I shall now put forward a few considerations and comments which will serve to explain and justify the above conclusions.

With regard to the first conclusion I would emphasize that, although we consider that the new text of article V prepared by the Working Group-particularly the addition which provides for the convening of an advisory committee of experts for the purposes indicated therein-represents an appreciable step forward,' that can in no way allow us to forget the very serious dangers involved in the provisions of article I of the identical drafts submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States of America in August 1975.5

In order to assess those dangers correctly, it should be remembered that the text of article I of the Soviet Union's original draft, reproduced in the annex to resolution 3264 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, read as follows:

Each of the Parties to this Convention undertakes not to develop meteorological, geophysical or any other scientific or technological means of influencing the environment, including the weather and climate, for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health, and, furthermore, never under any circumstances to resort to such means of influencing the environment and climate or to carry out preparations for their use."

Compared with this text, which is fully comprehensive in its prohibitions and categorical and unequivocal in its ideas, the text of article I which the super-Powers are now proposing to us is, by any reckoning, inadequate and ambiguous; so much is evident from the first paragraph, which reads as follows:

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread. long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to another State Party.

In order to make clear what we have called the "very serious dangers" of the foregoing provisions, we need only re-word them in a positive form which is equivalent from the legal point of view; the text would then read:

Each State Party to this Convention shall be entitled to use environmental modification techniques for military or other hostile purposes as the means of destruction, damage or injury to another State Party, provided that such techniques do not have widespread, long-lasting or severe effects.

The risks that would entail, not only from the legal but also from the practical point of view, can be appreciated even more if we take into account the explanations of the scope of the expression "environmental modification techniques" which are given in article II, to the effect that this expression would cover inter alia the deliberate manipulation of natural processes to cause earthquakes, tsunamis, cyclones of various types and tornadic storms, or changes in the state of the ozone layer or ionosphere or in ocean currents.

See post, pp. 577-588.

5 Documents on Disarmament, 1975, pp. 385–388.

6

Ibid., 1974, pp. 517-521. The res. is printed ibid., pp. 814-816.

It really seems to us extremely alarming that there can be any thought of legitimizing, in an international convention such monstrous actions as these, provided that they do not have "widespread, longlasting or severe effects", especially if it is borne in mind that in the assessment of such effects there will always, inevitably, be a large subjective element.

Furthermore it must be borne in mind that the effects of environmental warfare techniques which would be permitted because they would not be considered sufficiently "widespread" to matter would include, as the co-sponsoring super-Powers have already explained to us, those which might affect an area of less than "several hundred square kilometres", and that effects which would also be tolerated, as not falling within the "long-lasting" category under the Convention, would include those having a duration short of "several months or about a season".

The foregoing looks even graver when we consider that we are legislating on a subject-environmental modification for military purposes which is completely new. Because of that, any multilateral instrument adopted in the matter will constitute a precedent of incalculable consequences for the development of international law in a field of such momentous importance to the future of mankind.

For all the reasons I have just given, my delegation deems it essential, if we are to be able to consider the possibility of recommending to the General Assembly the draft Convention I have been speaking of, that the restrictive clause "having widespread long-lasting or severe effects" should be deleted. This would make the provisions of article I, paragraph 1—although far inferior to those of the original Soviet text which I read out a few moments ago-acceptable to us, since they would read as follows

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques as the means of destruction, damage or injury to another State Party.

Incidentally I would add that, although we do not regard this as indispensable, we would have preferred the last line of the paragraph to speak of "another State", as in paragraph 2, instead of "another State Party".

If it should unfortunately prove impossible to secure the consent of one or both of the super-Powers sponsoring the draft Convention to the change I have just proposed, the Mexican delegation will, much to its regret, be unable to support the draft. Furthermore, if the intention should be that the United Nations General Assembly should examine the draft Convention at its next session, my delegation would be compelled fully to reserve its freedom of position and action in the

matter.

Statement by the Brazilian Representative (Maciel) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Environmental Modification [Extract], August 26, 19761

As we near the closing day of this session of the CCD, I would like to make some brief comments on the main difficulties that have arisen during the negotiations on the draft Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

From the outset, as it will be certainly recalled, the Brazilian delegation was prepared to support the original draft Convention submitted by the Co-Chairmen.2 None the less, acting in a spirit of good will and compromise, we made all possible efforts in order to accommodate different views expressed in the Working Group. It was for the sake of flexibility that we accepted preambular paragraph 4 bis, although it takes account of a Declaration that has nothing to do with military or any other hostile uses of environmental modification techniques. Likewise, we agreed upon new language for article V and for article III, despite our belief that questions dealt with in the latter go far beyond the range of the draft Convention. Finally, it was also for the sake of conciliation that we accepted a proposal for withdrawal of the list of examples from article II. My delegation would have much preferred to retain this list because of its importance as a general guideline and illustration of the scope of the Convention.

This large measure of flexibility reflects our realistic acceptance of the fact that an agreement has to be a necessary compromise.

On the other hand, we cannot but share the views about article I expressed by many a delegation concerning the risks that questions of lesser importance and controversies falling outside the scope of this Convention could give rise to unnecessary friction and complaints. We are certain these risks would be even greater after new language had been agreed for articles III and V. For these reasons, my delegation has been fully supporting the original provisions of article I.

I would also like to reiterate the understanding of my Government that the scope of the first part of paragraph 2 of article III is restricted to the right of every State Party to have free access to technological and scientific information on environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes.

My country has been among those who deplore that efforts have been made to draft and approve conventions on collateral measures of disarmament, while the central issues of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, including, above all, nuclear disarmament, are left by the wayside. Nevertheless, we will

1CCD/PV.724, pp. 13–14.

2

For draft text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1975, pp. 385-388.

welcome the prohibition of military or other hostile uses of environmental modification techniques, as we have accepted other collateral measures such as the Bacteriological Weapons Convention. Partial measures certainly play a role in broadening the areas of understanding, so long as they are not discriminatory and so long as we do not lose sight of the fact that they are definitely not our main goal.

Speech by Senator Mondale to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco [Extract], August 30, 19761

2

Despite a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, a treaty curbing antiballistic missile systems,3 a 5-year agreement on offensive arms, a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and a convention to ban biological weapons," the arms race goes on.

5

The destructive potential of nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union is climbing beyond comprehension. In 1968, both sides together had about 2,600 nuclear strategic missile warheads. Today, the Soviet Union alone has more than that. And together both nations have about 12,000 plus thousands more of tactical nuclear weapons and bombs on each side.

Almost everywhere, the arsenals of conventional arms are growing at increasing rates. The world trade in arms has soared to $18 billion annually. World military spending is now $300 billion a year, while in a world of disease and suffering, public expenditures on health care are only half that. There is an alarming danger that the number of nuclear powers will increase to the point that the possibility of nuclear war changes from whether to when.

The unrestrained competition among nations to build more arms, to sell more weapons, to deploy more forces is senseless, wasteful but, above all, dangerous to our security. I would like to briefly outline the efforts that are needed to begin to catch up in the race to control strategic arms, conventional arms sales, and nuclear proliferation.

The irony is that in all probability even a good agreement based on Vladivostok will not put much of a dent in the arms race, because its guidelines are inherently limited.' They would leave forces on both sides at an extraordinarily high level; and worse, permit and even encourage continued growth in their destructive power.

Vladivostock would set a ceiling of 2,400 strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers and a subceiling of 1,320 strategic ballistic missiles with multiple independently targeted warheads (MIRVs). This

8 Ibid., 1972, pp. 133–138.

1 World Issues, Dec. 1976-Jan. 1977, pp. 22-23, 28. Reprinted with permission from World Issues, a publication of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, Calif.

'Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 291–293.

Ibid., 1972, pp. 197-201.

4 Ibid., pp. 202-204.

5 Ibid., 1968, pp. 461-465.

6 Ibid., 1972, pp. 133-138.

7 For the Vladivostok agreements, see ibid., 1974, pp. 746-747.

overall ceiling is above our level, and the MIRV missile ceiling is above the existing level for the Soviet Union and the United States. For the most part, it looks like both sides took their weapons programs, stapled them together and called the results a breakthrough. In fact, when President Ford came back from Vladivostok, he insisted that America would have an obligation to build up to the Vladivostok ceilings.8

Under such an agreement, half-a-dozen major strategic programs, involving tens of billions of dollars can go forward on both sides. Within the Vladivostok limits, both sides can greatly increase its deliverable weapons payload, and soon each will be able to rain upon the other more than 10,000 nuclear warheads.

If this strategic arms race goes on, anxiety, disappointment, and even anger, will increasingly dominate our relationship with the Soviet Union. In short, our goal of strategic stability will still elude us. Our hope for curbing the competition in new arms will fade. Defense budgets will soar. International tensions and risks of nuclear war will dramatically heighten. That is why Vladivostok, even if it is turned into a Treaty, can only be a first step. The most important strategic problems will remain.

We propose a two-track approach to these problems. On one track the U.S. should press for reductions and controls on new developments and deployments. We believe it is essential to press for mutual agreement to reduce the stockpiles of strategic nuclear arms-particularly the so-called first-strike weapons that undermine deterrence. Equally important, the U.S. should try to gain control over the introduction of new, destabilizing, and needless technological developments and explore the feasibility of retarding the strategic arms competition through mutual limits on the frequency and kinds of missile flight tests, and on the rate at which new weapons systems can be introduced and old ones improved.

These objectives will not be easy to achieve. The kinds of forces, the geography, and the types of technology are very different on each side. Nonetheless, we should make every effort to develop a schedule of reductions and a program of other limits that provide strategic stability and enhances rough equivalence.

To do this, we must put our best scientific brains back to work on the strategic arms control problem. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency needs a thorough and complete revitalization. The Soviet Union bears a major responsibility, too. Its leaders deprive their people with every costly new missile that is developed and deployed. They would suffer catastrophically, as we would, should the strategic arms race end in nuclear war.

Our arms program must be integrated with our arms control programs. We get foolish "bargaining chips" like the $6 billion spent on the useless and now inoperative ABM site in Grand Forks, North Dakota.

Ibid., p. 774.