The legislative history of Pub L 280 supports the conclusion that § 6 did not of its own force establish a state constitutional amendment requirement and did not preserve any such requirement that might be found in an Enabling Act. Pub L 280 was the first jurisdictional bill of general applicability ever to be enacted by Congress. It reflected congressional concern over law and order problems on Indian reservations and the financial burdens of continued federal jurisdictional responsibilities on Indian lands. Byron v Itasca County, 426 US 373, 48 L Ed 2d 710, 96 S Ct 2102. It was also, however, without question reflective of the general assimilationist policy followed by Congress from the early 1950's through the late 1960's.32 See HR Rep No. 848, 83d Cong, 1st Sess (1953). See also Hearings before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Interior & Insular Affairs Committee HR 459, HR 3235, and HR 3624, 82d Cong, 2d Sess (1952). The failure of Congress to write a tribal consent provision into the transfer provision applicable to option States as well as its failure to consult with the tribes during the final deliberations on Pub L 280 provide ample evidence of this.33

Indeed, the circumstances surrounding the passage of Pub L 280 in themselves fully bear out the State's general thesis that Pub L 280 was intended to facilitate, not to impede, the transfer of jurisdictional responsibility to the States. Pub L 280 originated in a series of individual bills introduced in the 83d Congress to transfer jurisdiction to the five willing States which eventually were covered in §§ 1 and 4. HR Rep No. 848, Cong, 1st Sess (1953). Those bills were consolidated into HR 1063, which was refered to the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs for consideration. Closed hearings on the bills were held before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs on June 29 and before the Committee on July 15, 1953. During the opening session on June 29, Committee Members,

35

32 That policy was formally announced in HR Con Res. 108, 67 Stat. B132, approved on July 27, 1953, the same day that Pub L 280 was passed by the House. 90 Cong Rec. 9968, 83d Cong, 1st Sess (1953). As stated in HR Con Res 108, the policy of Congress was "as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United States, to end their status as wards of the United States, and to grant them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship "This policy reflected a return to the philosophy of the General Allotment Act of 1887, ch 119, S 1, 24 Stat 388, as amended 25 USC § 331 (1970) [25 USCS § 331], popularly known as the Dawes Act, a philosophy which had been rejected with the passage of the Indian Organization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984.

In Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 US 373, 48 L Ed 2d 710, 96 S Ct 2102, the Court emphasized that Pub L 280 was not a termination measure and should not be construed as such. Our discussion here is not to the contrary. The parties agree that Pub L 280 reflected an assimilationist philosophy. That Congress intended to facilitate assimilation when it authorized a transfer of jurisdiction from the Federal Government to the States does not necessarily mean, however, that it intended in Pub L 280 to terminate tribal self-government. Indeed, the tribe has argued that even after the transfer tribal courts retain concurrent jurisdiction in areas in which they formerly shared jurisdiction with the Federal Government. This issue, however, is not within the scope of our order notng probable jurisdiction, see n 20, supra, and we do not decide it here.

33 These features of Pub L 280 have attracted extensive criticism. See generally Goldberg, supra, n 29. Indeed, the experience of the Yakima Nation is in itself sufficient to demonstrate why the Act has provoked so much criticism. In 1952. in connection with the introduction of bills that proposed a general jurisdictional transfer, see Hearings before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Interior & Insular Affairs Committee on HR 459, HR 3235, and HR 3624, 82d Cong, 2d Sess (1952) (hereinafter 1952 Hearings), a representative of the Yakimas testified that the Tribe was opposed to the extension of state jurisdiction on the Yakima Reservation. He stated:

"The Yakima Indians . . . feel that in the State Courts they will not be treated as well as they are in the Federal courts, because they believe that many of the citizens of the State are still prejudiced against the Indians.

"They are now under the Federal laws and have their own tribal laws, customs, and regulations. This system is working well and the Yakima Tribe believes that it should be continued and not changed at this time." 1952 Hearings, at 84-85.

In 1953, when the Indian Affairs Subcommittee of the House Committee on Indian Affairs considered the final version of Pub L 280, the Committee was again aware that the Yakima Nation opposed state jurisdiction. The House Report accompanying HR 1063 contains a letter from the Department of the Interior listing the Tribe as among those opposed to "bring subjected to State jurisdiction" and having a "tribal law-and-order organization that functions in a reasonably satisfactory manner." HR 848. 82d Cong. 1st Sess. 7 (1953). Had Washington been included among the mandatory States, it is thus quite possible that the Yakima Reservation would have been excepted.

34 Similar bills had been introduced in the 82d Congress, and in public hearings held on those the idea of a general transfer was discussed at length. See 1952 Hearings, supra, n 33. 35 See Unpublished Transcript of Hearings on HR 1063 before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on Interior & Insular Affairs. 83d Cong.. 1st Sess (June 29, 1953), and Unpublished Transcript of Hearings on HR 1063 before the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs 83d Cong., 1st Sess (July 15, 1953) (hereinafter cited as June 29 Hearings, and July 15 Hearings.) The transcripts of these hearings were first made available to this Court by the United States during the briefing of Tonas

counsel, and representatives of the Department of the Interior discussed various proposals designed to give HR 1063 general applicability. June 29 Hearings 1-16. It rapidly became clear that the Members favored a general bill. Ibid. At this point, Committee counsel noted that several States "have constitutional prohibitions against jurisdiction." Id., at 17. There followed some discussion of the manner in which these States should be treated. On July 16, a version of § 6 was proposed. July 15 Hearings 23. After further discussion of the disclaimer problem, the "notwithstanding" clause was added, id., at 27, and the language eventually enacted as § 6 was approved by the Committee that day. The speed and the context alone suggest that § 6 was designed to remove an obstacle to state jurisdiction, not to create one. And the discussion at the hearings, which in essence were mark-up sessions, makes this clear.38

While some Committee members apparently thought that §6 States, as a matter of state law, would have to amend their constitutions in order to remove the disclaimers found there," there is no indication that the Committee intended to impose any such requirement.

38

[9b, 10b] We conclude that § 6 of Public Law 280 does not require disclaimer States to amend their constitutions to make an effective acceptance of jurisdiction. We also conclude that any Enabling Act requirement of this nature was effectively repealed by § 6. If as a matter of state law a constitutional amendment is required, that procedure must-as a matter of state law-be followed. And if under state law as constitutional amendment is not required, disclaimer States must still take positive action before Public Law 280 jurisdiction can become effective. The Washington Supreme Court having determined that for purposes of the repeal of Art. XXVI of the Washington Constitution legislative action is sufficient, and appropriate state legislation having been enacted, it

39

ket v Washington, 411 US 451, 36 L Ed 2d 385, 93 S Ct 1941. They were again supplied in Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 US 373, 48 L Ed 2d 710, 96 S Ct 2102, and for this appeal have been reproduced in full in the Apellee's Appendix. These hearings, along with the House Report on HR 1063 as amended, HR Rep No. 848, 83d Cong. 1st Sess (1953) and the Senate Report, which is virtually identical, S Rep No. 699, 83d Cong, 1st Sess (1953), constitute the primary legislative materials on Pub L 280.

36 On July 15, Committee counsel presented an amendment which was eventually to become § 6. He explained the effect of the amendment as follows:

"[T]he legislation as acted upon by the committee would apply to only five states. The two additional section amendments would apply first to eight states having constitutional or organic law impediments and would grant the consent of the United States for them to remove such impediments and thus to acquire jurisdiction.

"The other amendment would apply to any other Indian states . . . who would acquire jurisdiction at such time as the legislative body affirmatively indicated their desire to so assume jurisdiction." July 15 Hearings, at 24. Immediately after the proposed § 6 was read to the subcommittee, the Chairman, Congressman D'Ewart, commented:

"I do not think we have to grant permission to a state to amend its own statutes. Id., at 25. Committee counsel replied:

"Mr. D'Ewart, I believe the reason for this is that in some instances it is spelled out both in the constitution and the statutory provisions as a result of the Act and it may be unnecessary, but by some state courts it may be interpreted as being necessary." Id., at 26. The version of § 6 read to the Committee members by counsel contained no reference to the Enabling Acts but merely granted consent for the States to remove existing impediments to the assertion of jurisdiction over Indians. It was suggested that in order effectively to authorize the States to modify their organic legislation the clause should be more specific. This suggestion resulted in the proposal of the "notwithstanding" clause. The following exchange then took place:

"[Committee counsel]: I believe that the clause 'notwithstanding any provisions of the Enabling Act' for such states might well be included. It would make clear that Congress was repealing the Enabling Act.

"[Congressman Dawson]: To give permission to amend their constitutions. "[Committee counsel]: I think that would help clarify the intent of the committee at the present time and of Congress if they favorably acted on the legislation." Id., at 27.

The next day, July 16, the Committee filed its report on the substitute bill. HR Rep. 848. 83d Cong, 1st Sess (1953). The report explains that $6 would

"give consent of the United States to those States presently having organic laws expressly disclaiming jurisdiction to acquire jurisdiction subsequent to enactment by amending or repealing such disclaimer laws.'

The Committee hearings thus make clear an intention to remove any federal barriers to the assumption of jurisdiction by Enabling Act States. They also make clear that that consent was not to effect an immediate transfer of jurisdiction.

37 See June 29 Hearings at 17; July 15 Hearings, at 24-28.

38 The House passed the bill without debate on July 25. 1953. 98 Cong Rec 9962-9963 (1953). In the Senate, the bill was referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. 99 Cong Rec 10065 (1953). That Committee held no hearings of its own, and it reported out the bill two days later without amendment. 99 Cong Rec 10217 (1953). The bill received only brief consideration on the Senate floor before it was passed on August 1, 1953, 99 Cong Rec 10783-10784 (1953).

30 The Tribe has intimated that the Washington Supreme Court's holding is incorrect. However, the procedure by which the disclaimer might be removed or repealed-Congress having given its consent-is as we have held a question of state law.

follows that the State of Washington has satisfied the procedural requirements of § 6.

IV

[2b] We turn to the question whether the State was authorized under Public Law 280 to assume only partial subject-matter and geographic jurisdiction over Indian reservations within the State."0

The argument that Public Law 280 does not permit this scheme of partial jurisdiction relies primarily upon the text of the federal law. The main contention of the Tribe and the United States is that partial jurisdiction, because not specifically authorized, must therefore be forbidden. In addition, they assert that the interplay between the provision of Public Law 280 demonstrates that § 6 States are required, if they assume any jurisdiction, to assume as much jurisdiction as was transferred to the mandatory States." Pointing out that 18 USC § 1151 [18 USCS § 1151] defines Indian country for purposes of federal jurisdiction as including an entire reservation notwithstanding "the issuance of any fee patent," they reason that when Congress in § 2 transferred to the mandatory States "criminal jurisdiction" over "offenses committed by or against Indians in Indian country," it meant that all parts of Indian country were to be covered. Similarly, they emphasize that civil jurisdiction of comparable scope was transferred to the mandatory States. They stress that in both §§ 2 and 4, the consequence of state assumption of jurisdiction is that the state "criminal laws" and "civil laws of general application" are henceforth to have the same force and effect within . . . Indian country as they have elsewhere in the State." Finally, the Tribe and the United States contend that the congressional purposes of eliminating the jurisdictional hiatus thought to exist on Indian reservations, of reducing the cost of the federal responsibility for jurisdiction on tribal lands, and of assimilating the Indian tribes into the general state population are disserved by the type of checkerboard arrangement permitted by Chapter 36. [15] We agree, however, with the State of Washington that statutory authorization for the state jurisdictional arrangement is to be found in the very words of $7. That provision permits option States to assume jurisdiction "in such manner" as the people of the State shall "by affirmative legislative action, obligate and bind the State to assumption thereof." Once the requirements of § 6 have been satisfied, the terms of § 7 appear to govern the scope of jurisdiction conferred upon disclaimer States. The phrase "in such manner" in § 7 means at least that any option State can condition the assumption of full jurisdiction on the consent of an affected tribe. And here Washington has done no more than refrain from exercising the full measure of allowable jurisdiction without consent of the tribe affected.

Section 6, as we have seen, was placed in the Act to eliminate possible organic law barriers to the assumption of jurisdiction by disclaimer States. The Tribe and the United States acknowledge that it is a procedural not a substantive section. The clause contains only one reference of relevance to the partial jurisdiction question. This is the phrase "assumption of civil or criminal jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this Act." As both parties recognize, this phrase necessarily leads to other "provisions" of the Act for clarification of the substantive scope of the jurisdictional grant. The first question then is which other "provisions" of the Act govern. The second is what constraints those "provisions" place on the jurisdictional arrangements made by option States.

40 Both parties find support for their positions on this issue in the legislative history of the amendments to Pub L 280 in Title IV of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. 82 Stat 73. The 1968 legislation provides that States that have not extended criminal or civil jurisdiction to Indian country can make future extensions only with the consent of the tribes affected. 25 USC §§ 1321(a), 1322(a) [25 USCS 81321(a). 1322(a)]. The amendments also provide explicitly for partial assumption of jurisdiction. Ibid. In addition, they authorize the United States to accept retrocessions of jurisdicton, full or partal, from the mandatory and the § 7 States. 25 USC § 1323 (a) [25 USCS § 1323(a)]. Section 7 itself was repealed with the proviso that the repeal was not intended to affect any cession made prior to the repeal. 25 USC § 1323(b) [25 TSCS § 1321 (b)]. Section 6 was re-enacted without change 25 USC § 1324 [25 USCS § 1324].

We do not rely on the 1968 legislation or its history, finding the latter equivocal, and mindful that the issues in this case are to be determined in accord with legislation enacted by Congress in 1953.

41 Since entire reservations were exempted from coverage in three of the mandatory States, the Tribe and the United States concede that the option States could probably assume jurisdiction on a reservation-by-reservation basis. The United States also concedes that the word "or" in § 7 might be construed to mean that option States need not extend both civil and criminal jurisdiction.

The Tribe and the United States argue as an initial matter that § 7 is not one of the "provisions" referred to by § 6. They rely in part upon the contrast between the phrase "assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction" in § 6 and the disjunctive phrase "criminal offenses or civil causes of action" in § 7. From this distinction between the "civil and criminal jurisdiction" language of § 6 and the optional language in § 7, we are asked to conclude that § 6 States must assume full jurisdiction in accord with the terms applicable to the mandatory States even though § 7 States are permitted more discretion. We are unable to accept this argument, not only because the statutory language does not fairly support it, but also because the legislative history is wholly to the contrary. It is clear from the Committee hearings that the States covered by § 6 were, except for the possible impediments contained in their organic laws, to be treated on precisely the same terms as option States.*2

Section 6, as we have seen, was essentially an afterthought designed to accomplish the limited purpose of removing any barrier to jurisdiction posed by state organic law disclaimers of jurisdiction over Indians. All option States were originally treated under the aegis of §.7. The record of the Committee hearings makes clear that the sole purpose of § 6 was to resolve the disclaimer problem." Indeed, to the extent that the Tribe and the United States suggest that disclaimer States stand on a different footing from all other option States, their argument makes no sense. It would ascribe to Congress an intent to require States that by force of organic law barriers may have had only a limited involvement with Indian country to establish the most intrusive presence possible on Indian reservations, if any at all, and at the same time an intent to allow States with different traditions to exercise more restraint in extending the coverage of their law.

The Tribe and the United States urge that even if, as we have concluded, all option States are ultimately governed by 87, the reference in that section to assumption of jurisdiction "as provided for in the Act" should be construed to mean that the automatic transfer provisions of §§ 2 and 4 must still apply. The argument would require a conclusion that the option States stand on the same footing as the mandatory States. This view is not persuasive. The mandatory States were consulted prior to the introduction of the single-state bills that were eventually to become Pub L 280. All had indicated their willingness to accept whatever jurisdiction Congress was prepared to transfer. This, however, was not the case with the option States. Few of those States had been consulted, and from the June 29 and July 15 hearings it is apparent that the drafters were primarily concerned with establishing a general transfer scheme that would facilitate, not impede, future action by other States willing to accept jurisdiction. It is clear that the all-or-nothing approach suggested by the Tribe would impede even the most responsible and sensitive jurisdictional arrangements designed by the States. To find that under Pub L 280 a State would not exercise partial jurisdiction, even if it were willing to extend full jurisdiction at tribal request, would be quite inconsistent with this basic history.

45

The language of § 7, which we have found applicable here, provides, we believe, surer guidance to the issue before us. The critical language in § 7 is the phrase permitting the assumption of jurisdiction "at such time and in such manner as the people of the State shall . . . obligate and bind the State to the assumption thereof." Whether or not "in such manner" is fully synonymous with "to such extent," the phrase is at least broad enough to authorize a State to condition the extention of full jurisdiction over an Indian reservation on the consent of the tribe affected.

The United States argues that a construction of Pub L 280 which permits selective extension of state jurisdiction allows a State to "pick and choose" only those subject-matter areas and geographical parts of reservations over which it would like to assume responsibility. Congress, we are told, passed Pub L 280 not as a measure to benefit the States but to reduce the economic burdens associated with federal jurisdiction on reservations, to respond to a perceived hiatus in law enforcement protections available to tribal Indians, and to achieve an orderly

See June 24 and July 15 Hearings, supra, n 35.

43 See ibid.

"See, e... July 15 Hearings, at 24.

The 1968 amendments, which re-enacted § 6 without change as 25 USC § 1324 [25 USCS 1324] but repealed § 7, 25 USC § 1323 (b) [25 USCS § 1324 (b)], and added substantive jurisdictional provisions covering "any state.' see 25 USC §§ 1321, 1322 [25 USCS 1321, 1322], suggest that in the future the scope of jurisdiction for all States is to be the same.

assimilation of Indians into the general population. That these were the major concerns underlying the passage of Pub L 280 cannot be doubted. See Bryan v. Itasca Cty., supra, 426 US, at 379, 48 L Ed 2d 710, 96 S Ct 2102.

But Chapter 36 does not reflect an attempt to reap benefits and to avoid the burdens of the jurisdictional offer made by Congress. To the contrary, the State must assume total jurisdiction whenever a tribal request is made that it do so. Moreover, the partial geographic and subject-matter jurisdiction that exists in the absence of trial consent is responsible to the law enforcement concerns that underlay the adoption of Pub L 280. State jurisdiction is complete as to all non-Indians on reservations and is also complete as to Indians and nontrust lands. The law enforcement hiatus that preoccupied the 83d Congress has to that extent been eliminated. On trust and restricted lands within the reservations whose tribes have not requested the coverage of state law, jurisdiction over crimes by Indians is, as it was when Pub L 280 was enacted, shared by the tribal and federal governments. To the extent that this shared federal and tribal responsibility is inadequate to preserve law and order, the tribes need only request and they will receive the protection of state law.

The State of Washington in 1963 could have unilaterally extended full jurisdiction over crimes and civil causes of action in the entire Yakima Reservation without violating the terms of Pub. L. 280. We are unable to conclude that the State, in asserting a less intrusive presence on the Reservation while at the same time obligating itself to assume full jurisdictional responsibility upon request, somehow flouted the will of Congress. A State that has accepted the jurisdictional offer in Pub. L. 280 in a way that leaves substantial play for tribal self-government, under a voluntary system of partial jurisdiction that reflects a responsible attempt to accommodate the needs of both Indians and non-Indians within a reservation, has plainly taken action within the terms of the offer made by Congress to the States in 1953. For Congress surely did not deny an option State the power to condition its offer of full jurisdiction on tribal consent.

V

[3b] Having concluded that Chapter 36 violates neither the procedural nor the substantive terms of Pub. L. 280, we turn, finally, to the question whether the "checkerboard" pattern of jurisdiction applicable on the reservations of nonconsenting tribes is on its face invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that it is, reasoning that the land-title classification is too bizarre to meet "any formulation of the rational basis test." 552 F2d, at 1135. The Tribe advances several different lines of argument in defense of this ruling.

First, it argues that the classifications implicit in Chapter 36 are racial classifications, "suspect" under the test enunicated in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 13 L. Ed. 2d 222, 85 S. Ct. 283, and that they cannot stand unless justified by a compelling state interest. Second, it argues that its interest in self-government is a fundamental right, and that Chapter 36-as a law abridging this right is presumptively invalid. Finally, the Tribe argues that Chapter 36 is invalid even if reviewed under the more traditional equal protection criteria articulated in such cases as Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 49 L. Ed. 2d 520, 96 S. Ct. 2562."

[16, 17] We agree with the Court of Appeals to the extent that its opinion rejects the first two of these arguments and reflects a judgment that Chapter 36 must be sustanied against an Equal Protection Clause attack if the classifiacations it employs "rationally further the purpose identified by the State." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, supra, at 314, 49 L Ed 2d 520, 96 S Ct. 2562. It ih settled that "the unique legal status of Indian tribes under

48 The Court of Appeals did not disturb the finding of the District Court that Chapter 36 had not been applied on the Yakima Reservation to discriminate against the Tribe or any of its members. The District Court found that the governmental legal services available to the Tribe and its members were not significantly different from those offered to other rural and city residents of Yakima County. It also concluded that the distinctions drawn between non-Indians and Indians in the statute were not motivated by a discriminatory purpose. In view of these findings, our inquiry here is limited to the narrow question whether the distinctions drawn in Chapter 36 on their face violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

47 The Court of Appeals limited its holding to the land-tenure classification. The Tribe, in support of the judgment, has argued that the Chapter 36 classifications based on the tribal status of the offender and on whether a juvenile is involved are also facially invalid. In our view these status classifications of Chapter 36, are indistinguishable from the interrelated land-tenure classification so far as the Equal Protection Clause is concerned.