lation, percutaneous, etc. The yardstick for the LD50 shall be mg/kg and each value shall contain two significant figures.

3. Any available data for animals used for experiments other than rodents shall be included for reference.

4. The form of the spectrum shall be that chosen by the CCD.

5. The research organization entrusted with work on the spectrum shall carry out its task of formulating the spectrum from a scientific standpoint.

6. On completing its work, the organization shall send the draft of the spectrum to the CCD, which will ask for the views of the Member States.

7. The CCD shall request the United Nations to provide the necessary funds.

Statement by the Japanese Representative (Ogiso) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, August 17, 19761

May I briefly explain the working paper on the "Draft of One Form of LD50 Spectrum" which my delegation has submitted (CCD/515).2 On 6 July, I made a statement on the question of banning chemical weapons. In that statement, I pointed out that toxicity has come to be recognized by many countries as being the primary criterion in delimiting CWAs for the ban, that, for the purpose of comparing the toxicity of different chemical substances, the lethal dose serves as a highly reliable index, and that its numerical value can be obtained for any chemical substance. Then I proceeded to suggest the formulation of a LD50 spectrum or a toxicity spectrum by using this numerical value, and to delimit the CWAS to be banned on that basis.3 At the informal meeting of experts held early in July, our expert explained the idea of the LD50 spectrum in a concrete manner. At a subsequent meeting, a request was made for a working paper containing further details. The working paper which my delegation submitted and is now before us further amplifies the aforementioned idea and suggests in an exhaustive manner how to formulate a LD50 spectrum, and is thus intended to respond to the request made at the informal meeting.

Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this paper explain respectively the need to formulate a LD50 spectrum and the reason for adopting toxic value as the index.

'In consideration of the fact that CWAs would be used mainly in the open, data obtained using other yardsticks, such as mg min/m3 (LCT50) or PPm should be included for reference.

Paragraph 3 refers to what the LD50 spectrum should contain. In this regard, I would add that, to make our meaning clearer, we have provided an example of the LD50 spectrum in appendix 1.

Paragraph 4 enumerates the criteria necessary for formulating a . LD50 spectrum. In formulating a complete LD50 spectrum, it will be necessary to amplify these criteria further and to draft the terms of reference. As a reference, we have shown in appendix 2 the terms of reference which my delegation has drafted on the basis of paragraph 4. The deliberations on the question of banning chemical weapons have entered into a new phase with the tabling on 12 August of the draft convention CCD/512 by the United Kingdom. My delegation hopes to comment on the United Kingdom draft convention at a future date, after carefully studying it.

On this question of banning chemical weapons, numerous documents have been submitted to this Committee, such as draft conventions submitted by socialist countries (CCD/361) and by my country (CCD/ 420), the memorandum submitted by the non-aligned countries (CCD/400), and numerous working papers. My delegation earnestly wishes that the tabling of the draft convention by the United Kingdom will spur the deliberations on banning chemical weapons at this Committee at the spring session of next year and that, in this context, the working paper which my delegation submitted will also serve a useful purpose.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Likhatchev) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Weapons of Mass Destruction, August 17, 19761

The Soviet delegation would like to concentrate in today's statement on the question of prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

The Soviet Union attaches exceptional importance to the solution of this major and urgent issue. The Soviet delegation is guided in this respect by the decision of the XXVth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union concerning the conclusion of an international agreement on the prohibition of the manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.2

When, at the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, it proposed the conclusion of such an agreement, the Soviet Union. had in mind that, given the current surging development of science

4 Ante, pp. 520-525.

5 Documents on Disarmament, 1972, pp. 120-124.

6 Ibid., 1974, pp. 99–106.

T Ibid., 1973. pp. 206–209.

1 CCD/PV.721, pp. 24-29. 2 Ante, p. 53.

and technology in a number of countries, there could emerge new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. We can be fairly confident in saying even now that in terms of their effectiveness they would be comparable with, and perhaps even surpass, current weapons of this type.3

None of this should be forgotten. Moreover, it is well known how difficult it is to remove a weapon from States' arsenals once it has been created, and, in consequence, how much more sensible, expedient and proper it is to put a stop to their emergence at an earlier stage. If we look at things from this viewpoint, it is obvious that effective measures to prohibit the manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction are urgently needed.

What is the essence of the Soviet proposal? We have suggested that States, and particularly the major Powers, should conclude an agreement, the basis of which would be an undertaking not to develop or manufacture weapons of this type. From the outset, the Soviet Union has emphasized the need to define just which categories of weapons should come under the ban, and it has declared its willingness to take part in a concrete discussion of this point during the appropriate negotiations. This Soviet proposal was upheld by an overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations, and, in accordance with a decision of the General Assembly, the matter has been passed on to our Committee for its consideration so that the Committee may proceed as rapidly as possible with the assistance of government experts, with the task of reaching agreement on the text of a suitable agreement.

We are fully aware that the question raised by the Soviet Union is an entirely new one, and not all States have sufficiently appreciated its significance and timeliness. It would seem that this might explain the fact that some States, and some military ones at that, abstained in the voting on the relevant resolution at the General Assembly.

The recent round of unofficial meetings of the Committee on Disarmament with the participation of technical experts showed that there has been an appreciable increase in the interest of States members of the Committee in considering the Soviet Union's proposal, as witnessed by the participation in those meetings of government experts from a substantial number of States. As you know, fifteen experts from eleven States members of the Committee took part in this phase of the Committee's work. In this connexion, we should like to draw particular attention to the fact that the States which at one time were extremely reserved in their attitude towards the Soviet Union's proposal changed their minds and took part in the consideration of this topic within the Committee on Disarmament, sending along their experts. We note this fact with satisfaction.

'For the Soviet proposal, see Documents on Disarmament, 1975, pp. 495, 799-804.

Previous meetings have shown that, although some delegations are still undecided about the Soviet proposal, a start has none the less been made on a businesslike and constructive discussion of the definition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

With a view to making this discussion businesslike and constructive, the Soviet Union has submitted a working paper (CCD/514),* which contains the views and suggestions of the Soviet side concerning the approach to the definition of these concepts, together with actual draft definitions. According to the definitions we are proposing. new types of weapons of mass destruction would include types of weapons based on qualitatively new principles of action, whose effectiveness may be comparable with or surpass that of traditional types of weapons of mass destruction.

We have also expressed the view that the term "qualitatively new principles of action" should be understood to mean new means of producing the effect, new targets, or a new kind of action or effect. A weapon of mass destruction should be considered as a new type of such weapons if it is new in respect of at least one of the three criteria I have mentioned. Naturally, the satisfaction of two or even all three criteria would make the determination even easier.

In our opinion, the classification criteria for new types of weapons of mass destruction are the means of producing the effect, i.e. the specific types of physical, chemical and biological action; the targets, which include man, the human environment, and man-made products; and the nature of the effect, leading to the mass annihilation of peoples and to other harmful effects on man, and also to the destruction and incapacitation of vitally important installations and networks.

We also cited new types of weapons of mass destruction by way of illustrating our approach to the definitions. Summing up the examples contained in the working paper and in the statements by Soviet and other experts, the following possible new types of weapons of mass destruction might be named: weapons of extermination by ionizing radiations, infrasonic, radio-frequency, genetic and biotic weapons, weapons operating on fuel-air mixture, weapons based on the partial transformation of atmospheric oxygen into ozone, and a few others. The Soviet delegation also submitted its considerations concerning the definition of new systems of weapons of mass destruction. We consider that, in addition to the systems which may be developed in future as a result of improved research and development on new types of weapons of mass destruction, new systems of weapons of mass destruction should also include systems of weapons which assume the quality of weapons of mass destruction as a result of the use of new technical elements in the strike or logistic components.

A determining feature of the transition from a traditional system of conventional weapons to a new system of weapons of mass destruction is the assumption by that system of a quality producing such ef

'Ante, pp. 538-541.

fects as mass annihilation of peoples and population, their degradation and extinction, and large-scale permanent (irreversible) and temporary loss of certain human abilities. The following have been cited as examples of new systems of weapons of mass destruction; missile, aircraft, artillery and other systems with trans-uranium (trans-plutonium) strike weapons; systems with ammunition equipped with radioactive substances; new missile, artillery and aircraft systems of mass destruction based on the use of fuel-air mixtures, and so on.

In this connexion, it should be noted that the draft agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons submitted by the Soviet side does not cover new variants of traditional systems of weapons developed on the basis of the modernization of existing systems or of other improvements not leading to qualitatively new principles of action of those systems.

It seems to us that the discussion which took place at the informal meetings testified on the whole to a general interest in the discussion of the question of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and showed that, in principle, the approaches to the definition of concepts were not disputed. The statements by some representatives and experts contained a number of remarks on the Soviet definitions and our approach in general. The Soviet delegation would like to dwell on a few highly pertinent comments by the representatives and experts of other countries.

A number of differing viewpoints and even differing conceptual approaches to the complex questions raised by the problem of prohibition were observable among the representatives and experts of the various countries. The fact that we submitted draft definitions does not mean that we would not be prepared to consider other points of view and proposals. On the contrary, we are ready to consider these questions constructively, with a view to working out a generally acceptable mode of definition.

Some of those who spoke pointed out that a number of the examples given of new types of weapons of mass destruction are covered by existing agreements or by agreements now being prepared. First of all, we should like to make it clear that in the Soviet document (CCD/ 514), which lists the classification criteria for such weapons, namely, the specific type of physical, chemical or biological action, the characteristics are given, not only of new types of weapons of mass destruction, but of all types. It is really impossible to imagine any different means of producing the effect. This document shows that the means of producing the effect may vary considerably, and this is quite right, as with the development of modern science and man's deepening knowledge of nature these means are constantly increasing in number. We are proposing these classification criteria so that, if a particular feature is new, it may be used for identifying new types of weapons of mass destruction.