communicating with incident participants) in joint operations;

b. Delineation of tasks that are the exclusive responsibility of police or of private security;

c. Specification of circumstances in which police intervention will be delayed or withheld on request; and

d. Provisions for cooperative investigative followup and postoperational review.

Commentary

About half the manpower devoted to direct anticrime efforts in the United States is organized through nonpolice agencies-the bulk of them private, for-profit firms offering protective services or divisions of corporations and governmental agencies organized to provide security. No comprehensive law enforcement planning effort can afford to ignore this extensive and various-private security establishment. In particular, however, planning for prevention and control of extraordinary violence must take it into account. To a considerable degree, the organizations and persons most likely to need the protective supervision of some element of the private security establishment are those who are at the greatest risk as potential targets of terrorism and quasi-terrorism.

The limits on the authority of private security personnel prevent full cooperation between private security agencies and official police. They do not bar close cooperation, particularly in prevention and in early-phase emergency operations-or effective information exchange.

Scope and Limits of Police Service to Private
Security

This standard recommends that, so far as police provision of advisory and informational services to private security is concerned, the scope of those services should be as great as the resources of the police agency permit. The general briefings, special briefings, and individualized consultations recommended here are only examples of the sorts of police services that can substantially upgrade private security's capacity to prevent serious law enforcement problems from arising.

In suggesting that police services be limited to private security forces that either are actively engaged in the protection of high-risk targets or are performing training for others who are (or will be) so engaged, this standard attempts to accomplish two ends. First, to suggest a limit that, if observed, would work to conserve police time and resources; second, to propose a general rule by which the needto-know of private security agencies seeking informa

tion from police could be evaluated. Some of the material figuring in police counseling to private security firms will inevitably be of a sensitive character, in that it reveals details of police tactical plans involving extraordinary violence. And although redisclosure by or through private security forces is not viewed as a particular risk, the only practical way to avoid redisclosure is to limit disclosure in the first instance. Thus, a clear, nondiscriminatory standard for determining which private security personnel will receive police aid is required.

Regardless of the qualifications of the private security organizations in question, however, some forms of information relating to extraordinary violence should not be shared with them by police. The prime example is raw intelligence data, which—as suggested in Standard 6.4 above-should ideally never be regularly disclosed outside the official law enforcement community. Private security forces' needs for information derived from police intelligence records cannot be denied. On occasion any limitation will complicate police/private security disclosure summaries. Such summaries must contain relevant details, exclude irrelevant ones, and protect the identities of sources and possible suspects alike.

Scope and Limit of Private Security Force Cooperation With Police

In order to assure that needed cooperation from private security forces is forthcoming, police must limit their requests for cooperation to what is believed truly necessary for effective official prevention and control of extraordinary violence. To tax private crime prevention personnel with excessive and unreasonable demands on their time and manpower is to risk causing a breakdown of private-official relations.

The forms of cooperation itemized in this standard, however, should be regarded as among the most critical-and as highly desirable-elements of even a limited program of cooperation. In Standard 6.11, the importance of uniform and complete threat reporting for both the immediate and long term effectiveness of police operations has already been stressed. Here, it should be noted that assuring such reporting should be urged on private security forces by police, as a part of their responsibility in cooperation against extraordinary violence.

This standard's stress on private security force cooperation in making details concerning high-risk targets available to police is potentially more controversial. Obviously, this recommendation touches on sensitive issues of privacy and private sector autonomy. It should be emphasized, however, that the purposes for which such information should be sought by police-and provided by private security forces are limited ones. It is neither feasible nor

desirable that police assume direct responsibility for nonemergency preventive security protection of persons or places (other than public officials and public buildings), except on specific request. In emergencies, however, police response will be simplified if background data on the target are immediately available. This standard does not propose an official usurpation of nonofficial roles. Rather, it recommends provisions that will permit the making of transitions from private control to official control of incident management under emergency conditions.

Joint Planning by Police and Private Security Forces

When emergencies involving threats or acts of extraordinary violence occur, speed is of the essence in the law enforcement response. Equally important, however, is the need for a clear definition of the nature of response. Because in practice-although not in law-police agencies and private security forces have overlapping responsibilities for early-stage emergency operations involving attacks on certain targets, a degree of coordinated planning is necessary to assure that response in incidents relating to those targets will be rapid and well defined.

This standard recommends that in joint planning exercises with private security forces, police agencies attempt to reach advance agreements of three principal kinds. The first relates to onscene cooperation. Because a number of functions that must be performed in emergencies can be undertaken by either police or private security forces, advance agreement as to how they will be divided will reduce delay and confusion in the actual organization of response efforts. Actual decisions on division of responsibility will depend, of course, on such considerations as relative levels of manpower and relative degrees of expertise. Thus, it may be appropriate for police to plan with one corporation to leave building evacuation to private security personnel in the event of an emergency during company hours and to assume that responsibility directly in joint planning with another firm.

The second variety of joint planning for emergency operations relates to situations in which active police intervention will be withheld or delayed. If some restraints on official intervention may be desirable, the value of advance planning is clear; without it, the advantages of leaving control in private hands will be lost through inadvertence. Although the number of such situations will be relatively few-limited, in the main, to incidents of ransom kidnapings or of threats accompanied by demands addressed to nonlaw-enforcement organizations-their importance in the overall scheme of extraordinary violence will be considerable.

Decisions on the discretion of withholding official

intervention will be hard ones, and not every department will choose to acknowledge that situations may exist in which-as a regular matter-private efforts at resolution should be allowed to run their course before official efforts begin. Much will also depend on the energy with which private security organizations urge a policy of selective nonintervention on police in joint planning, if they urge it at all. Finally, however, such decisions are too critical to be made ad hoc, and are thus appropriate subjects for advance official/private sector consultation.

The third and final kind of understanding on emergency interaction for which joint planning should strive relates to the class of incident in which private security forces should recede in favor of official law enforcement, insofar as direct operational roles are concerned. Because this represents the largest class of incident of extraordinary violence, special care should be taken in noting and defining it in advance. In fact, private security forces have no direct role to play in the direction or onscene tactical management of response to the bulk of quasi-terroristic incidents, true terrorism, or mass disorders. And it is well that this limitation on the extent of police/private security force cooperation be mutually understood.

This is not to say, however, that private security forces do not have important-and even criticalfunctions in the management of incidents involving many high-risk targets. Their contributions of detailed knowledge of the target and of general expertise can be invaluable to police in designing and carrying out responsive actions. Thus, although one focus of joint private-official planning for incidents that will be managed by police should be the clear definition of the limits on private security forces' direct participation, the other should be the provision of mechanisms to promote private security forces' effectiveness in an advisory capacity.

Planning should detail not only the sorts of information and opinion that will be sought by police or offered by private security forces in emergencies; it should also detail where and how responsible private security officials will be housed at an incident scene and how-in concrete terms-they will communicate with responsible police officials. Only if such details are specified in advance, can the goal of effective onscene cooperation be expected to be realized.

In addition to joint planning for three classes of emergency situations, this standard also recommends planning for police/private security forces, cooperation in followup investigations and in postoperational reviews of emergency responses. The importance of the former species of cooperation should be evident: for many crimes of extraordinary violence, and particularly those involving (or believed to involve) insiders or other persons related to a

target, private security forces will be as well or better prepared than official law enforcement agencies to perform some investigative tasks. The latter form of cooperation, however, is also critical. Whether a response operation involving a privately protected target has been carried out by police alone, private security alone, or both in cooperation, the views of both bear on the measurement of that operation's success. Interests and objectives differ, and what represents a successful operation for police (in terms of measures such as apprehension of participants and preservation of life) may appear less successful to private security (in terms of such measures as the minimization of disruptions of routine).

This is not to say, of course, that joint postoperational review will assure that future operations satisfy the interests of both the official and nonofficial communities. To the contrary, it is inevitable both that differences will persist and that-where they persist-the official formulation of tactics and objectives will prevail. To some degree, however, differences can be reduced, harmonized, or at least clarified. And because the postoperational review of one incident is, in effect, the first stage in the planning for response to the next, a commitment to joint planning implies a commitment to joint review.

References

1. Rayne, Fred. "Executive Protection and Terrorism." Top Security, Vol. 1, October 1975, p. 220. 2. Private Police in the United States: Findings and Recommendations. Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corp., 1971.

3. Davis, John. "Preparedness in the Vertical City." Security Management, March 1974, p. 14. 4. "How to Defuse Plant Bombings." Factory, May 1971, p. 30.

5. "Is Your Business a Bomb Target?" Industry Week, June 27, 1970, p. 40.

6. "What To Do When the Kidnapper Strikes." Burroughs Clearing House, July 1972, p. 25.

7. Also, see references to Standard 6.9, above.

Standard 6.24

Relations With Mental Health Professions

Incidents of extraordinary violence are situations of extreme stress for participants and police alike. Understanding of psychopathic motivation and psychopathically motivated behavior is necessary to the design of a comprehensive program of official response. Police agencies should cooperate closely with mental health professionals (and representatives of related disciplines) in attempts to upgrade police capacity to deal with extraordinary violence and in attempts to manage particular incidents of such violence. In particular, the following forms of cooperation are desirable:

1. Mental Health Professional Participation in Police Training. Wherever possible, mental health professionals should be sought to participate in curriculum design and in the actual delivery of training units. Such participation should be sought to increase police understanding of the psychology of incident participants and to improve the ability of individual officers to understand their own reactions to extraordinary violence. Among the subject matters as to which such participation should be sought are:

a. Community relations;

b. Threat evaluation;

c. Negotiation techniques; and

d. Specialized duty assignments (including special operations).

2. Mental Health Professional Participation in Threat Analysis. In assembling multidisciplinary

teams to assess the plausibility and seriousness of warnings of impending extarordinary violence, police should routinely include persons with expertise in the field of offender psychology. Wherever possible, particular mental health professionals should be sought to participate in police threat analysis efforts on a continuing, as-needed basis.

3. Mental Health Professional Participation in Negotiations With Suspects. Although police negotiators should generally be in direct control of discussions with suspected participants in extraordinary violence, mental health professionals should be sought

to:

a. Advise police negotiators on the conduct of negotiations;

b. Intervene directly in negotiations, where such intervention is regarded as likely to prove useful by both police negotiators and potential intervenors; and

c. Assist in the postoperational review of negotiations.

4. Mental Health Professional Participation in the Overall Postoperational Review Process. Wherever possible, the evaluative followup of police operations in response to extraordinary violence should include the taking of opinion from mental health professionals on such topics as:

a. The lessons in offender psychology to be derived from the incident;

b. The success or failure of psychological evaluation techniques and psychological management techniques employed; and

c. Police performance under stress.

5. Mental Health Professional Participation in Research on Extraordinary Violence as a Police Problem. Police should encourage qualified members of the mental health professions to undertake independent, objective inquiries into the issues of offender psychology and police response posed by extraordinary violence. Wherever possible, police records should be made available to qualified researchers.

Commentary

The place of psychopathy among the root causes of extraordinary violence is not precisely understood. Nor have the various techniques of psychological incident management available to police progressed far beyond the experimental stage. It is apparent, however, that all persons involved in incidents of extraordinary violence-whether as participants or as elements of the police response contingent-are under intense and immediate psychological pressure and thus may act in ways that do not correspond to rational expectations. It is equally apparent that without expert assistance police cannot be expected to incorporate a sophisticated understanding of psychological factors-relating to suspects' behavior and to their own-into their planning or tactical decisionmaking for extraordinary violence.

This standard, therefore, recommends that police undertake a special effort to secure the active cooperation of specialized mental health professionals in the design, execution, and evaluation of law enforcement responses to threats and acts of extraordinary violence. In particular, it recommends cooperation in improving police performance in the functions of training, threat analysis, negotiations, postoperational review-and in the field of research on extraordinary violence. Because the police functions for which participation by mental health professionals is recommended are discussed in detail elsewhere in this Report, the discussion that follows will treat particular issues of police/mental health professional cooperation that cut across functional lines.

Identification of Sources of Mental Health Professional Assistance

Most mental health professionals would be the first to stress that general experience in delivering therapeutic services to patients is an insufficient. qualification for advising or training police on psychological aspects of extraordinary violence. In seeking expert assistance, therefore, police must look

to mental health professionals with specialized experience in the areas of offender psychology, police operations, or both.

Two approaches to the search for such specialized expertise exist. The first, which is most practical for medium and large-sized police agencies, is to develop a continuing relationship between a department and one or more interested mental health professionals. Whether employed full time or part time, such departmental psychologists can develop expertise in police matters on the job; at the time of their retention, it is more important that they be willing to develop understanding of the police perspective on crime and law enforcement than that they possess any extensive experience.

The second approach, which is practical for departments of all sizes, is to seek the assistance of outside mental health professionals on an as-needed basis. Whether such services are donated or contracted for, however, the relatively slight continuing link between the department receiving them and the professionals delivering them has important implications. It should not be assumed that outside professionals who work with law enforcement on an occasional basis only will develop significant insight into police problems and viewpoints in the course of their assignments. Rather, police should seek occasional, as-needed services from professionals whose academic training or experience gives them special qualifications.

The two approaches just outlined are not, of course, mutually exclusive. A smaller department, for example, can obtain some of the benefits of each by arranging for a single mental health professional (although preferably one with some experience) to advise it on an irregular basis. Nor is the second approach necessarily more difficult to follow successfully. In many jurisdictions, and particularly in those where academic institutions or larger medical facilities are located, mental health professionals with specialized backgrounds in offender psychology or law enforcement will often be available.

Nevertheless, the first approach has much to recommend it. It is one that guarantees that the services of a mental health professional will be available when and where police require them and that promotes the development of a real understanding of police problems by the professional who will deliver those services. Before rejecting this approach on resource grounds, a department should consider the functions, in addition to the delivery of services specifically related to extraordinary violence, that a full- or part-time departmental psychologist could perform. In the areas of recruiting and personnel selection, short-term therapy or counseling to department members, and overall operational planning, these functions may be relatively