Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia

acquisition of nuclear Active Forces Tanks adversary Aggregate Ratio Aircraft Defense Spending all-out argues attack Author interview Bangladesh behavior Benazir Bhutto Bhutto billion Bomb China Chinese Cold War Combat Aircraft Defense Conflict Unending conventional aggression conventional conflict conventional military conventionally danger Delhi despite diplomatic DPRK facto nuclear period Forces Tanks Combat Ganguly Hagerty Ibid incentives India and Pakistan Indian government Indian leaders Indo-Pakistani conventional Indo-Pakistani relations instability Kargil conflict Kashmir dispute Kashmir insurgency launch Line of Control militarized disputes military capabilities Nawaz Sharif nonnuclear period North Korean nuclear capability nuclear deterrence nuclear escalation nuclear level nuclear proliferation nuclear weapons overt nuclear P. R. Chari Pakistan Army Pakistani leaders political proliferation's region result retaliation revisionist Sagan scholars Sharif Simla Agreement South Asia South Asian security Soviet Union stability/instability paradox subcontinent Tanks Combat Aircraft territorial preferences threat Total Active Forces United University Press Ussuri River violence weak Zhenbao Island