I really think it is a somewhat narrow point, in regard to which it may be said to be doubtful whether Mr Smith's last statement really covers the ground. It is, I admit, not perfectly clear, whether even yet he means to say that the law, as revealed in the Decalogue, is really essentially the same as that which continues to be revealed, and which regulates our duty under the New Testament. Still the difference comes into very narrow compass. Mr Smith has admitted that the law of love covers the whole ground; and therefore you have him at this point, that the moral law itself was revealed to Adam-was revealed under the Old Testament, at all events; and if he holds that, I do not see room for much more than a dispute about words, and about the statement of certain things about which we are substantially agreed. At all events, it would be a narrow point to libel on. I have said that Mr Smith admits that the law of love, revealed under the Old Testament, covers the whole ground of moral duty. I am aware that it is disputed whether he really holds this; but I don't remember that any ground is alleged for doubting it except that one matter of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. With respect to that, it has been said that Mr Smith withdrew the illustration but not the principle. But he did withdraw the principle, in as far as he withdrew the statement that the principle of revenge might be said to be inculcated. But if you look into it a little further, what is it he has in his mind? It is very much this, that under the Old Testament dispensation there were certain regulations that recognised a course of conduct on the part of the people, as what might go on under the theocracy; and that is what he refers to when he says that "while the great law of love to God and man was certainly declared at Sinai, yet in its practical application it was for wise, however inscrutable, reasons, subjected to various restrictions, so that the people of Israel did not fail in its observance merely because of their perverse will, nor yet merely because they had not quite so much light as we have, but because, in point of fact, there was positive statute authorising them to do in some cases what we must acknowledge to be repugnant to the law of perfect love." That is what he holds. Now, I never could adopt that principle myself. But yet we must acknowledge that the precise statement-if you choose not merely to make a general statement, but to go through it in detail-the precise statement of the principle by which you are to extricate all these particular cases, is not an easy problem. There are considerable difficulties; and, in point of fact, divines have differed not a little as to the particular way of explaining. These cases, in which some things seem to be sanctioned, or permitted, or not excluded, which

yet we know to be excluded now, fall under that part of the moral law which has been distinguished as moral in a second sense, and not in the first-that is, the morality is not that which arises directly out of the relation of man to God, but it is that which arises out of the relation of man to his fellow-creatures on earth. Now in regard to this, some divines have held that, within some limits, God retains within His own hands a dispensing power in such cases; because the reason of the law in given circumstances has altered, He alters the law for so long as He sees good, and He only is entitled to do so. I do not think this is a safe principle to apply to these cases; but I do not think we are entitled to decide that it is heretical to hold that that may be the explanation-viz., that God was pleased, for wise reasons, in existing circumstances, to exercise His dispensing power, so that by reason of the dispensation that took place, a certain thing did not then take the character which now in our own day it does take under the perfect law of love, as Mr Smith says. I repeat, I do not think it a safe way of stating it; but I am not prepared to say that it is a mode that can be shut out authoritatively. I believe we could produce the evidence of divines of good repute pointing to that as at least an alternative explanation. I think, therefore, this concluding statement may be accepted as a bona fide statement on Mr Smith's part, not only in intention, but in fact. And looking at it in this point of view, when I look to the report of the majority of the Presbytery, I am obliged to say that I do not think in the line they indicate this case can ever be extricated with advantage to the Church, to Mr Smith, or to the cause of truth. I think it clear that the only course under that proposition will be, with a shorter or longer delay, to libel; and I have given you my reasons for thinking that a libel will break down, if it is proposed. I think further, that the report of the Presbytery is not quite so accurate and discriminating as I should like the Assembly to authorise the Presbytery to proceed upon in dealing with Mr Smith and calling for a retractation-if, indeed, it be constitutional to call for a retractation before he is served with a libel, and that libel is proved. (Hear, hear.) I think the reasons for that were indicated at the bar with substantial justice. In regard to the effect on Mr Smith's mind, I cannot see the possibility of a good result from following out the line taken by the majority of the Presbytery. My own belief is, that the case is one of theorising carelessly and hastily in a couple of sermons, and that it is a very different case from that of Wright of Borthwick. Mr Smith himself immediately brought the sermons before the Presbytery, and they speedily arrived at that explanation, which, I think, ought to extricate the case. I have the strongest impression that if the General Assembly could see to the bottom of Mr Smith's mind, they would find nothing more there than I have indicated in connexion with this concluding explanation. But supposing that I am believing too much on the ground of my own previous knowledge of Mr Smith, suppose it should be the mind of the Assembly that there is a tendency in Mr Smith's mind leading him unconsciously in a wrong direction. If that is to be so, it lies in the future, and your business is to take such a course now as will enable you to deal with that most effectually, if ever it comes. And I not only pray God, but I do express my personal confidence that it will not come. If it does, you ought to take that course which will enable you to deal with Mr Smith so that all men will say that you have taken

action not hurriedly, not doubtfully, and not dividedly. That last consideration ought not to regulate our decision, but it may have some weight I mean, that if you can meet the substantial justice of the case you should do so with the undivided strength of the Assembly. The only other thing I have to say is, that I think it necessary in my motion to take notice of the characteristics of this case in so far as it is marked by what I have ventured to call-without intentional discourtesy to Mr Smith-blundering in connexion with his theorising on the subject. For on the second point we find marks of inconsiderate statement, quite as prominent as those I pointed out in connexion with the first. You have the argument from the rule of "an eye for an eye," that from the defects and lower attainments of Old Testament believers, that from the things permitted under the theocracy, that from the first commandment in connexion with the unity and the trinity in Godhead, that from the fifth commandment, that from the seventh, and that from the assertion that the Decalogue was not given to Adam, which certainly appears to me to be the strangest quibbling. All these have a common character of irrelevancy and inconsiderateness which give a peculiar colour to the whole case, and I do not think we can dispose of it properly, unless we take serious notice of these peculiarities. My motion is as follows:

"The General Assembly sustain the complaint, reverse the sentence of the Presbytery of Glasgow complained against, and-First, find that the two sermons of Mr Smith brought before the Presbytery contain statements with respect to the moral law and Old Testament which are at variance with the Confession of Faith and the teaching of Scripture. The General Assembly accordingly confirm the finding of the Presbytery of Glasgow, at their meeting on 12th September last, disapproving and censuring the said sermons. But in respect that the statements submitted by Mr Smith in explanation, specially that laid before the Presbytery on 19th November 1866, warrant the General Assembly in holding that Mr Smith's views are in substantial accordance with the teaching of the Confession of Faith, and that he disclaims the contrary doctrine which various passages in the sermons have been found by the Presbytery and the Assembly to convey-they find it unnecessary to take further judicial action in this case. Second, having regard to the importance of the doctrines set forth in our Confession with respect to the perfection and authority of the moral law as revealed in the Old Testament, and especially as summed up and set forth in the Decalogue-and also with respect to the Old Testament Scriptures as constituting, along with the New, not only an inspired record of God's revelation, but the authoritative rule of faith and manners-the General Assembly feel called upon to express their sense of the serious character of the errors which the statements in the sermons convey, although Mr Smith disclaims the intention of teaching these errors. Further, they have observed with pain and regret indications on the part of Mr Smith of his not having sufficiently considered the responsibility that attaches to the publication in the pulpit of theories on the important topics referred to-theories which bear the marks of having been hastily assumed, and which, even on Mr Smith's own showing, were incompletely thought out in their bearings and consequences, were supported by statements speedily withdrawn as erroneous, and requiring most serious modification in order to make them even seem consistent with the views which Mr Smith declares that he all along entertained.