ments at the United Nations. But they do not want to abandon the U. N.-they want us to work harder to make it what it was created to be-not a cockpit for controversy but an instrument for reconciling differences and resolving common problems.

And they want U. N. agencies to demonstrate the same commitment to excellence, impartiality and efficiency they are demanding of their own government.

We want to cooperate-not simply debate. A joint programwhether on nuclear energy or other global problems-is infinitely preferable to sustained and destructive polemics. Our desire for global cooperation is prompted by America's confidence in itself, in our capacity to engage in effective cooperation, and upon the moral imperative that as human beings we must help one another if any of us is to survive on this planet.

The nuclear age, which brings both sword and plowshare from the same source, demands unusual self-discipline of all nations. If we approach these problems with both humility and self-discipline, we may yet reconcile our twin goals of energy sufficiency and world order.

Address by ACDA Director Iklé Before the Conference on Nuclear Energy and World Order, May 13, 19761

You must be as impressed as I am by what the distinguished previous speakers have told us. This conference is particularly timely. We are on the verge of important choices: on the national scene, the elections; and on the international scene, the beginning of a new era— what I have called "the second nuclear era"-when nuclear technology is spreading from a very few nations to very many nations throughout the world.

Lately, a great deal has been said about the importance of truthfulness in the governing of democracy. I could not agree more. And I would go one step further. It is not only important that we be truthful in what we say to the people of this country-and other countries. It is just as important that we should not deceive ourselves that we not rely on comforting rhetoric to mask dangerous fallacies. So today, on this question of nuclear energy and world order, I feel obliged to make you uncomfortable-I have to warn you against some prevalent fallacies.

Fallacy Number One: Nuclear power offers the world a great boon of cheap, plentiful energy; therefore we must push all approaches to exploit it and accept the risk that it may be diverted to destructiva ends.

1ACDA press release 76-11. The conference, which was held in New York, was sponsored by the United Nations.

The truth is that nuclear power can be produced by many technical approaches. Some are benign, some dangerous; some are economically competitive, some wasteful; some are here-and-now, some conjectures. But the nuclear reactor technology that is leading today (the light water and heavy water reactors) by itself does not create an uncontrollable risk of diversion to the making of bombs. Today's reactor fuel— natural or low enriched uranium-cannot be used directly to produce nuclear weapons.

But technology that some wish to add on to these reactors and possible new types of reactors are far from benign. They may threaten the world order all out of proportion to their economic benefits.

Suppose, for example, we could invent a new type of nuclear reactor. Suppose the fuel for this reactor, if seized by a government or a wellequipped terrorist group, could-in a matter of weeks-be made into dozens of nuclear weapons. Should we push the development of this reactor?

Such a reactor has been invented. It is called the high temperature gas cooled reactor. It is fueled with highly enriched uranium, a material that can itself be used to make nuclear bombs. Fortunately, for arms control, this reactor has proved so far to be economically unattractive. But if it were attractive, how great would the economic benefits have to be for us to risk millions of lives?

The potential of the atom as a source of energy and its potential as a threat to world order are not balanced. With some technologies, the potential for catastrophe is deadly certain, the potential for economic benefits is not. Therefore our policies must recognize this tilt.

This is not to say that we should stop the peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy in its tracks. But, we must keep our priorities clear: we must guard against the destructive threat of the atom, even if this means a certain sacrifice of economic benefits.

Fallacy Number Two: The nuclear fuel cycle must be closed.

Many specialists assert that it is a waste to leave plutonium and unburned uranium in the spent reactor fuel. Instead, they argue, these materials must be separated from the spent fuel and recycled through reactors. This "closed cycle" sounds tidy and controlled-an "open cycle" seems to leave something dangling, be wasteful, and mess up the environment.

But the fissile materials recycled could replace at most about onethird of the fuel required, and far less in a rapidly growing nuclear power system. Hence, recycling would not bring independence from imported fuel. And on a worldwide scale, uranium needs would be only slightly lowered by recycling. As to the economics-at present the costs of separating plutonium for recycling would actually exceed the value of the plutonium as fuel.

So closing the fuel cycle is not guaranteed to save money. But it is guaranteed to accumulate thousands of pounds of plutonium at the reprocessing plants, in transit, and in storage as reload fuel. In each

of these stages, the plutonium is far more accessible for diversion to weapons manufacture than if it had been left in the spent fuel rods. This plutonium would be distributed throughout the world-enough material for hundreds and hundreds of atomic bombs.

In the future, new types of reactors such as the "breeder," may provide an economic justification for closing the fuel cycle. But the breeder is a distant and uncertain prospect. It will not come into widespread use until the 1990's, if then. Breeder fuel will be different from, and technically far more complex than today's fuels. The prospect of a breeder reactor twenty years hence is no excuse for attempting to close the cycle now with today's fuels.

A breeder reactor system would circulate within itself huge quantities of plutonium. We do not know if it would be possible to prevent the diversion of some of this material to weapons. At the very best, we would need to take extraordinary measures, perhaps through special installations for centralized use and control of plutonium.

But for the present, we are not obliged to live with large quantities of separated plutonium. The option to recycle spent fuel would not be permanently lost and it is relatively inexpensive to keep spent reactor fuel in temporary storage pending future developments. Before we take the plunge into a plutonium fuel economy, let us look very closely at the risks and our ability to control them.

Fallacy Number Three: The technologically advanced countries have an obligation to transfer nuclear technology to other nations—regardless of its potential for destruction.

There is no such obligation whatsoever, no international legal or moral commitment of this kind at all. The only international obligation to facilitate the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is the one written into the Nonproliferation Treaty (Art. IV. 2). But precisely, this treaty obligation underlines my point about the tilted choice between peaceful nuclear energy and world order. The undertaking to facilitate the transfer of this dangerous technology is not part of a technical assistance agreement, mind you, but is subordinate to an agreement "not in any way to assist" additional countries to acquire nuclear weapons. "Not in any way to assist" is the central and overriding obligation.

Moreover, there is no obligation to transfer nuclear technology when to do so would be uneconomic. Quite the opposite. The smallest power reactor on today's export market produces 600,000 kilowatts of electricity. This is larger than the entire power production of some nations and larger than the designed capacity of the power grids of many more nations. Nuclear reactors to generate power require large capital outlays; and poorer countries are, of course, facing notoriously strong competition for their short supplies of capital. In countries that can use only a few power reactors, the case for fuel enrichment 'Documents on Disarmament, 1968, pp. 461–465.

and reprocessing those stages that directly yield material usable for weapons-appears to be even weaker than the case for the reactors themselves.

Fallacy Number Four: We don't have to worry about the spread of nuclear technology and materials if they are under safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency.3

The most fundamental limitation of international safeguards is that they do not provide they are not intended to provide any physical control over nuclear materials. At their best, they provide warning that material has been diverted to an illicit purpose. These safeguards consist of accounting procedures to keep track of nuclear materials, with occasional international inspections to verify their location. The basic purpose is to deter the diversion of nuclear materials by posing a risk of detection and by providing a basis for international action against a violator. Safeguards are a burglar alarm, but not a lock.

Hence, timely warning is critical. "Timely" refers not to how soon a violation is discovered, but whether the warning allows enough time for an appropriate response. For if no prompt response can be mounted, then the deterrent value of the safeguards is undermined.

It is not widely understood that safeguards do not prevent a nation from having separated plutonium on hand-ready to be used for bombs. Therefore, if plutonium or highly enriched uranium are used as reactor fuels, a nation might produce a number of nuclear bombs well before the warning is sounded. What protection does this give to its neighboring countries?

Certainly, the International Atomic Energy Agency is one of the best organized, most technically competent international organizations existing today. But it must deal with problems of unprecedented technical complexity and political sensitivity, in a time of fast changing technology.

Moreover, it has a "split personality." One part of the Agency administers safeguards against the diversion of nuclear materials, while other parts promote nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Many nations that are members of the Agency, understandably, have more interest in nuclear assistance than in safeguards. The result: a limited number of safeguard inspectors rationing their time among a growing number of nuclear installations.

The Agency relies to a considerable extent on data supplied by the country under safeguards. When such self-accounting is independently verified, it may serve for the safeguarding of present-day power reactors. But what of the safeguarding of plutonium stockpiles? Is self-accounting, checked only by occasional inspections from outside, adequate for material that can be rapidly diverted to bombs? Moreover, the Agency is not empowered to inquire into unsafe

'Ibid., 1965, pp. 446-460.

guarded nuclear plants, and it is the declared policy of the Agency not to seek out possible clandestine nuclear plants.

In the long-term, more ambitious tasks might successfully be given to international organizations. But in the meantime we must be careful not to ignore the facts of life when we propose "international controls" over man's most destructive invention. How easily could these safeguards be circumvented? How can a multinational staff do the necessary "detective work"? How would intelligence about circumvention reach the Agency, and how could the Agency act on it? Let us face the real questions about international safeguards.

Fallacy Number Five: The refusal of the superpowers to reduce their vast nuclear arsenals is the reason why more and more countries seek the option of building their own nuclear bombs.

The Nonproliferation Treaty commits the superpowers to work towards nuclear disarmament, and obviously, the superpowers have a compelling interest of their own to move ahead with arms reductions. Already substantial progress has been made. In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to restrain their anti-ballistic missile systems, a technology which only they had the ability to develop. In 1974, these were further reduced." We are making progress toward limiting and reducing offensive strategic arsenals.

4

In truth, the motives of other countries to acquire nuclear arms have little to do with the size of the superpower arsenals. They arise for other reasons: fear of neighboring countries, regional competition in status, the lack of protection through alliances or low confidence in them, and a mistaken belief in the security conferred by unsophisticated nuclear forces.

What are some of the practical measures that can be taken to make nuclear energy compatible with world order? Let me tell you now some of the things the Ford Administration has done and is trying to do.

-This Administration recognizes the importance of our alliance commitments in restraining proliferation and has made efforts to strengthen them. There are now more than a dozen countries that could manufacture their own nuclear weapons, but have decided not to do so. A principal reason is that they feel adequately protected by our alliances. The message is clear: if U.S. commitments are allowed to erode, the fears of many nations will drive them to independent nuclear forces.

-The Ford Administration has tightened controls on American exports of dangerous nuclear materials and sensitive technology-a step long overdue. And what is even more important, we have developed new cooperation with other major suppliers of nuclear technology and have established new export standards.

-To improve the physical security of nuclear materials against theft and sabotage, we have proposed an international convention