tion before reaching the age of twenty-five years and upon compliance with allrequirements of the naturalization laws with the following exceptions: (1) No declaration of intention and no certificate of arrival and no period of residence within the United States or in a State shall be required; (2) The petition may be filed in any court having naturalization jurisdiction, regardless of the residence of the petitioner ; (3) If there is attached to the petition at the time of filing a certificate from a naturalization examiner stating that the petitioner has appeared before him for examination, the petition may be heard at any time after filing; and (4) Proof that the petitioner was at the time his petition was filed and at the time of the final hearing thereon a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States, and that he intends to reside permanently in the United States shall be made by any means satisfactory to the naturalization court. This brings somewhat into question the effect of the Elg opinion by the Supreme Court recently. As you gentlemen undoubtedly know, the Supreme Court considered the case of a girl who had been born in the United States and who had gone abroad and returned, as to whether or not that person could be expatriated through the act of a parent, and, broadly speaking, they held that expatriation was personal and she could not be expatriated through the act of the parent. Mr. REES. That is only applied to the parents and not to the child. Mr. SHOEMAKER. Yes. Mr. REES. Of course, that child was a native-born citizen. Mr. SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir. Mr. FLOURNOY. Furthermore, that girl returned to the United States almost immediately after reaching the age of 21. Mr. REES. This says if she comes back after 25. Mr. SHOEMAKER. Before 25, that is correct. Mr. REES. The court will say, "You are a citizen"? Mr. FLOURNOY. What the court would hold about that girl who lived there for 4 or 5 years after reaching majority, of course, we do not know. The court laid stress on the fact that she returned here immediately after reaching her majority. Mr. REES. She had passed 21, had she not? Mr. FLOURNOY. Just a little. Mr. SHOEMAKER. I believe that that will need just perhaps a little revamping because it says "expatriated," but that is a detail and not a feature of it. I think the provision was well considered and it would be advisable to pass it. Mr. REES. All right. Mr. SHOEMAKER (reading): (b) No former citizen of the United States, expatriated through the expatriation of such person's parent or parents, shall be obliged to comply with the requirements of the immigration laws, if he has not acquired the nationality of another country by any affirmative act other than the expatriation of his parent or parents, and if he has come or shall come to the United States before reaching the age of twenty-five years. That is new law, you will understand. There is nothing in existing law with regard to it. Mr. REES. How does that apply? Tell us about that. Mr. SHOEMAKER. Well, let us take a child born-take the old Tobiassen case. The child was born in the United States. Her parents were born in either Norway or Sweden. Her parents went back to Norway or Sweden. We had a treaty with the country from which they came, which provided that if the parents remained there for 2 years it would be presumed that they had regained their Norwegian citizenship. After regaining the Norwegian citizenship, it was held that that applied also to the child, who was a minor, and so it was held by the Attorney General that the girl Ingrid Tobiassen, who had gone abroad, I think, at the age of 11 and came back at the age of 18, had lost her American citizenship. Mr. REES. Had to become naturalized? Mr. SHOEMAKER. Had to become naturalized. And we had cases of children born in the United States to parents who go to Canada and become naturalized there. The children have a birthright under the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution and those children might be recognized as Canadian citizens, while they are in Canada at least. And then those children have come back to the United States and we have held that, by reason of the Tobiassen opinion of the Attorney General, to which I have referred, that they lost their Canadian citizenship status and must comply with the immigration laws upon their return. Now since the rendition of the Elg opinion, we are confronted daily with the question of who is and who is not a citizen of the United States, and we have to determine it, and we are doing that very thing. This child, when it comes in, will not have to comply with the immigration laws. That was the purpose of that clause to which I have just referred. Mr. REES. Is this true or not? Are there not a good many folks who have gone to Canada and become citizens-I am thinking of some of them who went up there to take up land. Mr. SHOEMAKER. Yes. Mr. REES. Went up there with their families, who were born here, and now conditions are not so good as they were, and a number of those American-born citizens who became citizens of Canada, because of their parents becoming citizens, they want to return to the United States and become citizens here. Under the present law, they cannot do that. They have to come under the immigration law. Is that not right? Mr. SHOEMAKER. We have held that they lost their American citizenship up until the Elg opinion was handed down by the Supreme Court. Now, we are holding that if a child came here prior to the rendition of the Elg opinion but was a minor at that time, that that child is an American citizen. Mr. REES. You do? Mr. SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir. And there are quite some problems in connection with it. Mr. FLOURNOY. I would like to ask a question in that connection. Mr. REES. All right. Mr. FLOURNOY. Suppose the child remained there 2 years after reaching majority, just lived there 1 year beyond his majority, and then wants to come back here and there is no vote, that he has never voted, that the child had acted as a Canadian but had never taken advantage of his Canadian citizenship; and suppose in another case that a child under similar circumstances, being of the same age, had taken advantage of his citizenship and had voted as a Canadiando you make any difference? Mr. SHOEMAKER. We try to take these things into consideration and handle them on the individual circumstances in each case and apply not only the common sense rule so far as we can do that but apply the principles which have been laid down in the Elg opinion and by our solicitor as to what the solicitor would take into consideration and how he would regard that, and so far we have had no considerable difficulty. I can see a case, for instance, like Mr. Flournoy points out, where a child may not have returned within 2 years after reaching his majority, it might be for a period of 1 year and a month or 2 months after attaining the age of 21 years. If that child had manifested an intention to come back, for instance by trying to come into the United States, and had been turned down, we would not hold that he had lost his citizenship. So, after reaching the age of 21, if he had indicated an intention of returning to Canada and had not been there since infancy, and since not attaining his teens and so forth-▬▬ Mr. FLOURNOY. Would not the voting have a good deal to do with your decision on that question? Mr. SHOEMAKER. Not necessarily, because a person does not have to be a citizen to vote in many cases. Neither does a person have to be a citizen to do various things, such as for instance, to be a member of a bar in Canada, or to be a school teacher, or things of that kind. That does not necessarily follow, of course. It depends on the oath of allegiance which he takes in connection with the act which he performs. It is rather a difficult problem, I am frank to tell you, but I think we are working it out along sound lines, in accordance with the solicitor's opinion, and he has tried to consider nearly every kind of case that can come up. Mr. REES. This section would broaden it just a little, would it not? Mr. SHOEMAKER. Yes; it would broaden it. Mr. REES. Of course, what you are doing is following that court decision, but you are getting a little broader than that opinion, are you not, if you follow that opinion's most liberal interpretation? Mr. SHOEMAKER. This would be broader than that, because this would allow the child to come in up until the age of 25 years. Mr. REES. Just say he was born in the United States. Mr. SHOEMAKER. Yes. We would not necessarily permit that under our construction of the Elg opinion. Mr. REES. If this child had been born in the United States and had become a citizen of a foreign country, he could come in and claim citizenship in the United States? Mr. SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir. Mr. FLOURNOY. He would come in and be naturalized. Mr. REES. I should say he could come in and be naturalized. Mr. SHOEMAKER. He could come in and claim his citizenship, too, under certain circumstances, and he does it quite frequently. Mr. BUTLER. It is subject to court action, though. Mr. SHOEMAKER. It is subject to court action; oh, yes. Mr. REES. All right. Mr. SHOEMAKER (reading): (c) After his naturalization such person shall have the same citizenship status as if he had not been expatriated. That is self-explanatory and does not need any remarks from me. Mr. REES. Yes; 318? Mr. SHOEMAKER (reading): (a) A person who as a minor child lost citizenship of the United States through the cancellation of the parent's naturalization on grounds other than actual fraud or on the ground specified in the second paragraph of section 15 of the Act of June 29, 1906, as amended (34 Stat. 601, 40 Stat. 544; U. S. C. title 8, sec. 405), or who shall lose citizenship of the United States under subsection (c) of section 337 of this chapter, may, if such person resided in the United States at the time of such cancellation and if, within two years after such cancellation or within two years after the effective date of this section, such person files a petition for naturalization or such a petition is filed on such person's behalf by a parent or guardian if such person is under the age of 18 years, be naturalized upon compliance with all requirements of the naturalization laws with the exception that no declaration of intention shall be required and the required five-year period of residence in the United States need not be continuous. I may explain that by this: Section 15 of the act of June 29, 1906, provides, among other things, that the certificate of naturalization may be canceled for fraud or illegal procurement. This dismisses the fraud, because this clause dismisses the fraud. Illegal procurement, I think, in general may be construed to mean without warrant of law. In other words, an alien may go into a court and be naturalized who did not have a declaration of intention 2 years old. It might not be noted at the time of the hearing that the declaration was not more than 2 years or less than 7 years old, or he might not have the 5 years' residence, and that would have constituted an illegal procurement. It has been held generally that where a certificate of naturalization is canceled for fraud or illegal procurement, anyone, whether the person or one claiming under or through him loses all status. This clause is designed to give that child who perhaps may have lost his American citizenship the opportunity to become naturalized without the formality of filing the declaration of intention or having continuous residence, but he must submit himself to the court's decision. Mr. REES. It is just a case of where he had lost his citizenship, not by a fault of his own or through no fault of his own? Mr. SHOEMAKER. Yes. Take a case where an individual was naturalized in 1910, and 5 years after that naturalization the person went abroad, and the child remained in the United States. The child acquired citizenship through the act of the father. In 1940, say that the certificate is canceled, that would divest that child of his American citizenship status, despite the fact that he has been in the United States all of that time, and this would cure that. Mr. REES. All right. Mr. SHOEMAKER (reading): (b) Citizenship acquired under this section shall begin as of the date of the person's naturalization, except that in those cases where the person has resided continuously in the United States from the date of the cancellation of the parent's naturalization to the date of the person's naturalization under this section, the citizenship of such person shall relate back to the date of the parent's naturalization which has been canceled or to the date of such person's arrival in the United States for permanent residence if such date was subsequent to the date of naturalization of said parent. I think that is self-explanatory. Mr. REES. Yes; I think so. All right, let us quit right there. We will come back at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. (Whereupon at 12:40 p. m., the subcommittee adjourned.) TO REVISE AND CODIFY THE NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES INTO A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONALITY CODE WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1940 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Washington, D. C. The subcommittee met at 10 a. m., there being present Representatives Rees (acting chairman) and Rockefeller. There were also present Mr. R. W. Flournoy, assistant to the legal adviser, Department of State; Thomas B. Shoemaker, Deputy Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization; Mr. B. W. Butler, Department of Justice; and Mr. Edward J. Shaughnessy, Deputy Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization. STATEMENT OF THOMAS B. SHOEMAKER-Resumed Mr. REES. All right, Mr. Shoemaker. Mr. SHOEMAKER. I think we proceeded through section 318 at the conclusion last night. That is on page 20 of part 2. We start now with section 319: SEC. 319. A person not an alien enemy, who resided uninterruptedly within the United States during the period of five years next preceding July 1, 1920, and was on that date otherwise qualified to become a citizen of the United States, except that such person had not made a declaration of intention required by law and who during or prior to that time, because of misinformation regarding the citizenship status of such person, erroneously exercised the rights and performed the duties of a citizen of the United States in good faith, may file the petition for naturalization prescribed by law without making the preliminary declaration of intention, and upon satisfactory proof to the court that petitioner has so acted may be admitted as a citizen of the United States upon complying with the other requirements of the naturalization laws. That is substantially the same as existing law. It applies, of course, to cases where individuals have been under the erroneous impression that they were citizens and acted in good faith under misapprehension and suddenly find themselves without the status of American citizens, and it gives them the opportunity to become naturalized without filing the declaration of intention and waiting the period of 2 years thereafter before filing an application for so-called second papers. Mr. REES. That is practically a restatement of the 1932 law? Mr. SHOEMAKER. The act was first passed in 1910 and has been amended since then and has continued on the books with some variations since that time. Mr. REES. The question as to his misunderstanding or as to his notion that he was a citizen is determined by the court, I suppose. Mr. SHOEMAKER. Exactly. |