Natural theology has of late attracted a good deal of attention, owing in part to the well known bequest of the late Earl of Bridgewater: and here in passing we would express the wish, that the wealthy of our own land would consider how easily they can command the efforts of the highest intellects, and how worthily a portion of their wealth might be employed in directing those efforts for the improvement and happiness of their fellow men. We rejoice that a subject so intimately connected with the foundation of our happiness and hopes is receiving increased attention. Too long has the physical inquirer contented himself with simply learning the laws of nature, and stopping short of the inference which would throw a sublimity over all his inquiries.

It is our design to present to our readers a brief account of the train of thought pursued in the work before us, and to offer some remarks which may serve, perhaps, to place some of the topics discussed in a clearer light.

The following topics are treated preliminary to entering on the direct argument for the being and attributes of God, viz:the distinction between the ethics and the objects of theologyDr. Samuel Clarke's argument a priori-Mr. Hume's objection to the argument a posteriori-and the hypothesis that the world is eternal. By the objects of theology are meant the facts respecting the existence and attributes of God-by the ethics, the perceptions of duty which the presentation of those facts to the mind necessarily awaken, or rather, to give his prevailing use of the term, the nature which renders us capable of such perceptions. Thus, when one sustains towards another the relation of benefactor, the latter immediately (by means of his "ethics," Dr. C. would say) feels that gratitude is due, and when God is presented to the mind, by the same principle of his constitution, he feels that obedience and homage are due. The ethics exist independently of the facts that set them agoing, just as the mathematics exist independently of the facts to which they are applied. The facts in natural philosophy are the result of observation, the mathematics which are applied to them are received by a different and peculiar evidence of their own; so the facts of theology are the result of observation, the ethics of theology are perceived by their own evidence. Were the objects of theology utterly unknown, the ethics would still exist, ready to be awakened and affected by the presentation of

* The author uses the term ethics in two senses-sometimes for duties perceived, and sometimes for the nature rendering us capable of such perceptions. The latter, as noticed above, is the prevailing use of the term in the chapter under consideration.

appropriate objects. When we pass from the terrestrial to the celestial in natural philosophy, there is a change in the facts, but the mathematics we apply to the facts are the same; so when we pass from the terrestrial to the celestial in theology (that is, from natural to revealed theology) there is a change in the facts, but the ethics are the same. The telescope is to natural philosophy what revelation is to natural theology. Since man is possessed of these principles, or ethics, or of this moral nature, the presentation of any object of theology imposes a felt obligation. However obscure the object may be, still some obligation will be felt. The possibility, or even the imagination of a God, imposes the obligation to inquire after him, and such a possibility cannot be denied-for no man can positively say there is no God, unless he is omniscient-for, granting that there are no vestiges of a God where he has been, yet there are other regions of the universe unvisited by him, and he does not know but that there such vestiges may be found.

This distinction between the ethics and objects of theology is dwelt upon at large, and exhibited in a great variety of aspects and applications. The chapter is a valuable one on account of the just and impressive views it gives of our moral constitution. Though these views were long since unfolded by Butler, and have been recognized by Stewart and others, yet owing to the material, or, at least, the unspiritual influence of the philosophy of Locke and Paley, there is great need of repetition and noonday clearness on this subject. The light, we are happy to believe, is increasing; juster views respecting our moral nature are gradually extending, and we trust the day is not far distant, when the doctrines of those writers who have denied to man the possession of a moral nature, and have made him dependent on sense for what little of factitious spirituality they are constrained to allow him, will be consigned to merited neglect. Too long have these doctrines held their place in our academic halls, upheld by the authority of those who through merit or courtesy have received the appellation of great.

The next topic is the argument a priori. Of this Dr. Chalmers justly regards Dr. Clarke as the great patron, and confines his remarks to the reasonings given under the third proposition, or the "Demonstration of the Being and attributes of God." We will first state the argument as given by Clarke; we shall then give the views of Dr. Chalmers respecting it. The argument of Dr. Clarke is contained in the following extracts from his" Demonstration." We must first, however, give his definition of necessary existence: "It is to exist by an absolute necessity originally in the nature of the thing itself." "Now a neces

sity absolutely such in its own nature, is nothing else but its being a plain impossibility, or implying a contradiction to suppose the contrary. For instance: the relation of equality between twice two and four is an absolute necessity, only because it is an immediate contradiction in terms to suppose them unequal. This is the only idea we can frame of an absolute necessity." We now proceed to the demonstration: "When," says Dr. Clarke, "we are endeavoring to suppose that there is no being in the universe that exists necessarily, we always find in our minds some ideas, as of infinity and eternity, which to remove, that is to suppose that there is no Being, no substance in the universe, to which these attributes, or modes of existence are necessarily inherent, is a contradiction in the very terms. For modes and attributes exist only by the existence of the subject to which they belong. Now he that can suppose eternity and immensity (and consequently the substance by whose existence these modes or attributes exist) removed out of the universe, may, if he please, as easily remove the relation of equality between twice two and four." "That to suppose immensity removed out of the universe, or not necessarily eternal is an express contradiction, is intuitively evident to every one who attends to his own ideas, and considers the essential nature of things. To suppose any part of space removed, is to suppose it removed from and out of itself: and to suppose the whole to be taken away is supposing it to be taken away from itself, that is to be taken away while it still remains." The argument reduced to its simplest form may be expressed as follows: Space and time necessarily exist; they are attributes, and hence necessarily imply a subject, a substance; that substance is God. In this way Dr. Clarke thinks he has achieved a demonstration a priori.

We will now give Dr. Chalmers' objections to this reasoning, in his own language:

"He confounds, we think, a logical with an actual impossibility. Insomuch that if the conception of the non-existence of any actual thing involve in it no logical impossibility, then that thing is not necessarily existent. He applies the same test to the things of which it is alleged that they necessarily exist, as to the propositions of which it is alleged that they are necessarily true. He holds that if things do necessarily exist,we cannot conceive these things not to be, just as when propositions have in them an axiomatic certainty, we cannot conceive these things not to be true. And so on the other hand, if we can conceive any existent thing not to be, then that thing exists, but does not exist necessarily. It has not the ground of its existence in itself— even as a necessary truth has its evidence or the ground of its trueness

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in itself. And therefore, the ground of its existence must be in another besides itself. It must have had a beginning. It must not have existed from eternity." Vol. i. p. 101–2.

"The logical is made to be identical with, or made to be the test or measure of the actual or the physical necessity. The one is confounded with the other; and this we hold to be the first fallacy of the a priori argument." p. 104.

"But we have only touched upon what may be called the negative part of the a priori argument-that by which matter is divested of self-existence. Thence, on the stepping stone of actual matter, existent though not self-existent, we might pass by inference to a superior and antecedent Being from whom it hath sprung. But this were descending to the a posteriori argument-whereas the high pretension is, that in the light of the same principle which enables the mind to discard from all matter the property of self-existence, may it without the intervention of any derived or created thing lay immediate hold on the truth of a self-existent God. This forms what we might call the positive part of the a priori argument." p. 105—6.

"Now it is at the transition which the argument makes from the necessary existence of space and time to the necessary existence of God, that we apprehend the second fallacy to be. Eternity and immensity, it is allowed, are not substances-they are only attributes, and, incapable as they are of existing of themselves, they necessarily suppose a substantive Being in which they are inherent. For modes and attributes,' says Dr. Clarke, 'exist only by the existence of the substance to which they belong. The denial then of such a Being is held to be tantamount to the denial both of infinite space, and of ever. lasting successive duration-and so such denial involves contradiction in it. It is with him a contradiction in terms to assert no immensity and no eternity; and to suppose there is no Being in the universe to which these attributes or modes of existence are necessarily inherent is also a contradiction in terms. Now, it is here we think the nonsequitur lies. We do not perceive how boundless space and boundless duration imply either a material or immaterial substratum in which these may reside as but the modes or qualities. We can conceive un limited space empty, and empty for ever of all substances whether material or immaterial-and we see neither logical nor mathematical impossibility in the way of such a conception. We do not feel, with Dr. Clarke, that the notion of immense space as if it were absolutely nothing, is an express contradiction. Nor do we feel aught to convince us in the scholastic plausibility of such sentences as the following: For nothing is that which has no properties or modes whatever. That is to say, it is that of which nothing can truly be affirmed, and of which every thing can truly be denied, which is not the case of immensity or space.' In spite of this we can imagine no eternal and infinite Being in the universe--we can imagine an infinite nothing; nor do we feel that in so doing, we imagine eternity and immensity removed out of the universe while they at the same time still continue

there. There is nothing, it appears to us, in this scholastic jingle about modes and substances, that leads by any firm and solid pathway to the stupendous conclusion of a God. Both space and time can be conceived without a substance of which they are but the attributes-nor is it all clear that these modes imply a substantive Being to which they belong. Now the main stay of the a priori argument is that eternity and immensity are modes-and as we cannot rid ourselves of the conception of a stable existence in the modes, so neither can we rid ourselves of the conception of an existent substance to which these modes belong. We repeat that we have no faith in the product of such excogitation as this--and should as little think of building upon it a system of theism, as we should of subordinating the realities of history or nature to the mere technology of the schoolmen.” p. 107--8.

Such are the objections urged by Dr. Chalmers, and they are certainly valid as against Clarke's argument-resting upon the assumption, that infinite space and time are attributes. But it may be observed in passing, that there is another way of putting the argument a priori, to which these criticisms of Chalmers do not apply--that namely, which asserts the logical conception of an Infinite and Eternal Being, (the possible existence of God) as involving for our minds, an invincible belief in the actual existence of such a being; in other words, that the IDEA of God, proves the reality of God. This is a question which we cannot now discuss. We shall dismiss this part of the subject with simply remarking, that we do not attach any particular value to the so-called a priori arguments for the Divine existence.

He next considers Mr.

We go on with our author. Hume's objection to the argument, a posteriori. Hume asserts, (and Dr. Chalmers thinks with reason) that the inference of design from its effects, is the result of experience. We have seen a watchmaker make a watch, whenever therefore we see a watch, we, from our experience, infer that it was made by a watchmaker. Now we have never seen a world made, and hence have no experience on which to ground the inference of a worldmaker. The world is a singular effect, (if effect it be) and we can logically infer nothing respecting its cause. Such is the objection of Hume.

Dr. Reid, and after him Stewart, assert, that the inference of design, is not the result of experience, but is intuitive-that on surveying the world, we intuitively or necessarily infer, that it is the result of design. They affirm, that this inference is grounded on an original principle of our nature, which had previously escaped observation. For this Dr. Chalmers sharp