POPULAR ELECTION OF UNITED STATES
SENATORS.

TH

HE sentiment in favor of the popular election of United States Senators is gradually growing stronger and stronger. On February 13 the fourth resolution providing for the election of Senators by direct vote of the people was passed by the House of Representatives. This fact is significant, for whatever may have been the individual opinions of the Representatives themselves they have given by their vote a positive demonstration of their interpretation of the public will on the question. A more conclusive proof that the people favor this change cannot under the circumstances be reasonably asked for; yet those who oppose this change, and foremost among them Senator Hoar, refuse to see in this action of the House any indication of a real public desire for this change. The Senator just mentioned even went so far as to state on the floor of the Senate that in his opinion the House had passed this bill "as half a joke." There is little evidence, however, to show that one branch of our national legislature permitted a resolution advocating an amendment to the Constitution to pass without any opposition "as half a joke.”

There is no doubt that the people generally favor this new method of election, and when the people of the United States seriously advocate any political innovation it becomes the duty of all earnest public men to make this innovation the object of their thoughtful attention. There are many who claim that, since this proposition involves an amendment to the Constitution, those who favor it have assumed a difficult burden of proof and must show beyond all reasonable doubt that the proposed change is positively better than the present system of selecting Senators. This is true to a certain extent; yet it might be answered that, in a country whose political dogma is the sovereign will of the people, when the people unite in

demanding a certain change it becomes the duty of all opposing them to show good reasons why they should not have it. The people want the popular election of United States Senators, and we hope to s

sound reason why,

instance. This argume...

clear'v that there is to-day no

should not be followed in this nopular desire will appeal to

many; it is indifferent to very few, and will be opposed chiefly by those who have selfish interests to guard.

There are, however, several sound and positive arguments for the election of Senators by direct vote of the people. First among them is that this new method is the logical outcome of our political development, and is quite in accord with our ideals of government to-day. To look upon this question historically we must go back to the time of the birth of our Constitution. This step is important and necessary, as our knowledge of the past and present aids us in our efforts to foresee the future. But this attempt to seek advice from the past is often dangerous. Influenced by a natural and just regard for the sound opinions of the framers of our Constitution, we are very apt to overlook the fact that these men drew many of their conclusions from premises that no longer exist and while they were influenced by conditions that we have great difficulty in thoroughly realizing to-day. In wondering at the stability of the great document drawn up by these men, we too often forget that this stability is quite as much the result of the sound political sense of the American people as it is of any inherent qualities of the Constitution itself. Few people familiar with the subject ignore the fact that our Constitution to-day differs much in spirit if not in letter from that Constitution which was the result of the mutual ideals and concessions of the members of the Convention of 1787. And yet many of us fail to take this fact into due consideration when we freely quote the opinions of these men upon specific questions of the present day.

Many opinions quite rational in 1787 would be ridiculous in 1902. Because our forefathers believed in a certain method of selecting Senators over a hundred years ago is no reason for

supposing that they would favor it to-day. Every student of history knows that the political development of the United States has been a gradual change from the aristocratic and conservative ideals of the framers of our Government to the popular democratic ideas of to-day; that the doctrine of the sovereign will of the people has ceased to be our abstract philosophic theory of political resources, and has become a live, practical, every-day principle of the politician. Newspapers, railroads, telegraphs, and accumulated political experience have in the course of time become some of the main causes of this change. When communication between the States was difficult; when the average citizen had merely local interests-little knowledge of State affairs and less of national; when to many Americans a newspaper was a novelty and to all of them a railroad or a telegraph was a dream, we can see the wisdom of those men who wished to keep direct power from a people who for unavoidable reasons had not acquired that political knowledge which is essential to the proper exercise of sovereign power in politics. But to-day, under present conditions, these same statesmen and patriots would undoubtedly be of another opinion.

Remembering the condition of affairs in 1787, we can easily understand how the State legislatures elected the governors and all other officers, civil and military, of the State (even the members of the Constitutional Convention themselves were chosen by the several State legislatures); how the President was intended to be selected by electors; how property and even religious qualifications were retained in several of the States as absolutely essential to the privilege of voting. But by to-day many changes have taken place. Our President is practically elected by popular vote; so are the governors of the States. Civil and military officers are no longer appointed by the legislatures, and property qualifications are generally abolished. And it is not an extravagant supposition to believe that the framers of our Constitution would to-day applaud these changes in the great instrument of their own creation. But this change, great as it is, is not yet complete. We have still

the choice of United States Senators by the legislatures to remind us of the days when the people were not trusted, and to remind us also that there remains still something for us to do in order to make the doctrine of popular rights everywhere a practical proposition rather than an abstract idea. These several steps in this great change have been gradual, and therein lies the stability of our institutions; but we claim, and we believe not rashly, that the time has now come to make this change, and that it follows in logical sequence with the others. To hold otherwise is to claim that a people that has made such wonderful advances in commerce, industry, and in civilization has remained at a standstill in politics. This argument of the historic necessity of this change gains in strength the longer and more attentively we consider it.

Another argument in favor of the change we propose is that the present method of choosing Senators is quite inconsistent with our political ideals of to-day. A republican form of government should avoid all inconsistencies in its composition. They form a great element of weakness, not only from the fact that they destroy the harmony of the system on which the government is based, but because they expose the government to the frequent natural and adverse criticism of the people and thereby lessen that popular respect which is so essential to the strength of any institution founded on the will of the people. Political anomalies can be supported only by selfish class interests, by narrow bigotry, or by that timid and senseless conservatism which, forgetting that progress is an irresistible law, looks with dread upon all changes. We claim that the present method of choosing our national Senators has grown to be one of these dangerous political anomalies. It fitted logically into the scheme of our government when it was framed, but it is not in keeping with its spirit in the year 1902. When the people are considered capable of directly electing every four years a President who represents the entire nation, why should it be considered dangerous to allow them to choose directly two men who represent their State? Are not these two contradictory principles an excellent example of that dangerous in

consistency just referred to? This question is all the more difficult to answer negatively when we remember that the President is nearly always a man of another State, and that the people know far less about him personally than about their own Senators. It may be claimed that in voting for the President the people are voting for a party; but this is quite as true of the Senators. It may also be argued that the people of one State alone do not elect a President; but it is quite as true that the people of one State cannot control the Senate.

Again, the position of Chief Executive may be filled by the people acting all at one time and under the predominating influence of one agitated question, while the people can fill the Senate only after expressing their will in three separate parts and under the influence of three successive periods. Perhaps it will be said that periods of two or six years are nothing in politics. This may be true, but the effects of a continued popular excitement of a longer period would invade the Senate even if the State legislatures shield them from the terrible influences of popular enthusiasm. Furthermore, it is far from being the mere assertion of a demagogue to insist that to hold the people incapable of electing Senators is an insidious reflection upon the dignity of a nation whose political creed is the sovereignty of the people; and this the more so as these same 'people clect directly every four years the executive branch of the government whose hasty or foolish acts entail quite as great disaster as the similar action of one-half of the legislature. Surely these two principles of election are quite inconsistent. Again, our national legislature does not elect representatives of the nation, and why should the State legislature elect those of the State? Every State in the Union has a senate, and its members are chosen by direct vote of the people. In fact, all the agents of the people with the single exception of the national Senators are practically selected either by popular vote or by executive appointment. It is true that the legislatures exercise a certain control over executive appointments, but that does not alter the fact that the present method of selecting Senators is inconsistent with our ideals and our practise.