Trabing v. U. S. (1897), 32 Ct. of Cl., 440. U. S. v. Canter (1870), 2 Bond, 389.. U. S. v. Chung Fung Sun (1894), 63 Fed., 261 45 56 53 54, 60, 162 46 59 55 U. S. v. Cruikshank (1875), 92 Ú. S., 542, 549; s. c. 1 Words, 308. U. S. v. Cisna (1835), 1 McLean, 258 U. S. v. Cook (1873), 19 Wall, 591 U. S. v. Crook (1879), 5 Dill., 453 U. S. v. Crosby (1871), 1 Hughes, 448.. U. S. v. Flournoy, etc., Co. (1896), 71 Fed., 576. U. S. . Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey (1876), 93 U. S., 188 U. S. v. Gillies (1815), 1 Pet. C. C., 159 ̊. U. S. v. Gleason (1897), 78 Fed., 396.. U. S. v. Kagama (1885), 118 U. S., 375.. U. S. v. Kellar (1882), 13 Fed., 82; s. c. 11 Biss., 314. U. S. r. Kornmehl (1898), 89 Fed., 10.. U. S. v. Kopp (1901), 110 Fed., 160.. U. S. v. Petersburg ( ), 1 Hughes C. C., 493 U. S. v. Power (1877), 14 Blatch. (C. C.), 223. U. S. v. Ragozzini (1892), 50 Fed., 923. U. S. v. Reese (1875), 92 U. S., 214 . U. S. v. Ritchie (1854), 58 U. S., 524 U. S. v. Repentigny (1866), 5 Wall., 211 U. S. v. Rhodes (1866), 1 Abb. U. S., 28; 1 Am. L. T. Rep., 22. 93, 95, 96 95 46 158 63,99 58 144 53, 55, 59, 61 67,70 U. S. v. Santistevan (1874), 1 New Mex., 583. U. S. v. Severino (1903), 125 Fed., 949. 58, 156, 157 95, 96, 97 U. S. v. Villato (1797), 2 Dall., 370; rep. also in Whart. St. Trials, 185.. U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark (1898), 169 U. S., 649; s. c. 61 Fed., 382. 44, 47, 74, 77, 82, 84 Virginia v. Rives (1879), 100 U. S., 339 Walsh v. Lallande (1873), 25 La. Ann., 188. Ex parte Walton (1804), 1 Cr. C. C., 186. Page. 99 66 103, 105, 111 In re Wehlitz (1863), 16 Wisc., 443. West v. West (1840), 8 Paige, 432. Westcott's Lesseer. Fairfield (1811), Peter's C. C., 45. White . White (1859), 2 Met. Eq. (Ky.), 189 Wooldridge v. Wilkins (1839), 3 How. (Miss.), 360. APPENDIX II. CITIZENSHIP OF THE STATES OF THE UNION. DEFINITIONS OF CITIZENSHIP OF A STATE. "A citizen of the United States residing in any State of the Union is a citizen of that State." Marshall, C. J., Gassies v. Ballon (1832), 6 Pet., 761, 762. This principle is confirmed by Article XIV of the amendments to the Constitution in the declaration that all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are "citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." As regards citizenship of a particular State this definition is incorporated in the constitutions and statutes of various of the States. In Kentucky (Stats., by Carroll (1903), sec. 332); Maine (Rev. Stats. (1903), ch. 5, sec. 1), and West Virginia (Const., Art. II, sec. 3), it is incorporated in similar phraseology. In Georgia (Const., Art. I, sec. 1, par. 25), Massachusetts (Rev. Laws (1902), Ch. I, sec. 1), and Mississippi (Const., Art. III, sec. 8), all citizens of the United States resident or domiciled in the State are declared to be citizens thereof. In California (Polit. Code, sec. 51), as also in North Dakota (Polit. Code, sec. 11), all persons born in the State and residing therein, except the children of transient aliens and of alien public ministers and consuls, and all persons born out of the State who are citizens of the United States and residing within the State, are declared to be citizens of the State. Save the clause expressly excepting from citizenship children of public ministers and consuls born in the State, the same provision is found in the laws of Montana (Polit. Code, sec. 71). În Vermont citizens of the United States and persons who have become citizens of the State by virtue of the constitution or laws are, while residing in the State, citizens thereof. (Stats. (1894), sec. 60.) In Virginia it is declared that all persons born in the State, all persons born in any other State of the Union, who may be or become residents of the State; all aliens naturalized under the laws of the United States who may be or become residents of the State; all persons who have obtained a right to citizenship under former laws; and all children, wherever born, whose father, or if he be dead, whose mother, shall be a citizen of the State at the time of the birth of such children, shall be deemed citizens of the State (Code (1904, by Pollard), sec. 39). See Exhibit A. RESIDENCE. A person may, under the fourteenth amendment, be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a particular State. An important element is necessary to convert the former into the latter. He must reside within the State to make him a citizen of it, while H. Doc. 326, 59-2—17 257 it is only necessary that he should be born or naturalized in the United States to be a citizen of the Union. Miller, J., Slaughterhouse cases, 16 Wall., 36, 74. By Article III, sec. 2, of the Constitution, the judicial power of the United States is extended to controversies between citizens of different States." The test of citizenship for the purpose of Federal jurisdiction under this section is domicil, which implies a fixed home and abode at the place of residence, with the animus manendi. Poppenhauser v. Comb. Co. (C. C.), 14 Fed. Rep., 707; Sharon ». Hill (C. C.), 26 Fed. Rep., 337; McDonald v. Flour Mills Co. (C. C.), 31 Fed. Rep., 577; Nichols v Nichols (C. C.), 92 Fed. Rep., 1; Haskell v. Bailey (C. C. A.), 63 Fed. Rep., 873; Collins v. City of Ashland (D. C.), 112 Fed. Rep., 175; Eisele v. Oddie (C. C.), 128 Fed. Rep., 941. It is essential that the citizenship of the parties, or the facts which in legal intendment constitute it, should be distinctly and positively averred in the pleadings, or should appear with equal distinctness in other parts of the record; and the mere averment that a party is a resident of, or resides in, a particular State is not an averment of citizenship in that State for the purposes of jurisdiction. Parker . Overman, 18 How., 137; Robertson v. Cease, 97 U. S., 646; Continental Ins. Co. v. Rhoads, 119 U. S., 237; Everhart . Huntsville College, 120 U. S., 223; Menard v. Goggan, 121 U. S., 253; Timmons . Elyton Land Co., 139 U. S., 378; Denny v. Pironi, 141 U. S., 121; Wolfe v. Hartford L. & A. Ins. Co., 148 U. S., 389; Cooper v. Newell, 155 U. S., 532; Steigleder. McQuesten, 198 U. S., 141, 143. "The place where a person lives is taken to be his domicil until facts adduced establish the contrary, and a domicil when once acquired is presumed to continue until it is shown to have been changed." Fuller, C. J., Anderson . Watt (1891), 138 U. S., 694, 706. "The intention and the act must concur in order to effect such a change of domicil as constitutes a change of citizenship." Harlan, J., Morris v. Gilmer (1889), 129 U. S., 315, 328. "There must be an actual, not pretended, change of domicil; in other words, the removal must be a real one, animo manendi, and not merely ostensible." Id. citing Case . Clarke, 5 Mason, 70. "Among the circumstances usually relied upon to establish the animus manendi are: Declarations of the party; the exercise of political rights; the payment of personal taxes; a house of residence, and a place of business." Swayne, J., Mitchell v. United States (1874), 21 Wall., 350, 353. The rules of the several States determining what constitutes a residence sufficient to establish citizenship are chiefly to be found in the decisions of the courts. As codified in California (Polit. Code, sec. 52), Montana (Polit. Code, sec. 72), and North Dakota (Polit. Code, sec. 12), they are as follows: Every person has, in law, a residence. It is the place where one remains when not called elsewhere for labor or other special or temporary purpose, and to which he returns in seasons of repose. There can be only one residence. A residence can not be lost until another is gained. The residence of the father during his life, and after his death the residence of the mother while she remains unmarried, is the residence of the unmarried minor children. The residence of the husband is presumptively [in California the word "presumptively" does not appear] the residence of the wife. The residence of an unmarried minor who has a parent living can not be changed by either his own act or that of his guardian. Residence can be changed only by the union of act and intent. * * * "Two considerations must be kept steadily in view, and these are, 1, that every person must have a domicil somewhere; and 2, that a man can have only one domicil for one purpose at one and the same time. Every one has a domicil of origin, which he retains until he acquires another, and the one thus acquired is in like manner retained." Shaw, C. J., Abington v. North Bridgewater (1839), 23 Pick., 170, 177.. "In regard to questions of citizenship, and the disposition of property after death, every person must have a domicil. For every one is presumed to be a subject of some government while living, and the law of some country must control the disposition of his property upon his decease." Davis, J., Gilman v. Gilman (1863), 52 Me., 165, 174. “A man may have more than one place of residence, but he can have but one domicil, and can hold citizenship in but one State." Beck, J., Savage v. Scott (1876), 45 Io., 130, 133. "Actual residence, that is, personal presence in a place, is one circumstance to determine the domicil, or the fact of being an inhabitant; but it is far from being conclusive." Shaw, C. J., Sears v. City of Boston (1840), 1 Met., 250, 251. The habitation fixed in any place, without any present intention. of removing therefrom, is the domicile." Parker, J., Putnam v. Johnson (1813) 10 Mass., 488, 501. The factum and the animus must concur in order to establish a domicil. Harvard College v. Gore, 5 Pick., 370. The latter may be inferred from proof of the former. But evidence of a mere intent can not establish the fact of domicil." Bigelow, J. (1856), Holmes . Greene, 7 Gray, 299, 301. "Change of domicil consists of an act done, with an intent. The act is an actual change of residence. The intent to effect the change must be to acquire a new domicil, either permanent in purpose or of indefinite duration." Stone, C. J., Young v. Pollak (1888), 85 Ala., 439, 444; Caldwell v. Pollak (1890), 91 Ala., 353, 357. "Residence being a visible fact is not usually in doubt. The intention to remain is not so easily proved. Both must concur in order to establish a domicil. * * ** And, as both are known to be requisite in order to subject one to taxation or to give him the right of suffrage, any resident who submits to the one or claims the other may be presumed to have such intention." Davis, J., Gilman v. Gilman (1863), 52 Me., 165, 177. See also Thomas v. Warren (1895), 83 Md., 14, 20. "The question what constitutes domicil is mainly a question of fact, and the element of intention enters into it. Personal absence for a while does not necessarily change one's domicil, and personal presence in a place for a somewhat prolonged period does not necessarily establish domicile there." Allen, J., Olivieri e. Atkinson (1897), 168 Mass., 28, 29. One may acquire a domicil by the residence of a day, if to the fact of residence be superadded the requisite intention. Littlefield v. Brooks, 50 Me., 475; Parsons v. Bangor, 61 Me., 457; Stockton v. Staples, 66 Me., 197. "An absence for months, or even years, if all the while intended as a mere temporary absence for some temporary purpose, to be followed by a resumption of the former residence, will not be an abandonment." Scholfield, J., Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer (1888), 125 Ill., 141, 195. "A temporary residence does not change its character by lapse of time." Park, J., Easterly v. Goodwin (1868), 35 Conn., 279, 286. "A man who has a domicile in Indiana |