securities claimed to be usurious, or otherwise rendered void by a statute, must, in the absence of a State statute to the contrary,12 contain an offer by the plaintiff to pay the defendant with lawful interest the money he has received therefor.18 So a bill to redeem mortgaged, 14 or pledged,15 property, must contain an offer to pay what is due thereon, though the particular sum need not be specified. A bill to set aside a judicial sale as void must be accompanied by a tender or offer of the purchase-money with interest, provided it was applied for the benefit of the estate; and this the court may require to be prepaid before the bill is filed.16 It seems that a bill to set aside a foreclosure of a railway mortgage should contain an offer of payment of the amount admitted to be due under the mortgage, and of the costs of the foreclosure suit, or at least show some reason why such an offer should not be required.17 In a bill to set aside a transaction for fraud, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to tender the payment of any expenses which the parties guilty of fraud have made. It is sufficient if the complaint offers to do equity, and the court can then adjust the rights of the parties by a conditional decree.18 A bill to set aside a tax sale ordinarily must contain an of fer to repay the purchaser at least all legal taxes on the property paid by him, both those for which the property was sold and those subsequently levied thereupon and paid by him, with interest upon each sum.1 A bill to restrain the collection of 19 12 Mo., K. & T. Tr. Co. v. Krumseig, 172 U. S. 351, 43 L. ed. 474. 13 Mason v. Gardiner, 4 Brown, C. C. 436; Tupper v. Powell, 1 J. Ch. (N. Y.) 439; Matthews v. Warner, 6 Fed. 461, 465; s. c., 112 U. S. 600, 28 L. ed. 851. 14 Story's Eq. Pl., § 187a; Harding v. Pingey, 10 Jurist (N. S.), 872; Perry v. Carr, 41 N. H. 371; Robinson v. Iron Ry. Co., 135 U. S. 522, 34 L. ed. 276; Gordon v. Smith, C. C. A., 62 Fed. 503. 15 Uehling v. Lyon, 134 Fed. 703. 16 Davis v. Gaines, 104 U. S. 386, 26 L. ed. 757. But see Rush v. First Nat. Bank, C. C. A., 71 Fed. 102. 17 Carey v. Houston & T. C. Ry. Co., 45 Fed. 438, 443. 18 Gage v. Pumpelly, 115 U. S. 454, 29 L. ed. 449. But see Mendenhall v. Hall, 134 U. S. 559, 569, 33 L. ed. 1012, 1015. 19 State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, 617, 33 L. ed. 669, 674; Alburquerque v. Perea, 147 U. S. 87, 37 L. ed. 91. But see Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Republic County, C. C. A., 67 Fed. 411; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. B. of C. of Norton County, C. C. A., 67 Fed. 458; Chi State taxes must aver payment of what is conceded to be due, or what can be seen to be due on the face of the bill, or can be shown by affidavits, whether conceded or not, before the preliminary injunction should be granted.20 If it is claimed that the whole tax is void as improperly assessed, the complainant must tender the amount he would owe if the proper assessment had been made; 21 or, if it is impracticable to determine that sum, he should offer security for its payment; 22 unless there is no right to assess the property at all, either because it is exempt from taxation, or because there is no law providing for the same. 23 In a case where the whole assessment was attacked for improper discrimination against the complainant in favor of the owners of similar property, the court required, as a condition precedent to the issue of an injunction, the payment of a tax, assessed at the same rate as that levied upon other property, and on corporations of the same class, within the State.24 The rule has been applied to a suit to enjoin the collection of penalties for a failure to pay taxes due the United States.25 The rule does not apply to a special enactment, which is fundamentally void and entirely illegal.26 If the proper officer refuses to receive a part of the tax, it must be tendered without cago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Hartshorn, 30 Fed. 541; Tacoma Ry. & Power Co. v. Pierce County, 193 Fed. 90. The same rule applies to a bill to enjoin the collection of a license, increased by a recent statute, where there is no allegation that the statute imposing the original license was invalid. Morenci Copper Co. v. Freer, 127 Fed. 199. 20 State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, 617, 23 L. ed. 669, 674; National Bank v. Kimball, 103 U. S. 732, 26 L. ed. 469; People's Nat. Bank v. Marye, 191 U. S. 272, 281, 48 L. ed. 180, 185; Raymond v. Chicago Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20, 38, 52 L. ed. 78, 88; Chicago Union Traction Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 114 Fed. 557. 21 Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490, 503, 48 L. ed. 761, 767. But see Ritterbusch v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., C. C. A., 198 Fed. 46. 22 People's Nat. Bank v. Marye, 191 U. S. 272, 281, 48 L. ed. 180, 185; Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490, 503, 48 L. ed. 761, 767. 23 Raymond v. Chicago Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20, 38, 52 L. ed. 78, 88; Chicago Union Traction Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 114 Fed. 557, 567. 24 Kohlhamer v. Smietanka, 239 Fed. 408. 25 Valley v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., C. C. A., 236 Fed. 176, 182. 26 Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 293, 43 L. ed. 443, 452; Chalker v. Birmingham & N. W. Ry. Co., 249 U. S. 522. the condition annexed of a receipt in full.27 Ordinarily, where it is impracticable for the plaintiff to ascertain the amount actually due, and the defendant denies his right to any relief, a tender in the bill without a previous payment is sufficient; 28 and in such a case an offer to pay the money into court whenever so ordered is equivalent to a payment into court in the first instance.29 Upon a bill to enjoin the enforcement of a statute reducing railroad fares, the injunction order was conditioned upon the execution of a bond by the corporation, to pay into the registry of the court from time to time as ordered, such sums of money as should be equal to the difference between the rate enjoined and the original rate, and to give to each purchaser of a ticket a coupon for the payment of that proportion of the difference, to which he was entitled in case the bill should finally be dismissed.30 Upon a bill to enjoin a statutory reduction of the price of gas, it was required that the gas company pay into court the difference between the old and the new charges, the same to be there retained until the final determination of the case. 31 A bill to compel the specific performance of a contract by a defendant should, it seems, contain an offer by the plaintiff to perform his part thereof.32 And formerly it was,33 but no longer is,34 required that a bill for an account should contain an offer on the part of the plaintiff to pay the balance, if any, found due against him. Upon a stockholder's bill, no 27 State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, 617, 23 L. ed. 669, 674; National Bank v. Kimball, 103 U. S. 732, 26 L. ed. 469. 28 Gordon v. Smith, C. C. A., 62 Fed. 503; Butchers' & Drovers' S. Y. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., C. C. A., 67 Fed. 35. 29 Cheney v. Bilby, C. C. A., 74 Fed. 52. 30 Hunter v. Wood, 209 U. S. 205, 52 L. ed. 747. 31 Consolidated Gas Co. v. Mayer, tender is required; 35 although a payment by the corporation might be made a condition of the granting of the injunction. A bill filed by the United States to vacate a patent for public lands as obtained by fraud, need not contain an offer to return the money paid therefor by the fraudulent patentee.36 It has been held that a bill by a trustee in bankruptcy, to set aside a fraudulent or a preferential sale, need not allege a tender of the purchase money.37 The same rule applies to a suit by the United States to cancel a conveyance made by an Indian in violation of a statute.38 But in a proper case a decree conditioned upon the return of the consideration might be made.39 Nor need a bill to obtain relief against an infringement of a copyright contain a waiver of the complainant's statutory right to a forfeiture of the piratical plates.40 It is, however, a rule in equity, that no person will be compelled to discover that which may expose him to a penalty or forfeiture.41 A discovery of such matters can only be compelled when the complainant is the only person who can enforce the penalty or forfeiture, and he is willing to waive it,42 as, for example, in a case of infringement of copyright.43 An omission of a waiver, tender, or offer, whenever considered necessary, was formerly a ground for demurrer 44 and would now justify a dismissal of the bill,45 but leave to amend is in such cases usually given.46 And in many, but not all 36 U. S. Minor, 114 U. S. 233, 29 L. ed. 110; U. S. v. Trinidad Coal & Coke Co., 137 U. S. 160, 34 L. ed. 640; U. S. v. Laam, 149 Fed. 581; U. S. v. Howard, C. C. A., 247 Fed. 455. See also Moffat v. U. S., 112 U. S. 24, 28 L. ed. 623; U. S. v. White, 17 Fed. 561, 565; U. S. v. Pratt C. & C. Co., 18 Fed. 708. 37 Johnston v. Forsyth Mercantile Co., 127 Fed. 845. 38 Heckman v. U. S., 224 U. S. 413, 56 L. ed. 820. 39 Ibid. 40 Farmer v. Calvert Lithog. Co., 1 Fippin, 228. But see Snow V. Mast, 63 Fed. 623. 41 Stewart v. Drasha, 4 McLean, 563; Atwill v. Ferrett, 2 Blatchf. 39; U. S. v. White, 17 Fed. 561, 565; Snow v. Mast, 63 Fed. 623. 42 Lord Uxbridge, v. Staveland, 1 Ves. Sem. 566; Atwill v. Ferrett, 2 Blatchf. 39. 43 Atwill v. Ferrett, 2 Blatchf. 39; Farmer V. Calver Lithog. Co., 1 Flippin, 228, 233; infra. § 348. 44 U. S. v. Pratt C. & C. Co., 18 Fed. 708. 45 See $364, infra. 46 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Republic County, C. C. A., 67 Fed. 413; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. B. of C. Norton County, C. C. A., 67 Fed. 458. cases, ,47 when no actual tender is required, a general offer to do whatever equity requires in the premises seems to be sufficient. 48 § 154. The prayer for relief. The Equity Rules of 1912 require that each bill shall contain "A statement of and prayer for any special relief pending the suit or on final hearing, which may be stated and sought in alternative forms."1 There is no express provision in these rules for a prayer for general relief. It will, however, be the better practice to insert the same and to comply with the requirements of the former practice upon the subject. The prayer for general relief, Mr. Robbins, "an eminent counsel," used to say, was "the best prayer after the Lord's Prayer."2 It is usually in one of the two following forms: "And that your orator shall have such other or further, or other and further, relief in the premises as to this court shall seem meet;" or "that your orator may be further and otherwise relieved in the premises according to equity and good conscience." Under the prayer for general relief the court will usually grant any relief justified by the evidence, other than an interlocutory order, which is consistent with, and a ground for which is included in, the allegations of the bill, and not inconsistent with the prayer for special relief or with the case made by the bill.5 3 47 State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, 617, 23 L. ed. 663, 674. 48 Gordon v. Smith, C. C. A., 67 Fed. 503. $154. 1 Eq. Rule 25. Am. Graphophone Co. V. Nat. Phonograph Co., 127 Fed. 349; Bloomfield v. Eyre, 8 Beav. 250, 259. 1 V. 2 Mansaton V. Molesworth, Eden; 26, note b; Dormer Fortescue, 3 Atk. 124; Storey's Eq. Pl., § 41, n. 1. 3 Tayloe v. Merchant's Fire Ins. Co., 9 How. 390, 13 L. ed. 187; Stewart v. Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co., 1 Fed. 361; County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 26 L. ed. 238; Chicago, St. L. & N. O. R. Co. v. Macomb, 2 Fed. 18; Adams Fed. Prac. Vol. I-58 Less relief than that v. Kehlor Milling Co., 36 Fed. 212. See Butterfield v. Miller, C. C. A., 195 Fed. 200; Central Improvement Co. v. Cambria Steel Co., C. C. A., 210 Fed. 696; Wright v. Barnard, 248 Fed. 756. Foxall, 2 Pet. 595, 4 English v. 7 L. ed. 531; Curry v. Lloyd, 22 Fed. 258, 265; Mackall v. Casilear, 137 U. S. 556, 564, 34 L. ed. 776, 778. 5 Hiern v. Mill, 13 Ves. 118; Soden v. Soden, there cited; Grimes v. French, 2 Atk. 141; Curry v. Lloyd, 22 Fed. 258, 265; Haggart v. Wilczinski, C. C. A., 143 Fed. 22. See Kerr v. Houthwick, C. C. A., 120 Fed. 772. In the following cases relief not prayed in the bill was |