While the Canadian government recognizes the legitimate energy requirements of its trading partners, it is determined to do everything within its power to avoid contributing to nuclear weapons proliferation. It is for this reason that the Government of Canada has unilaterally decided to strengthen further Canada's safeguards requirements. As in the past we are prepared to accept the commercial consequences of being clearly ahead of other suppliers. This is the price we are prepared to pay to curb the threat to mankind of nuclear proliferation. We recognize that for this policy to be fully effective we must persuade other nuclear suppliers to adopt similar export policies. In discussions amongst suppliers we have urged that a collective decision be taken to restrict their nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon states to those which have ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty or otherwise accept full scope safeguards. We regret that to date it has not been possible to reach a collective decision to this effect. Canada, however, is determined to assume responsibility where it has the power to act, that is, with regard to Canada's own exports of nuclear equipment, technology and uranium. We are charting a course which we hope will serve as a compelling example for other nuclear suppliers. With this announcement I am calling on other nuclear exporters to review their own export policies, not in the light of commercial gain but in the interests of maintaining a safe and secure world. Interview of General Secretary Brezhnev by Joseph K. Smith [Extract], December 29, 19761 Question. What, in your opinion, are the most important steps the Soviet Union and the United States, working together, could undertake in 1977 in the interests of world peace and stronger SovietAmerican relations? Answer. I think that in this respect our states could do a great deal. Let me mention only the most important: We would like as soon as possible to finish work on a Soviet-American agreement limiting strategic armaments on the basis of the understanding achieved in Vladivostok in 1974.2 For our part we see no obstacles, past, present or future, to this goal that affects all mankind. This Soviet-American agreement would definitely be a very important step toward effective termination of the arms race and have a most direct bearing on the chief goal of our time-the prevention of nuclear war. And, on the other hand, delaying the agreement under conditions when still more terrible kinds and systems of weapons are being developed is fraught with the emergence of new threats to peace and international stability 1 Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XXVIII, no. 52 (Jan. 26, 1977), pp. 15-16: Tuss, Dec. 29, 1976; Pravda, Dec. 30. 1976. 2 Documents on Disarmament, 1974, pp. 746–747. and security. Judging from a recent statement by the newly elected US President James Carter, the American side also understands the urgency of this matter. I hope that this promises rapid success. I cannot refrain from saying that we in the Soviet Union are amazed by the position taken by certain circles in the West-both in the United States and in other NATO countries. They act as if nothing had occurred in recent years, as if nothing had changed and the world continues to exist in a state of "cold war." They trump up one noisy campaign after another about the supposedly growing "military threat" from the USSR, demanding ever greater military appropriations and pushing ahead with the arms race. We think that things should not go on in this way. Having achieved political detente, we also open the door for earnest discussion of the cardinal questions of arms limitation and disarmament. I would like to state it once again most unequivocally: The Soviet Union does not threaten anyone and does not intend to attack anyone. Let us not scare ourselves with mythical threats, but rather let us practically and constructively discuss the problems and possibilities that actually exist in this area. Continuing the arms race cannot be justified on grounds that limitation poses a risk to national security. Today a much greater risk to worldwide security lies in inaction, in allowing the arms race to continue unrestrained. We would very much like to see 1977 become a true turning point in the effort to stop the arms race. In that case it would unquestionably occupy a worthy place in history. Q. Would you welcome an opportunity to meet with the new American president at a mutually suitable location at a very early date in 1977? A. Experience, including experience in Soviet-American relations, demonstrates the usefulness and fruitfulness of meetings at the highest level, when each of the participants strives for constructive practical dialogue. Therefore, we favor continuing this practice. The time of the next regular Soviet-American meeting will be determined, naturally, by mutual agreement and depending upon progress in the appropriate matters. In conclusion, I would like to repeat what was said at the 25th Party Congress. Our country firmly intends to pursue a policy of further improvement of Soviet-American relations, for this corresponds to the interests of the American and Soviet people and also the interests of world peace.3 3 Ante, pp. 49-54. Press Conference Remarks of Secretary of State Kissinger: Strategic Arms News Conference Remarks by Secretary of State Kissinger: Strategic Page 1 7 Letter From Senator Pell to ACDA Director Iklé: Environmental Modification, January 23, 1976 . Statement by ACDA Assistant Director Davies to the Subcommittee on Statement by ACDA Director Iklé to the Senate Committee on Government Operations: Export Reorganization Act of 1976, January 30, 1976 14 Executive Order 11902 on Exports of Nuclear Materials and Equipment, 17 Interview of Secretary of State Kissinger: Détente and the Defense Budget [Extracts], February 2, 1976 . . 19 Address by Secretary of State Kissinger: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [Extract], February 3, 1976. Statement by Department of Defense Director of Defense Research and Statement by Secretary of State Kissinger to the Joint Committee on Statement by ACDA Director Iklé to the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Address by General Secretary Brezhnev Before the 25th Congress of the 49 Senate Resolution 399: Sense of the Senate on Strategic Arms Limitation and Cruise Missiles, February 25, 1976. Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Environmental Modification, March 4, 1976 . 56 955 Press Interview of Secretary of State Kissinger at Atlanta: Strategic Arms Page 61 62 71 74 Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of 78 Letter From ACDA Director Iklé to Senator Pell: Environmental Modification, March 17, 1976. . ACDA Responses to Questions by Senator Pell: Environmental Modification, March 17, 1976 . 100 Statement by the Argentine Representative (Berasategui) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Environmental Modification, March 18, 1976. . 103 ACDA Responses to Questions by Senator Glenn: Nuclear Exports and Testimony of Secretary of State Kissinger Before the Senate Committee on Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban, March 18, 1976. . . Statement by the British Representative (Allen) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Environmental Modification, March 18, 1976. . . . Address by Secretary of State Kissinger: Strategic Arms Limitation [Extract], March 22, 1976 Statement by ACDA Director Iklé to the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations: First Use of Nuclear Weapons, March 25, 1976 . . Statement by the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs of the Department of State (Vest) Before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations: First Use of Nuclear Weapons, March 25, 1976 .. Statement by the FRG Representative (Schlaich) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Environmental Modification, March 25, 1976. Statement by the Swedish Representative (Thorsson) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [Extracts], March 25, 1976 . . . . . Swedish Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: The Test Ban Issue [Extract], March 26, 1976. . . . Swedish Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Cooperative International Measures To Monitor a CTB, March 26, 1976. .. Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Environmental Modification, March 30, 1976. . 110 114 116 120 123 126 133 140 152 160 Page United States Statement on Negotiating an Agreement on Underground Statement by the Canadian Representative (Barton) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Environmental Modification, April 1, 1976. . Japanese Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee Press Conference Statement by the Netherlands Representative (De Vos) British Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee . . British Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on . . Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Environmental Modification, April 20, 1976 . . Canadian Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: The Verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban by Seismological Means, April 20, 1976. . . 166 167 168 172 177 182 184 186 192 200 205 211 221 225 237 240 United States Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Current Status of Research in Seismic Verification, April 20, 1976. 251 Statement by the British Expert (Fakley) at an Informal Meeting of the 265 |