the parties, a District Court of the United States may entertain a bill, to restrain parties claiming liens from seeking to enforce the same against the property elsewhere than in such District Court.38 When property has been seized by a marshal of the United States, the Federal court may take jurisdiction, by removal, of a proceeding in a State court to enjoin the marshal from proceedings under the writ.39 There is no ancillary jurisdiction of a suit to foreclose a mortgage upon a line that has been in the possession of Federal receivers of a street railroad system, who have been operating the same under a lease which they have elected to surrender; when they have offered to return the property to the lessor.40 After a Federal court has appointed a receiver, it has ancillary jurisdiction over all suits brought by him irrespective of the citizenship of the parties and of the amount involved.41 He cannot, however, remove into such a court all suits brought against him.42 It has been held at circuit that a suit pending against the corporation at the time of the receivership may, on the petition of the receiver, be removed into the Federal court, 38 Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U. S. 93; Wabash Railroad Co.. v. Adelbert College, 208 U. S. 38, 53, 52 L. ed. 379, 385. 89 Frank v. Leopold & Feron Co., 169 Fed. 922. v. Second 40 Guaranty Tr. Co. Ave. R. Co., 165 Fed. 487. 41 White v. Ewing, 159 U. S. 36, 40 L. ed. 67; Pope v. Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co., 173 U. S. 573, 43 L. ed. 814; Connor v. Alligator L. Co., 98 Fed. 155; Bowman v. Harris, 95 Fed. 917; Alexander v. So. Home Bldg. & L. Ass'n, 120 Fed. 963; Hampton Roads Ry. & El. Co. v. Newport News & O. P. Ry. & El. Co., 131 Fed. 534; Gunby v. Armstrong, C. C. A., 133 Fed. 417; Cooper v. Newton, 160 Fed. 190; Hume v. City of New York, C. C. A., 255 Fed. 488; Hollander V. Heaslip, C. C. A., 222 Fed. 808; see supra, $37, infra, § 311. So when he is an ancillary receiver. 42 Gableman v. Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Ry. Co., 179 U. S. 335, 45 L. ed. 220; Baggs v. Martin, 179 U. S. 206, 45 L. ed. 155; supra, $$ 5, 24, 37, infra, §§ 537, 538. ! at least when the plaintiff has intervened there, although original jurisdiction over the same could not have been entertained.43 Where assets are in the course of administration, all persons entitled to participate may come in under the jurisdiction acquired between the parties by ancillary or supplemental pleading, even though jurisdiction would be lacking if said proceedings had been originally and independently prosecuted. It has been held that a person, whose citizenship, if an original party, would have deprived the court of jurisdiction, cannot intervene when the court has possession of no fund or proceeding in which he is interested.45 Where in a suit to foreclose a mortgage to secure its bonds issued by a corporation the Federal court had made a foreclosure sale without any reservation and distributed the proceeds for the benefit of other holders of rights or liens; meanwhile, by independent proceedings in the State Courts, a judgment had been rendered against the same company because of its guarantee of bonds issued by another and such judgment had been presented and registered as a claim in the Federal court because it was contingent at the date set for proving claims there; it was held that the Federal court had no ancillary jurisdiction of a suit to have such State judgment impressed as a lien on the property which it had sold.46 It has been held: that pending a foreclosure suit a bill to enjoin the sale of shares of the capital stock of the defendant, not covered by the mortgage, is not ancillary to the former suit; although the defendant has the equity or redemption therein; 47 that where a railroad had been sold under a decree of fore 48 Rice v. Durham Water Co., 91 Fed. 433. 44 Rouse v. Letcher, 156 U. S. 47, 49, 39 L. ed. 341, 342; Second Nat. Bank v. New York Silk Mfg. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 12,601 a; New York Silk Mfg. Co. v. Second Nat. Bank, 10 Fed. 204. See Henderson v. Moode, 49 Fed. 887; infra, § 258e. 45 Seligman v. Santa Rosa, 81 Fed. 524; United El. S. Co. v. La. El. L. Co., 68 Fed. 673; G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 241 U. S. 22, (where the defendant to the ancillary bill had paid the expense of the defense to the former suit); Venner v. Pennsylvania Steel Co., 250 Fed. 292, (a purchaser pendente lite), contra, Ferguson v. Omaha & S. W. R. Co., C. C. A., 227 Fed. 513, (a bill to protect the purchaser at a foreclosure sale). 46 Hamer v. N. Y. Rys. Co., 244 U. S. 266. 47 Raphael v. Trask, 194 U. S. 272, 48 L. ed. 973, s. c. 118 Fed. 777. closure by a Federal court such court had no jurisdiction over a subsequent suit to restrain the enforcement of a State judgment of ejectment obtained by a plaintiff who was not a party to the foreclosure; 48 that after judgment in ejectment, which awards a writ of possession, the court has no jurisdiction of an application by the marshal or other officer to whom the writ is addressed, seeking instructions as to the performance of his ministerial duties, when there are adverse claims of strangers to the suit; 49 that a Federal court after formal judgment has no jurisdiction, independent of a difference of citizenship, to enforce an agreement under which the same was entered, when the construction of the judgment is not in question: 50 It has been held: that where the original proceedings are dismissed, the ancillary proceedings fall with such dismissal, even though such dismissal is voluntary by the plaintiff,51 and that upon the authorized surrender of property by Federal receivers to a State receiver, the Federal court loses jurisdiction of a suit previously begun to foreclose a mortgage upon the same, when there is no diversity of citizenship between the parties.52 But that the discharge of the receiver does not compel the dismissal of an ancillary suit brought by him against a stranger which may be continued by the person who has bought the assets.53 A creditor's bill between citizens of the same State founded upon a decree in admiralty has been held not within the jurisdiction of a Federal court.54 It has been held at Circuit that a bill cannot thus be sustained, irrespective of the citizenship of the parties, when filed to set aside for fraud, subsequent to its entry, the decree of the Federal court or a contract affecting such decree; 55 nor when filed to set aside for fraud a stipulation and decree in a former suit, the defendants to the bill being neither parties to 48 Central Trust Co. v. Grantham, 83 Fed. 540. 49 Dickinson v. Huntington, C. C. A., 185 Fed. 703. 50 Stillman v. Combe, 197 U. S. 436, 49 L. ed. 822. 51 Venner v. Graves, C. C. A., 255 Fed. 686. 52 Guaranty Tr. Co. V. Ave. R. Co., 171 Fed. 1020. C., 165 Fed. 487. Second 53 Keith Lumber Co. v. Houston Oil Co., C. C. A., 257 Fed. 1. 54 Winter v. Swinburne, 8 Fed. 49. See Provident Savings Soc. v. Ford, 114 U. S. 635, 29 L. ed. 261; Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U. S. 586, 32 L. ed. 543; supra, §§ 24, 39. 55 Yeatman v. Bradford, 44 Fed. 536. 56 the former suit nor the personal representatives of such parties, but trustees created by a defendant to such suit after the decree, and where none of the property affected by the former suit was within the custody of the court; nor when filed against defendants to a former decree and a third party to whom it was alleged that lands, the subject matter of the former suit, were conveyed prior to the commencement of the same.57 After a final decree granting damages for the injury to a street railway by the construction of another railroad, where the jurisdiction had attached because a constitutional question was involved, Mr. Justice Brewer refused to take jurisdiction of a supplemental bill to enjoin the construction of the rival railroad upon other grounds, none of which presented a Federal question.58 Conversely, there is a similar limitation upon the jurisdiction of the Federal courts. This is well explained in the following extract from an opinion by Bradley, J.: "The question presented with regard to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is, whether the proceeding, to procure nullity or the former judgment in such a case as the present is or is not in its nature a separate suit, or whether it is a supplementary proceeding, so connected with the original suit as to form an incident to it, and substantially a continuation of it. If the proceeding is merely tantamount to the common-law practice of moving to set aside a judgment for irregularity, or to a writ of error, or to a bill of review, or an appeal, it would belong to the latter category, and the United States court could not properly entertain jurisdiction of the case.59 Otherwise, the Circuit Courts of the United States would become invested with power to control the proceedings in the State courts, or would have appellate jurisdiction over them in all cases where the parties are citizens of different States. Such a result would be totally inadmissible. On 56 Ralston v. Sharon, 51 Fed. 702. See Sowles v. First Nat. Bank of Plattsburgh et al., 133 Fed. 846. 57 Anglo Florida P. H. Co. v. MeKibben, 65 Fed. 529. See Montgomery v. McDermott, 99 Fed. 502. 58 Omaha H. R. Co. v. Cable T. W. Co., 33 Fed. 689. 59 Graver v. Faurot 64 Fed. 241; Little Rock Ry. Co. v. Burke, 66 Fed. 83; Hall v. Ames, C. C. A., 190 Fed. 138. But see Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kurtzman, 82 Fed. 241; Queens Land & Title Co. v. Kings County Tr. Co., 255 Fed. 222. i the other hand, if the proceedings are tantamount to a bill in equity to set aside a decree for fraud in the obtaining thereof, then they constitute an original and independent proceeding, and, according to the doctrine laid down in Gaines v. Fuentes, 60 the case might be within the cognizance of the Federal courts. The distinction between the two classes of cases may be somewhat nice, but it may be affirmed to exist. In the one class there would be a mere revision of errors and irregularities, or of the legality and correctness of the judgments and decrees of the State courts, and in the other class the investigation of a new case arising upon new facts, although having relation to the validity of an actual judgment or decree, or the party's right to claim any benefit by reason thereof." 61 I A suit to make the judgment or decree of a State court the judgment or decree, respectively, of the Federal court can be maintained at common law 62 and in equity.63 The Federal court may take jurisdiction of a creditor's bill to enforce a judgment of the State court in the same district. Proceedings supplementary to execution under the judgment of a State court authorized by State statutes against a judgment debtor or third persons cannot be instituted in or removed to the Federal courts; although a creditor's bill may be.65 A petition, after judgment in a State court, by plaintiff in ejectment to have the defendant's damages allowed to him, is a mere incident to the ejectment suit and the Federal courts can take no jurisdiction of it.66 It has been held that a bill cannot be maintained to 60 92 U. S. 10, 23 L. ed. 524; Cf. Arrowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U. S. 86, 32 L. ed. 630; Robb v. Vo, 155 U. S. 13, 39 L. ed. 52; Hatch v. Ferguson, 52 Fed. 833; Davenport v. Moore, 74 Fed. 945; Strand v. Griffith, C. C. A., 144 Fed. 828; Schultz v. Highland Gold Mines Co.. 158 Fed. 337; Union Ry. Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., C. C. A., 207 Fed. 745. But see Travelers' Protective Ass'n v. Gilbert, C. C. A., 55 L.R.A. 538, 111 Fed. 269; Bailey v. Willeford, 126 Fed. 803. As to suits to set aside decrees of naturalization, see infra, § 151b. 61 Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U. S. 80, Glenn, 56 Fed. 372. 62 Barr v. Simpson, Baldwin, 543. 63 See Davis v. Davis, 65 Fed. 380; Collins v. Ashland, 112 Fed. 175. 64 Feidler v. Bartleson, C. C. A., 161 Fed. 30. 65 Webber v. Humphreys, 5 Dill. 223; Poole v. Thatcherdeft, 19 Fed. 49; Buford v. Strother, 3 McCrary, 253; s. c., 10 Fed. 406; Flash v. Dillon, 22 Fed. 1. 66 Chapman v. Barger, 4 Dillon, 587. |