ideas of prominent lawyers and people well versed in constitutional law in this country.

I noticed particularly last week a couple of editorials and columns by outstanding writers in the Washington papers-not papers from Alabama or South Carolina. On the 25th day of March 1965, Mr. James J. Kilpatrick, columnist in the Washington Star, had a fine article on this bill, entitled "Voting Bill Piles Wrong on Wrong." In my opinion, that is a good analysis of the bill.

Then the very next day, March 26, the Star carried an editorial the topic of which is "Illogical Is the Word." Yes, indeed, it certainly is illogical in many respects.

I am sure that most members of this committee read or heard discussed the very fine editorial of the Wall Street Journal which is certainly not a southern paper, and not an extremist and not a racist publication. The title of that front page editorial was "Immorality of the Law." I hope each Member of Congress reads this most enlightening article.

Gentlemen, this points up to me the fact that we have a great deal of work to do on this committee before this bill is brought to its proper form. If we are going to pass legislation, I hope and pray that we will get a bill that is not unconstitutional, a bill that does not set up double standards and have special provisions for certain areas of the country.

I, and I think, every member of the South Carolina delegation, and I know, the attorney general who sits with me here today, are unalterably opposed to discrimination for any reason.

I am not here today and the attorney general is not here today to try and justify discrimination in South Carolina or anywhere else. We do not believe in it; we know it is immoral, it is illegal, it is unchristian and it is everything that is wrong, and we do not take a stand on that side at all.

We are here to show primarily I think-and the attorney general will emphasize these two things-that the bill as written is unconstitutional and; second, that even if it is constitutional, we in South Carolina do not like it because we are stigmatized and criticized wrongfully under the terms of this bill. We are accused of being a State that discriminates.

We do not discriminate and I think that the attorney general will prove to you gentlemen today, my colleagues, that we do not and that we should not be included in that group who do, if anyone does, and of course some people do.

But my primary purpose here today is to introduce a man who comes from South Carolina as a member of a prominent family, one who has been in the political life of the State for many years, one whose forebears were always honorable and moderate in their political philosophy and in their treatment of their fellow man.

Mr. McLeod has been in the attorney general's office in my State since 1950, I believe, and he is now serving his second term as the attorney general of South Carolina.

Some members of this committee will recall that he appeared before the committee in 1957, in 1960, and again last year in 1964. Those of you who heard him then know that he is a man of great capability,

a man of great knowledge, and a man who is moderate and fairminded in every sense of the word.

We are glad to have you back with us today, General.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McLeod.

STATEMENT OF DANIEL R. McLEOD, ESQ., ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Mr. MCLEOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. I am deeply appreciative of the opportunity to appear before the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you a prepared statement?

Mr. MCLEOD. I do, and if I may, I will submit it to the stenographer and I will have copies furnished for the committee. I have a limited number.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you distribute those?

Mr. MCLEOD. The recent introduction of the bill and being under some pressure of time, there has been difficulty in procuring the necessary preparation.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen: I concur wholeheartedly in what Congressman Ashmore said with respect to the feeling I have, and I am sure the people in my State as a whole have, that they do not condone discrimination in any sense of the word, and I think that it can be shown in South Carolina, particularly, that there has been no basis for a charge of discrimination.

As Mr. Ashmore said, I have been affiliated with the attorney general's office for about 15 years. In that capacity as assistant attorney general and as attorney general, I think that if any allegations have been made anywhere within the State, I would have had some knowledge of it, directly or indirectly. In latter years, most certainly I would have had knowledge of it.

There is on the statute books of my State a simple procedure whereby one who is denied registration on any particular ground can appeal immediately to the board of registration which takes the process. If the denial to register is made by that board and appealed it is forwarded to the circuit courts and it must be heard immediately.

If a dissatisfaction exists with respect to the decision of the circuit court, an appeal can be made and provision is made for a special calling of a session of the supreme court of the State to pass immediately upon the matter. That provision of law has never been invoked since it has been up on the statute books for a period of almost 20 years. In other words, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, there is no complaint that has ever been made with respect to deprivation of the right to vote under the procedure that is provided by State law which is a simple procedure, and which has never been invoked, which has never been tried.

There is no complaint whatsoever that has been formalized in that

manner.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand that the South Carolina Constitution requires that an applicant must be able to read and write any sections of the constitution supplied by a registration officer or show that he has paid taxes on property assessed at $300 or more in the previous year? Am I correct in that?

Mr. MCLEOD. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. What is meant by "paid taxes on property assessed at $300 or more in the previous year" Is that real estate?

Mr. MCLEOD. It includes real estate and personalty, both or either. The CHAIRMAN. And produce a receipt showing the payment of such taxes or they cannot register to vote?

Mr. MCLEOD. That is right. That is a condition of registration, Mr. Chairman. Either be able to read and write a provision of the constitution, and I can personally state that has been administered

to me

The CHAIRMAN. I am not concerned so much with that. I did not quite understand the requirement that they have paid previously an assessment on property, you say that property could be personal as well as real estate.

Mr. MCLEOD. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Does it have any effect on the numbers that can be registered in this receipt showing the payment of $300 assessment? Mr. MCLEOD. That is an alternative provision.

Mr. MCCULLOCH. May I interrupt? Does that provision which the Chairman has read mean that the applicant who registered must have paid $300 in taxes or paid taxes on property assessed at $300?

Mr. MCLEOD. Must have made the taxes on property assessed at $300 which under the millage would be $10 or $15.

Mr. McCULLOCH. This is in the alternative?

Mr. MCLEOD. That is the point I was just getting ready to make. You can either demonstrate your ability to read or write a provision of the constitution or, if you are unable to do that, show that you have paid taxes on property assessed at $300.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not quite understand that.

Mr. ASHMORE. Mr. Chairman, if I may inject this at that point, I believe that is a less harsh law than your literacy test in the State of New York because there if I understand correctly, you must have what is equal to an eighth grade education, do you not? But the idea is that we have a literacy test in South Carolina that is less harsh than your great State of New York whereas we would come under the gun, as the saying is, in this bill because 50 percent of our people are not registered and don't vote. Your people in New York would not be covered by law but your literacy test is more harsh than ours. That is an injustice, an inequity. That is one reason why it is unconstitutional.

Mr. McCLORY. Would the gentleman yield?

Do I understand from your response to the question that there is no compulsory literacy test in the State of South Carolina; that there is an alternative to the literacy test in that the literacy test can be avoided by exhibiting a receipt or other evidence of having paid tax?

Mr. MCLEOD. That is right. A person who can actually read and write may prefer not to demonstrate that and would merely show payment on taxes of property assessed at $300.

Mr. McCLORY. You are not making the point that under the proposed bill, that you are exempt from its provisions?

Mr. MCLEOD. The State comes clearly within the scope of the bill as drawn.

Mr. McCLORY. Even though you can escape from the literacy test provision by showing the payment of tax?

Mr. ASHMORE. No, that is part of the literacy test. It is all one and the same, Mr. McClory.

Is that not right?

Mr. MCLEOD. That is right.

Mr. ASHMORE. If you cannot read and write but you can show that you paid taxes on property assessed at $300, you can still get your registration certificate.

Mr. MCLEOD. I think I understand your point.

Mr. CRAMER. Would the gentleman from IIlinois yield?

Let me make sure the record is clear. South Carolina comes under the provisions of the bill before us because, No. 1, South Carolina has a literacy test.

Mr. MCLEOD. That is right.

Mr. CRAMER. So it meets the first criteria.

The second criteria is whether 50 percent are registered or 50 percent voted. Now in South Carolina in excess of 50 percent are registered; is that correct?

Mr. McLEOD. No; that is not correct. Of 2,300,000 people in the State, say 172,000 are registered. Now you have an inequality there because you don't know what the population count is now. I am giving you the 1960 count and it is probably up 10, percent. The figures I gave you with respect to registration are permanent as of September 1964 but the count that I gave you with respect to the population is the 1960 census, 4 years before.

Mr. CRAMER. According to the census figures we have, 59 percent are registered, but only 38 percent of the people voted. Whichever the case may be, you come in under one or two of those categories. Mr. MCLEOD. Apparently so. I am not prepared because I don't know what census figure they used. I do know the number of votes that were cast.

Mr. CRAMER. They use the 1960 census figure so that is probably the difference.

Mr. MCLEOD. It may be.

Mr. CRAMER. But in any event, 50 percent did not cast votes, so you are covered.

Mr. MCLEOD. I would think so. That is the number that voted in the last presidential election; 772,000 registered. I assume that the construction that will be given to this bill is the number of persons voted. They mean the number of persons voted as to the percentage of the population rather than the number of persons who voted as contrasted to the registered number of voters.

Mr. CRAMER. Correct. That is what it says. In any event, that is another subject. But you are covered.

Mr. MCLEOD. I assume that we will come within the scope of this bill.

Mr. CRAMER. Right.

Mr. ASHMORE. Not because we discriminate but because they assume discrimination of 50 percent of the people.

Mr. CRAMER. That is the second point I am getting to. In South Carolina, the Civil Rights Commission has not found cases of discrimination.

Mr. ASHMORE. That is exactly correct.

Mr. MCLEOD. Yes.

Mr. CRAMER. Now the third point I wanted to make, so far as clariying the record is concerned, is that in South Carolina you have a iteracy test that requires lower standards of qualification than in the State of New York. New York under this formula, however, is not overed. So, in effect, New York can continue its literacy test, but ou are penalized for having one that is less onerous than the State of New York, even though you have not discriminated. Is that right? Mr. MCLEOD. I understand that New York requires it to be given n the English language, in my State we do not.

Mr. CRAMER. That is the point I wanted to make.

Mr. ROGERS. Would the gentleman yield at that point?
Mr. CRAMER. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. ROGERS. There is a provision in section 3 (c) that if the State has not discriminated, it can file an action here in the District of Columbia and can get out from under the determination made by the Attorney General. Hence, if you have not discriminated for the period of time you file the action, then South Carolina is completely out of it. Would that not be true, Mr. Attorney General?

Mr. MCLEOD. Let me comment on that this way: In the first place, citations of authority with respect to constitutionality have been given to the committee. I adhere to the statement in ex parte Siebold that you are infringing upon and usurping the State rights when you impose Federal determination of voting qualifications under the 15th amendment.

I do not think you can constitutionally do that.

Mr. ROGERS. But constitutionally or not, you could relieve the State of South Carolina from imposition of this bill by simply filing an action saying that you have not discriminated for 10 years, and South Carolina goes on its way, could you not?

Mr. MCLEOD. Let me answer that this way.

Mr. CRAMER. I yield for the question.

Mr. MCLEOD. May I comment on that, Mr. Rogers?

Mr. ROGERS. Go ahead.

Mr. MCLEOD. Number one, the presumption which you raise from the mere fact that a certain designated arbitrary peak percentage of persons have not registered or have not voted, is an unreasonable presumption. I can expand on that a little bit, if I may, subsequently, in my remarks.

Number two, your 10-year period is an arbitrary period fixed for that.

Thirdly, it is an imposition, and an unwarranted imposition, to thrust the burden of proof upon the State from an unwarranted presumption such as you referred to a moment ago, the 50-percent figure, to thrust the burden of proof upon a State to assume that obligation of going to a court to disprove an allegation of discrimination drawn from the presumption I referred to.

Fourthly, you are doing what all of the judicial considerations prompted this Congress last year to do, and that is, to adhere to the traditional concept of American justice being best served by the convenience of the courts.

46-535-65--39