which accounted for them without a divine interposition. The Gentiles attributed them to magic, and the Jews to demonaical influence. The true reason of resorting to these subterfuges, was the repugnance of the system to their preconceived opinions, and their secular interests. Christ crucified was a stumbling-block to the Jews, and foolishness to the Greeks.

We need not wonder that, in modern times, there should be disputers by whom the evidence of Christianity is impugned, and its claims are rejected. The corrupt passions of mankind account for their opposition. "Men hate the light, because their deeds are evil; and will not come to it, lest they should be reproved." Licentiousness wishes to be free from restraint; and pride of understanding will not acknowledge the deficiency of its own resources, and submit to the dictates of superior wisdom. Was it ever found that a truly virtuous and humble man was an infidel? Does infidelity abound among persons of this character, the devout, the pure, the modest, and dispassionate inquirers after truth? Or are its advocates the profane and the dissipated, smatterers in knowledge, false pretenders to philosophy, and self-conceited speculatists, who, from the lofty eminence of genius and science on which they suppose themselves to be placed, look down with contempt upon the opinions and pursuits of the multitude?

I shall conclude this series of lectures upon revelation and its records, by briefly considering some of the objections which have been advanced against them.

The first objection is against any revelation at all; and proceeds upon the ground, that it is unnecessary, because reason is a sufficient guide in religion. A revelation reflects upon the wisdom of the Creator of man, as if he had not at first duly fitted him for the end of his being, and therefore found it expedient afterwards to supply the defect. We answered this objection by anticipation, when we showed, in a former lecture, the inadequacy of reason in matters of religion. It appeared, that unassisted reason has never attained to the knowledge of the true God, been able to construct a perfect rule of duty, and establish beyond doubt the doctrine of a future state. In whatever manner it is accounted for, the fact is undeniable. Nothing is more absurd than to wrangle about the sufficiency of reason, although it has proved insufficient in every trial; and to engage in a formal refutation of the claim, would be as great a waste of time, as to prove by arguments that the sun does not shine at midnight, were it not expedient to guard those who are ignorant of the history of mankind against being imposed upon by bold, but false affirmations. Show us, I will not say a nation, but an individual, who, unaided in his researches, discovered the truth in the particulars mentioned, and we will acknowledge, at least, that reason was sufficient to him. If it shall be asked, How can this be, since reason is the gift of God? I am not obliged to answer that question; it is enough that I prove that it is not sufficient. If the infidel shall choose to lay the blame upon his Maker, of having bestowed an imperfect gift upon man, let him do so, and abide the consequence of his blasphemy. The fact is a stubborn one, and no speculation can set it aside. To us, there is no difficulty in accounting for it. We believe, that reason, when first conferred, was fully adequate to all the purposes which it was intended to serve; but that it has since been impaired and perverted by sin, which has both darkened the understanding and corrupted the heart; so that it is now led astray by the imagination and the passions, adopts false principles, and draws erroneous conclusions. Let it not be said that the depravity of reason is only a doctrine of revelation, which it has assumed to justify its own pretensions. The history of mankind vouches for its truth; for, what is it, but a history of the grossest absurdities, so far as religion is concerned? To say, then, that a revelation was unnecessary, because men possessed, from nature, the means of

making all useful discoveries, is to contradict the most ample evidence furnished by the prevalence of idolatry, superstition, and immorality in all ages and nations. Either, then, truth on these points was not an object of importance, or a revelation was desirable, and there was no improbability against it. The strength of the argument is increased, when we consider that if human nature is depraved, as the errors of reason abundantly show, even although it had succeeded in discovering all the articles of natural religion, it would not have been a competent guide, because the new circumstances of man required the knowledge of new truths, which lay beyond the range of its inquiries. Reason could give us no information respecting the means of recovering our innocence, and regaining the favour of our Maker, any more than the knowledge of all that is necessary to us in health, would direct us to the remedies which are wanted in disease and sickness. This was an occasion which called for the interference of superior wisdom, or for the interference of the Creator, who alone could tell by what expedient we might be restored to our original state. Unless, then, it be denied that man is a sinner-and with those who controvert so plain a fact it is in vain to reason-and unless it be denied that more knowledge was necessary to us when fallen, than sufficed us when innocent, it must be admitted, that a revelation was necessary to revive our hopes, and to direct us into the way which leads to peace and felicity. If men were ignorant and exposed to perdition, it surely was not unworthy of God to supply the instruction which would extricate them from that deplorable condition.

The second objection is directed against the revelation in the Scriptures, and is founded on its partial diffusion. If it was necessary, why has it not been granted to all? Can we believe that to be a gift of the universal Parent, which only a few of his children are permitted to enjoy ? shall we ascribe favouritism to a Being of infinite benevolence? The objection applies to the Christian, but with greater force to the Jewish revelation. Here is a nation inferior in many respects to other nations, which is said to have been selected by God to be his peculiar people, and on which he conferred peculiar privileges; while the rest of the human race were left to wander in the mazes of ignorance and sin. Let us state a similar case. Here is a nation without any peculiar merit, which enjoys all the advantages of a fine climate, and a fertile soil, and all the blessings of civilization; while there are many others in a haif barbarous state, inhabiting barren regions, and struggling with inclement seasons. Again, here are a few individuals adorned with genius and taste, so as to seem to be beings of a superior order, when compared with multitudes who rank low in the scale of intellect, and are as children in comparison of them. Unless, on the ground of these differences, you are prepared to deny a Providence which rules over all, I do not see that you can deny a revelation because it was once confined to a single people, and is still known only to a portion of mankind. To reason from the goodness of God, that it will be dispensed in equal shares to all men, is found to be false in experience, and must be false also in theory: that is, to infer a priori, that if a revelation were made, it would be communicated to all nations, is contrary to the analogy of providence, which gives to one, and withholds from another. Men forget themselves, when they seriously bring forward the present objection. Does it belong to them to prescribe to the Almighty the mode of his providence? or have they a right to demand that a free gift shall be alike imparted to all? We could not have claimed a revelation as our due, unless God had at first made man without the knowledge necessary for the fulfilment of the end of his being. But the revelation of the Scriptures supposes every individual to be guilty, and consequently to have forfeited any title to the favour of his Maker. Upon what ground, then, shall he complain, that a particular blessing has been withheld from him? or, upon

101

what ground shall he say, It is impossible that God has bestowed a gift upon
another, because he has not bestowed it upon me? This question is met by
another, May not God do what he pleases with his own? You see, then, that
there is no reason for rejecting the Jewish revelation, because it was confined
to Judea; or the Christian, because it is not universal. If the nations of the
world had forsaken the true God, were worshippers of idols, and practised
innumerable abominations, he was not bound in justice to reclaim them. He
did more than he was under any obligation to do, when he gave his statutes
and judgments to one of them. The proofs of his mercy towards that nation,
cannot be annihilated by the withholding of it from others. It never entered
into the mind of any Israelite to deny that there was light in Goshen, because
there was darkness over all the land of Egypt. What is the fact at present?
Here is a religion said to have come from God, which is known to several
nations. Is there any evidence of its divine origin? It is to this that we
must look, and not to the accidental circumstance of its partial or universal
propagation. This is not the test by which its claims should be tried. We
must appeal to the evidence in its favour, if we would fairly decide the ques-
tion; and finding it sufficient, we are bound to embrace the religion, whether its
benefits have been extended to few or to many. Let a man acknowledge the
virtue of the medicine which has cured him, although there should be thou-
sands labouring under the same disease, to whom it has not been administered.
In the third place, it is objected against revelation, that it contains mysteries
What do you object to mysteries? Is it
and doctrines contrary to reason.
that they surpass our comprehension? Well, but you are not required to
understand them. Have you any thing farther to say? Yes; it is absurd to
suppose that a divine revelation would propose, as objects of belief, articles of
which we cannot form an adequate conception. They must be useless, as
they are unintelligible. No; I answer, it by no means follows, that a fact is
useless, because I cannot explain it. There are many facts of this description
upon which the business and the happiness of human life intimately depend.
We know that a wound inflicted on the body causes pain, but we do not know
how it affects the mind; and yet the simple fact excites us to use the pre-
cautions which are necessary to the preservation of life. In like manner, the
mysteries of religion may have, and are proved to have, a powerful influence
upon the devotion, the consolation, and the obedience of those who believe
them. Nothing can be more unreasonable, than to object to mysteries in
revelation, while they abound as much in natural religion; and it is so far from
being true that religion ends where mystery begins, that all religion begins
with mystery, and is accompanied by it throughout its whole progress. What
is a more mysterious subject than God, a being without beginning, infinite but
not extended, comprehending all things at a glance, upholding all things with-
out perplexity, and infallibly accomplishing his purposes, yet leaving his
creatures in possession of liberty? Is there, in fact, any thing which man
thoroughly knows? A grain of sand or drop of water puzzles him. Why
then does he expect that religion shall be free from mysteries? Is this a
department in which all things must be plain? Why should every nook and
crevice be illuminated here, while in every other province light is mingled
with darkness? Is not the God of revelation the God of nature? and does it
follow, that because he has been pleased to speak to us, all the secrets of his
Essence shall be disclosed, and his transcendent Majesty shall be brought
down to the level of our capacity? Might it not have been anticipated that as he
was now to appear in a new character, and to carry on a new system of opera-
tions, new wonders would meet our eyes? The objection against revelation
But it
on account of its mysteries, is utterly contemptible; unless it could be shown
that the doctrines referred to under this name, are contrary to reason.

is one thing to assert, and another thing to prove. If a man should tell us, as Hume has done in his speculations on Cause and Effect, that for aught which we know, a feather might have created the universe; or should affirm with atheists, that the human race had no beginning, although each individual had a beginning; or should maintain that, although there are marks of design in the system of created things, it had not an intelligent author; we might justly pronounce his doctrines to be contrary to reason. But are there any doctrines in revelation which resemble these? We are often reminded of the Trinity, and clamorously told, that it is impossible to conceive a proposition more repugnant to our clearest ideas, than that the same Being should be one and three. This would unquestionably be true, if it were affirmed that he is one and three in the same sense; but let our adversaries demonstrate the impossibility of his being one in one sense, and three in another; one in essence, and three in personal distinctions. It is not so in men, they exclaim. We grant it; but does it follow that it is not so in God? Is nothing possible in an infinite, unless it exist in a finite essence? This is the logic of these mighty men of reason; but they should be sent to school again that they may learn not to draw conclusions which are not contained in the premises. The presumption would be ridiculous, were not a more serious emotion excited by the impiety of puny mortals who know not how a hair of the head grows, and yet take upon them to pronounce what can and cannot be, in that Nature which fills heaven and earth.

In the fourth place, objections are advanced against the scheme of redemption revealed in the Scriptures, as implying what is incredible and impossible. Infidels exclaim against the incarnation of our Saviour as absurd and impious; and say, Who can believe that man was God, and God man, that God was born, suffered, and died on a cross? Let us first state the doctrine accurately. We maintain that God became man by uniting himself with human nature in a mysterious manner; but we deny any confusion or mixture of the natures, which remained perfectly distinct; so that when we speak of the Son of God as having been born, and as having suffered and died, we refer exclusively to the assumed nature, of which alone such things are predicable, although we ascribe them to the person to whom that nature belongs. Now, to the doctrine thus cleared from misrepresentation, what objection can be made? Although such a union would have been previously improbable-and it is acknowledged that nothing could have been more remote from the ordinary train of human thought-this neither proves that it was impossible, nor can it invalidate the evidence that it has actually taken place. In any other case, a man would be laughed at who should obstinately withhold his assent to what was told him, on the ground that it was improbable, although it had been established by satisfactory evidence. The only ground which could justify him in disregarding evidence, would be the impossibility of the thing. But who will presume to say that this union of the divine and human nature was impossible? or rather, who will demonstrate that it was impossible? for we will not be content with assertion, but demand proof. Who can tell us what God can and cannot do? Who has explored all the resources of Omnipotence? God has conjoined in the composition of man two substances which have no common properties, and yet, as experience teaches us, operate together and upon each other. God exerts his power immediately upon his creatures, to uphold, assist, and excite them to act; for it is a dictate of reason as well as of revelation, that "in him we live, and move, and have our being.' How is it proved that he must stop here? that he cannot form a more intimate alliance with his creatures? that it would be unworthy of him and contrary to the nature of things, to select a human being as the instrument of his agency for some great purpose, and with this view, to connect that being with himself by

a peculiar and mysterious relation! This is the doctrine of the incarnation, and till we hear something more than clamours against it, we shall continue to believe it upon the general evidence that the Scriptures are true.

Again, infidels object against the method by which the incarnate Redeemer is said to have effected our salvation, namely, by his substitution. What is more inconsistent with justice, than that one person should suffer for another, the innocent should bear the punishment of the guilty? Whatever force there may seem, at first sight, to be in this objection, it has been rejected by universal consent; for the idea of vicarious sufferings has prevailed in all ages and nations. Jews and Gentiles have believed that the Deity might be appeased, not only by the sufferings of the guilty themselves, but by the death of animals offered in their room; and hence sacrifices were an essential part of their religion. To whatever original source the idea may be traced, its universal diffusion is a proof that men did not consider it as incompatible with justice, that the penalty to which one individual was subject, should be inflicted on another. The idea is admitted still in all cases of suretiship, when one person is called to make good the engagements which another has failed to fulfil. It may be said that in such cases there cannot be injustice, because the surety, when he became responsible for another, was aware of the consequences, and according to the common saying, volenti nulla fit injuria. It is precisely on this ground that we vindicate the Scripture doctrine of the atonement of Christ. His sufferings were voluntary, in the most perfect sense, the result of generous love to man, and of ardent zeal for the glory of his Father. It would be contrary to justice that the innocent should suffer for the guilty, if the sufferer was compelled to be the victim; if he were not master of his own life, and, however willing, had not a right to dispose of it; or if society would be injured by his death, and if the punishment would be complete and final loss to himself. But none of these things is applicable to the present case. First, Jesus Christ was a willing victim; and when the time of his sufferings was near, he steadfastly set his face to go to Jerusalem."* Secondly, he was Lord of his own life; he had power to lay it down, and had power to take it again. Thirdly, so far was his death from being injurious to society, that the greatest benefit has resulted to mankind from it, as the price of their eternal redemption. Lastly, his sufferings have terminated in unspeakable advantage to himself; for while he has accomplished the benevolent design on which he was so fully bent, he has obtained the highest felicity and glory, and reigns at the right hand of his Father, over heaven and earth. When we consider the ultimate end of his sufferings, the manifestation of the holiness of God, the maintenance of his authority, the restoration of his law, the advancement of the cause of righteousness, and the expulsion of sin and misery from his kingdom; the substitution appears to be an act worthy of the Supreme Governor of the universe, and in itself and its consequences, the most glorious part of his moral administration.

Once more, it is objected that if the Son of God assumed human nature, and died for the salvation of men, the end was disproportionate to the means. The dispensation would be unworthy of the wisdom of God; for it is incredible that such grand preparations should have been made for the sake of a race of beings so insignificant, that the destruction of them, and the earth which they inhabit, would not have caused a perceptible blank in the wide regions of creation. But such reasoning is fallacious. The universe itself is as nothing, yea, less than nothing, in the eyes of its Maker. Might we not then say, why does he take any concern in it? Why does he bestow atten tion on particular parts of it-for example, upon men—as we learn from expe