We ought not simply allow this coup to go by without clearly stating that we condemn the coup and that we want the sanctions to be in place until there are democratic institutions back, in fact, in Pakistan.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Gejdenson, would the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEJDENSON. I will be happy to yield.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. I am going to be looking at this as quickly as possible.

Perhaps some other Members will want to claim time at this point.

Mr. COOKSEY [presiding]. Who seeks recognition?

Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. I don't disagree with my colleague from Connecticut that we want to see democratic institutions reinstalled into Pakistan as quickly as possible, but as a practical matter it can't be done tomorrow. It is going to probably take a few months to organize a plebiscite or a referendum, and that is why I think the Chairman of the Subcommittee and I and others, when we talked about this, thought 6 months would be a reasonable period of time within which to demand, if you will, that Pakistan have a plebiscite or have a referendum on the government that is now in power, the military government.

Another thing I think we ought to consider is the very touchy situation that exists in that part of the world right now.

Pakistan and India have been at brink of war for a long time, and the first steps away from the brink of war took place after this military government took power just recently. This general has withdrawn the troops from the Kashmiri border up there, and he has also reached out to the Indian government to try to start a dialogue that will lead to a permanent peace at least what we hope to be a permanent peace.

I think right now for us to pass a resolution, being the only superpower in the world, so to speak, it would send a signal maybe to India and maybe to some of the adversaries of Pakistan, from inside as well as outside, that we want to see them out or overthrown immediately. That is why I thought a more reasonable resolution should be acceptable at this point. That is saying that we want them to do something within 6 months to restore a civil government, a democratically elected government, to power.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURTON. Yes, I will in just 1 second.

I think it would provide a feeling of stability in that region, because of the detente, if you will, between India and Pakistan at the present time. It would serve to put a little oil on the water while all of this is taking place.

So I would urge my colleagues to accept the recommendations of the Chairman of the Subcommittee because I think that language sends a very strong message, but it is not inflammatory to the degree that it might upset the balance of power over there. I will be happy to yield to my colleague.

Mr. GEJDENSON. I appreciate the gentleman's concerns.

I would say two things. One is, to the contrary of the gentleman's assessment that this might last 6 months, General Musharraf has

said that he is not putting down any kind of time line, so we don't know how long the military would maintain control.

I think, again, if we can just take ourselves out of this situation for one moment and think what message you want to send to all the countries that were once part of the Soviet Union that are having trouble with corruption-that are having problems in the court systems, that are having problems in their economy-do we want to tell them that the Congress of the United States thinks it is appropriate to have a coup to fix the system? I don't think so.

Mr. BURTON. If I can reclaim my time, let me just say that nothing in the resolution, as amended, by the Chairman of the Subcommittee condones or approves of the military government, that now exists or the way they took over.

What we tried to do, what the Chairman tried to do, was to make sure that while we were, in effect, demanding that there be a return to civil government, that it be done in such a way as to ensure the stability of the region, and I think this does this.

You are not going to be able to change the situation overnight. While the general over there may say he is not going to accept any time line, it certainly won't hurt for us to put one in the resolution. I think we do that with this resolution. I think it is one that will send a very strong signal, and it is something that is do-able.

You cannot force them to change that government overnight. Even if they were going to return to democracy, it is going to take time to set up the mechanism to do that. So I think 6 months is a reasonable length of time, and I think the Chairman's substitute is the right approach.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. COOKSEY. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Brown, is recognized.

Mr. BROWN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I rise in support of the Gejdenson Amendment, as co-author of the amendment. I think this Committee needs to, as my colleague from Connecticut said, send a strong and unequivocal message that the U.S. is not in the business of supporting military dictatorships. We don't do it in Burma. We don't do it in North Korea. We shouldn't do it in Pakistan.

No matter how unpopular he was, Prime Minister Sharif was elected by the people of Pakistan, and if General Musharraf is unhappy with his prime minister, he should have resigned his military commission and entered the political arena. That is the belief that people in this institution have. That is why the language in the Gejdenson Amendment should be adopted, the language restoring the language of the original bill.

I think Mr. Gejdenson's statement quoting General Musharraf that reaction was more mild than he expected tells us everything. If reaction is more mild than he expected and we continue that mild reaction from this Committee and from this Congress, from the floor of the House, then we are sending a message to potential dictators, to people that are thinking of launching coups against democratically elected governments, we are sending the message to them that, well, we won't object too much in this institution-other world leaders won't object too much if there is a coup.

Now, there is nowhere in the Pakistani constitution that I can see that says you give them 6 months before they need to restore democratic rule. If you give them 6 months, it helps them consolidate their military rule. Where are they as a nation? Where are they as a democracy?

Also, I might add, in the language of the amendment, under no circumstances should taxpayers in this country be asked to provide training and assistance to the same Pakistani military that just deposed its civilian-elected government.

I ask my colleagues to support the Gejdenson Amendment because it restores the original language, and it does, in fact, say that Americans condemn this kind of military action against a democratically elected government.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COOKSEY. The gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. I would like to be recognized in opposition to the Gejdenson Amendment, but perhaps we can find some common ground here.

Mr. COOKSEY. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BEREUTER. I believe there are only four subsections where there is a difference between the resolution reported from the Subcommittee and the gentleman's substitute.

The first two, the gentleman restores language, condemns instead of expresses concerns, expresses grave concern. This is a matter of degree, and I can understand the gentleman's point of view, and this is not worth arguing over as far as I am concerned. The gentleman may be right that it is appropriate to condemn.

But when you look at subsection 4. Mr. Gejdenson, your language calls for the immediate restoration of civilian, democratically elected government. You know that is not going to happen. There is no possibility for that to happen, even if the general would decide to walk away from the situation.

So what we did, I thought, was a reasonable kind of suggestion, where we can give them some room to come back as quickly as possible.

So we have rapid restoration, and I think, accepting a suggestion from Mr. Ackerman, we said including immediate release of a timetable for restoration of democracy and rule of law.

I think that is a reasonable approach. You know perfectly well that calling for immediate restoration is only rhetoric. It

cannot

Mr. GEJDENSON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BEREUTER. I would ask the gentleman to reconsider that, and I would move to the fourth point, but I would yield to the gentleman.

Mr. GEJDENSON. I am not sure it is rhetoric, but I am willing to try to work with the gentleman. Let's go to the fourth point and see what the package looks like.

Mr. BEREUTER. The fourth point the gentleman had already agreed to, but backing away from it because of perhaps a concern about the amendments that were made by this Member in Committee, with some suggestions from your side of the aisle. I believe that any time you cut-off IMET, you are hurting our interests, our

national interests. This is a very limited opportunity to try to have influence on their military. At times when we have made the mistake of cutting off IMET funds for a country, no matter how legitimate our concern was, we lost contact with a whole generation of military people, and we have oftentimes paid the price for that lack of contact.

So the gentleman, perhaps reluctantly, before we started the markup in the Subcommittee, I recall, agreed that he would be willing to drop the ending of IMET.

So if we could have the timetable, the rapid restoration and a restoration of IMET, I can understand how the gentleman might want to say condemn.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Well, the gentleman asks for a little too much. I mean, I would love to work something out with the gentleman and not take up everybody's time, but I think the timetable alone is not the answer here. I mean, I could put several timetables in place, and I guess at that point every timetable I put in place would keep me in the good stead of the gentleman from Nebraska. Mr. BEREUTER. I reclaim my time and would just say that the gentleman's language does not do anything except make us feel good and expresses our great concern because he asks for the immediate restoration. You know that is impossible.

Mr. GEJDENSON. If the gentleman would maybe suspend for a

moment

Mr. BEREUTER. I would yield to the gentleman.

Mr. GEJDENSON [continuing]. Allow some of the other Members to express themselves, maybe we can get counsel together and see if we can come up with some language. Frankly, I have been frustrated by the resistance to this proposal, but I am always trying to work something out with the Member from Nebraska, whom I have great respect for. So maybe the gentleman can suspend and the staffs can see if we can work something out.

Mr. BEREUTER. I yield to the gentleman from North Dakota. Did you ask me to yield or who was that? I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. ROTHMAN. I thank the gentleman.

I am trying to think of the appropriate analogy for the gentleman from Nebraska with regard to the immediate language versus the rapid restoration. It is as if somebody broke into your home and stole something from you and then fenced the goods. The question is: What do you ask of the person? Do you ask for a rapid return or the immediate return?

Now, obviously the person who fenced your stolen goods, after he stole them from your home, will not be able to immediately return it to you, but there is a certain power in demanding for immediate restoration of your own rights.

That is No. 1.

No. 2, if we are to be the fosterers, if that is the word, of democracy, the supporters of democracy throughout the world, we have to let our colleagues know that after 220 years of experience we have something to teach them. In particular, democracies will go through tough times, perhaps ruled by tyrants and corrupt Administrations, as has been the case in our beloved history here in America, but nonetheless, we have never sanctioned or approved

the overthrow of our government, other than by the peaceful transfer of power through an election. So I cannot see, while the gentleman makes a good point, that perhaps the immediate restoration is not possible. I think that it is, in fact, the appropriate language. The gentleman makes an interesting point with regard to IMET. Hopefully, you and the gentleman from Connecticut can work that out, but we need to send a clear message to all the fledgling democracies, and I say all of this with enormous regard and respect for the gentleman from Nebraska who I generally agree with.

Chairman GILMAN [presiding.] Mr. Bereuter's time has expired. Mr. Menendez.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As Mr. Gejdenson tries to work something out with Mr. Bereuter, I want to speak up for Mr. Gejdenson's substitute. The fact of the matter is that I think we run a great risk of sending a message throughout the world that it is OK to go ahead and have a military coup, and that we will sit here idly, as a country to which we have given so much military assistance and weapons, in essence uses that assistance to overthrow their own government, as well as to be potentially antagonistic to their neighbors.

It is impossible to believe that if, God forbid, tomorrow we here in the Congress are overtaken by a military coup that we would want the rest of the free world to remain silent while that, was taking place. It is impossible to believe that the simple condemnation of the overthrow of a democratically elected government, in violation of its own constitution, and the suspension of that constitution, and the dismissal of its national government is so objectionable, particularly given the grave concerns that we have for security and stability in South Asia. Mr. Chairman, can I have order, please? I can't hear myself.

Chairman GILMAN. The Committee will come to order, please, so the gentleman can be heard.

Mr. Menendez, have you completed your statement?

Mr. MENENDEZ. Let me just simply say that it seems to me we have a double standard being advocated here. We continuously speak out against military coups in all parts of the world, and we clearly should be saying that there will be no further military armament sales to a country that has defied all of its own constitutional standards, not to mention our own beliefs and what we promote throughout the world.

We should support Mr. Gejdenson's substitute, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Menendez.

Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I move the question.

Chairman GILMAN. That is out of order at the moment.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Then I would just like to speak then, if I could. Chairman GILMAN. We have two other speakers. Yes, Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I just would like to suggest that in terms of stability in the subcontinent and the relationship between India and Pakistan, it was the former prime minister who was the target of the coup who initiated cross-diplomacy, who initiated efforts in terms of a detente, if you will, a rapprochement between India and