LIST OF PRINCIPAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean Established by General Assembly resolution 2992 (XXVII), Dec. 15, 1972, and subsequently enlarged by resolution 3260 B (XXIX), Dec. 9, 1974. Met in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3468 (XXX), Dec. 11, 1975, holding eight meetings between May 10 and September 17, 1976. Chairman : Sri Lanka (Amerasinghe); Vice-Chairman: Indonesia. Members: Australia, Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, United Rep. of Tanzania, and Zambia. Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament Established by General Assembly resolution 3484 B (XXX), Dec. 12, 1975. Held 19 meetings in 1976: organizational session, Jan. 26-29; substantive sessions, June 14-24 and Sept. 7-10. Chairman: Sweden (Thorsson). Participation: Open to all U.N. members. Working Group of Whole: 11 meetings between June 16-24, 1976. Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference Established by General Assembly resolution 3183 (XXVIII), Dec. 18, 1973; extended by resolution 3469 (XXX), Dec. 11, 1975. Held eight meetings, Mar. 1-July 14, 1976. Chairman: Iran (Hoveyda). Members: 40 non-nuclearweapon states appointed by President of the General Assembly: Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombiɛ, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zambia. Working Group: Established by Ad Hoc Committee, June 26, 1974. Members: Burundi, Egypt, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Mexico, Peru, Poland, and Spain. Held 29 meetings, Mar. 10-July 12, 1976. Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events Established by the CCD at its 714th plenary meeting, July 22, 1976. Met Aug. 2-6, 1976. Participants: Scientific experts and representatives from 12 states members of CCD (Canada, Egypt, FRG, India, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Nigeria, Romania, Sweden, U.K., and U.S.) and 5 other states (Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Norway). Chairman: Sweden (Ericsson). Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Nineteenth session, June 21-July 2, 1976. Chairman: Austria (Jankowitsch). Legal Subcommittee, 15th session, May 3-28, 1976. Chairman: Poland (Wyzner). Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, 13th session, Mar 22-Apr. 7, 1976. Chairman: Australia (Carver). See footnotes at end of article. Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 1969- (formerly Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament) Announced at the United Nations, Dec. 13, 1961, and endorsed by General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI), Dec. 20, 1961. Name changed from Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament to Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Aug. 26, 1969. Twenty-ninth session, Feb. 17-Apr. 22, 1976; 30th session, June 22-Sept. 3, 1976. Membership: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, FRG,' France,' GDR,1 Hungary', India, Iran, Italy, Japan', Mexico, Mongolia1, Morocco', Netherlands,1 Nigeria, Pakistan', Peru, Poland, Romania, Sweden, U.K., U.S., USSR, Yugoslavia,1 and Zaire.' Permanent Co-Chairmen: U.S. and Soviet representatives. Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Convened by the International Committee of the Red Cross. First session: Sept. 24-Oct. 18, 1975, in Lucerne. Second session: 12 plenary meetings, Jan. 28-Feb. 26, 1976, in Lugano. Participants: Experts appointed by governments of 43 states. Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe First stage: Foreign Ministers of 35 European nations, July 3-7, 1973, in Helsinki. Second stage: Meetings held in 1973, 1974, and 1975 in Geneva. Participants: 35 nations, including Western and Eastern European countries, U.S., and Canada. Final summit meeting, July 30-Aug. 1, 1975, in Helsinki. Did not meet in 1976. Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts Held under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3500 (XXX), Dec. 15, 1975. Third session: Apr. 21-June 11, 1976, in Geneva. Participants: Delegations from 106 states. Disarmament Commission, 1952 Established by General Assembly resolution 502 (VI), Jan. 11, 1952. Since 1959 the Commission has comprised all U.N. members. It has not met since 1965. Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets Established by General Assembly resolution 3463 (XXX), Dec. 11, 1975. Held three sessions in 1976: Mar. 22-26, June 28-July 9, Aug. 30-Sept. 7. Chairman : Peru (Encinas). Participants: Experts from FRG, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Sweden, U.K., U.S., Yugoslavia. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 1956– Established by Statute of Oct. 26, 1956. Membership: 109 nations as of Mar. 1976. Twentieth session of General Conference: Rio de Janeiro, Sept. 21-28, 1976. International Symposium on Management of Radioactive Wastes from the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Sponsored jointly by IAEA and NEA, Vienna, Mar. 22–26, 1976. Participants: 354 participants from 32 countries and 5 international organizations. See footnotes at end of article. Negotiations on Mutual Reductions of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe (MBFR) Preparatory talks held in 1973 in Vienna. Negotiations began in Oct. 1973, continuing to present. Three rounds of talks held in 1976: Jan. 30-Apr. 9, May 17July 21, Sept. 30-Dec. 17. Regular participants: NATO-Belgium, Canada, FRG, Luxembourg, Netherlands, U.K., and U.S.; Warsaw pact-Czechoslovakia, GDR, Poland, and USSR. Special status participants: Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Romania, and Turkey. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Between the United States and the Soviet Union (SALT) Announced July 1, 1968. First phase: Nov. 1969-May 1972. Second phase began in Nov. 1972. Three sessions held in 1976: Jan. 28-May 6; June 2-July 30, Sept. 21-Nov. 20. U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). Established Dec. 21, 1972. Met twice in 1973, twice in 1974, and three times in 1975 (Sessions (I-VII). Session VIII: Mar. 29-May 5, 1976. Session IX: Sept. 27Oct. 28, 1976. United Nations General Assembly Thirty-first regular session, Sept. 21, 1976-Sept. 17, 1977. Plenary meetings, Sept. 21-Dec. 22, 1976. Total membership: 145 members. United States-Soviet Consultations on Chemical Weapons Prohibition Meetings held in accordance with a U.S.-USSR agreement, July 3, 1974. Met Aug. 16-27, 1976, in Geneva. Working Group on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques Established by the CCD to consider modifications of the identical texts of a draft convention on environmental modification for hostile purposes submitted by the US and USSR on Aug. 21, 1975. Held 29 meetings during July 2-Sept. 1, 1976; submitted modified draft convention to CCD, Sept. 2, 1976.* Press Conference Remarks of Secretary of State Kissinger: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [Extracts], January 14, 19761 The United States holds the view that the essence of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, if it is to proceed toward a genuine easing of tensions, is that neither side will seek to obtain unilateral advantage vis-a-vis the other, that restraint will govern our respective policies, and that nothing will be done that could escalate tense situations into confrontation between our two countries. It is the U.S. view that these principles of mutual relations are not simply a matter of abstract good will. They are at the very heart of how two responsible great powers must conduct their relations in the nuclear era. It must be clear that when one great power attempts to obtain a special position of influence based on military intervention and irrespective of original motives, the other power will sooner or later act to offset this advantage. But this will inevitably lead to a chain of action and reaction typical of other historic eras in which great powers maneuvered for advantage only to find themselves sooner or later embroiled in major crises and, indeed, in open conflict. It is precisely this pattern that must be broken if a lasting easing of tensions is to be achieved. Whatever justification in real or alleged requests for assistance the Soviet Union may consider to have had in intervening and in actively supporting the totally unwarranted Cuban introduction of an expeditionary force into Angola, the fact remains that there has never been any historic Soviet or Russian interest in that part of the world. It is precisely because the United States is prepared to accept principles of restraint for itself that it considers the Soviet move in Angola as running counter to the crucial principles of avoidance of unilateral advantage and scrupulous concern for the interests of others which we have jointly enunciated. The United States considers such actions incompatible with a genuine relaxation of tensions. We believe that this is a wholly unnecessary setback to the constructive trends in U.S.-Soviet relations which we cannot believe is ultimately in the Soviet or the world interest. The question arises whether, in the light of Angola and its implications for Soviet-American relations, it is consistent with our policy to go to Moscow and to negotiate on SALT. There are two points that need to be made in this context. 1 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 2, 1976, pp. 125-128, 128-129, 130-131, 1 First, we have never considered the limitation of strategic arms as a favor we grant to the Soviet Union, to be turned on and off according to the ebb and flow of our relations. It is clear that the continuation of an unrestrained strategic arms race will lead to neither a strategic nor a political advantage. If this race continues, it will have profound consequences for the well-being of all of humanity. Limitation of strategic arms is therefore a permanent and global problem that cannot be subordinated to the day-to-day changes in Soviet-American relations. At the same time, it must be understood on both sides that if tensions increase over a period of time, the general relationship will deteriorate, and therefore the SALT negotiations will also be affected. Second, we must consider the long-term consequences of a failure of the SALT negotiations. If the interim agreement lapses, the Soviets will be free of several severe restraints. They can add heavy ICBM's without restrictions. They can build more submarines without dismantling old ICBM's. There will be no equal ceiling of 2,400. The immediate impact would be that the numerical gap frozen in SALT One, and equalized in Vladivostok, would again become a factor, facing us with the choice of either large expenditures in a strategically and politically unproductive area or a perceived inequality with its political implications.2 Of course we will not negotiate any agreement that does not achieve strategic equality for the United States and that we cannot defend as being in the national interest. Nor does it mean that Angola or similar situations will, if continued, not impinge on SALT as well as the general relationship. But it does mean that the general objective of a more orderly and stable nuclear relationship is in the interests of the United States and in the interests of the world and cannot be easily abandoned. This is why the President has decided that I should go to Moscow to negotiate on SALT, and we expect that the talks will be conducted in the same spirit by the Soviet side. U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND ANGOLA Q. Mr. Secretary, does the fact that you are going to Moscow now mean that you have forwarded a new proposal to the Kremlin on SALT? Secretary Kissinger: We have not yet forwarded a new proposal to Moscow on SALT, but we expect to do so before I go there, within the next day or two. Q. Mr. Secretary, what is standing in the way of a compromise that would point the way to a treaty at this point? Secretary Kissinger: The obstacle to an agreement results primarily from issues that could not be considered fully at Vladivostok because For the text of the SALT One agreements, see Documents on Disarmament, 1972, pp. 197 ff. |