banking business at a particular point, that the corporation of which he was the receiver and another of the three acquired the stock of the third, and that ultimately the first, of which plaintiff was receiver, was absorbed by the second corporation. The complaint alleged as elements of damage the amount paid by the second bank to the stockholders of the first bank, of which he was receiver, which was in excess of the actual value of the stock, on the theory that the bank was deprived of some right, and as other items of damage alleged that it ultimately became insolvent;" that his corporation which previously had a surplus of $110,000 above its liabilities to creditors, became insolvent so that its assets were reduced to more than $500,000 below such liabilities.12 Construing the pleadings, the court cannot take judicial notice of decisions in the State courts in actions by other plaintiffs to which the defendant was a party.13

By the Clayton Act: "The several circuit courts of the United States are hereby invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of § 73 of this Act; and it shall be the duty of the several district attorneys of the United States, in their respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations. Such proceedings may be by way of petition setting forth the case and praying that such violations shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties complained of shall have have paid at the rates charged the Leader Company, that on account of its competitive relation with that Company it was compelled to sell the product of its job printing and photo-engraving business at the prices set by the Leader Company, and that, 'its overhead expenses being unduly increased by the unfair requirements of defendant, plaintiff was deprived of its fair and legitimate profit and damaged to the extent of said overcharge.' The complaint then 'demands damages against defendant for the sum of $2,950.46 actual damages with interest thereon.'

12 Noyes v. Parsens, C. C. A., 245 Fed. 689; Homestead Co. v. Des Moines Electric Co., C. C. A., 248 Fed. 439, held that: "the complaint states facts sufficient to sustain an action in tort for damages under the statute. It sufficiently states like contemporaneous services to the job printing and photoengraving plants of the two competitors, and like business situation and circumstances of the competitors and of their plants, and the charge and collection from one of rates 21⁄2 times the rates collected of the other, avers that this discrimination compelled the plaintiff to pay for substantially like service $2,950.46 more than it would

13 Strout v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 208 Fed. 646, 653.

been duly notified of such petition, the court shall proceed, as soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the case; and pending such petition, and before final decree, the court may at any time make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises. Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any such proceedings may be pending that the ends of justice require that other parties should be brought before the court, the court may cause them to be summoned whether they reside in the district in which the court is held or not, and subpoenas to that end may be served in any district by the marshal thereof." 14 The order may be obtained as soon as the bill is filed before the issue of a subpoena for the resident defendant and without notice to him.15 The word "found" means that the corporation must be present in the district, or its officers or agents carrying on its business.16 What constitutes such a business as will subject a corporation to service of process depends upon the facts in each case.17 The general rule is that the business must be of such a nature as to warrant the inference that the corporation has subjected itself to the local jurisdiction.18 The ownership of stock in local corporations, the publication of advertisements within the district, and the presence there of agents without authority to sell, to collect, or to extend credit, who solicit orders which are filled by

14 Clayton Act, October 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 15. 38 St. at L. 736, Comp. St. 8835. The former statute was as follows: "The several (circuit courts) of the United States are hereby invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this act; and it shall be the duty of the several district attorneys of the United States, in their respective districts, under the direction of the

Attorney-General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations. Such proceedings may be by way of petition setting forth the case and praying that such violation shall be enjoined or otherwise prohibited. When the parties complained of shall have

been duly notified of such petition the court shall proceed, as soon as may be, to the hearing and determination of the case; and pending such petition and before final decree, the court may at any time make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises." July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 4, 26 St. at L. 209.) See § 61, supra.

15 See supra, § 61.

16 People's Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 79, 84; U. S. v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 29 Fed. 17, infra, § 164b.

17 Ibid. See infra, $164b.

18 Ibid. U. S. v. Am. Bell. Tel. Co., 29 Fed. 17.

jobbers who buy from the corporation, will not subject it to the service of process there. 19

"Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws, including sections two, three, seven and eight of this Act, when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings, and upon the execution of proper bond against damages for an injunetion improvidently granted and a showing that the danger of irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to entitle any person, firm, corporation, or association, except the United States, to bring suit in equity for injunctive relief against any common carrier subject to the provisions of the Act to regulate commerce, approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, in respect of any matter subject to the regulation, supervision, or other jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission." 20

The Clayton Act is not retrospective.21 Under the former law an individual could not maintain a suit for an injunction.22 No injunction can now be granted to parties not showing special injuries to themselves.23 Under the former law it was held that such a suit could not be brought by a stockholder who had suffered no special injuries.24

It has been held that the court will not enjoin a clause in an agreement between competitors in Interstate Commerce when there is no evidence that it has been put into effect or that preparations have been made for that purpose,25 and that the Clayton

19 Ibid.

20 38 St. at L. 737, ch. 323, § 16, Comp. St. § 8350.

21 Ketcham v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., C. C. A., 248 Fed. 106.

22 Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459, 471.

23 Venner v. Pennsylvania Steel

Co., 250 Fed. 292.

Fed. Prae. Vol. I-56

24 Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 I. S. 459, 471; Ketcham v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., C. C. A., 248 Fed. 106.

25 U. S. v. Prince Line, 220 Fed. 230.

Act is limited to suits seeking preventive relief and does not authorize a suit to annul a transaction which has been completed.26 A bill to enjoin the consolidation of two corporations as being in violation of the Anti-Trust Laws of certain States was held to be insufficient when it did not show that any restraint was caused by the consolidation upon transportation exclusively in any one of such States.27 It has been held that a stockholder who bought his stock with knowledge that a consolidation or combination of railway companies was contemplated cannot sue to enjoin the proceedings as in restraint of trade.28

"Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases may be served in the district in which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found." 29

Where the defendant transacts business within a district it may be sued in the District Court there held, although it has no agent within such district, service being made at the defendant's domicile.30

It has been held that it cannot be sued in a district where it is not incorporated and transacts no business; although its agent is found there, when the latter is not acting in his representative capacity.31

The Act of July 2, 1890, provides: "Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any proceeding under section four of this act may be pending, that the ends of justice require that other parties should be brought before the court, the court may cause them to be summoned, whether they reside in the district

26 Venner v. Pennsylvania Steel Co., 250 Fed. 292.

27 De Koven v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., 216 Fed. 955.

28 Continental Sec. Co. v. Interborough R. T. Co., 221 Fed. 44.

29 38 St. at L. 731, Comp. St. § 8835d, supra, § 61. By the Act of July 2nd, 1890, "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act, may sue therefor in

any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three fold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."

30 Southern Photo Material Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 234 Fed. 955.

21 Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., 228 Fed. 209.

in which the court is held or not, and subpoenas to that end may be served in any distict by the marshal thereof. '' 32

"A final judgment or decree hereafter rendered in any criminal prosecution or in any suit or proceeding in equity brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in any suit or proceeding brought by any other party against such defendant under said laws as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto: Provided, This section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony has been taken: Provided further, This section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees rendered in criminal proceedings or suits in equity, now pending, in which the taking of testimony has been commenced but has not been concluded, provided such judgments or decrees are rendered before any further testimony is taken.33

"Whenever any suit or proceeding in equity or criminal prosecution is instituted by the United States to prevent, restrain or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, the running of the statute of limitations in respect of each and every private right of action arising under said laws and based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in said suit or proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof." 34

This section of the statute is not retroactive either as regards the rule of evidence or the application of the statute of limitations which it provides.3

35

By the Act of June 28, 1910:

"In any suit in equity pending or hereafter brought in any Circuit Court" now in any District Court "of the United States under the Act entitled 'An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies,' approved July second, eighteen hundred and ninety, 'An Act to regulate com

32 26 St. at L. 210, ch. 647, § 5, Comp. St. § 8827.

33 38 St. at L. 731, ch. 323, § 5, Comp. St. § 8835e.

34 Buckeye Powder Co. v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co., 248 U. S. 55. Act of March 3, 1913,

ch. 114, 37 St. at L. 731, Comp. St. § 8826.

35 38 St. at. L. 731, ch. 323, § 5, Comp. St. § 8835e. See infra, §§ 181a, 333p.