ed with real events. Lastly, in the interpretation of an allegory, we have a clue, which leads us from one sense to the other. Sometimes the allegory is accompanied with an explanation: and even where an allegory is left to explain itself, the application of one sense to the other must be easy and obvious, or the object of the allegory will be defeated. If the immediate representation, which is suggested by the words of the allegory, has not a manifest correspondence with the ultimate representation, or the moral of the allegory, we lose the very thing, which constitutes its worth. In every allegory therefore there is, and must be, a clue, which leads from one sense to the other. But in the interpretation of a prophecy, to which a double meaning is ascribed, we have no clue whatever, which can lead us from the primary to the secondary sense. The primary sense is suggested by the words of the prophecy. But the secondary sense is suggested, neither by the words of the prophecy, nor by the things, which those words signify. It is a hidden, a remote sense; indeed so hidden, and so remote from the literal sense, that it is supposed to have been unknown even to the prophet, who committed the prophecy to writing.

Yet, with all these impediments, the system of primary and secondary senses received such an accession of strength from the celebrated author of the Divine Legation, that many subsequent writers have agreed with him in the opinion, that the system, as

he explained it, is proof against every objection. According to this explanation, the existence of secondary senses in Hebrew prophecy is founded on the supposition of their "logical propriety and moral fitness." The secondary sense of a prophecy is there represented, as having the same relation to the pri mary sense, which an antitype has to its type. But, if the primary and secondary senses of prophecy are subservient to the same end with types and antitypes, it is inferred, that they rest on the same foundation. As the Jews, for instance, when they sacrificed their paschal lamb, were not aware, that this was a type, prophetic of the sacrifice of Christ, so it is argued, that there might be verbal prophecies of the same event, though the literal meaning of those prophecies no more suggested that event to the Jews, than the type, by which it was prefigured. And the moral fitness, as well of primary and secondary senses on the one hand, as of types and antitypes on the other, is argued on the following ground. The Law being only a preparation for the Gospel, the Jews were kept in ignorance about the real tendency of types, till those types were superseded by the accomplishment of their antitypes: for, if they had previously understood the meaning of those types, they might have neglected the Law, before the fulness of time was come. A fore-knowledge of its intended abolition, a fore-knowledge, that it was only a shadow of better things to come, might have induced them to

disregard the preparatory Dispensation, even during the period, while it was destined to last. But the same reason; as is further argued, for which the Jews were kept in ignorance about the meaning of types relating to the Messiah, must have operated also in the case of verbal prophecy relating to the Messiah. The same veil of obscurity, which was thrown over the former, is supposed therefore to have been necessarily thrown over the latter, in order to preserve consistency in the several parts of the Jewish Dispensation. And to this purpose nothing is supposed to have been better adapted than the use of secondary senses; because these senses are so remote from the literal sense, that they occurred not to the prophets themselves. Lastly, to the objection, that secondary or mystical senses may be multiplied without end, while the literal or primary sense of a passage can be only one, it is answered, that, when the system is so explained, the secondary sense has no less its limit, than the primary sense, the one being determined by a reference to the Christian dispensation, as the other is determined by a reference to the Jewish dispensation.

Such is the sum and substance of that ingenious system, which was proposed by the celebrated author of the Divine Legation. But, if we examine it closely, we shall find, that it labours under difficulties, which are not easily surmounted. In the first place, the tendency of this system is to destroy en

tirely the notion of prophecies, which relate to the coming of Christ according to their literal sense. But we have already seen, not only how important it is to shew the existence of such prophecies; we have further seen, that many such prophecies really do exist. That the tendency of this system is to destroy the notion of literal prophecy, appears from the very purport of the system. The logical propriety and moral fitness, which are supposed to have operat ed in one case, must be supposed to have operated in another. The whole system would be destroyed by the allowance of exceptions. If concealment was the object of secondary senses, that object would be defeated by every prophecy, which foretold the com. ing of Christ in a literal sense. And accordingly we find, that the author himself, in his Doctrine of Grace, speaks of the prophecies which relate to the Messiah, as relating to him generally in a secondary sense. But in a part of his Divine Legation he ap pears so sensible of the importance of literal prophe. cy, that he allows the existence of some such proph. ecies, and even argues against Grotius, who denies their existence. At the same time, being aware, that prophecies, however few, which predict the coming of Christ according to their primary sense, are so many obstacles in the way o a system, which is founded in obscurity, he endeavours to remove those obstacles by saying, that whatever prophecies do relate to the Messiah in their primary sense, are de

livered in such figurative terms, as to produce the same obscurity, which is produced by secondary senses. But this attempt to remove the acknowledged obstacles is by no means satisfactory. For however figurative the use of single words in any passage may be, yet if the passage itself is interpreted literally, as the primary sense requires, we shall still obtain a determinate sense. We shall obtain the sense, conveyed by the words of the passage: and the meaning of each word, whether literal or figurative, will be ascertained by the context. Let the terms therefore of any passage be as figurative, as the argument may require, yet the primary sense of that passage can never be subject to the same obscurity, which envelops a mystical or secondary sense. It is impossible, that a sense, which the words of the passage do convey, should be equally concealed from the view of the reader, with a meaning, which the words of the passage do not convey. The system in question therefore is irreconcileable with the notion of prophecies, which predict the coming of Christ in a primary sense. And the consequences of rejecting that notion are sufficiently apparent from the preceding Lecture.

Another difficulty, under which the system labours, is this; that the existence of a thing is argued from the supposed propriety of the thing. But there are hundreds of things, of which we might plausibly shew, that they would properly have taken place, not one