Mr. HAMILTON. I don't think you can say you are giving them what they want. They are going to object to this very strongly.

Mr. HARRINGTON. I never saw an executive department coming in and getting all of what they wanted. They are getting a good part of it.

SHOULD NOT DICTATE SURRENDER

Mr. FOUNTAIN. I did not place the same construction on this that you did. I can see how that could be the result, but in voting for this draft I was not voting to say that the State Department bear on the existing situation to transfer power to the enemy. That is probably what the result is going to be but I don't think we want to put ourselves in that position.

Mr. HAMILTON. We are not saying that.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Then we would be saying the U.S. Congress rather than the formal process of the battle-this war could continue in some form even if they have to use shovels. I don't want to put us in the position of saying we have delivered our friends into the hands of the enemy by forcing them to yield and turn over the ruins to somebody else. Now, that is probably what would happen.

Mr. HAMILTON. You are correct in your observation that it does say that in the resolution of course.

not

Mr. FOUNTAIN. It was my intention to say that although I can realize that as a possibility-but I would hate for it to be interpreted as being intended to force the State Department to so change its policy that it now will support the Lon Nol government or whatever government is there for a period of 90 days or thereabouts, but thereafter we do everything we can to put in another government or to turn them over to the enemy, so to speak.

NOT GIVING THEM WHAT THEY WANT

Mr. WINN. It was not my intention when I worked against Mr. Harrington-my motion to table was not to give them everything they wanted. I did not intend to stay here for 2 hours and not try to arrive at something that might be acceptable to the various governments including the United States, the State Department, the executive branch, and mainly the members of the full committee.

I am willing to work on this further but I do not intend to give them everything they want, but I don't intend to cut them all off and just say "Too bad boys."

Mr. FOUNTAIN. But this is a reversal of policy in that we are saying to them after this money is used up, so far as our contribution to the Cambodian Government is concerned, that comes to an end.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. There is another fiscal year and there is a whole new battle in Congress over that.

WE ALL WANT TO AVOID VIOLENCE

Mr. HARRINGTON. Could I ask the chairman a question?

A lot of what seems to be going on is predicated on a desire everyone shares to avoid violence which ends up in slaughter or chaotic conditions.

But the information I have indicates that the Cambodians themselves have not drafted the eligible people that are still available in

the capital; they are not, according to the testimony yesterday, joining effectively in ground combat to pursue their own self-defense.

Why should we be so solicitous when there is demonstrable evidence they are not doing everything they can to help themselves in dealing with what is described to us as a mortal struggle for their survival?

MINIMIZING BLOODSHED

Mr. HAMILTON. I don't know if there is anything there to commend them to our solicitude. My search here is for a procedure that will minimize bloodshed and I am not, I think, opposed to your objectives at all but it is how you bring it about.

Mr. WINN. I think the gentleman makes a good point, but these are the same arguments we heard on South Vietnam and we are right back where we are picking our own friends, instead of trying to find out any weaknesses in our so-called enemies.

Mr. HARRINGTON. I could ask the gentleman how does picking our friends suggest a desperate fight for survival?

Mr. WINN. I don't understand how you can say "Let's let it go down the drain," and nowhere in your discussion have I heard how you are trying to defend against any bloodbath nor do you deny there will be one.

ILLUSION WE ARE GOING THROUGH

Mr. HARRINGTON. I raised some questions this morning with Congressman Chappell based on the CIA's estimates yesterday of the bloodbath in the past, but my other point-and I offer it more seriously-I would think the incentive for the enemy to do something civilized here may be offering them $222 million, if they avoid what we are expressing concern about. I think that is a better investment than the illusion we are going through now. Perhaps we should provide that money, give the executive branch what they want, but give it to them on the condition they make that available only if the same formula Kissinger applied in the Paris setting is available to use as an incentive.

That would be a specific suggestion. Rather than say here are a limited number of additional weapons, maybe it will work, maybe it won't, but this is all we are going to do for you.

Mr. WINN. I do not disagree with that philosophy but that is the first time we heard of it since 2 o'clock.

Mr. HARRINGTON. I thought I offered it a few times, maybe not as specific. I would try to draft article 21 or whatever it is.

OPTIONS AVAILABLE

Mr. HAMILTON. We have been at it almost 211⁄2 hours and it is very clear that there is not agreement within the subcommittee as to what we ought to do and perhaps we won't be able to reach it this afternoon. We have two options. We can meet tomorrow morning for further discussion or we can merely report to the chairman of the committee that we are evenly divided on the question and see what action, then, the chairman wants to take so far as the full committee is concerned. Mr. HARRINGTON. Frankly, I think if you want direct response, that is what should have been done to start with. I think the entire committee should have faced that issue and not put the burden on us in this fashion.

Mr. HAMILTON. One of the things the chairman sought to do, and we will have done this for him, is to clarify the options through the subcommittee work and we can do that by presenting something similar to the option list that we have here.

So I do not think the work of the subcommittee has been done in vain even if we are not able to agree. It will help focus the discussion of the full committee, but we really do not have any choice about the matter at the moment. We have to make some kind of report to Chairman Morgan on it.

Mr. WINN. If we are going to look into all the options there may be additional options including the one Mr. Harrington just talked about.

IMMEDIATE QUESTION

Mr. HAMILTON. The immediate question then is do you want to meet tomorrow to go over this further or do you want to simply report to the chairman that we are deadlocked.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Or vote on the draft provision.

Mr. BONKER. Maybe we should just report to the chairman.

Mr. WINN. I wonder if we could meet with the chairman or suggest the chairman meet with us.

Mr. FOUNTAIN. You could informally report to the chairman and then call a meeting of the subcommittee thereafter and find out which procedure he would prefer.

We have some pretty strong-minded members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. And it may be that we are better off not to go back and say, "This is what you take." I don't know. It would be nice if we could agree on something.

REPORT TO CHAIRMAN

Mr. HAMILTON. Suppose I report to the chairman the results of today's deliberations and then that we meet tomorrow afternoon. We will set aside a time to meet and I will report on the chairman's reactions and at that time we can decide what action we should take, if any. Mr. DU PONT. And you will report to the gentleman outside there that

Mr. HAMILTON. I will report nothing to them.

Mr. DU PONT. You might report to them that deliberations are going to be continued. We are still meeting.

Mr. HAMILTON. I will say that deliberations are continuing.

Mr. WINN. May I make another suggestion?

After you meet with the chairman that, either at the same meeting or at a subsequent meeting to

Mr. HAMILTON. Any member of the subcommittee that would like to go with me to see Dr. Morgan is entitled to do so.

Mr. WINN. I am saying at the same meeting with Dr. Morgan or a subsequent meeting could we include Mr. Broomfield?

Mr. HAMILTON. Certainly. I think that is a good suggestion. I think

we should invite Mr. Broomfield right now.

Mr. DU PONT. I have talked to Mr. Broomfield on a number of Occasions

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

THE CAMBODIA-VIETNAM DEBATE

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 1975

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met at 2 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. HAMILTON. The subcommittee will come to order.

This session is a continuation of our session yesterday.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Would it be appropriate to request a procedure to raise the question of whether to open or close the hearing? You said yesterday you would vote on whether to consider yesterday's decision. binding on today.

REVISED DRAFT

Mr. HAMILTON. I do consider it binding. Since it is a continuation of that session, it is binding.

The draft before the subcommittee is the draft that has been passed out and was under discussion at the time the subcommittee recessed yesterday.

It has been altered as a result of a session this morning between Mr. du Pont and myself. I will give each member an opportunity to read it and I will ask Mr. Van Dusen to explain the contents of it.

Then we will open it up for questions and as I understand it Mr. Harrington has a substitute which he would like to offer at the appropriate place and there may be other members who likewise have drafts that they want to submit.

[The revised draft provision follows:]

REVISED DRAFT PROVISION

Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding the following new subsection:

"(h) The Congress directs that United States policy shall be to achieve an end to the conflict in Cambodia no later than June 30, 1975. To achieve that objective, an amount equal to 10% of any ceiling provided for in this section may be provided which shall be in addition to the amount authorized under such ceiling in each successive thirty day period beginning on the date of enactment of this subsection, subsequent to a report by the President to the Congress during such thirty day period which states

"(i) That the United States is undertaking specific steps to achieve an end to the conflict in Cambodia no later than June 30, 1975, in order to relieve human suffering and end all United States military assistance to Cambodia by such date; "(ii) That the Khmer Republic is actively pursuing specific measures to reach a political and military accommodation with the other side in the conflict;

"(iii) That initiatives have been taken toward the other side to achieve a peaceful and orderly conclusion to the conflict, including safe passage out of Cambodia for those persons who desire to leave the country, appropriate care and help for the refugees and victims of the conflict, and assurances that combatants and prisoners will be treated in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War;

"And which provides specific details of such initiatives; unless the Congress, within 10 calendar days after receiving any report under this subsection adopts a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the provisions of the report."

Mr. HARRINGTON. Could I ask, with the reference you made to the proposal that was before us yesterday at the adjournment being altered, I assume you propose to offer the language you developed this morning as an alteration to that.

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. HARRINGTON. I would assume we are dealing with that in the present form as the matter before us.

NEW DRAFT IS AMENDMENT

Mr. HAMILTON. It is the suggestion of the Chair we are dealing with the draft before you, amendment to H.R. blank, offered by Mr. Hamilton. We will fill in my name for purpose of identification. Mr. HARRINGTON. Is this yesterday's or is this a new draft?

Mr. HAMILTON. This is an alteration of the draft we had yesterday. Mr. HARRINGTON. Parliamentary inquiry. Can you do that in the sense of having preexisting business in a continued session without it being offered as an amendment?

Mr. HAMILTON. I am offering it as an amendment.

Mr. HARRINGTON. I just wanted to clarify the procedure. It will have to be voted on.

Mr. HAMILTON. It will have to be voted on. This has not been voted on.

Mr. VAN DUSEN. That was not voted on yesterday or today.
Mr. HAMILTON. Go ahead, Mr. Van Dusen.

EXPLANATION OF DRAFT

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Let me comment on changes made. On page 1, we cite the amounts that will be available for each month. This was done on the advice of legislative counsel because yesterday's draft, as written, indicated that the amount that was available for each month could be used entirely for military aid.

To insure that the portions available for Public Law 480 be available for Public Law 480 we had to put in the money amounts.

The first three of four subparagraphs are essentially those that existed yesterday with some important changes.

I guess the most important change is in the first where a date certain is inserted and the United States is directed to undertake specific steps.

Those steps would have to be reported to Congress three times in the next 3 months and Congress would have an opportunity to vote against further aid three times.

The purpose of setting a date certain is to end all U.S. military assistance to Cambodia by the end of the fiscal year.