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TO USE PAROLE AUTHORITY
To a certain extent we have achieved some progress in this area. Both the State Department and the President have gone on the record in opposition to the repression of Jews in the Soviet Union. Also, Attorney General Mitchell has informed Congress that he would use his parole authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act to admit into the United States all Jewish refugees irrespective of the numbers involved.
This action was a direct response to the Soviet Jews Relief Act of 1971, which I and over 100 other Members cosponsored. This bill would have authorized 30,000 special immigrant visas for Jewish refugees from the U.S.S.R.
It was reported last weekend that a new surge of emigration to Israel from the Soviet Union has been permitted in the last 3 weeks. It is now said that approximately 7,500 Jews have been allowed to leave the U.S.S.R. so far this year. This total may well climb over the 10,000 mark by the end of 1971.
Diplomats knowledgeable in this area have suggested that this upsurge in emigration has been largely the result of the pressure of world public opinion, especially that exerted in foreign capitals visited recently by high Soviet officials. It has supposedly been privately said by Soviet officials that 50,000 formal applications for visas have been received from Jews. It is expected that this figure will increase as the Soviets approve greater numbers of applications.
This news should certainly be encouraging to those of us in Congress who have been trying to keep this issue alive on the assumption that the Soviet Union can be pressured into assuming a more humanitarian stance toward its Jewish population. It would
be foolhardy for us to assume at this point, however, that the problem has been in any way solved. Continued pressure must be brought on the U.S.S.R., and for this purpose the resolutions under consideration are very important.
EMIGRATION A SENSIBLE GOAL
The resolutions are directed at both improving the conditions within the U.S.S.R. and changing that Government's emigration policies. I believe that, of the two, the latter is the most sensible objective for us to emphasize as it is in this area that the U.S.S.R. has shown the most flexibility.
Thus, I would prefer that House Concurrent Resolution 391, of all the resolutions I have sponsored, be given the most serious consideration. House Concurrent Resolution 391 would call upon the State Department to raise in the General Assembly of the United Nations the issue of the Soviet Union's transgression of the Declaration of Human Rights, specifically the right to freely emigrate.
Soviet officials boasting of the social and moral responsibility of their system say that any citizen may leave the country if he wishes, but this is not the truth. The Soviet Union must be confronted with their hypocrisy at the forum of the United Nations so that they will loosen further their restrictions.
Again, Mr. Chairman, may I commend you for undertaking these hearings. I recommend that you strongly push for the passage of legislation putting the House officially on record for the immediate
halt to repression and discrimination against Soviet Jews. Again, I urge that you support legislation that calls upon the administration to bring the matter before the United Nations.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. House Concurrent Resolution 391 is also the Anderson-O'Neill resolution.
Mr. Gude, in House Concurrent Resolution 391, the Soviet Union was singled out in each of the four items on page 2. In other words, the thrust of the resolution is entirely against the Soviet Union and yet in item No. 1, there is reference to the free expression of ideas. We all know that there is not free expression of ideas in some other countries. Would this perhaps be stronger if it were adjusted to take note of the fact that in other areas of the world there is also a lamentable restriction on such free expression? Have you considered that possibility!
Mr. GUDE. I think this is a possibility that would have support of a substantial number of Members of Congress. I think it is a question of how much you can broaden this and still focus on the main issue. Certainly numbers alone should not be our only reason.
If a human right is denied one individual, it is as bad as if it were 10,000.
Mr. FINDLEY. Thank you very much.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you very much, Mr. Gude, for a very forthright, precise, and succinct statement. It is a very important contribution to the workings of the subcommittee.
Mr. GUDE. Thank you very much.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Our next witness is Prof. Hans J. Morgenthau, chairman, academic committee, American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry.
Let me thank you personally, Professor Morgenthau. I am pleased to be the chairman of any subcommittee that is graced with your distinguished presence. The work you have done in other areas, including foreign policy, represents the direction our country ought to be taking. I am very pleased that I am permitted the opportunity to listen to your remarks.
STATEMENT OF HANS J. MORGENTHAU, CHAIRMAN, ACADEMIC
COMMITTEE, AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE ON SOVIET JEWRY
Albert A. Michelson Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and Modern History, Emeritus, University of Chicago, and Leonard Davis Distinguished Professor of Political Science, City University of New York.
Born, Coburg, Germany, February 17, 1904; s. Ludwig and Frieda (Bachmann) Morgenthau; student, University of Berlin, Frankfort, Munich, 1923-27; magna cum laude, University of Munich, 1927; summa cum laude, University of Frankfort, 1929; L.L.D., Clark University (1962); L.L.D., Ripon College (1962); Litt. D., Western Reserve University (1965); L.L.D., Alma College (1965).
Married Irma Thormann, June 3, 1935; children--Matthew, Susanna. Came to United States, 1937; naturalized, 1943. Admitted to bar, 1927. Assistant to law faculty, University of Frankfort, 1931 ; acting president, Labor Law Court, Frankfort, 1931–1933; instructor in political science, University of Geneva, 1932– 1935; professor, Institute of International and Economic Studies, Madrid, 1935– 36; instructor in government, Brooklyn College, New York City, 1937–39; assistant professor, law, history, and political science, University of Kansas City, Missouri, 1939-1943; admitted to Missouri bar, 1943; visiting associate professor, political science, University of Chicago, 1943-45, associate professor, 1945-49; professor, 1949-61; director, Center for Study of American Foreign and Military Policy, 1950—; professor of political science and modern history, 1961-63; Albert A. Michelson, distinguished service professor, 1963; Leonard Davis distinguished professor, political science, City University of New York, 1968—; visiting professor, University of California at Berkeley (1949); Harvard (1951, 1959, 1960–61) ; Northwestern (1945); Wyoming (1955, 1958); Columbia and Yale (1956-57) ; lecturer at Armed Forces Staff College, Air, Army, Naval, National War Colleges, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Inter-American and NATO Defense Colleges; consultant, Department of State, 1949. 1951, 1963—; consultant, Department of Defense, 1963–65; member, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, 1958–59; associate, Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research, 1958-60; senior research fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, 1966.
Member: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, American Philosophical Society, American Political Science Association, American Association of University Professors; Honorary member: Spanish Institute of Political Science.
Mr. MORGENTHAU. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before your subcommittee and with your permission I shall not read my prepared statement and ask that it be inserted in the record.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Without objection it will be included in the record. (Mr. Morgenthau's prepared statement follows:)
STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR Hans J. MORGENTHAU The conflict between the Soviet government and Soviet Jewry stems from three sources : popular anti-Semitism; the general incompatibility of any totalitarian regime with any autonomous organized religion; and the special incompatibility of the Soviet regime and Judaism.
Anti-Semitism as a popular movement has a long history in Russia, frequently stimulated by the government of the day and exploited for a particular political purpose. This tradition has been continued sporadically by a succession of Soviet governments, the outstanding example being the persecution of the Jews during the last phase of Stalin's regime.
Any totalitarian regime, claiming to have a monopoly of truth and virtue and therefore commanding the ultimate loyalities of its citizens, must find it difficult to tolerate competition in the form of other worldly religions which by definition claim an independent source of truth and virtue. Thus a totalitarian regime can at best only have an uneasy relationship with organized religion and at worst will try to subvert and eliminate it.
A CHALLENGE TO TOTALITARIANISM Judaism, in particular, presents a challenge to any totalitarian regime, for the prophetic tradition of Judaism has made it its business, since the times of the prophets of the Old Testament, to subject the rulers of Israel to the moral standards of the other world. It has endeavored, in the Biblical phrase, “to speak truth to power," and thereby reminded the powers that be of a higher law to which they are subject. A regime for which truth is a mere by-product of its own power cannot fail to recognize in this Judaic claim an element of subversion. That uneasy relationship between a totalitarian regime and Judaism is aggravated by the existence of Israel, upon which the spiritual aspiration of many Soviet Jews are naturally focused.
If there is any merit in this analysis of the nature of Soviet-Jewish relations, three practical conclusions follow. The tension in the relations between the Soviet government and Soviet Jewry is existential. That is to say, it is the inevitable result of the nature of the two moral and social systems, and cannot be necessarily attributed to the ill will of the Soviet regime.
Secondly, Soviet Jewry is not faced only or primarily with disabilities of one kind or other but with a threat to its very survival as an entity conscious of its distinct spiritual and secular culture. Thirdly, the steps to be taken for the protection and revival of that distinct culture must take into account not only the existential tension between the Soviet regime and Soviet Jewry mentioned before, but also the limitation within which even a benevolent Soviet government would have to operate.
If one considers these limitations, one arrives at the conclusion that activities addressed to the Soviet government on behalf of Soviet Jewry are subject to corresponding limitations, both in terms of substance and procedure.
MASS EMIGRATION UNREALISTIC
As concerns substance, it is unrealistic to expect the Soviet government to consent to mass emigration of Jews. It is so for three reasons. Such mass emigration would be a demonstration of utter lack of confidence in, and alienation from, the Soviet regime. Secondly, if Soviet Jewry, considered by the Soviet regime to be a nationality among others, were allowed to emigrate en masse, other Soviet nationalities might want to follow suit. Thirdly, mass immigration to Israel under the auspices of the Soviet Union would completely negate the Middle Eastern policies of the Soviet government.
The efforts on behalf of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union ought to concentrate not on the unattainable goal of mass emigration but upon selected cases of personal hardship. As recent events have shown, this discriminating approach has met with a measure of success.
The main objective of the world-wide efforts on behalf of Soviet Jewry must concentrate upon the main threat to which Soviet Jewry is exposed : spiritual and cultural extinction. How can the outside world strengthen the will of Soviet Jewry to survive, and what can it do to implement that will? The answer to that question is two-fold.
The outside world must maintain and extend its contacts with Soviet Jewry through personal visits, correspondence and the supply of food and other materials, which will not only meet the immediate needs of the recipients but also will make it clear to them symbolically that they have not been forgotten.
The other answer is more difficult, because it refers to the reactions of the Soviet government to steps to be taken by the outside world. The Soviet government has proven to be sensitive to outside pressures in a dual sense. It has refused to yield to such pressure when it considered it to be insulting or dan. gerous to its interests. It has yielded, generally surreptitiously, to other more subtle pressures, especially when it could thereby improve its position in the world community.
DIGNIFIED AND DISCREET PRESSURE
It follows that the effectiveness of such pressures stands in inverse relation to their violence and ostentatiousness. In other words, the more dignified, and the more discreet, and the more widely supported by important segments of the peoples of the world those pressures are, the more effective they are likely to be. On the other hand, if they are trying to put the Soviet Union on the spot, conjuring up memories of the Cold War at its most acrimonious, they are likely to be ineffective.
This last point is emphatically borne out by the testimony of Jews who have recently emigrated from the Soviet Union. They have testified to the damage to their aspirations and, more particularly, to their support from other segments of the Soviet population, which has been caused by the violence committed upon Soviet citizens residing abroad. Such violence, they have pointed out, tends to create in the Soviet Union a united front against foreign attacks, which leaves Soviet Jewry isolated and exposed to reprisals. Thus such violence, reprehensible on moral grounds, is bound to have results the exact opposite of those intended.
Mr. MORGENTHAU. It is, of course, obvious that the Soviet Jews share the condition of oppression with many other religious and nonreligious minorities in the Soviet Union. I shall not go here into the historic and contemporary details. I have tried to point them out in the submission. I want only to make one point which is stimulated by the headline in one of this morning's papers to the effect that the Soviet Jews do not live in terror in the Soviet Union, and a point is made to the effect that the attitude of the Soviet Government toward the Jews is quite different and less brutal than was that of the Nazis.
NO COMPARISON WITH NAZIS
Nobody in a responsible position has ever dared to compare the Soviet Government's treatment of the Jews with that practiced by the Nazis. But it is still true that there exists a spirit of terror and an attack upon the very spirtual existence of the Soviet Jews which, while entirely different and less obvious in nature than was the Nazi persecution, may be no less painful for the souls of the individuals and no less disastrous for the survival of the Jewish community in the Soviet Union.
The issue which really faces us has perhaps best been defined by a great scholar who also has been for a time a víctim of Soviet oppression until he finally got permission to leave, Professor Zand. Professor Zand, in a lecture at Columbia University in New York, made this statement :
First of all, I want to point out that among Soviet Jews there are two poles. The first pole, which I belong to, are Jews who say there is no possibility to remain Jews, to continue Jewish life in the Soviet Union, and therefore the only way to remain sons of our people is to return to our homeland, to Israel.
The second poles are Jews who say there is no future for Jewish life in the Soviet Union and therefore they prefer to become completely assimilated and remain in Russia as Russians. There is no part of Soviet Jewry which says there is a possibility of Jewish life there. You have to understand this fact if you wish to evaluate the situation accurately.
I think this is in a simple and profound way a correct definition of the problem that faces us. Let me say a word about the means which appear to be most conducive to alleviating the position of the Jews in the Soviet Union. First of all, the use of threats or the consummation of threats through violent acts is utterly counterproductive. No self-respecting government and, more particularly, not a government so sensitive in these matters as that of the Soviet Union will yield to outrages committed against its citizens in a foreign land. Aside from the moral issue with which this kind of blind and purposeless violence confronts us, there is simply the practical issue: If you want to help the Jews in the Soviet Union, this is the utterly wrong way of going about it, and again Professor Zand and others who have had firsthand experience have been emphatic in warning against the use of violence for that purpose.
What impresses the Soviet Union, and I speak here not only on the basis of general principles but also on the basis of admittedly limited experience with Soviet officials and private citizens, what impresses the Soviet Union is the pressure of public opinion, because the Russians are enormously sensitive on that issue.
I remember having had as a guest in my home a very prominent Soviet lady, with whose name you are all acquainted, but I don't want to put it on the record here, and the first thing she did was to plunge into a tirade about the agitation against the Soviet Union with regard to the conditions of Soviet Jews.