ARTICLE 21 DID NOT WORK Mr. WINN. I just wanted to point out, I think I understand what Mr. Harrington is trying to accomplish, and we did discuss it pretty thoroughly yesterday but the end results are article 21 and what happens just did not pan out. It did not work. Mr. HARRINGTON. I did not try to maintain it did. Mr. WINN. But I wanted to point out to the other members of the committee that history shows it was an inducement to settle the war between South Vietnam and North Vietnam, and it probably helped that. But from then on all hell broke loose in this country about what are we going to do with our money. Why are we helping rebuild the Communist countries and things like that, so I do not think this is the answer to it at all and I will vote against it. CONCERN ABOUT INTENTIONS OF MEASURE Mr. HAMILTON. The Chair would speak in opposition to the amendment offered by Mr. Harrington. I have some concern about what it intends to do. I also have concern about the specific language. First of all, it calls for an immediate cease-fire. "Immediate," as Mr. Bonker pointed out yesterday, is an indefinite word and allows a lot of flexibility. Second, the word "cease-fire" itself is a word of art as I understand it. There are all kinds of cease-fires. And we really are seeking more than that in the resolution of the Hamilton-du Pont amendment. We are seeking an end to the conflict. Cease-fire, in my mind at least, is a temporary type of arrangement and what we are really seeking is an end to the conflict. TIMING TROUBLING The timing likewise bothers me. If this amendment were adopted by the committee and adopted by the Congress it would take a week or two perhaps for that to be achieved and at that point you are almost at the point of ammunition being out. So you would have a cease-fire on one side only in all probability, and I would be concerned from that standpoint, but more basically my concern is the concern that I expressed yesterday about the rejection of the entire supplemental aid request. One of the things we did not discuss yesterday which I think needs to be called to the attention of the committee is that we have a lot of people in Cambodia, Americans, volunteer workers and third country nationals working for us that we want to do all we can to assure their protection. How many people do we have there, Jack? 600 AMERICANS IN CAMBODIA Mr. SULLIVAN. There are 600 people. Of that number 200 are in the embassy. There is another, roughly, 100 people in the voluntary agencies and there are another 200 to 250 who are third-country nationals who have been working with the United States, again in the voluntary agency side, Red Cross, Catholic Relief, and then there are a number of newsmen, some businessmen, so that the Embassy estimates it has responsibility for 600 persons. Mr. HAMILTON. That may not be a critical fact, but it is a fact that needs to be taken into consideration as we think about trying to bring the conflict to a conclusion. Is the subcommittee ready to vote, or, Mr. Harrington, do you want to respond in some way? LANGUAGE NOT INTENDED TO BE PRECISE Mr. HARRINGTON. To the inevitable. Let me rejoin to the degree that the language was not intended to be a precise arrival at what is suggested. I thought in view of our mandate as described to me yesterday by the chairman our purpose was not to write legislation but to make a report to the full committee, that this would at least generally suffice for the purpose of Mr. HAMILTON. I think I should say Mr. Harrington is right on that. As a matter of fact, I happen to know this language was prepared very quickly by perhaps Mr. Harrington and Mr. Riegle so it might not be entirely appropriate to dig at the language real, real hard. I think the members do know what you are seeking to achieve and I believe the subcommittee is ready for a vote. VOTE ON HARRINGTON AMENDMENT Unless there is further discussion, all those members in favor of the Harrington amendment respond by saying aye. [Chorus of ayes.] Mr. HAMILTON. Opposed. [Chorus of noes.] Mr. HAMILTON. The noes have it. Mr. HARRINGTON. Could we have a rollcall? Mr. HAMILTON. We will have a rollcall on that as soon as we return from answering the rollcall. Mr. BONKER. We have 15 minutes. Mr. HAMILTON. Go ahead. The clerk will call the roll. Mr. VAN DUSEN. Chairman Hamilton. Mr. HAMILTON. No. Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Fountain. Mr. FOUNTAIN. No. Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Yatron. Mr. YATRON. Aye. Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Harrington. Mr. HARRINGTON. Aye. Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Bonker. Mr. BONKER. Aye. Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. du Pont. Mr. DU PONT. No. Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Winn. Mr. WINN. No. Mr. VAN DUSEN. Four noes and three ayes. Mr. HAMILTON. The amendment is not agreed to. VOTE ON HAMILTON-DU PONT AMENDMENT The vote occurs on the Hamilton-du Pont amendment. Any further discussion? All those in favor will signify by saying aye when their name is called; those opposed no. Mr. VAN DUSEN. Chairman Hamilton. Mr. HAMILTON. Aye. Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr Fountain. Mr. FOUNTAIN. Aye. Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Yatron. Mr. YATRON. No. Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Harrington. Mr. HARRINGTON. NO. Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Bonker. Mr. BONKER, No. Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. du Pont. Mr. DU PONT. Aye. Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Winn. Mr. WINN. Aye. Mr. VAN DUSEN. The ayes have it, 4 to 3. Any further business? If not, the subcommittee stands adjourned. We will see you tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock, full committee. [Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] THE CAMBODIA-VIETNAM DEBATE THURSDAY, MARCH 13, 1975 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, D.C. The committee met at 10:15 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Thomas E. Morgan (chairman) presiding. Chairman MORGAN. The committee will please come to order. We meet this morning to consider legislation requested by the executive branch to authorize emergency supplemental assistance for Cambodia. I introduced the executive draft by request, on February 4, together with the ranking minority member, Mr. Broomfield. The number of the bill is H.R. 2704, and a copy is before each member. Shortly after introducing the bill, I directed two members of the committee staff who had previous experience in investigating our programs in Indochina, to travel to Cambodia and South Vietnam in order to bring back an up-to-date assessment of the situation there. The report of Dr. Brady and Dr. Sullivan has been printed as a confidential committee print. It is available to all members of the committee. I also asked the Special Subcommittee on Investigations, headed by Lee Hamilton, to review the situation carefully and report its findings to the full committee. Mr. Hamilton's subcommittee has done a very conscientious job in reviewing the situation in Cambodia. The subcommittee held hearings with State Department and Defense Department witnesses. It also met with the Director of the CIA and with members of the Special Congressional Mission which traveled recently to Vietnam and Cambodia. " I will first call upon Mr. Hamilton to present his subcommittee findings and recommendations, and then I will call on the ranking minority member of that subcommittee, Mr. du Pont, to present his side. After that I propose to call on the Acting Secretary of State, the Honorable Robert S. Ingersoll, who is present in the room, to restate. the administration's position and to answer any questions that the committee may have. I should also like to mention at this point that the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the Honorable Philip C. Habib; Lt. Gen. Howard M. Fish, U.S. Air Force, Director, Defense Assistance Security Agency; and Mr. Erich F. Von Marbod, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), are also in the room and will be available to answer any questions. We will begin with Mr. Hamilton. Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the Special Subcommittee on Investigations has held six meetings over the last week to review the situation in Cambodia and to discuss recommendations we want to make to the full committee concerning the fiscal year 1975 supplemental aid requests of $222 million in military aid and $75 million in Public Law 480 food. During these hearings and briefings we have heard testimony from the State Department, Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the delegation of Members of the House of Representatives who recently visited Indochina and Jack Brady and Jack Sullivan of our committee staff who visited Vietnam, Thailand, and Cambodia about the time the delegation was in Indochina. Several themes emerged from these sessions. Let me list five of them: First, odds are substantial that Phnom Penh will fall in the next several weeks. If we do not provide additional military aid, the Khmer Republic will run out of ammunition sometime in late April and will be unable to fight until next fiscal year. In this case Phnom Penh will certainly fall. Even if we provide additional military aid, make ammunition available and are able to get the ammunition into Phnom Penh, there is no assurance that Phnom Penh will not fall, but there is a chance that the fighting will continue into the summer and into the wet season which begins sometime in June. But there is no assurance that the Khmer Republic will be able to improve its military position in the wet season or open up the lower Mekong River. The latter will depend on the effectiveness of Khmer Communist mines in the river. Second, for the Khmer Republic, the critical problem now is ammunition, not food and medical supplies. If current airlifts of rice are able to continue, there will be, when existing fiscal year 1975 funds are exhausted, enough food in Khmer Republic-held portions of Cambodia to last until sometime in July. If we give the additional $75 million requested in food aid, and it can be delivered, we will be able to provide enough food to last until sometime in November 1975. Problems, then, that exist with food and medical supplies in Cambodia have less to do with the supplies themselves and more to do with distribution. Some of the existing obstacles to getting enough food to those who need it most, especially the refugees, have been removed in recent days, we were told. Third, it has been U.S. policy to try to create a military equilibrium or stalemate and thereby create a situation where negotiations for a coalition government in Cambodia might be successful. Some observers suggest that the situation in Cambodia may have progressed beyond the point where such goals were attainable. Regardless, it is becoming clear that as long as U.S. policy is directed toward achieving such a stalemate as the basis for trying to start talks and end the civil war in Cambodia, that war will continue provided both sides continue to receive military equipment and neither side gains a military victory. Some testimony before the subcommittee indicated that there was no chance that the Khmer Republic forces would be able to regain the military initiative in Cambodia. If this is the case, U.S. policy objectives are in need of urgent review and, in the opinion of the subcommittee, redirection. |