Two modes in which art transforms natural delight: Imitation and . (a) The function of the Imitative in art as a distinct source of plea- Notion that imitation is the supreme end of art (b) The function of the Imaginative and Creative in art Art a resultant of these two forces On the relation of Genius to this two-fold aim Completion of the definition of art How far this theory is capable of yielding canons of artistic practice. THE RELATION OF THE EVOLUTION HYPOTHESIS TO HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY. в PSYCHOLOGY holds a unique rank in the hierarchy of the sciences. It partakes both of the purely scientific attraction which belongs to the progressive expansion and arrangement of facts, and of that deeper charm that promises to invest for ever such themes as the limits of knowledge and the nature of the environing universe. It is in its scientific aspect that psychology presents itself to the evolutionist. For his doctrine is quite independent of the metaphysical question of Idealism and Realism, being a philosophy of the universe, the highest formulation of our objective knowledge.* It affirms the existence of a certain order in the manifestation of material phenomena, and it may attach mental phenomena to this order by means of the vital link that holds together mind and body. It is clear that this mode of treating mind will vary in certain important features from that adopted in the older human psychology. For, first of all, it leads one to view all successive manifestations of individual mind as one continuous phenomenon, and to seek for the antecedent of any habit or emotion just as easily in the psychical life of some remote parental race, as in the experiences and impressions of the same individual development. And, secondly, the evolutionist, instead of carrying on pari passu the process of subjective observation, and that of objective inquiry into the visible actions of other minds and the nervous conditions of their intelligence, has to confine his researches through a large part of his field to the objective side of the phenomena, the appeal to subjective knowledge being clearly precluded in dealing with the ideas and feelings of the lower animals. This extended and "geological" conception of the mental world has * This is well stated by Professor Fraser in his Life and Letters of Berkeley p. 376. B been made familiar by the writings of two distinguished living biologists. Mr. Herbert Spencer has recently rediscussed the phenomena of consciousness through all its manifested gradations in the animal series, affiliating his conclusions to his general system of evolutional ideas. In a less systematic manner Mr. Darwin has been led to discuss certain aspects of mental evolution, in connection with the origin of man, and with the phenomena of emotional expression. It is not my present object to seek to estimate either the ultimate credibility or the scientific worth of these new conceptions of organic development. Such a task will probably remain for several generations an impracticable one. Only when a vastly larger number of observations, physiological, ethnological, etc., have been collected will this very complex question be satisfactorily determined. These difficulties, however, do not appear to apply to another line of inquiry. What relation the evolution hypothesis bears to pre-existing psychology; what additional means it offers for elucidating the facts of human consciousness; and how far, if it be finally accepted as a verified truth, a distinct science of the human mind is desirable or even possible-these are questions which one may appropriately seek to determine before the theory of organic descent has received its final definition. Considerable attention appears to have already been drawn to this question, and one may have observed signs both of an eagerness to thrust aside the older psychology, in order to make way for the proud progress of the new doctrine, and, on the other side, of an unwillingness to lend a hearing to the younger philosophy of life, because of its supposed incompatibility with ancient methods of investigating the human mind. Possibly it may be seen, after a closer examination of the facts, that neither path of investigation really interferes with the other or renders the use of it superfluous. What, then, is the problem in the psychology of the individual mind? Seemingly, to trace out the laws of its growth, to formulate the processes by which sensations aggregate, now into the ideas, now into the emotions of mature life, and by which the crude impulses of youthful spontaneity pass into the calm far-reaching resolutions of manhood. Now it is surely conceivable that these processes are not susceptible of complete explanation if studied by themselves. Every new individual, it may be said, possesses at birth a certain type of organism with a particular form of nervous and cerebral structure more or less definitely fixed, and probably, too, a number of predispositions to certain habits of thought and action. If so, it would appear to follow that the whole progress of the individual mind is modified by the action of forces whose origin must be looked for outside the boundaries of the individual life, in the inherited results of ancestral experiences. That a mental predisposition can be thus inherited, will at once be allowed by all who have clearly grasped the meaning of the intimate connection of mind and body.* If, as is asserted, a young monkey shows terror at first sight of a snake, one must admit that this vague sense of dread is as much passed on from parent to offspring as an unmistakable similarity of features. If once the postulate be conceded that all mental phenomena are contained, potentially, in the fine tissues of the brain, it becomes easy to conceive how the new system of precisely similar plexuses of fibres and cells thrown off in the act of reproduction should carry with it definite possibilities of feeling and thought. And if so, is it not probable that the psychologist who is bent on discovering the laws of growth in the individual mind, will need to go back again and again to this primitive fountain of conscious life? The thoughtful student of the human mind will readily admit that, in deriving the complex and later growths of an individual consciousness from its simpler and earlier forms, he has to take much for granted. That the infant at birth possesses a nervous structure fitted to receive a definite order of impressions, and an incipient arrangement of cerebral ganglion and nerve-filament favouring certain modes of combination among impressions, will be readily believed, even though one feels incapable of determining the precise nature and extent of these connate conditions.† So, again, one will admit that in respect to the lower regions of human consciousness, the instincts and appetites, no explanation is possible without a reference to the laws of organic descent. Finally, an impartial inquirer will allow that even in the higher regions of individual consciousness, modes of feeling present themselves, which See Mr. Spalding's essay on Instinct in Macmillan's Magazine for February, 1873. † An interesting example of the mode in which biological research may help one to understand the coexistences of mental life, has been supplied by Mr. Spencer in his speculations on the genesis of pleasures and pains. He argues that whatever the ultimate physiological conditions of these opposite mental states may be, processes of natural selection must have tended to connect pleasurable feelings with conditions of organism and actions beneficial to the individual life, and painful feelings with the opposites of these. |