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CONSEQUENCES OF LON NOL DEPARTURE
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. What would happen if Lon Nol got on the night plane to Switzerland tonight and just left? Is there anyone who could step in and take his place?
Mrs. FENWICK. Well, I wonder if this general who is Prince Sihanouk's general, is perhaps being prepared by Lon Nol for that very role. You see, these are the only faint straws of hope that we have to offer. We have only our opinions. In my opinion anyway, I just would like to say the only victory here is peace.
As far as the U.S. Government is concerned, for me its prestige and its status and all that rests in a sincere concern for human beings and sensible actions that express that concern. That is the way I regard the responsibilities of a great nation and not in military might. I think the atom bomb has almost rendered this ultimate recourse to force impossible. We have got to have some moral status. That is where prestige lies. I think the greatness of England
NEED TO HELP PEOPLE
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Of course, there is more than status here to some people and I would share in this. I see no alternative at this point but I think it is somewhat immoral having put these people in that position, these 2 million at least
Mrs. FENWICK. To abandon them, I agree.
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. To abandon them.
Mrs. FENWICK. Yes.
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Not only to the danger of physical violence and starvation which is certainly very real but also to the idea of their having to give up their religion. Many of them have already lost their property. They must give up their religion and the whole thing.
Mrs. FENWICK. Well, Sihanouk is a Buddhist. I don't think he would start suddenly
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. In all candor, wouldn't Sihanouk merely be a figurehead for the Khmer Rouge?
Mrs. FENWICK. God knows. He is Cambodian and that is their business.
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. All right.
WILL BE BAD SITUATION
Mr. CHAPPELL. I think the feelings are just about as high as feelings can get and I doubt that there is going to be any great increase of that regardless of what happens. I think the procedures which the Communists employ have been very well defined. I don't think they are going to change those procedures; they are going to do whatever is necessary when they take over and that usually means the death of many leaders and those who could possibly be in opposition to them. I think the death toll is going to be real high.
The thing that really concerns me, I suppose, is the fact that as we in the Congress take on more and more responsibility in the making of foreign policy we are going to find it more and more difficult to negotiate anywhere in the world because the Congress is the finest barometer for what we are going to do in the future. The only way you can conduct meaningful negotiations is from a unified position of strength.
The thing that bothers me is that we are saying to all the rest of the world, to the Communists-even if we do anything we are not going to go past the wet season. Somehow I had hoped that we could conclude our consideration without any talk beyond the fiscal year and talk only about this fiscal year and let there be the decision later as to what we would say to the world regarding our position beyond that point.
PROBLEM WITH NEGOTIATIONS
The thing that bothers me right now is the fact that while we want negotiations and while our State Department tells us they certainly have a zero opportunity for negotiation under the present situation, they tell us that we do have some opportunity. I am inclined to agree with Mr. Flynt on somewhere between zero and 50 percent that we would have some opportunity for negotiation if we approve this request.
I feel we would have a lot more opportunity if we were not in a position of having to say what we are going to do beyond this point because we telegraph to the Communist world exactly what we are going to do. This is what really bothers me as we approach the problems in Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia. I think the Thais have already indicated that we are not really going to live up to our commitment. We have already telegraphed what we are going to do in that area of the world and they have indicated to us that they are going to accommodate toward the Communists because they know what we are going to do.
BETTER COMMUNICATION NEEDED
So as we in the Congress assume our greater role in the making of foreign policy, I think we are going to be faced with some real problems in establishing the proper communication between our Department of State and the 535 Members of Congress in such detail that we in the Congress can truly understand what is going on and obtain a better understanding of real world diplomacy. This situation has been a real eye opener to me.
In response to what Mr. Bonker, I believe, said, I had really gone to this area of the world saying that I would not vote any more money for Cambodia but I have came to the conclusion that for this fiscal year-and we ought to limit our talks and everything to this fiscal year-if we are going to be helpful in negotiations then we can do nothing less than provide the requested assistance. Of course, I am more optimistic about the strength of these people to defend themselves than some because I think we have to look at the enemy as well as the government forces to see the real possibilities of a stalemate. Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Solarz.
WHY IS GOVERNMENT LOSING?
Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chappell, during the testimony you said that, in comparison to the Khmer Communists, the government troops were equally clothed, equally fed, equally motivated, and we all know they are better armed. If. in fact, that is the case, how do you account for the
fact that the government seems to be losing and the Khmer Communists seem to be winning?
Mr. CHAPPELL. I think that is somewhat of a delusion at the present moment according to the reports we are receiving. Although the city is besieged, this is not a difficult situation as I understand the makeup of the country. In every attempt to move inside the perimeter the government troops have held and thrown them back. For example, Route 4 to the north was completely cut and taken over by the Khmer Rouge. The government forces have gone back in and opened that route according to the information of March 2 unless they have lost it again.
My point is they have been able to hold their position as long as they have had the wherewithal to do so, and I am talking about the materials of war. Now, of course, this is a besieged city but remember this: There is at least one town in Cambodia that has been under siege for 8 months already and everybody said they would last only a few days. They are still holding, a besieged city beside Phnom Penh. You don't hear much about it. They are dropping supplies in there daily which indicates a tremendous will on the part of these people to live under a free society of some sort rather than under communism.
WHY ARE COMMUNISTS ADVANCING?
Mr. SOLARZ. How do you account for the fact, sir, that if they are equally clothed, equally fed, equally motivated, and better armed that the Khmer Rouge seems to have gotten control of 80 percent of the countryside?
Mr. CHAPPELL. I didn't say they were better armed, I said they were essentially armed and I think those are the facts that come from my talking with men who had been captured, a little 16-yearold girl who had been captured, from talking to a Communist who had been captured, and from talking to the soldiers on the government side. They are all going into battle essentially as I have described it.
The control of land mass does not mean a whole lot in an area like Cambodia as it might in this country, but in an area like Cambodia one of the things that is vital to either side is the ability to produce food. Now as those peasants leave the farm and the farming areas they become nonproductive. They are certainly nonproductive to the Khmer Rouge as well as to the government forces. The control of land mass is not so important as the control of the people, if the people themselves are motivated to do something about it.
Unquestionably, if the area is overrun, these people in the camps are going to be put at forced labor to produce in the fields. I am not trying to defend the fact that they have lost land. Certainly they have lost land but it is not as vital as it would be in a more sophisticated country.
CONSEQUENCES OF COLLAPSE
Mr. SOLARZ. I would like, if I may, to ask Mr. McCloskey and Mrs. Fenwick a question about the consequences of a collapse of the present government. Both of you have spoken of your great concern over the possible loss of life which could well ensue in the event of a Khmer Rouge victory in Cambodia. I think that everybody of any moral
sensitivity shares the concern over the possible murder and execution of people who have been sympathizers of the present government. The real question, I think, is how we can minimize the killing. The real alternative, it seems to me, is whether by providing the present regime with the wherewithal to continue the war we are, in fact, minimizing the loss of life that would otherwise occur.
Speaking from the perspective of someone who shares that concern, I don't view the Khmer Rouge as a group of agrarian reformers whose triumph would necessarily be in the best interests of the people of Cambodia or Southeast Asia. I am convinced that a perpetuation of the war is in no one's interest. I think this is the point that Congresswoman Abzug was making with such great force.
RATE OF DEATHS
Given the rate at which people are getting killed in Cambodia, the estimates vary. Let us say a conservative estimate at the present moment is 10,000 a month; some say it is as high as 30,000. If we give them the ammunition to survive into the rainy season, we are talking easily about another 150,000 to 200,000 deaths. Other than Congressman Chappell, I don't know that anybody who has spoken to us about the possible bloodbath that might ensue in the wake of a Khmer Rouge victory has projected executions anywhere in that vicinity.
I would like to know from your point of view what the justification is for enabling them to continue for several more months when the probabilities are that, by virtue of that kind of continuation of the war, substantially more Cambodians will be killed and maimed than if we were to cut them off and the war were to end because they ran out of ammunition sometime around the beginning or the middle of April.
Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Solarz, I think in response to your question I would like to offer to the committee at this point in the record a telegram from the Department of State that was sent to the delegation in response to our inquiries along those lines. I think if this can be duplicated and returned to me that we would all benefit. [The text of the telegram follows:]
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C., March 2, 1975,
1. The Indochina CODEL requested certain information which embassy promised to provide prior to their takeoff from Saigon later today. This covered ammunition consumption rates, recruiting, casualty figure for FANK, and program expenditures for medical supplies in MAP and in the AID programs.
2. Recruits. FANK has received 4,871 new recruits between Jan. 1 and Feb. 28. 3. Casualty figures. Here a word of caution is needed. The system for casualty reporting within FANK is notoriously poor and incomplete, and sizable discrepancies often appear between different sources. While the Defense attaché's office does its best to reconcile these figures, we are often in the position of arriving at our own estimate, which in some cases is based on actual observations of particular units affected.
4. According to the operations section (J-3) of FANK headquarters, total casualties for January/February were: 2,037 killed in action (1,158 for January, 879 for February); 8,025 wounded in action (3,948 for January, 4,077 for February), and 674 missing in action (111 for January, 563 for February). As a check against these figures, the total number of wounded brought into the military hospital reception (triage) center was 10,070 for the 2-month period.
Not only is this some 2,000 higher than the FANK J-3 figures but the latter are supposed to be for the entire country, not just Phnom Penh area. (Defense attaché would expect countryside wounded to reach some 15,000 for the 2 months.) This is cited just to recommend a certain skepticism regarding the FANK figures, which in our opinion are considerably lower than the true figure. We estimate that between 1 January and 20 February 4,260 FANK personnel were killed in action.
5. The CODEL asked for casualty figures by units. Here are some sample figures for major units: (January 1-February 28)
First division : 60 killed in action, 170 wounded.
Second division: 14 killed, 1,030 hospitalized. (Would include previously wounded and sick); 9 missing in action.
Third division: 170 killed, 955 wounded, no reported missing.
Seventh division: 1,800 killed and wounded; 500 plus missing.
Ninth division: (for February only): 45 killed; 194 wounded; 258 missing.
Airborne (para) brigade (of strength of about 1,200): 81 killed; 345 wounded. 23rd brigade (of about 1,100): 28 killed; 148 wounded.
13th brigade (of about 800): 20 killed; 148 wounded.
5th brigade (of about 800): 300 killed and wounded; 100 missing.
Khmer navy (includes both naval marines and boat crews): 308 killed; 649 wounded; 117 missing in action.
6. Ammunition consumption: the following are daily, repeat, daily, average consumption rates for the weeks ending on the respective dates: 3 January-344; 10 January-570; 17 January-571; 24 January-555; 31 January-704; 7 February503; 14 February-342; 21 February-347; 28 February-364. On March 1, reflecting slightly increased stocks as a result of the recent airlift, daily issue rose to 542 tons, a figure which indicates the likely continuing consumption rate for the near future, at least.
7. Medical supplies and pharmaceuticals-military.
$2 million has been programed for this purpose out of the fiscal year 1975 MAP program, of which all funds have already been obligated. out of the $222 million supplemental request, $750,000 has been programed for medical supplies. 8. Medical supplies and pharmaceuticals civilian.
The AID-supported exchange support fund, which finances licensed imports, financed $4.8 million of pharmaceuticals in calendar 1973 and $3.2 million in calendar year 1974 (this fund operates by the calendar year). The fund also financed chemicals (other than pesticides and fertilizers) of $955,000 and $1.6 million for calendar 1973 and 1974, respectively. It may be assumed that about 50 percent of these chemical imports were raw materials for pharmaceutical manufacturing establishments in Phnom Penh.
9. Some of the voluntary agencies which are largely financed by AID buy their own medical supplies with some of the AID-furnished funds. Thus, world vision averages $25,000 a month, and Catholic relief services averages $55,000 a month, for purchase of medical supplies. Lutheran World similarly purchases $100,000 per year.
This would bring total expenditures for medical supplies by the voluntary agencies to more than $1 million a year. Two international organizations, the International Committee for the Red Cross and UNICEF, also bring in medical supplies, and of course the United States contributes to their funds through the parent organizations. UNICEF brings in $350,000 and ICRC brings in $660,000 a year of medical supplies. Accordingly, medical supply imports by humanitarian assistance agencies total about $2 million a year.
10. The voluntary agencies supported by AID tell us they expect their pharmaceutical needs for the coming year to rise about 40 percent. This increase will be funded through AID grants made to the voluntary agencies.
11. Examples of the will to resist. A member of the CODEL asked for some specific examples of military action by this side which are indicative of a will to resist. Here are a few examples:
A. Kompong Seila, which had been cut off and surrounded by the enemy since May 1974 (and still is), withstood intensive enemy shelling, rising to as much as 1,000 rounds per night, and ground attacks throughout the past 8 months. A Khmer special forces team was airlifted into the camp on January 12. It found that there were 8,800 civilians, some 800 military effectives, and that there had been over 500 killed in action, some 400 wounded and another 300 sick. Yet these people had held their isolated enclave for 8 months. They continue to do so. Their morale was surprisingly high. Meanwhile supplies continue to be parachuted in to them, as has been the case for the past 8 months.