want of a clue, to determine our choice between two senses already known; but we want a clue, which shall lead us from the knowledge of one sense to a discovery of the other. The primary sense of a Hebrew prophecy is ascertained by a grammatical analysis of the Hebrew words. But no such grammatical analysis will assist us, in discovering the secondary sense of a Hebrew prophecy. Indeed most writers, who treat of secondary senses, contend, that those secondary senses were unknown to the proph ets themselves; and that Divine Providence so ordered it, that the very persons, who committed to writing the words, which were dictated by the Holy Spirit, did not perceive the whole extent of their meaning. But if words, employed in a Hebrew prophecy, were intended to convey a sense so remote from the common acceptation of the words, that even the prophet, who wrote the words, did not perceive the sense intended, the same divine authority, which communicated the prophecy, must interpose, to explain the prophecy. For, without such divine interposition, it would be absurd to suppose, that we could discover the meaning of a prophecy, which the prophet himself was unable to discover. If we say, that a prophecy relating to the Messiah may be understood by us, though not by the prophet, because we have the advantage of having seen its accomplishment, we argue, though unconsciously, from a petitio principii. When it is previously known, that a

prophecy does relate to the Messiah, they, who live to see its accomplishment, will undoubtedly have a more comprehensive view of the subject, than they, who lived in a preceding age. But, when the question is in agitation, whether a certain passage of the Old Testament, which, according to its literal meaning, does not apply to the Messiah, has also a mystical meaning, which does so apply, we take for granted the thing to be proved, if we begin by arguing about its accomplishment. We must ascertain the existence of the prophecy, before the accomplishment of the prophecy can be matter even of inquiry. It is true, that the words, in which the prophecy is delivered, may be of such general import, as not to excite the notion of any one particular event; but that a particular event may happen in a future age, which so accords with the words of the prophecy, as to enable us to perceive a connexion between the words and the event, which was not perceived before the event. And, if a prophecy can be interpreted by no other means than by history, or by the actual arrival of that very event, to which the prophecy relates, the prophecy must in that case be fulfilled, before the prophecy can be understood. But then it must be observed, that throughout the whole of this reasoning the existence of the prophecy is pre-supposed. We set out with the supposition, that a certain passage was originally designed to be prophetic of some future event and then comparing a particular event

with the description given in that passage, we argue from the similarity between the event and the description, that the one is connected with the other. But in whatever case we must previously examine, whether a passage of the Old Testament really was designed for prophecy, or not; in other words, wherever the existence of a prophecy must be previously established, something more is requisite for that purpose, than a mere correspondence between the pas sage in question, and the event, to which we apply it.

Now, if we consider the peculiar character of prophecy in a secondary sense, we shall find that the existence of every such prophecy must be established, before we can begin to argue about its accomplishment. And to conduct such a proof is not quite so easy, as many writers have imagined. In this respect, there is a material difference between prophecy in a primary sense, and prophecy in a secondary sense. The primary sense of a prophecy is the literal sense of the passage, by which the proph ecy is conveyed. And this sense we obtain by a grammatical analysis of the words. But when we attempt. to discover a secondary sense, we attempt to go further, than the words will carry us. Beside the plain and primary sense, which the words of the prophecy do convey, we seek for some remote, or mystical sense, which the words of the prophecy do not convey. Consequently we undertake what we ourselves have not the means of performing.

It is true, that many writers have endeavoured to shew the practicability of the attempt by comparing the double sense of prophecy with the double sense of allegory. Every allegory has two senses; one of which is a literal sense, the other an allegorical sense. And a knowledge of the first sense leads us to a discovery of the second sense. Why therefore (it is said) may we not ascribe a double sense to prophecy? And, if a prophecy has a double sense, may we not argue from the first to the second sense, in the same manner, as we argue from the first to the second sense in allegory? This is the common ar. gument in favour of that system, which provides a double meaning for the prophecies of the Old Testament, the one relating to the Jewish, the other to the Christian dispensation. But the argument, though very specious, and employed by very eminent writ ers, will appear on examination to be altogether untenable. It is founded on a supposed analogy between the double sense of prophecy, and the double sense of allegory; whereas, the two things, instead of being analogous, are totally dissimilar. When we interpret a prophecy, to which a double meaning is ascribed, the one relating to the Jewish, the other to the Christian dispensation, we are in either case concerned with an interpretation of words. For the same words, which, according to one interpretation, are applied to one event, are, according to another interpretation, applied to another event. But, in the

interpretation of an allegory, we are concerned only in the first instance with an interpretation of words: the second sense, which is usually called the allegor. ical sense, being an interpretation of things, as was fully proved in the Lecture on that subject. An allegory is commonly delivered in the form of a narrative, as in those two incomparable allegories, our Saviour's parable of the sower, and Nathan's para. ble to David. And the interpretation of the words gives nothing more, than the plain and simple narratives themselves; whereas the moral of the allegory is learnt by an application of the things, signified by those words, to other things, which resemble them, and which the former were intended to suggest. There is a fundamental difference therefore between the interpretation of an allegory, and the interpretation of a prophecy with a double sense.

If we proceed with the parallel, we shall find other differences, which destroy the analogy altogether. In the interpretation of prophecy we are concerned with historic truth: in the interpretation of allegory we are concerned with moral truth. And this difference leads again to a still greater difference. For since the object of allegory is moral truth, the narrative, which conveys the allegory, is commonly fictitious, as in the two examples already quoted. But in the interpretation of prophecy, whether we consider the primary, or consider the secondary sense, we are wholly and solely concern