and as President of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. (a) The Secretary of State is designated to receive from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission a copy of each export license application, each proposal by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to issue a general license for export, and each proposal by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for exemption from the requirement for a license, which may involve a determination, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, that the issuance of the license or exemption from the requirement for a license will, or will not, be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to the commmon defense and security.

(b) The Secretary of State shall ensure that a copy of each such application, proposed general license, or proposed exemption is received by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of the United States Energy Research and Development Administration, hereinafter referred to as the Administrator, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, hereinafter referred to as the Director, and the head of any other department or agency which may have an interest therein, in order to afford them the opportunity to express their views, if any, on whether the license should be issued or the exemption granted.

SEC. 2. Within thirty days of receipt of a copy of a license application, proposed general license, or proposed exemption, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator, the Director, and the head of any other agency or department to which such copy has been transmitted, shall each transmit to the Secretary of State his views, if any, on whether and under what conditions the license should be issued or the exemption granted.

SEC. 3. The Secretary of State shall, after the provisions of section 2 of this order have been complied with, transmit to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator, the Director, and the head of any other department or agency who has expressed his views thereon, a proposed position of the Executive branch as to whether the license should be issued or the exemption granted, including a proposed judgment as to whether issuance of the license or granting of the exemption will, or will not, be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security.

SEC. 4. If the heads of departments and agencies specified in section 2 of this order are unable to agree upon a position for the Executive branch, the Secretary of State shall refer the matter to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee of the National Security Council in order to obtain a decision. In the event the Under Secretaries Committee is unable to reach a decision, the Chairman of that Committee shall refer the matter to the President for his decision.

SEC. 5. The Secretary of State, after taking the actions required by this order, shall notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the

position of the Executive branch as to whether the license should be issued or the exemption granted, including the judgment of the Executive branch as to whether issuance of the license or granting of the exemption will, or will not, be inimical to or constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security. The Executive branch position shall be supported by relevant information and documentation as appropriate to the proceedings before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

GERALD R. FORD

Interview of Secretary of State Kissinger: Détente and the Defense Budget [Extracts], February 2, 19761

Dr. Ramo: This question is about détente with the Soviet Union. I think you will forgive anyone who suggests that it is a controversial subject in the United States. [Laughter.]

There are those who believe that we haven't gotten very much out of efforts at détente-and that moreover it is very dangerous to pursue such a policy.

Can you tell us what you think are the principal gains that we have gotten from pursuing détente and what you consider under reasonable, favorable, but realistic circumstances the maximum that you would hope the United States would get from pursuing such a policy-and if there are any alternatives to détente?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, you have to ask me what détente is.

Curiously-one of the curious aspects of the present situation is the mercurial change of the mood. When we came to Washington in 1969, there were hundreds of thousands of people in the street demonstrating for peace. For three years we were assailed monthly with the accusation that the government was too tough, it was reckless, risking the American future. Now, suddenly, three years later, the mood has changed; and the impression is created that the government is giving away needlessly concessions to the Soviet Union.

Let's get clear, first of all, what we are trying to do. We face a historic problem we did not create and which no American Administration can remove-which is the fact that after 60 years in power, through the evolution of technology and industry the Soviet Union has become a superpower. It has weapons that can reach every part of the globe, for the first time in Russian history. It has a navy that can traverse the seas, for the first time in Russian history. It has the largest land army in the world.

1

Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 1, 1976, pp. 268-269, 270-271. The Secretary was interviewed by a panel at a meeting in Los Angeles, Calif.

These are facts which we did not create, which no American policy can remove. It is an uncomfortable experience for Americans to deal with a country of roughly the same strength. We have never had to do this in our history.

Secondly, we face the fact that nuclear weapons are destructive in a way that is absolutely unprecedented in history. A war fought with nuclear weapons would kill hundreds of millions in a matter of days. If you think of the impact that the two World Wars have had on Europe, in which the casualties would be minor, really minor to what would occur in a nuclear war, you can see the responsibility that any American leader concerned with the future of this country must have. Therefore we have two problems. The first problem is to prevent the Soviet Union from using this growing power to achieve political gains. The second problem is to manage these relationships in a way that is different from the way it used to be, traditionally. Traditionally, when two countries of roughly equal magnitude competed with each other, a war was inevitable. Now a war must not happen; and therefore we must contain Soviet power and at the same time we must look for new international arrangements that go beyond power politics to a more cooperative international structure.

This is what we mean by the policy of détente.

And therefore, when you ask what is America getting out of it, what we intend to get out of it is an option for a more peaceful and saner and safer world. This cannot be measured every day.

Many of the things that people complain about are the inevitable result of the growth of Soviet power that I described. This newest of them could have been avoided by American action.

When the Soviet Union makes a move toward expansion, we resist, as we are trying to do in Angola-against public and congressional opposition as we did in Jordan in 1970 and as we did in Cuba in 1970 and as we did in 1973 during the Middle East crisis. But at the same time we are trying to build a more constructive relationship.

I do not see any unilateral advantage that the Soviet Union has gained from this. This is not a favor we do for the Soviet Union, and I do not know what the alternative is. I don't know whether the people want to go back to the confrontations of the Berlin crisis, whether a country that has just gone through Vietnam, Watergate, the intelligence investigations, and endless domestic turmoil wants to contrive crises in which its domestic structure will be tested. If the Soviet Union behaves aggressively, we will resist.

But I must say that whether this Administration brings it to a completion or not, some Administration must deal with the problem of peace. Because in a nuclear age, tough rhetoric unsupported with a vision of the future is just too dangerous.

Mr. Day: Mr. Secretary, after the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Schlesinger, left office one of his supporters very strongly argued that

the Ford Administration was not providing enough money in its budget for defense and not as much as Schlesinger and the Joint Chiefs wanted, and there was a whole argument raging on this. What-in your view of the responsibility for meeting the Soviet Union-what is your view of the general level of the American defense budget?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course we have one massive handicap in our defense budget. This is that we have to spend nearly 60 percent of our budget on personnel. The Soviet Union spends only about 30 percent, less than 30 percent, of their budget on personnel. So at comparable levels of expenditure, the Soviet Union can translate it much more effectively into useful military hardware.

The second problem is to determine what kinds of weapons are most useful for the purposes of foreign policy. Or to put it another way-what sorts of threats are they most likely to face? Now, it is my view that from the point of view of foreign policy, the threats we are most likely to face are in so-called "peripheral areas"-well, I don't want to list them, but certainly in the Middle East-and that America's capacity to intervene locally is of decisive or potentially decisive importance. Therefore, over the next 10 years, in my view, we have to strengthen our conventional forces.

I do not believe that in the field of strategic forces it is so easy to calculate what a decisive advantage is, and at the level of casualties that I have described earlier it is very complicated to believe that any responsible national leader would easily resort to strategic nuclear weapons. So this is why I believe that that area should be constrained by arms limitations negotiations.

Now, on the whole, our defense budgets, though large in absolute numbers, have been on the skimpy side in terms of our needs. I have generally agreed with Secretary Schlesinger about the order of magnitude of what was required. I might quibble about the distribution within this. And I support a substantial military establishment, especially in the field of conventional forces.

Address by Secretary of State Kissinger: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [Extract], February 3, 19761

There is one central fact that distinguishes our era from all previous historical periods: the existence of enormously destructive weapons that can span unlimited distances almost instantaneously. No part of the globe is beyond reach. No part of the globe would be spared the effects of a general nuclear exchange.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 23, 1976, pp. 206–209.

For centuries it was axiomatic that increases in military power could be translated into almost immediate political advantage. It is now clear that new increments of strategic weaponry do not automatically lead to either political or military gains. Yet, in the nature of things, if one side expands its strategic arsenal, the other side will inevitably match it. The race is maintained partly because a perceived inequality is considered by each side as politically unacceptable even though it has become difficult to define precisely what purely military purpose is served.

We thus face a paradox: At current and foreseeable levels of nuclear arms, it becomes increasingly dangerous to invoke them. In no crisis since 1962 have the strategic weapons of the two sides determined the outcome. Today these arsenals increasingly find their purpose primarily in matching and deterring the forces of the opponent. For under virtually no foreseeable circumstance could the United States or the Soviet Union-avoid 100 million dead in a nuclear exchange. Yet the race goes on because of the difficulty of finding a way to get off the treadmill.

This condition imposes a unique and heavy responsibility on the leaders of the two nuclear superpowers. Sustaining the nuclear competition requires endless invocation of theoretical scenarios of imminent or eventual nuclear attack. The attempt to hedge against all conceivable contingencies, no matter how fanciful, fuels political tensions and could well lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy. The fixation on potential strategic arms imbalances that is inherent in an unrestrained arms race diverts resources into strategically unproductive areas particularly away from forces for local defense, where shortfalls and imbalances could indeed be turned rapidly to our disadvantage. If no restraint is developed, the competition in strategic arms can have profound consequences for the future of international relations and indeed of civilization.

The United States therefore has sought and achieved since 1963 a series of arms control agreements which build some restraint into nuclear rivalry. There was a significant breakthrough to limit strategic weapons in 1972.2 If the 1974 Vladivostok accord leads to a new agreement, an even more important advance will have been made.3

Yet, at this critical juncture, the American people are subjected to an avalanche of charges that SALT is a surrender of American interests. There are assertions that the United States is falling behind in the strategic competition and that SALT has contributed to it. There are unsupportable charges that the Soviets have systematically violated the SALT agreements.

None of this is accurate. What are the facts?

First of all, American policy decisions in the 1960's set the level of our strategic forces for the 1970's. We then had the choice between

For the 1972 SALT agreements, see Documents on Disarmament, 1972, pp. 197 ff.