verse. We would not say, with some, that the argument from the attributes of God is, in every case, good for nothing; but we will say, that it should be conducted with the most extreme caution as well as with the most profound humility. The importance of this remark is strongly illustrated by the following argument of our author.

"The contemplation of the Deity's goodness, as deduced from the great preponderance of instances in which benevolent design is exhibited, when accompanied with a consideration of the feelings and wishes of the human mind, gives rise to the first argument which is usually adduced in favour of the immortality of the soul. There is nothing more universal or more constant than the strong desire of immortality which possesses the mind, and, compared with which, its other wishes and solicitudes are but faint and occasional. That a benevolent being should have implanted this propensity without the intention of gratifying it, and to serve no very apparent purpose, unless it be the proving that it is without an object, appears difficult to believe for certainly the instinctive fear of death would have served all the purposes of self-preservation without any desire of immortality being connected with it, although there can be no doubt that this desire, or at least the anxiety about our future destiny, is intimately related to our dread of dissolution." A similar argument is drawn from the tender affections, which are so powerful and so universal in their operations. We have no wish to quarrel with this view, only it must be taken at its just value. It gives no certainty. If we may infer the actual immortality of the soul from the strong desire that possesses the mind, we may, in like manner, conclude that all men will be happy in a future state, since the desire of happiness is also universal and pow erful in its operation. If Lord Brougham's argument be taken as establishing this point, an equally valid one might be built to prove the position just intimated; nay, to prove that we are very much mistaken when we suppose that our species are subject to misery in this life, or that we may pluck down temporal ruin upon ourselves. In truth, the deep-seated and unextinguishable desire of happiness, when viewed in connexion with the goodness of God, only goes to show, if it goes thus far, that the attainment of happiness is possible, whilst the ultimate possession of it may be made to depend upon the fulfilment of certain conditions on our part. So, likewise, the argument drawn from "this longing after immortality" can in strictness only lead us to believe that the soul may, or probably will, exist for ever; whilst, for ought that we know, we

may forfeit our very being, by neglecting to comply with the conditions on which it may have been suspended. Thus far the argument is supported by the whole analogy of nature; but beyond this, it is not only unsound, but also destructive to the great interests of morality and religion.

The remaining arguments in this part of our author's discourse are such as are commonly employed to prove the doctrine of a future state. The first is drawn from the unequal distribution of rewards and punishments in this world, and the second from the universal prevalence of religion. The fact is also noticed, that our existence in a future state is not at all contrary to the analogies of nature; but, on the contrary, that it is of a piece with innumerable transformations around us.

The sixth section treats of Lord Bacon's doctrine of final causes. In handling this subject, our author shows, first, that the judgment which Lord Bacon pronounced has been misunderstood by those who have looked only at particular opinions without duly regarding the connexion in which they stand: and, secondly, that he may very probably have conceived a prejudice against the study of final causes, from the abuses to which a misplaced affectation for it had given rise in some of the ancient schools of philosophy. We shall not follow the remarks under these heads, since the same subject has been so fully and so satisfactorily discussed by Mr. Stewart and other writers of eminence.

But our author has fallen into one mistake with regard to the opinion of Lord Bacon, which is by far too common to be passed over in silence. Bacon uses the expression "final causes" in a very different sense from that in which it is ever employed at the present day. When we speak of searching out the cause of a thing, we frequently mean nothing more than the ascertaining of the general fact under which it may be arranged, or the class of facts to which it belongs. This mode of expression is carried out by Lord Bacon; so that he speaks of final causes when he alludes to what we would call ultimate facts or principles. Whoever will consult his works,* may see that this is the sense in which he uses the expression, when Lord Brougham supposes that he speaks disparagingly of the study of final causes.

"That Lord Bacon speaks disparagingly of the inquiry concerning final causes, both when he handles it didactically, and when he mentions it incidentally, is admitted. He enumerates it among the errors that spring from the restlessness of the

Nov. Org. lib. 1. aph. 48.

mind, (impotentia mentis,) which forms the fourth class of the idols of the species, (idola tribus,) or causes of false philosophy connected with the peculiarities of the human constitution." In the passage to which his Lordship here refers, and to which we have just referred, Lord Bacon is speaking of that restlessness of the mind by which it is for ever prone to rise too rapidly from particulars to general principles.

Using the phrase in this sense, of course we might expect him to condemn the too great haste and precipitancy with which we are prone to grasp at "final causes," when it was the great object of his immortal labours to correct this incurable tendency of the human mind. Throughout the whole course of the Novum Organum, he cautions us with the utmost eloquence against this same restlessness of mind, by which we are led to rise too rapidly in the process of generalization; or, to speak more accurately, by which we too readily adopt our own generalizations as established truths, and rest satisfied with them.

In the same sense, but to a much worse purpose, are the words in question used by Laplace in a passage quoted from his writings by Mr. Whewell. He supposes that the argument from final causes has been weakened by the progress and discoveries of science, and that it will continue to lose its force as philosophy advances. Thus, he supposes that Newton has greatly diminished the force of this argument by resolving many final causes into one more general, and by having in this way removed them to the limits of the solar system. How little must Laplace have known about the argument for an Intelligent First Cause, when the mention of a final cause suggested no other idea to his mind but that of a law of Nature! He seems never to have imagined that the strong-hold of the theist lies, not in the laws which God has ordained for the government of his creatures, but in the infinite skill which he has displayed by making, without number, the most complicated arrangements of means, so as to accomplish the purposes of his wisdom in perfect conformity with those laws. And he affords a striking illustration of the excellent remark of Dr. Chalmers, that atheists escape the overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of an Intelligent First Cause, by confining their attention exclusively to the laws of Nature; as if they furnished the only proofs of design. If he had conceived of final causes in the proper sense of the words, it would have puzzled him to conceive how two or more of them could be resolved into one.

In the seventh section, after making a few remarks on the subject of scientific arrangement, the author gives us the fol

lowing threefold classification of the truths of every science: 1. "The truths which it teaches relative to the constitution and action of matter or of mind; 2. The truths which it teaches relative to theology; and, 3. The application of both classes of truths to practical uses, physical or moral." This division he has illustrated by an example.

But, he supposes, it may be objected to on the ground that it omits one of the objects of scientific investigation-namely, the explanation of phenomena. In order to meet this objection, our author denies that there is any real difference between the discovery of general truths and the explanation of phenomena by them; or, in other words, that there is any difference between analysis and synthesis in the sciences of contingent truth. Both processes, he contends, are made up of the same steps, and there is no difference between them, except that these steps are taken in an inverse order. To make this point good against the commonly received distinction, Lord Brougham lays great stress upon the circumstance, that the facts employed in any analysis, and leading to the establishment of a general truth, might themselves have been explained by that general truth, provided it had first been established in some other way. But we confess we cannot see that the two processes in question should be regarded as one and the same, merely because the same phenomena may be indiscriminately made the subject matter of either of them.

We shall not follow the author in his remarks respecting the pernicious influence which he imagines the above distinction is calculated to exert upon our inquiries after truth. If the distinction has a real foundation in the nature of things, this is sufficient. We agree, however, with Lord Brougham, that the terms synthesis and analysis have been improperly applied to the sciences of contingent truth, and that they have given rise to no little confusion; but this is no reason why we should annihilate the distinction which they are intended to preserve. We should rather retain this distinction by the use of the more appropriate terms-induction and deduction; and not suppose, with his Lordship, that the former constitutes the sole method to be followed in our investigations.

The truth is, that although Lord Brougham has written so much about induction, he seldom speaks of it without betraying some inaccuracy of thought or of expression. For example, "Induction gives us a right to expect that the same result will always happen from the same action operating in the like cir cumstances." Who does not see that this proposition should be regarded as a self-evident truth, as the spontaneous result of

our mental constitution, and not as founded upon induction? Again: "The fundamental rule of inductive science is, that no hypothesis shall be admitted-that nothing shall be assumed merely because, if true, it would explain the facts." If this is correct, it is evident that Newton has violated the fundamental rule of inductive science, in supposing that the power of gravity varies inversely as the squares of the distances; for the only ground for believing this is, that it serves to explain the facts observed.

We should now come, in order, to the second part of the Discourse before us, which contains but few pages, and treats of the three following subjects-the pleasures which attend all scientific pursuits, the pleasures and the improvement peculiar to the study of Natural Theology, and the service rendered by this study to the doctrines of Revelation.

But we have already drawn out our remarks to a great length, and we shall only observe, with respect to this part of the Discourse, that it contains some very important and interesting observations. On the last subject of which it treats, the connexion between natural and revealed religion, we had intended to extend our remarks to a considerable length; but, for the reason just stated, we shall desist.

If the reader imagines that we have taken great pains to point out the defects of the ex-chancellor's Discourse, we beg leave to inform him that we have only given a few specimens of his style of reasoning; and that we have, indeed, left some of his most pregnant passages untouched. We do not pretend, however, that the author has not displayed uncommon powers of one sort; but they are not such, in our opinion, as qualify him for the task he has undertaken. He is capable of producing a very great effect by combinations of thought, and, in this way, he has given us some specimens of fine writing; but he wants the power of discrimination. We hardly know which is the more remarkable, the extent and variety of his knowledge, or the want of logical precision which pervades his Discourse. We take leave of the book, by again reminding our readers that our main ground of quarrel with the work is found in its pretension of being a statement of the "nature of the evidence" for the truths of Natural Theology. A good cause suffers a great deal more from the bad arguments of its friends than from the objections of its enemies. There are, too, scattered through the treatise, several false statements, psychological and logical; some of the most important of which we have exposed, because, occurring incidentally in a work like this, they are likely to do harm by being thought