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The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m. the subcommittee adjourned.]


Mr. HAMILTON. The meeting will come to order. In the middle of the hearing this morning I asked Mike Van Dusen to put together for us, for purposes of discussion, the various options that we might face.


I don't know that these are exclusive, you may be able to think of other options, but I think these are probably the four major ones and there may be variations on each one.

So, it is not intended to be an exclusive list of options by any means. It is intended to help focus our thinking.

The first option is to reject the entire supplemental aid request. The second option is to provide additional food aid with no additional military assistance.

The third option is to provide both food and military aid, but make it conditional upon initiatives to end the war.

The fourth option is to provide the executive branch with all or a substantial part of the funds requested without conditions.

I think the way we ought to proceed is just to give the members an opportunity to discuss their views and their reactions to the hearings that we have had and see how we line up with regard to these several options.

Mr. DU PONT. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a procedural question? Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.


Mr. DU PONT. Is it your intention after discussion to mark up Dr. Morgan's bill or to try to report out a new draft bill today or what is the procedure?

Mr. HAMILTON. We will go as far as we can. Dr. Morgan has requested that we come before the committee tomorrow morning

Mr. VAN DUSEN. Mr. Chairman, that meeting has been postponed until Thursday because of the Democratic caucus tomorrow. Mr. HAMILTON. That gives us an additional day.

Mr. WINN. The Democratic caucus is more important than Cambodia?

Mr. HAMILTON. The caucus is on Cambodia.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Depending on what point of view.

Mr. WINN. Why don't we just go sit and wait for the results?
Mr. HAMILTON. No one is bound by the caucus.

We will meet Thursday then, the full committee, to consider our recommendations. I would like to go as far as we can. If we can agree first of all on an option, fine.

Second, if we agree upon an option then we can agree upon the specific language that we want to embody in that option I think it would be well and good.

So the floor is open for discussion.


Mr. WINN. Point of order, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Point of order?

Mr. WINN. Just one little clarification on what the chairman of the full committee expects this committee to do or, second, thinking out loud, what would a motion to table do so that seven or eight of us are not particularly lassoed with a decision that is going to fall to the entire full committee Thursday anyway?

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I think Chairman Morgan wants us to come -before the full committee with a recommendation as to what we ought to do on the supplemental aid request to the administration.

Second, if there is a motion to table and it carries, then the subcommittee has in effect made a decision not to support the supplemental aid request.

Mr. WINN. Well, may I continue without making a point of order? It seems to be fairly informal here.


Mr. WINN. I got the idea this morning, and I may be wrong, that a few members, including some of those testifying, would like to lay the blame on the State Department. I may be wrong, but I don't think that that is going to accomplish a great deal and at the same time it is my understanding that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is waiting for a decision from this subcommittee.

I would like to figure that out of our discussions here and I believe Pete du Pont has an amendment or a change in wording-that we could arrive at something that would not try to zero in on State, that would not try to reflect on the executive branch and something that we could all live with and that they can all live with.

I think from an international standpoint maybe it would look better if we could arrive at that type of a decision.

That is all I have to say.


Mr. HAMILTON. We will do our best. It won't be easy.

I would like to concentrate on the options that are before us and see if we can get some idea of how the members feel.

Now, I suppose I should begin by indicating to you the direction of my own thought, and I must say that when I launched upon these hearings, I was pretty strongly opposed to the President's supplemental aid request and as a result of the hearings I have not been moved entirely off that position, but I am at the place in my own mind where I consider option 1 or option 3 as the ones which I might support and option 3 only if we can get language that is tight and would in fact lead us in the direction of a peace settlement.

I recognize that may not be the position of all on the subcommittee and it is a matter that is controversial and I suspect it is probably that we will not all be able to agree, but I would like to have some reaction from the members.


Mr. WINN. I had marked option 3 but I have double underlined the part above where it says, "upon initiatives to end the war."

Now, that leaves a question mark in my own mind. What are we talking about? That sort of follows along the line that Don Fraser talked about this morning but he really was not very clear.

Mr. DU PONT. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. WINN. I would be glad to yield.


Mr. DU PONT. Let me make one suggestion that maybe will clarify things a little. I took the draft provision that I saw earlier today and the question of initiatives to end the war is a most difficult one. I don't think you can key it to peace negotiations or anything else.

I have provided some rough language here that we can work with. Suppose we keyed it to assurance by the government of the Khmer Rouge that all prisoners taken and all Cambodian citizens would be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention? Now, that might solve the bloodbath problem. We would provide aid in this limited form until that time as soon as they certified that that was the case and presumably there would have to be some inspection of course and then we would cease aid at that point.

Mr. HAMILTON. All right.

Now, for purposes of discussion I take it, Pete, that you are interested in option 3 as a possibility for the subcommittee action.


Mr. DU PONT. I would say option 4 is not acceptable. That is just a personal point of view. Option 2, I would like to be realistic, but it really is not so that we are faced with option 1 unless we can define a package along those lines.

Mr. HAMILTON. All right.

Now, are there other subcommittee members that would want to address themselves to the options?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Let me clarify what Pete has just raised.

You are suggesting, Pete, that it would be language to provide both economic or humanitarian aid as distinguished from military aid on an incremental basis until there was some broad response of the kind that dealt with the question of being more than that afterward?

Mr. DU PONT. Yes; and at that point you would terminate the military and presumably continue the humanitarian.

Mr. HARRINGTON. What is the incentive that you think this may have to provide an alteration of the pattern that exists right now? Mr. DU PONT. Hopefully it will do two things.

First of all, it will give some protection to all those thousands of civilians that may well be killed if we simply let ammunition run out. Second, it may bring the Khmer Rouge into a negotiating position because after all as soon as they make that certification our military supplies stop and the situation presumably is stable.


Mr. HARRINGTON. I am puzzled. If I could go back and forth like this, if it is agreeable to the chairman. To agree that we have any

credibility to exercise initiative that might not be taken in accordance with what Don Fraser said this morning-the French or something like a facet of the United Nations dealing with the problem as the place to which leverage could exist rather than have it appear that it is us doing it.

Mr. DU PONT. I certainly would be willing to explore that.

Mr. HARRINGTON. I don't know how practical that would be.

Mr. DU PONT. I have no insistence that it be the United States, but it seems to me that ought to be a cutoff point. What I am trying to do in effect is say:

Look, Cambodia, we are going to help; we don't want a bloodbath to occur and we will help until the other side certifies that respect of the Geneva Convention rules.

At that point you have gotten into the rules and are respected and you are on your own. We will continue to supply rice and medical supplies.


Mr. WINN. Would the gentleman yield?

I agree with Mike. I don't think there is much incentive really if what they said this morning and yesterday and what we read in the paper over the weekend is true, and I don't have any doubt about that.

At the same time I think the entire world is watching what the United States does. If in your warning somewhere, Pete, you would mention the French or any other outside countries, it might be helpful, but it might mean we walk out of here or whenever the report of this committee is presented to the full committee, certainly on Thursday, why that is what is going to be the policy of the United States.

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me just comment. Do we have a copy of cutoff language?

My understanding is, this is a closed session, State Department people are not to be here.

Go ahead and proceed.

Miss Folger is with the State Department, and I think it would be inappropriate for her to be present during the committee session.


Mr. DU PONT. Well, maybe we ought to try to start from the begin ning.

One thing we could do is simply vote to cut off all the aid right now. I am of a mind to do that, unless I can see some language that might help with the aftermath problem.

The fact is that if you do cut out some, the last bullet is going to be fired and then all hell is going to break loose.

Now, is there some way that we can give a small amount of aid such as the amounts suggested in the original draft and still condition the giving of that just as a product to bringing an end to that war.


Now, my draft language, particularly subsection (iii) thereof, is designed so.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Would you yield for a question?

What was the figure suggested by the staff and what did it involve? Mr. VAN DUSEN. An explanation is on page 3 of that draft in front of you, Mr. Harrington.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Entitled "Draft Provision"?


Mr. HAMILTON. For purposes of identification, we have passed out a series of an amendment entitled "Draft Provision" and I might say that this was drafted by the staff-by Mr. Sullivan, I believe-at my direction, and it was handed to me this morning during the course of our hearings.

Then Mr. du Pont has taken that draft provision and worked on it just within the last hour or two.

So, we will identify that as the du Pont draft and I think that has been passed out to you. So we will refer to the subcommittee's draft provision and the du Pont draft.

[The subcommittee's and Representative du Pont's draft provisions follow :]


Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding the following new subsection:

"(h) An amount equal to 10% of any ceiling provided for in this section may be provided which shall be in addition to the amount authorized under such ceiling in each successive thirty day period beginning on the date of enactment of this subsection, subsequent to a report by the President to the Congress during such thirty day period which states

(i) That United States is seeking an immediate end to the conflict without requiring the participation of the present government in any subsequent government of the Khmer Republic;

(ii) That the Government of the Khmer Republic is pursuing a similar objective; and

(iii) That initiatives have been taken toward the other side in the conflict to achieve a peaceful conclusion under which Cambodians who wish to do so may be permitted a reasonable time to leave the country.

And which provides specific details of such activities; unless the Congress, within 10 calendar days after receiving any report under this subsection adopts a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the provisions of the report."


Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding the following new subsection:

"(h) Any ceiling provided for in this section may be exceeded by 10 percent of such amount in each successive thirty day period beginning on the date of enactment of this subsection, subsequent to a report by the President to the Congress during such thirty day period which states

(1) that it is recognized that the only objective of any further aid is to relieve human suffering by ceasing military action.

(2) that the Government of the Khmer Republic is pursuing a similar objective; and

(3) that to this end, military supplies are being provided only until such time that our government is assured by the Government of the Khmer Rouge that non-combatants and prisoners will be treated in accord with the provisions of the (Geneva) Convention.

(4) that initiatives have been taken toward the other side in the conflict looking to a controlled solution, and which provides specific details of such initiatives; unless the Congress, within 10 calendar days after receiving any report under this subsection adopts a concurrent resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the provisions of the report."

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