which the vanquished appeal, are by no means an abolition but only a mitigation of the conqueror's absolute right.

LI. There are conditional surrenders, reserving to the individuals, certain personal privileges, and remains of their property, and to the state, certain parts of its constitution.

LII. Hostages and pledges may be considered as an appendage to treaties. And some of those hostages are a voluntary surrender, and others given by authority of the state as a security. For the sovereign has the same power over the persons and actions of his subjects, as over their property. But the state or its ruler will be bound to recompense individuals or their relatives for any inconveniences they may sustain.

LIII. Though the law of nations may in its literal rigour allow of putting hostages to death, it can never conscientiously be enforced, but where they have committed crimes deserving of capital punishment. Neither can they be made slaves. Indeed the law of nations permits them to leave their property to their heirs, although by the Roman law provision was made for confiscating it to the state.

LIV. If it should be asked whether hostages may lawfully make their escape: it may be answered in the negative, especially if, at first, or afterwards, they have pledged their faith to remain, upon condition of being prisoners at large. But it does not appear that states so much intended to impose a hardship upon their subjects by forbidding their escape, as to give the enemy security for the performance of their engagements.

LV. The obligation of hostages is of an odious nature, as being unfriendly to personal liberty, and arising from the act of another. Therefore a strict interpretation must be given to such engagements, so that hostages delivered on one account cannot be detained on any other, nor for any contract, where hostages are not required. But if in another case there has been any violation of good faith, or any debt contracted, hostages may be detained, not as hostages, but in the capacity of subjects, whom the law of nations makes liable to be seized and detained for the acts of their sovereigns. To guard against which, provision may be made by additional clauses for the restoration of hostages, whenever the engagement for which they were delivered has been fulfilled.

LVI. Whoever has been delivered as a hostage for other prisoners, or for the redemption of other hostages, will naturally be released upon the death of those persons. For by death the right of the pledge is extinguished in the same manner as by the ransom of a prisoner. And therefore, according to Ulpian, as a PERSONAL debt is confined to him, who has contracted it, so one person, being substituted for another, cannot be detained any longer than while the obligation of that other continues.

LVII. The decision, whether hostages can be detained upon the death of the sovereign, by whom they were delivered, must depend upon the nature of the engagements, which he has made. If they are PERSONAL, they continue in force only during his natural life, but if they are what are called REAL or more PERMANENT treaties, they pass with all their consequences to his successors. For ACCESSORY articles cannot authorise any deviation from the GENERAL rule of interpreting the fundamental and principal points of a treaty, but the accessory articles themselves ought rather to be explained in conformity to those general rules.

LVIII. A cursory observation may be made, that hostages are sometimes considered, not as appendages, but as forming the principal part of an engagement, where any one is bound not for himself, but for another, and, in case of non-performance, being obliged to pay damages, his hostages or sureties are answerable in his stead. There is not only some thing of harshness, but even injustice in the opinion that hostages may be bound for the conduct of another even without their own consent.

LIX. Pledges have some characteristics in common with hostages, and some peculiar to themselves. It is a common characteristic of both to be detained for something else that is due, except where public faith is given, and provision made to the contrary. Pledges may be detained with greater latitude than hostages; which is one of their peculiar characteristics, there being less of odium in the former case than in the latter: THINGS being of a nature more proper for detention than PERSONS.

LX. No time can bar the redemption of a pledge, whenever the engagement for which it was given is fulfilled. For it is never to be presumed that engagements

proceed from new causes, when old and known causes can be assigned. If a debtor therefore has forborne to redeem a pledge, we may still suppose that he has not abandoned his original engagement, unless there be clear proof to the contrary: as if, for instance, though desirous of redeeming it, he has been prevented, or suffered a space of time to elapse unnoticed, that would be requisite to imply his consent.

CHAPTER XXI.

ON FAITH DURING THE CONTINUANCE OF WAR, on Truces, SAFE-CONDUCTS, AND THE REDEMPTION OF PRisoners.

Truces of an intermediate denomination between peace and war— Origin of the word- New declaration of war not necessary after a truce-Time from whence a truce and all its correspondent obligations and privileges commence A retreat may be made, or fortifications repaired during a truce- Distinction respecting the occupying of places - The case of a person prevented from making his retreat, aud taken in the enemy's territories at the expiration of a truce, considered-Express terms and consequences of a truce-Breach of a truce by one party justifies a renewal of war by the otherPenalty annexed-Truce broken by the acts of individuals—Rights belonging to safe-conducts without a truce-Persons in a military capacity how far allowed the benefit of a safe-conduct - Privileges of goods arising from thence-Attendants of the person protected by a safe-conduct — Safe-conduct does not expire upon the death of the grantor-Safe-conduct given to continue during the pleasure of the grantor Protection thereof extending beyond his own territory - Redemption of prisoners favoured, and not to be prohibited by law.

I. and II. IN THE midst of war there are certain points generally conceded by the belligerent powers to each other, which Tacitus and Virgil call the intercourse of war, and which comprehend truces, safe-conducts, and the redemption of prisoners.-Truces are conventions, by which, even during the continuance of war, hostilities on each side cease for a time. DURING THE CONTINUANCE OF WAR; for, as Cicero says, in his eighth Philippic, between peace and war there is no medium. By war is meant a state of affairs, which may exist even while its operations are not continued. Therefore, as Gellius has said, a peace and a truce are not the same, for the war still continues, though fighting may cease. So that any agreement, deemed valid in the time of war, will be valid also during a truce, unless it evidently appears that it is not the state of affairs, which is considered, but the commission of particular acts of hostility. On the other hand, any thing, agreed to, to be done, when peace shall be made, cannot take place in consequence of a truce. There is no uniform and invariable period fixed for the continuance of a truce, it

may be made for any time, even for twenty, or thirty years, of which there are many instances in ancient history. A truce, though a repose from war, does not amount to a peace, therefore historians are correct in saying that a peace has often been refused, when a truce has been granted.

III. After a truce a new declaration of war is not necessary.

For upon the removal of a temporary impediment, the state of warfare revives in full force, which has only been lulled asleep, but not extinguished. Yet we read in Livy, that it was the opinion of the heralds' college, that after the expiration of a truce war ought to be declared. But the ancient Romans only meant to shew by those superfluous precautions, how much they loved peace, and upon what just grounds they were dragged into war.

IV. The time, generally assigned for the continuance of a truce, is either some uninterrupted period, of a HUNDRED DAYS, for instance, or a space limited by some artificial boundary of time, as the Calends of March. In the former case, the calculation is to be made according to the natural motion of time: whereas all civil computations depend upon the laws and customs of each country. In the other case it is generally made a matter of doubt, whether in naming any particular day, month or year, for the expiration of a truce, that particular day, month, or year, are comprehended in the term of the truce, or excluded from it.

In natural things there are two kinds of boundaries, one of which forms an inseparable part of the things themselves, as the skin does of the body, and the other only adjoins them, as a river adjoins the land, which it bounds or washes. In either of these ways voluntary boundaries may be appointed. But it seems more natural for a boundary to be taken as a part of the thing itself. Aristotle defines the extremity of anything to be its boundary: a meaning to which general custom conforms: - thus if any one has said that a thing is to be done before the day of his death, the day on which he actually dies is to be taken into the account as forming part of the term. Spurinna had apprised Caesar of his danger, which could not extend beyond the Ides of March. Being accosted, respecting the matter, on the very day, he said, the Ides of March are come, but not passed. Such an interpretation is the more proper where the pro