PLATO of all things, as the many say, but of few things that happen to men He is the cause, and of many things He is not the cause: for our good things are far fewer than the evil. And of the good we must assign no other cause than God, but of the evil we must seek the causes in other things, but not in God. 'I think, said he, you speak most truly. 'We must not then, said I, allow either Homer or any other b poet foolishly to commit such an offence as this against the gods, and to say that "Two coffers lie beside the door of Zeus, With gifts for man; one good, the other ill." "Him sometimes evil, sometimes good befalls"; 'Nor must we admit that Zeus is to us "The sole dispenser both of weal and woe." 'And if any one say that the violation of oaths and treaties wrought by Pandarus was brought about by Athene and Zeus, we shall not approve: nor that the strife and contest of the gods was caused by Themis and Zeus: nor again must we permit our young men to hear how Aeschylus says that "God plants in mortal breasts the cause of sin, When He would utterly destroy a house." 'But if any one writes a poem, in which these iambics are d found, about the sorrows of Niobe, or the calamities of "Pelops' line," or the "tale of Troy," or any other such events, either we must forbid him to call them the work of a god, or, if of a god, then he must invent some such explanation for them as we are now seeking, and must say that God did what was just and good, and the others were the better for being chastised. But we must not permit the poet to say that those who suffered punishment were miserable, and that this was God's doing. 'If, however, they would say that the wicked were miserable p. 644 because they needed punishment, but were benefited by being punished by God, that we must approve. 643 b 3 Hom. Il. xxiv. 527 (Lord Derby) 532 c9 Aeschylus, Niobe, Fr. 160 b 6 ibid. 530 c 4 ibid. iii. 275 CI ibid. сб 'But as to saying that God, who is good, becomes the author of PLATO evil to any, we must by all possible means contend that no one shall make such statements in his own city, if it is to be governed by good laws, nor any one either young or old listen to his tales whether in verse or prose, as such statements if uttered would be impious, and neither profitable to us, nor consistent with themselves. 'I vote with you, said he, for this law, and am pleased with it. "This then, said I, will be one of the laws and moulds in b which our speakers must speak concerning God, and our poets write, That God is not the cause of all things, but only of the good. 'That is quite satisfactory, said he. And what then of this second? Do you suppose God to be a sorcerer, and of a nature to show Himself craftily now in one form and now in another, at one time actually becoming what He seems, and changing His own proper form into various shapes, and at another deceiving us, and making us imagine such transformations in Him; or do you think that He is a simple essence, and most unlikely to go out of His own proper form? 'I am not able, said he, to answer now off-hand. 'Well, what do you say to this? If anything were to change. from its own proper form, must it not be changed either by itself or by some other? 'It must. 'Are not then the things which are in the best condition least liable to be altered or moved by another? As for example when a body is affected by meats and drinks and labours, and every plant by sunshine and winds and other such influences, is it not the healthiest and the most perfect that is altered least? 'Of course it is. 'And would not the bravest and wisest soul be least disturbed and altered by any influence from without? 'Yes. 'Moreover I suppose that, on the same principle, among all manufactured things, furniture, buildings, and clothes, those that are well made and in good condition suffer the least alteration from time and other influences? d PLATO p. 645 'It is so. 'Everything then which is well constituted either by nature or art, or both, admits the least alteration by any other? 'So it seems. 'But surely God, and the things of God, are in every way most excellent ? 'Of course. 'In this way then God is most unlikely to take many shapes. 'Most unlikely indeed. 'But would He change and alter Himself? 'Evidently, said he, if He is changed at all. 'Does He then change Himself into what is better and more beautiful, or into what is worse and less beautiful than Himself? 'It must be into what is worse than Himself, if He is changed at all for surely we shall not say that God is imperfect in beauty or goodness. 'You are quite right, said I. And this being so, do you think, Adeimantus, that any one, whether god or man, would willingly make himself worse in any way? 'Impossible, said he. 'It is also impossible then, said I, that a god should be willing to change himself, but each one of them, as it seems, being as perfect b as possible in beauty and goodness, remains ever absolutely in his own form. 'It seems to me quite certain, said he. that Then, my good friend, said I, let none of the poets tell us "Gods, in the guise of strangers from afar, Wander in various forms from state to state." 'Nor let any one slander Proteus and Thetis, nor introduce Hera in tragedies nor in any other poems transformed as a c priestess begging alms "For Inachus the Argive river-god's Life-giving daughters." 'These and many other such falsehoods let them cease to invent. Neither let our mothers be persuaded by these poets to terrify their children by the tales which they wickedly tell them, 645 b 6 Homer, Odyssey, xvii. 485 Fragment known only from Plato's quotation o 2 Aeschylus, Xantriae, a that certain gods forsooth wander about by night in the likeness PLATO of many animals of different kinds, lest they be both guilty of blasphemy against the gods, and at the same time make their children more cowardly. 'Let them beware, said he. 'But then, said I, do the gods, though they are not capable of d actual change, make us imagine, by their deception and magic, that they appear in various forms? 'Perhaps, said he. 'Well then, said I, would a god be willing to lie either by word or by deed, in putting phantoms before us? 'I do not know, said he. 'Do you not know, said I, that the true lie, if one may so speak, is hated by all both gods and men? 'How do you mean? said he. 'You know, of course, said I, that no one willingly consents to lie to the highest and chiefest part of himself, and concerning matters of the highest importance, but every one fears above all to harbour a lie there. 'No, I do not even now understand you, said he. 'Because, said I, you think I have some grand meaning: but I only mean that to lie to the soul about realities, and to be p. 646 deceived and ignorant, and to have and to hold the falsehood there, is what all men would most dislike, and what in that part of them they utterly detest. 'Yes, utterly, said he. 'But surely, as I was saying just now, this is what might most rightly be called "a true lie," this ignorance in the soul of the deceived since the lie in words is a sort of imitation of the affection in the soul, and an image produced afterwards, not at all a pure unmixed lie. Is it not so? "Yes, certainly. 'The real lie then is hated not only by gods, but also by men? b 'I think so. 'Well then? When and in what case is the lie in words useful, and so not deserving to be hated? Is it not in dealing with enemies, and when any of those who are called our friends from madness or any kind of folly attempt to do some mischief, it then becomes useful as a remedy to turn them from their purpose? PLATO 'Also in those mythical tales of which we were speaking just now, because we know not how the truth stands about ancient c events, do we not make the falsehood as much like truth as possible, and so make it useful? 'It certainly is so, said he. 6 For which of these reasons then is falsehood useful to God? Would He lie from ignorance of ancient events by trying to make them like the truth? 'Nay, that would be ridiculous. 'There is nothing of the lying poet then in God? 'I think not. 'But would He lie through fear of His enemies? 'Or because His friends are foolish or mad? 'Nay, said he, no fool or madman is a friend of God. 'There is no motive then for a god to lie? There is none. 'The nature then of gods and demi-gods is quite incapable of d falsehood? 'Yes, utterly so. 'God then is perfectly simple and true both in deed and word, and neither changes in Himself, nor deceives others, either in apparitions, or by words, or by sending signs, either in dream or waking vision. 'I too think it is just as you say. 'You agree then, said I, that this is a second mould in which speech or poetry about the gods must be cast, that they neither are wizards who transform themselves nor mislead us by falsehoods either in word or in deed? 'I do agree. 'While therefore we commend many other things in Homer, we shall not commend this, the sending of the dream by Zeus to Agamemnon; nor the passage of Aeschylus, in which Thetis says p. 647 that Apollo, singing at her marriage, "Dwelt on my happy motherhood, The life from sickness free and lengthened years; Favoured of heaven, in strains that cheered my soul. 646 d 14 Homer, Il. ii. 5 ff. 647 a 2 Aeschylus, Fragment, 266 (281) |