they might be cut off from assistance in the event of a disturbance;

e. Staff exposed to risk of assault in open inmate populations should not carry institutional keys;

f. Emphasis should shift from reliance on mechanical hardware to the improvement of staff capabilities:

i. The maximum number of inmates to be observed simultaneously should be limited according to circumstances and the number of officers present;

ii. Rotation policies should permit correctional personnel to become acquainted with the inmates and inmate groups entrusted to their control and custody; and

iii. Closed-circuit television should be used selectively and should not be relied upon to replace direct supervision.

g. The controls to central locking systems should be located in a protected area, remote from densely populated sections of the institution; and

h. Where structural considerations permit, there should be secure outside entrances into every building, not available to inmates, to allow unrestricted observation of every point in the building except the cell interiors.

Commentary

Many disorders taking place in a correctional setting are specifically grievance-oriented. They are the outcome of inmate frustrations; these frustrations are the product of heightened expectations, which many authoritative studies have suggested are reasonable but which have been crushed by the harsh facts of reality. It is not necessary to enter into a discussion of correctional theory here. Instead, the widely publicized recommendations of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals Task Force on Corrections will be accepted as a yardstick. Attention is drawn to the urgent need for meeting those recommendations as a means of reducing the potential for disorder and extraordinary violence in correctional institutions. Particular attention is drawn to common precipitating factors, all of which are found to have far greater influence in the genesis and eruption of institutional disorder than does any concerted plan of agitation or ideological, organized resistance to authority. Study of actual situations suggests that a great many disorders are attributable to insufficient attention to one or more of these factors, and could have been prevented through greater sensitivity to the reasonable expectations of the inmate population. Although some inmate expectations have been raised above the level that the

system is currently capable of meeting, it is undeniable that many disorders have occurred as a result of institutions failing to measure up to those standards that the Task Force on Corrections considered minimally acceptable. This standard seeks to avert some of those disorder-provoking situations that are manifestly avoidable, rather than allowing a situation to deteriorate until it is necessary to undertake these remedial measures under the threat of violence.

It is strongly recommended that every institution develop procedures for the proper airing and correction of grievances. Such procedures serve not only as a safety valve to dissipate the forces that would otherwise build up into situations of violent conflict, but also as a useful educational device for resocializing the inmate and developing a reasoning and reasonable attitude. These devices should be seen not as weakening the authority of those to whose care, control, and custody the inmate is consigned, but rather as a proper, constructive part of the correction program. The inmate should be taught how to work in safeguarding his interests, in a constructive, verbal, and nonviolent way. The real prospect of improving his own environment must be held out to him in a way that he can understand and respect. Grievance procedures must be seen to work and to bring fair and acceptable results. The inmate must learn, through these means, that although instant gratification of every request is neither possible nor desirable, grievance procedures do take account of his legitimate expectations and provide for their satisfaction, where appropriate.

The recommendations of the standard are flexible and can be adapted to the needs of each particular system and institution. It is strongly urged that amicable, nonpartisan, staff/inmate collaboration be developed in the design and functioning of this grievance mechanism. Proper appeal procedures, implemented in a way that minimizes damage to human susceptibilities on sensitive issues, constitute a further tension-reducing device. An overlegalistic approach should be avoided; care should be taken to define and deal with the substance of the grievance, rather than to allow it to become lost in procedural technicalities. The secret of success in this area is the employment of competent, dedicated individuals who are able to exercise balanced, responsible judgment.

Ideally, new institutions should always be designed to serve the needs and philosophies of a particular correctional system, with special attention to the security and well-being of those obliged to live and work in them. Many older institutions, unfortunately, contain features that are hazardous, uncomfortable, and are inimical to the realization of the goals of the system. The well known and broadly accepted work of Oscar Newman on environmental

design as a deterrent to crime has particular application in the correctional field. Some institutions, by their very nature, are conducive to the outbreak of disorder among the inmates housed in them; unfortunate design features contribute to making the control and containment of a disorder very difficult. Economic conditions make the continued use of many of these institutions necessary. Wherever possible, steps should be taken to study, remove, and remedy those features that pose a particular threat to the maintenance of good security and inmate control-particularly those features that expose the staff to unnecessary risk. Special attention should be paid to those features that impede visibility or that might lead to correctional staff being cut off from aid, trapped, or taken hostage in the event of a disorder. Especially dangerous are those areas that oblige a single officer to move among a large number of freely circulating inmates without access to prompt and adequate staff assistance.

The development of effective personal and institutional alarm systems is recommended, particularly a system that is designed to alert staff members in any case where an officer may be attacked. The emphasis should always be upon relieving the inevitable tensions produced by close personal contact with a potentially hostile body of inmates, thus allowing the correctional staff to concentrate upon the positive aspects of their work with the inmate population rather than being preoccupied with their own physical security. Overreliance should not, however, be placed upon protective devices that induce a false sense of security or those that are of a threatening or provocative nature.

The highest degree of inmate/staff contact, consistent with available staffing patterns and the safety features of the institution, should be encouraged. It is important that the inmate regard the correctional officer, not as a remote, mechanical, unresponsive custodian, but rather as a figure of real authority to whom appeal can be made in case of need. To this end, it is suggested that the numbers of inmates assigned to an officer's personal supervision be limited by reference to the tasks the officer must undertake and by the physical setting. Post assignments

should take account of the need of correctional staff to become acquainted with the inmate population and its problems on a realistic, personal basis in order that the politics of the administration be properly implemented.

References

1. American Correctional Association. Riots and Disturbances in Correctional Institutions. Washington, D.C., 1970.

2. Benton, F. Warren and Robert Obenland. Prison and Jail Security. University of Illinois, 1973. 3. Goldfarb, Ronald L. and Linda R. Singer. Redressing Prisoner Grievances. 29 George Washington Law Review, 1971, p.176.

4. Goldfarb, Ronald L. and Linda R. Singer. After Conviction. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1973.

5. South Carolina Department of Corrrections. Inmate Grievance Procedures. Columbia, S.C., 1973.

6. Jeffery, C. Ray. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1971.

7. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals: Corrections. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973.

8. Newman, Oscar. Defensible Space. New York: Collier Books, 1973.

9. Moyer, Frederick and Edith Flynn. Correctional Environments. Urbana: University of Illinois Department of Architecture, 1971.

a. Wherever practical, the officer observing the incident should make a prompt report to his superior, who should alert the head of the institution, if necessary;

b. The officer on duty, with staff assistance as needed, and pursuant to the orders of the officerin-charge, should attempt to disperse inmate groups and regain control. Physical intervention should be avoided; officers should attempt to regain control without using weapons, but should tell the inmates what conduct is required of them and warn them if weapons are to be used; and c. The officer-in-charge should not summon standby correctional personnel and outside supportive agencies to the institution, but should alert them to be ready for duty if needed.

2. Early Phase of Tactical Response in Situations of Serious Disorder. A serious disorder is one in which a substantial number of inmates resist the authority of a correctional officer, erect physical barriers, and threaten violence if those barriers are

penetrated. Elements of the appropriate tactical response include:

a. The establishment of an emergency command post in the location designated as the center of operations. The commander should be predetermined by the institutional plan, but the location of the command post should be viewed as temporary. It should be close enough to the disorder to enable the commander to be informed of developments but sufficiently removed to insure safety if the disorder spreads. The commander should summon the necessary supportive agencies, as specified in the contingency plan.

b. Personnel should be immediately deployed to establish perimeter control and contain the disorder. Perimeter security guards against escape attempts and any form of external support for participating inmates. Containment of the disorder involves cordoning off, and barring access to or egress from, the area controlled by the inmates engaged in disorderly behavior, and securing areas inhabited by inmates who are not participating in the disorder. Direct confrontation with participating inmates should be avoided at this stage.

c. General deployment of personnel should commence. Marksmen and other special service personnel should be placed in position, with instructions not to use force without prior clearance unless it is absolutely necessary. Other correc

tional personnel should be deployed to act as observers, bringing back to the command post regular reports on the status of the disorder and the condition of the hostages and inmates. As specially trained personnel become available, they should replace those correctional officers who were at the scene of the incident initially. As officers are relieved, they should be withdrawn from the area of operations and held in reserve. Deployment of correctional personnel in the early stages should be limited to such personnel as the commander may deem necessary to contain the disorder. Each operating unit differentiated by function or location should be guided by its own predetermined supervisor. Unit supervisors should report regularly to the overall commander of operations.

d. Initial discussions between the persons in command and participating inmates for the restoration of order should preferably be conducted through an intermediary who has been trained in communication skills and crisis intervention. The intermediary should seek to be informed of inmate intentions, grievances, or demands, and should attempt to ascertain the emotional and physical condition of the inmates and any hostages.

3. Later Phase of Tactical Response in Situations of Serious Disorder. At this stage stabilization has taken place; the boundaries of the disorder have been set and the nature of the disorder has been determined.

Decisions made during this phase require that the emergency commander consult with negotiators, other specialists, civil authorities, institutional authorities, and agency directors. An assessment of the situation can be appropriately made at this time and an agreement arrived at concerning the tactical response that will be used. Tactical elements include:

a. Negotiation. Where the inmates have manifested a willingness to negotiate a return to order and an official decision has been made, after consultation, to enter into negotiations, the procedure outlined in Standard 8.5 for setting up a negotiation committee should be followed. In the event of an official commitment to negotiations, force should not be used unless a considerable risk of increased injury to hostages or inmates occurs. The decision not to conduct substantive negotiations, when followed by a period of relative calm, should be periodically reexamined.

b. Continued Discussions. In the event that the decision is taken not to negotiate on specific issues, tactical considerations may dictate that general discussions with inmates continue as a means of prolonging the incident to gain certain advantages.

c. Prolongation. Where there seems to be no

increased risk of either injury to hostages or property, or an escalation of violence among inmates, prolongation of the stabilized situation, without continuing discussions, should be considered as a tactical option in itself. The passage of time can also be considered a positive element in substantive or nonsubstantive discussions with inmates.

d. Nonlethal Force. Use of nonlethal force should be preceded by a warning, after due consideration of the full range of relatively harmless options. The type of nonlethal force chosen for use should be the type least likely to cause injury. Special attention should be given to the possibility of harm inherent in the use of chemical agents within enclosed areas, and to the possibility of injury to nonparticipating inmates. Medical facilities should be made available before the order to use force is given.

e. Lethal Force. Lethal force should only be ordered as the option of last resort-as the only alternative to the real risk of injury to hostages, or as a response to an escalation of inmate violence that is likely to result in death or injury to a person or persons. No force should be applied unless adequate provision has been made in advance for medical treatment and evacuation of the wounded.

4. Aftermath. There should be an immediate, official investigation of the disorder to determine, as objectively as possible, what caused it and what immediate steps should be taken to prevent a recurrence. In the light of these findings, there should be a reappraisal of the contingency plans; they should be modified where necessary. The danger of contagion elsewhere in the system should be assessed and appropriate steps should be taken to minimize this danger.

Commentary

The individual disorder contingency plan of each correctional institution should include a general outline of the tactics to be employed in regaining control of the institution. In implementing the plan, the emergency commander should pay particular attention to the sequence of the steps, rather than to the literal application of the recommendations. Generally, the model tactical sequence outlined in this standard describes these steps: early intervention, containment of the disorder, the establishment of a command post, negotiations or prolongation, the use of nonlethal force, and the use of lethal force as a last resort. Although some steps can be skipped, the recommended order should generally not be altered. The tactical plan should also deal, in some detail, with the aftermath of the incident.

The crucial factor in restoring institutional order is the rapid and judicious handling of disruptive incidents. Early intervention limits the escalation of an incident by reducing the time available for participating inmates to involve other inmates, to widen the area of the disorder, to take hostages, and to procure weapons. The danger that overreaction on the part of the officials will escalate the disorder must also be considered. The most trivial of incidents have precipitated large riots due to an overly punitive or dramatically overlarge official response in the early stages. Upon notification of an incident by the officer-on-duty, the officer-in-charge must weigh these considerations in determining the level of staff assistants to employ. Pursuant to the directions of the officer-in-charge, correctional officers should avoid physical intervention and the use of force in dispersing the group of inmates and regaining control. Wherever it is necessary to resort to force, officers should warn the involved inmates and should use the least amount of force consistent with the need to restore order.

If, in the judgment of the officer-in-charge, the incident may escalate, he should place all the onduty and off-duty correctional personnel and outside support agencies on call, as provided by the institutional contingency plan. The concentration of a large number of personnel at the incident scene increases the potential for overreaction and needless escalation. Although an early show of force is helpful in some cases, it can lead to unnecessary confrontation in other cases. This can be avoided without sacrificing preparedness if the individuals that might be needed are placed on call, but are stationed at a location removed from the immediate incident scene.

A situation is defined here as serious when it has progressed to the point where the inmates have erected physical barriers, beyond which the authorities may not penetrate without risk of harm. This is not an absolute precondition; for example, if a warden or other officers have been taken hostage, this might give the inmates enough control to make physical barriers unnecessary. Physical barriers are given as a turning point because they generally indicate a level of inmate organization, purpose, and time elapsed without official intervention which constitutes tangible evidence that officials have been denied authority over a part of the facility.

The first priority is the establishment of an emergency command post. The emergency commander, as designated in the contingency plan, should set up a center of operations and begin summoning the supportive personnel determined to be necessary. He should seek to insure perimeter security as quickly as possible because many prison disorders are escape-related-particularly where extremist organizations are concerned. Containment of the disorder is

important for the same reasons that early intervention is important; similar difficulties are involved in setting up boundaries. Areas of nonparticipation or those containing few inmates should be secured. As far as possible, direct confrontation with participating inmates should be avoided.

As better trained or specialist personnel become available-skilled marksmen, for example, or those trained in the use of special weapons and tactics— the officers-on-duty when the disorder began should be replaced in areas of potential confrontation. Deployment not believed necessary to the immediate containment of the disorder should be organized at secondary command posts-on call, but removed from the area. Because the commander must remain at the command post, personnel must be sent out to investigate and report any new developments; supervisors must be responsible for their individual units and must report back to the commander; and the commander must initiate any discussions with the participating inmates through an intermediary. This intermediary can be particularly useful if he or she is someone experienced and, preferably, specially trained in crisis intervention. The use of inexperienced or insensitive intermediaries can lead to unnecessary difficulties. For example, in the initial stages of the uprising at Attica, Superintendent Vincent Mancusi, by his own admission, prejudiced his future participation in negotiations by telling inmates to "Shut up and let one man tell the story." This injunction is understandable in the heat of the moment, but it had unfortunate consequences and served only to aggravate the conflict.

By this stage, the commander will have assembled all support personnel, deployed specially-trained personnel in their proper positions, and informed himself as fully as possible of the facts of the situation. The disorder will have stabilized, the participants should have been identified, and the physical boundaries of the disorder set. Decisions made during this phase are crucial and require the fullest consultation on the part of the commander with local civil authorities, departmental executives, conflictmediators, and others-as provided by the contingency plan. Though consensus is difficult to achieve, it should be sought on the course of action to be taken. The official response to serious prison disorder is normally viewed in terms of either force or restraint. A policy of restraint is strongly recommended, because experience shows that such a policy significantly reduces the likelihood of harm to inmates and hostages. The argument that the use of force can promote the safety of hostages has not been verified by the best evidence. This evidence shows that hostages have rarely been killed by inmates, even where the authorities have resorted to force to restore order. In those cases where force has been