Imagini ale paginilor

With the airlift you can get all $84 million worth of ammunition in there at the present time. If, as the Mekong widens out, they try to sail it up the Mekong, the transportation charges will be less but they can anticipate losing considerable amounts of it, so these figures are based on the continued airlift. That is $84 million in ammunition and $19.6 million in handling and transportation charges.

Their figures for medical assistance for the military was $750,000 but in the situations that were observed they are obviously short of both military and civilian medical supplies. They used the figure to us of $3.2 million for medical assistance. We doubled that to $6.4 million and the military asked for $6.7 million in spare parts.


The total that I was prepared to recommend along the lines of Don Fraser's is that if military assistance were deemed appropriate to accompany the raising of the Public Law 480 ceiling that the figure would be $116.7 million, not the $222 million that the administration had requested. It would be a little over half, and that is based on 75 days at the use of 450 tons a day that has been the use of the last 2 months and in my judgment would have to go down as these combat forces are suffering attrition.

Finally, on the food situation, all of us found out and, I think, saw some refugees or talked to some individuals. The people that I met personally were in two small villages alongside the road as we returned from the front and in a refugee camp that people have been coming into in the last 60 days. In all cases it was clear there was insufficient food, insufficient nutrition for the children and the people. There are over 2 million people in that perimeter, over half of whom were refugees from Phnom Penh.

I think it is the unanimous recommendation of the eight of us there that the committee raise the ceiling of Public Law 480 as requested by the administration, but that if we lift that ceiling, we would recommend that at least 12 additional AID personnel be assigned to the area to insure that one man-one bag of rice. We were not satisfied that the Cambodian Army or the Cambodian Government is going to be charitable at all to the civilians or the refugees of the population. As I understand it, if you should enact the raising of the Public Law 480 ceiling it would require the personnel ceiling to be raised as well, to add an additional 12 people. I think the ceiling now is 200.


Now some personal observations that might be of some interest. When I went over there dedicated not to vote one nickel for further aid to Cambodia, the two things that changed my mind were these. One, when we visited the Cambodian Army, apparently they are taking no prisoners. Congressman Murtha and I had gone around and visited various units in Vietnam and it was common to find that if they suffered 200 killed in action and had 800 wounded that they had killed twice the number of enemy and they had taken perhaps 20 or 30 prisoners, that kind of a ratio.

The same is true of killed and wounded in Cambodia but we could find no prisoners-at least there were none taken by the unit that I

saw which leads me to the conclusion that if they have run out of ammunition on April 15 as provided and the Khmer Rouge comes in and they treat the Cambodian Army in the same manner that the Cambodian Army has treated the Khmer Rouge, there are going to be considerable casualties suffered by the vengence of the people that have been living first under our B-52's and then engaged in this very vicious war over the last 5 years.


The second factor was that the refugees that I talked to, and that would include one prisoner that we were able to interview back in the rear and three people who had rallied-and rallied means voluntarily coming over to the Cambodian Government side-the prisoner who was fortunate enough to be alive and the only one I could find was 16 years of age. Three weeks earlier he had been living in a village 15 miles outside the perimeter when the Khmer Rouge had come into his village. They had given him an American rifle and 500 cartridges. They had trained him in the use of the rifle as he was walking down to fight in the perimeter. They told him he was fighting against Americans so he had gone along. He had fired two clips of that AR-15 rifle and then had been captured.

Apparently the Khmer Rouge is impressing this on the troops on their side, people of this age with no military training at all but who indicate a willingness to participate to some extent in the fighting. Of the two ralliers and the refugees with whom I talked-and I would say from 12 to 15 people, because while various people interjected themselves into the conversation it could not be any more exact than that in every case the refugees described that when their village had been taken over by the Khmer Rouge, when the Khmer Rouge walked into town, they have taken, 2, 10, 30 people out and executed them either by shooting or in some villages beating them to death or driving a bamboo stake into those people. I was impressed with the aura of fear that pervaded these refugees as to what would happen to them if the Khmer Rouge should take over.


As you know, I have opposed the war in Vietnam but I would not be under any illusions as to the intentions of the Communists. They trained people in Hanoi who returned and killed the civil service employees, the school teachers, the monks, the leaders and the like. It is for that reason it seemed to me appropriate that we continue the limited military aid to get the Cambodian Government into the wet


The further recommendation that I would make personally is that this committee ought to take careful testimony from the State Department. There seems to be a reluctance on the part of the State Department to want to urge the Lon Nol government to step down even though it is recognized that the Khmer Rouge will not negotiate; there is no chance to negotiate with Lon Nol and the seven or eight men around him.

The Lon Nol government had condemned the Khmer Rouge leaders to death and it appears that the sentiment is returned in kind. The

Khmer Rouge attitude is: Why should we negotiate; we are going to win in 1 month to 3 months to 9 months so why negotiate under any circumstances with Lon Nol and the people closely around him.


There is a further reluctance, it appears to me, from the conversations that I have had with the State Department people. I might say that in every respect it is a refreshing change in the Ford administration to find a complete candor and a complete openness in the discussion of both the facts and the issues by the State Department, the Department of Defense and the CIA people with whom we have discussed the matter.

There seems to be in the State Department a continuing belief that it is the prestige of the American Government and the credibility of the American commitment based on other State Department programs and problems around the world that forces the State Department to continue to support the Lon Nol government and to continue to urge the Congress that we have a commitment. There is a difference in the State Department's feeling of commitment and I think certain of us on this delegation who, if we feel any commitment to assist at all, is based on the guilt of what we have imposed on this country as a basis for getting our troops out of Vietnam somewhat earlier than we might have had we not invaded and bombed, and supported the Lon Nol government to serve our purposes up until 1973.

I would point out that when we raised this issue with Secretary Kissinger that we expressed the hope of a State Department initiative. Secretary Kissinger's response was that he had been within a few days of settling the Cambodían question when the Congress cut off the bombing by that vote in June of 1973 and that by our vote we had interfered and hindered his ability to engage a Cambodian peace. I just got the impression that the Secretary was a little reluctant to proceed with any new diplomatic initiatives in this state of affairs when obviously there is no condition of strength from which to deal.

I think that sums up my testimony, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Congressman McCloskey. Mr. Chappell.

We welcome you before the committee.


Mr. CHAPPELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think Pete has done a tremendous job in summarizing what is pretty much my position except as to degree. We varied a little bit in degree on what the recommendations to the committee would be.


First of all, let me say that there is no easy solution in Cambodia. To decide to vote aid for Cambodia insofar as I am concerned has been one of the toughest decisions in my entire politicial career. So,

if we are looking for an easy solution or easy answer we are not going to find it with respect to Cambodia. I think, as Pete says, it is going to lie very keenly in the conscience of every one of us to try to help people who are in this very beleaguered condition.

Let me first address myself to what the moneys would do if they are voted. First of all, they would assure food and medicine to these besieged people; second, they would buy time for negotiations; and third, they would lessen the chance for the tremendous bloodbath that we all must expect.

Sometimes I think we are a little bit too reluctant to understand truly the nature of the Communist world and we are a little bit reluctant to understand exactly what the atrocities are and what is happening over in that area of the world. I would like to go back to a little bit of the history on the Communists-and this is nothing new, you know it, but I would just like to summarize briefly.


When Mao started his proceedings in China he issued instructions that violence was to be employed against 2 percent of the farm families, no more and no less. There were about 34 million farm families in the old "liberated areas" and 68 million in the new "liberated areas." These percentages suggest that there were over 1 million people actually killed systematically by plan in order for the Communists to control. As all of us know, they control the population by terror. The statistics which I am reciting to you come from my request to our own State Department updated to 2 days ago. Let's look at the situation in which we find Cambodia with reference to what might happen in the event of a breakthrough.

According to our State Department, the Khmer Communists have already indicated in their statements and their actions that they intend to retaliate against those who have supported the Lon Nol government and perhaps more importantly anyone who could serve as potential opposition to a Communist regime. Given their minority position, it is a prudent step in controlling political competition.

Here are the actual circumstances we find right now within this perimeter. The Cambodians, particularly the urban elite, very early in the war committed themselves to the Government position by regularly and publicly subscribing to petitions, fund raising, elections and the like which has facilitated the Communist job of preparing lists of potential targets.


In the countryside where the Communist apparatus has been established, the Communists have already imprisoned or killed buddhist monks, lay leaders, village elders, teachers, and civil servants. The international press has already been replete with stories of villagers slaughtered who refused to accede to collectivization plans and who attempted to escape from Communist zones.

In combat, the Communists have long practiced the execution of all captured officers and noncommissioned officers. As the current military offensive gathers momentum, the Communists will attempt to kidnap and murder selective government officials and members of

parliament to further intimidate the government leadership. Intelligence sources have already confirmed that the Communists ordered the murder of two government ministers last June who were being held by students protesting economic conditions.

Prince Sihanouk has already noted that the Communists will probably dump him if given the opportunity. He has referred to himself as the potential Jan Masaryk of Cambodia. Most recently he has said he will spend little time in Cambodia if the Communists win because he does not wish to risk being "put on trial" at some future date.


So there is no question in my mind and no question I think in the minds of most that if Phnom Penh is permitted to fall and the situation there becomes totally uncontrolled, there is going to be slaughter by the millions.

Let's look at the situation described by Mr. McCloskey. We have roughly a million refugees. Now these refugees have also voted already against the Communist forces with their feet and they have come by their own choice into the refugee camps in Phnom Penh. Unquestionably there will be thousands and thousands of those who are going to suffer the same plight.

Let me turn to the question of food and medicine without military aid. To my mind it would be totally foolhardy to send in food and medicine without sending military assistance in to insure that the food and medicine gets to the right place. If we don't send in the military assistance that is to say, moneys-there is no need in sending the food and medicine. So I hope that whatever we do, if we should choose to vote, we won't provide food and medicine without the military assistance to go with it.


Now, as I view the situation, none of us want to send money into a totally helpless cause where the people have no will to win. It has been indicated by Mr. Murtha and Mr. McCloskey that the will to win is pretty high. We have information from our own State Department based upon actual history of these units that is to say the fighting units and the will to win has been displayed at a very high level. Now, they have been able to hold man to man in almost every instance where they have been engaged.

We tend to look at the fighting going on in this area of the world pretty much on our own standard when actually it is not on our standard. We expect Phnom Penh to fall at any time. We expect it to be quick and rapid. In my opinion unless we default, insofar as our obligation is concerned, and it is a moral one, I think these people have the capacity to withstand for a substantial period of time, maybe indefinitely.

In comparing the two forces of people, looking at the personnel first of all, both sides are going in with their foot soldiers fighting in sandles with very meager clothes-maybe a pair of shorts, shirt, usually without a helmet. That is the picture of the personnel on the two sides. They are essentially equally clothed, they are essentially equally fed. In my opinion the Government forces certainly have at least

« ÎnapoiContinuă »