page 3. I would think it would be pretty clear to the Court from that and from the argument we would make that this was to enforce the 15th amendment. Mr. ROGERS. And it has no relation whatsoever to the 14th amendment as it relates to actions we have taken in the other civil rights legislation? Mr. KATZENBACH. As drafted this is based entirely on the legislative provision of the 15th amendment which empowers Congress to enact legislation in order to effectuate the substantive prohibitions against discrimination on the ground of race or color. Mr. ROGERS. Section 3 of the bill provides that no person shall be denied the right to vote in Federal, State, or local elections. You mean all elections? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes. Mr. ROGERS. Be it county, municipal, school district? Mr. KATZENBACH. Right. Mr. ROGERS. And as outlined to the Chairman, in a school bond election if they were qualified to vote. Would you attempt to set aside those provisions of State law which provide that only property owners may vote in elections where bonds are issued? Would you attempt to nullify that provision of the State law? Mr. KATZENBACH. That would be covered by section 8 of the bill, Congressman. It would not set aside any existing provisions of that kind, but should a State enact new provisions with respect to the qualifications or procedures for voting, then it would have to come into a three-judge court in the District of Columbia before those provisions could be effected, and it would have to establish to the satisfaction of the court that those qualifications and procedures would not have the effect of denying or abridging rights guaranteed by the 15th amendment. Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Attorney General, do you mean to say that if the State of Alabama should want to change its laws as they relate to elections, particularly as to the school bond issues we were discussing, that before they could do it they would be compelled to come and file a declaratory judgment in the District of Columbia before they could change that law? Is that what you say? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes. Mr. ROGERS. Now let us go to the question where you define "test and device," page 2, line 8. You define this as including "any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting: (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter." Do you mean by that that no State registrars or Federal examiners who may be appointed, could determine whether an applicant could read and write? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes. Mr. ROGERS. Then the applicant would not be required to read and write according to section 3(b) of the bill? Mr. KATZENBACH. That is correct, Congressman. I might add that in those States there are a number of examples where despite the existing law no such requirement has ever been used by the registrar. In fact, I have heard sworn testimony in court, and I can remember one instance of a registrar whose practice was to let somebody come in and register all the members of his family. Mr. ROGERS. I think you will agree, Mr. Attorney General, that in the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 we did not attempt to disturb the qualifications of voters as prescribed by State law. However, in the 1964 act we did say there was a rebuttable presumption of literacy if a man has a sixth-grade education. Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes. And as a result of that the States of Mississippi. Louisiana, and Alabama enacted a long and difficult test of comprehension and understanding, which they were going to apply prospectively, which we had to litigate. The CHAIRMAN. New York State has a literacy test. Would this act abolish the literacy test in New York? Mr. KATZENBACH. New York had a sufficient number of people registered and voting in 1964 so as not to come within its prohibitions. The CHAIRMAN. So if they do not come within that 50-percent provision they still could have the literacy test? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes. Mr. McCULLOCH. May I interrupt to particularize the question and answer a bit? On line 11 of the very first page of the bill, we have the phrase "political subdivision." I understand that phrase to mean any school district, borough, township, county, or any other political subdivision within the meaning of the State law. If in the State of New York in 1964 there was a political subdivision where less than 50 percent of the people voted or were registered to vote, wouldn't that trigger this bill in that political subdivision in the State of New York? Mr. KATZENBACH. I think it could, Congressman. I think the only way in which we can gather valid statistics here is really-we are aiming at voter registration and I think the term "political subdivision" is used here aimed primarily at the area in which the registration process takes place. Mr. KATZENBACH. That may be a point which should be clarified. Mr. McCULLOCH. If there were registration within a school district, and less than 50 percent of the people were registered to vote, or less than 50 percent of the people did vote, then it could possibly trigger this legislation when it becomes law? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes. Mr. McCULLOCH. And particularly if the test were applied for a particular purpose and the result were that. In certain sections of this country and in New York there are certain classes of people who are prevented from registering or voting by reason of literacy tests. Mr. KATZENBACH. That is particularly true in New York because of the New York State constitution having an English language requirement which cannot be met by a great number of Puerto Ricans. Mr. McCULLOCH. I asked that question at this time, Mr. Chairman, because I wanted to know whether this bill would trigger such authority when it became law in any one of several States. The CHAIRMAN. If the 50-percent provision were to apply to a political subdivision, would that have the effect of abolishing the literacy test in the entire State or only in that political subdivision? Mr. KATZENBACH. Only in that political subdivision. Mr. ROGERS. Under section 3(b) of the bill, would the determinations of the Attorney General follow the determinations made by the Director of Census? Mr. KATZENBACH. Congressman, I feel that the way this is drafted that I would review the laws of the 50 States and determine which had tests and devices, and then within those States I would ask the Director of the Census to certify to me the voting statistics, the voting and registration statistics within those States and within those subdivisions. If he found them to be less than 50 percent in either one of the two tests he would so certify and then this would become the trigger to action. Mr. ROGERS. Would it not be rather difficult to rely upon a census of 1960, if the election commission should change the boundaries of an election precinct or other political subdivision? Would it not become extremely difficult? Mr. KATZENBACH. It would become extremely difficult, Congressman. It is for that reason that we froze it in 1964, so as to make that job possible. Mr. ROGERS. Then by using the November 1964 date you believe that that problem will be adequately covered? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes. We know what they are and the people cannot keep changing them. Mr. ROGERS. Since you said you were eliminating literacy tests and other devices, I direct your attention to section 5(b) which provides: "Any person whom the examiner finds to have the qualifications prescribed by state law in accordance with instructions received under 6(b), shall promptly be placed on a list of eligible voters." Mr. KATZENBACH. Right. Mr. ROGERS. Do I understand that the persons who will be selected by the Civil Service Commission to determine whether applicants are qualified must look at the State law in order to determine the qualifications? Mr. KATZENBACH. No; they simply have to look at the regulations of the Civil Service Commission which have been put out after consultation with the Attorney General and the Attorney General has certified what those provisions are. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair must announce that the committee is not privileged to sit. The House is now in session. I say that most reluctantly. To insure expeditious consideration of the bill, and in view of the fact we cannot sit while the House is in session, we will resume these sessions tonight at 8 o'clock. Mr. Attorney General, can you possibly return here? I hope you can. Mr. KATZENBACH. I certainly will. As I said at the outset, Mr. Chairman, I will be here at any time of the day or night that this committee wishes to hear me. Mr. McCULLOCH. I want to take this opportunity to say that I think this is one of the best statements I have heard in 17 years of service on this committee. I think mention should be made of the tireless service the Attorney General has given to this troublesome problem since he has become head of the Department. Mr. KATZENBACH. Thank you very much, Congressman. You are very kind. (Whereupon, at 12, the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 8 p.m., the same day.) VOTING RIGHTS THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 1965-Resumed HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE No. 5 OF THE The subcommittee met at 8 p.m., pursuant to recess, in room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Emanuel Celler (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Celler, Rodino, Rogers of Colorado, Brooks, Kastenmeier, Corman, McCulloch, Cramer, Lindsay, and Mathias. Also present: Representatives Willis, Ashmore, Gilbert, Tenzer, Grider, Jacobs, and MacGregor. Staff members present: William R. Foley, general counsel; Benjamin L. Zelenko, counsel; William H. Copenhaver, associate counsel. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will resume. We will proceed with the questioning by Mr. Rogers. The Chair wishes to announce that it will endeavor to terminate the session tonight at 10 o'clock. I hope that the members will govern themselves accordingly. Mr. Rogers. Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Attorney General, do I understand that under section 3(a) of your bill that in order for the Federal examiners to be appointed there must first be determination by the Attorney General whether tests or devices as to qualification for voting were used in a State or in a political subdivision. That is the first determination that must be made. FURTHER TESTIMONY OF NICHOLAS deB. KATZENBACH, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Mr. KATZENBACH. That is right. Mr. ROGERS. Following through, the Census Bureau must determine whether less than 50 percent of the people of voting age either had registered on November 1, 1964, voted in the presidential election of 1964. In other words, the two things must be present in order for the appointment of the Federal examiners to register people. Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, at least those two things. Mr. ROGERS. At least those two things in section 3 (a)? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, sir. Mr. ROGERS. Section 4(a), provides that when the Attorney General certifies that he has received the complaints in writing from 20 or more residents of a political subdivision*** what do you interpret as a political subdivision in that case? Mr. KATZENBACH. I believe the political subdivision there means the same thing as it means in section 3, Congressman. Mr. ROGERS. I now direct your attention to section 4(a), line 23. Do I understand from that that if in the judgment of the Attorney General, the guarantees of the 15th amendment are being violated, that regardless of any complaints, the Attorney General has the right to ask that an examiner be appointed? Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, Congressman, that is correct. Mr. ROGERS. What then is the necessity of 20 complaints from anybody or 20 residents of a political subdivision? Why don't you just eliminate that and place it entirely within the discretion of the Attorney General? Mr. KATZENBACH. I think, Congressman, it is true that it is completely within the discretion of the Attorney General under section 2, and the purpose of section 1 was simply to indicate the kind of circumstances under which the Attorney General's discretion might be justified in being exercised, and that is to provide at least a rough guide as to the circumstances which might justify the appointment of Federal examiners. I agree that as a matter of law on this, you could eliminate section 1 and simply leave it at the discretion of the Attorney General. Mr. ROGERS. Would that not be more effective and help you carry out the objectives that you have outlined in the first eight pages of your statement here? Mr. KATZENBACH. It could not be more effective, Congressman, since that discretion is vested in the Attorney General in any event, but I think putting in the first section gives some assurance to people who are being denied their rights-could I be excused for a minute, Mr. Chairman ? The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wants to announce that Mr. Foley, our counsel, who had difficulties a few moments ago, is suffering from complete exhaustion. He has been working most arduously and we members of the committee have been taxing his strength because we have been on the floor with the various bills, particularly the bill yesterday and the congressional reapportionment bill the day before. Yesterday morning, the committee reported out the Presidential disability bill. He has been working on all these bills and I know of no more faithful and energetic, efficient and dedicated counsel than Bill Foley. I am sure we are all sorry for what has happened. He is greatly improved. Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Attorney General, I believe we were discussing the discretion given to the Attorney General under section 4(a)(2). Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes; and I believe I was saying, or had said, or was about to say, that the reason for having the section 1 of that section 4 about the 20 complaints was to give some assurance to people that if 20 people were turned down that this would be the sort of thing as to which the Attorney General would exercise his discretion. If the discretion is left simply in his judgment, then it seems to me that potential voters have no kind of indication as to when this would be done. The purpose of putting that section in was to give notice to them and to give notice to State registrars that if they turned down 20 people, this might be cause, although not necessarily, for the appointment of a Federal examiner. Mr. ROGERS. You refer to the political subdivisions in section 4 (a)(1), but in section 4(a) (2) there is no reference to a political |