We shall now attempt to give a popular view of those solemn and humbling doctrines, Total and Native Depravity doctrines which if only accurately stated and defined, are more than half demonstrated.

Few have ever denied the universal sinfulness of man. But the degree of that sinfulness has been greatly called in question. The following explanation, in which orthodox divines would generally concur, of the doctrine of Total depravity, is given by Dr. Woods in his recent Essay on this subject.

"The doctrine relates to man as a moral being, subject to a moral government; and accordingly the depravity predicated of him is a moral depravity. And it is to be farther remarked that moral, in relation to this subject, is used in its highest sense. The word is not unfrequently ap plied to those affections which attend our domestic and social relations, and to the conduct which those affections prompt. Such affections, generally called natural affections, may indeed be regarded as of a moral nature in a secondary sense. They possess a higher excellence than the animal appetites, and more directly involve our moral interests. But the word moral, as commonly used with regard to the present subject, respects the high standard of God's holy law, the sum of which is, to love God with all the heart, and our neighbour as ourselves. So far as we are wanting in this affection for God, and our fellow-men, and so far as we have an affection of a contrary kind, we are morally depraved. And if we are entirely destitute of the holy love required by God's law, and if all the affections we have in relation to that law are of an opposite nature, then we are totally depraved." pp. 45, 46.

The doctrine, as thus explained, does not teach that the body is depraved. We know indeed, that depravity abuses the body by using its members as "servants to unrighteousness," and consequently, that which is made to furnish occasions and means of sinning is involved in suffering, and doomed to dissolution. Matter is incapable of transgressing a moral law. Sin, strictly speaking, is an attribute of the heart. The sentiment so extensively held in ancient times, that matter is the seat of depravity, is now exploded.

Men may be totally depraved without being totally ignorant of moral duties and relations. Nay, the doctrine we speak of even presupposes that men are in some way acquainted with these things. Depravity is a want of conformity to the law, for "where no law is, there is no transgression ;" and " by the law is the knowledge of sin." It is not always the most ignorant, who are the most evidently depraved. Men may have richly cultivated minds, and yet from that very circumstance be more obviously alienated from the life of God. It will not help us to determine the VOL. IV.

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moral character of any being, to learn that he is endowed with knowledge. This is not the proper criterion.

The doctrine of total depravity so far from implying that men are devoid of understanding, stands upon the opposite supposition. It is impossible to conceive of moral corruption in a creature which is not possessed of intelligence. Sin is solely the unreasonable act of a reasonable being. Man's guilt does not prove him to be bereft of reason; on the contrary, his guilt bears a close proportion to the vigour of his mental powers. As they say proverbially, The greater light, the greater sin. It is no clue to the moral character of any creature to know that he is an intelligent being. Nay, the higher the opinion we have of his intellectual powers, the more we dread him, till we learn from other sources, whether he will make a benevolent use of his powers.

This doctrine does not imply that men are destitute of conscience. What is conscience? Is it a relic of native goodness? Is it a spark of moral excellence? Or is it not rather a created part of the soul, conferring neither merit nor demerit on the creature? It is a mere faculty, which, without being, morally speaking, either right or wrong, enables us to distinguish right from wrong; just as the eye distinguishes light from darkness, without being either the one or the other. Should we witness the arrival of a winged visitor from another world, of whom we could only ascertain that he had a conscience, it would be impossible for us to determine from that fact whether he were an angel or a fiend. The possession of this faculty is not a test of moral character. Is not remorse of conscience the deathless worm of the second death ? The truth is, that conscience, as God's vicegerent, reigns in every world; swaying in heaven the sceptre of peace over the spirits of the just; and in hell dashing the wicked in pieces with a rod of

iron.

It cannot be inferred from the doctrine of entire depravity, that men would be without natural affection. Perhaps no point connected with the subject has caused more. perplexity or mistake than this, or stands more in need of an original and fundamental investigation. Natural affection is an animal feeling, for it exists and powerfully acts in the brutes that perish. If natural affection were holiness, it could never become inordinate or excessive;-it would

never take a wrong direction ;-it would never be excited by wrong motives;-it would never act to the injury of others. Persons naturally amiable are as indifferent as any others to the law of God. The Bible preaches regeneration, repentance and faith as alike necessary to all, and makes no exception in favour of persons of strong or tender natural emotions. Such persons, till sanctified by the Spirit of God, are no holier than any other animals of gentle and tractable dispositions. A man may be, in respect of his fellow-creatures, a "faultless monster" of perfection; and at the same time, in respect of God, he may be a prodigy of sin. There is such a thing as giving to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and yet robbing God of the things that are God's. Nor can the former be considered as the least offset to the latter. Nothing can take the place of holy love, for there is nothing like it. The finer feelings of our animal life or soul (anima in distinction from animus,) have more resemblance to it than any thing else, and yet are entirely different. They answer to Kant's definition of instinct, "a felt necessity of doing or enjoying something." We do not hold that men by depravity, are necessarily bereft of these amiable instincts; nor do we hold that they are useless or unimportant: but only that they are not that holiness which the law of God requires, and without which no man can see the Lord.

"If ye, being evil," says our Lord, "know how to give good gifts unto your children," &c. In his view the traits of parental affection and care could not avert that general brand of being evil. He who possesses such characteristics in a most exalted degree may yet" lack one thing," the want of which will deprive those traits of all moral excellence.

The doctrine of total depravity is very far from involving the sentiment that men are not free agents. Except as free agents, they could not transgress the will of God: except as free agents, they could not be depraved at all. And total depravity is nothing less than moral licentiousness, or the highest state of moral freedom acting in a wrong direction. There is not a more terrible truth than this of free agency; for there is no established connection between the liberty of the will, and moral purity. It is a dreadful responsibility to possess the power of voluntary action, since it may result in the choice of infinite evil, as well as in the election of eternal good. The will is simply a natural faculty, and not a moral quality. The universal possession and exercise of

unquestionable maxim; Whatever -being of man, that alone is truly

o's rò suv, is the test of an alleged,
e true Utility;-being that is well
r the whole of man, not for parts
Let me explain myself by illustrat-
his statement is opposed. Horace,
os, has given, as every scholar re-
scription of a supposed painting, in
joined to a human head, different
over limbs gathered from every
uty terminated in the shape of a
picture pass into vital being; and
of being have as many kinds of life
e are animals out of which it is
horse, the vulture, turtle, wren, or
oman and fish connected without
> oneness, nothing a whole, every
t. Who sees not the disorder, the
s of piece to piece, the unfitness of
and in conjunction to any one end?
his monstrous assemblage of deformi-
type of what the originally god-like
imes made by theories of pretended
ived of manhood; next even the de-
oken into fragments of every sort.
ce, but the physical nature, is con-
here is of the material in the human
d, and haply withal the understand-
as! as merely animal without either
Thus bowed down from his upright
I is regarded, not as one being, but as
is elements, without either symmetry,
of end. Thus the theory distorts
to search out and evolve the good,
intelligent piece of matter.

stood, of course, to mean that any
hole length of such absurdity; my
what I deem the general complexion
lent notions concerning utility; and
1, are the two great errours which
hey do not contemplate utility such