and to work unceasingly towards reaching an immediate agreement fulfilling the hopes and dreams of mankind, without letting political problems inhibit the progress of their negotiations. In the light of present circumstances, time is of the essence. The nuclear powers should not let this propitious moment slip away for want of a resolute and determined effort to reach an agreement which all the world, including the nuclear powers, needs and aspires to.

4. Various non-aligned delegations to our Committee, during the last three months produced many valuable ideas and thoughts which are well-known to the nuclear powers, and which aimed at breaking the deadlock in the Geneva test-ban negotiations about the number of inspections as well as about the method of discussing the quota-figures in relation to the study of the modalites of inspections.* The three African Delegations earnestly appeal to the nuclear powers to give attention to those non-aligned ideas and thoughts as well as to their continued attempts at finding practical honourable and equitable compromises, which, in the last analysis, may prove to be good and lasting solutions to the test-ban problem. 5. Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy's exchange of letters in December and January on the cessation of tests has given proof of the existence, on both sides, of a welcome spirit of constructive compromise and mutual accommodation, and above all, of courage and goodwill."

6. It may very well be that science may, in the future, show beyond doubt that on-site inspections may no longer be needed to identify suspicious seismic events or to adequately control a test-ban treaty. For the time-being, however, the 3 African Delegations recognize that three, four or so, yearly truly effective inspections or an adequately proportionate figure spread over more yearsmay be needed to dispel mutual suspicions, to help build up confidence between the nuclear powers, and, no less importantly, to facilitate their reaching a practical political settlement.

7. After having maintained that there was no need for any obligatory inspections, Mr. Khrushchev's offer last December, of three on-site inspections must therefore, be taken as a sign of moral courage and good faith. In a like manner, the current British-American demarches at Moscow, and their offer of the possibility of further compromise should be encouraged and taken as a sign of political courage and goodwill."

8. The three African Delegations are convinced that they speak not only for their own people and all the African peoples, but for the whole world, when they urgently appeal to the nuclear powers to give more proof of a much needed sense of practicality and of a necessary spirit of constructive compromise and goodwill. The World will hail and appreciate any show of compromise as evidence of great moral courage, political acumen and love for peace. On the other hand, the world cannot but consider their failure to compromise over the last few remaining differences, as unwillingness on their part to end nuclear testing and the nuclear armaments' race, essential conditions for any constructive and realistic discussion of general and complete disarmament.

9. Since there is general agreement, however, that the number of on-site inspections is less relevant than the terms of the modalities or conditions for the ade quate and effective conduct of such on-site inspections, the three Delegations therefore exhort the nuclear powers to rise above quarreling on an insignificant difference of one or two inspections, and to accept a reasonable compromise-quota of inspections contingent upon adequate and effective modalities on inspection. 10. Agreement on the latter should be sought, inter alia, in these illustrative

areas:

(a) The location of the epicentre of the seismic event;

(b) criteria for the eligibility of the seismic event for inspection;

*A document giving a synopsis of suggestions by the nonaligned members of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee during the period Feb. 12-June 10, 1963, concerning a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 206-214.

63

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1306-1308, 13101313 and ante, doc. X-25.

(c) composition of the International Scientific Committee and its role in the establishment of the criteria and the supervising of their proper application;

(d) agreement on the initiation of inspections according to agreed criteria and to the data submitted to the International Committee;

(e) the composition of the Inspection teams in such a way as to obviate selfinspection and to ensure the effectiveness and the adequacy of the visit;

(f) agreement on the criteria and relevant details of the actual conducting of the inspection;

(g) agreement on the shape and size of the inspection area;

(h) safeguards against abuse and against the utilization of such facilities and inspection personnel in any manner that might be extraneous to the purpose of identifying the event concerned or that might endanger the security of the receiving state.

In the name of the African peoples and in the name of all humanity, the three African Delegations address this urgent appeal to the nuclear powers to give the world proof of their goodwill, of their seriousness of purpose, and of their sense of responsibility, by issuing the necessary instructions to their representatives in the test-ban negotiations to come to the quick and equitable compromise solutions which the whole world is expecting of them, and whose groundwork has already been laid during the last three months of negotiations at Geneva.

X-44

"IT MUST BE REGRETTED THAT. WE LACK THE DESIRE OF THE WESTERN POWERS TO REACH AN AGREEMENT [ON A NUCLEAR TEST BAN] AND TO ABANDON PLAYING AT NEGOTIATIONS": Reply Made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) to a Question Asked at an Interview With Editors of Pravda and Izvestia, June 15, 1963 (Excerpt) 65

As is well-known, test ban talks have been held for several years. Now, too, many speeches are being made in Geneva on this topic. On what does the question rest? The Western countries advanced their terms on a certain number of inspections for the conclusion of a test ban agreement. What do they want? Essentially, they want Soviet territory to be opened to spies from NATO military headquarters.

The presentation of this demand shows that the governments of the Western states make distrust the foundation of relations between nuclear powers. But if one adopts such views, it turns out that it will be impossible to solve any disputed international problem. Something like the endless story of the white bull-calf follows: Now we do not believe you, now you do not believe us.

The Soviet Government has stated, and does state, that it will not agree to throw open the territory of our country for inspection for the purpose of espionage. Science has proved the possibility of detecting nuclear explosions through national means of control. We think that the President himself is well aware of this and, one would think, so is the audience he was addressing. Besides, we have agreed to accept the proposals of the British scientists—and we repeat our agreement-to the installation of a limited number of automatic seismic stations for observation purposes."

67

66

National facilities of detection combined with automatic seismic stations are a dependable guarantee to ascertain any possible attempts to violate a test ban agreement. It will be recalled that we agreed to two or three inspections to check the discontinuation of underground tests. And we did this for political

68

07

68 Ibid.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1306–1308.

considerations. This was, so to speak, a step meeting the desires of the other side halfway. It must be regretted that our proposal was not properly appreciated by the partners of the talks.

What do we lack today? We lack the desire of the Western powers to reach an agreement and to abandon playing at negotiations. In regard to the Soviet Union, we are ready to sign an agreement on the discontinuation of all nuclear tests even today. It is up to the West. We agreed to a meeting between the representatives of the three powers in Moscow to try once again to reach an agreement on this question. But the success of this meeting will depend on the luggage the United States and British representatives bring with them to our country.

X-45

"THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT EXPRESSES ITS READINESS TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF NUCLEAR TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, IN OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER": Statement Made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) at a Rally, East Berlin, July 2, 1963 (Excerpt) 69

The Soviet Government has on several occasions declared its readiness to sign without delay a treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear tests for all time-I repeat, all nuclear tests, wherever they may be conducted. Many years ago, we raised the question of prohibiting nuclear weapons and prohibiting tests of such weapons.

But the Western Powers, particularly the United States, do not want to come to such an agreement. They are dragging out the negotiations interminably and putting forward various artificial pretexts in order to avoid the cessation of all nuclear tests. They are insisting with particular stubbornness on international inspection.

It has been proved by science and fully confirmed by practice that there is no need for any inspection for control over the cessation of tests, including underground tests. The national means of detecting nuclear explosions which are available to States, especially in conjunction with automatic seismic stations, to the establishment of which we have agreed, ensure reliable control over the cessation of all tests. Nevertheless, the Western Powers stubbornly persist in linking the question of the cessation of nuclear tests with so-called international inspections.

This means that the Western Powers' demand for inspections has something else behind it. What is it? We have long been convinced that the Western Powers need international inspections not for control over the cessation of tests, but in order to penetrate by any means into various parts of the Soviet Union for intelligence purposes. Thus, it is not a question of control over the cessation of tests, but essentially of legalized espionage.

If anyone still had any doubt before about the real purposes of the Western Powers when they demanded the carrying out of inspections, there are no grounds for this now. It is well known that at the end of last year the Soviet Government took a big step to meet the Western Powers in agreeing to two or three inspections a year." How did the Western Powers respond to that expression of good will?

70

"U.N. doc. ENDC/112, Aug. 22. 1963 (text as printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 244-246). For another excerpt concerning the proposal to link the signature of a nonaggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries with the conclusion of an agreement on cessation of nuclear weapons tests, see ante, doc. IV-24; see also ante, doc. VI-23.

70 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1306-1308.

They not only failed to evaluate this step of ours in the proper way, but tried to impose on us a bargaining in regard to the number of inspections and the conditions under which they were to be carried out. Since then it has become even more clear that our Western partners are not concerned with concluding an equitable agreement, but wish to secure opportunities to fly all over Soviet territory and to engage in aerial photography and other matters which have no connexion whatsoever with the cessation of tests, but meet the needs of the military staffs of NATO.

It is time the imperialists realized that the Soviet Government will never forgo the security interests of its country and of all socialist countries. It will never open its doors to NATO spies. This is not a subject for bargaining. Our position on this question is clear and unshakable.

The Soviet Government is convinced that the interests of the peoples would be best served by the speediest possible conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests-in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water and under ground. Apparently, however, this is impossible in view of the attitude of the Western Powers.

Having carefully weighed up the situation, the Soviet Government, moved by a sense of great responsibility for the fate of the peoples, declares that, since the Western Powers are impeding the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear tests, the Soviet Government expresses its readiness to conclude an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. We have made such proposals before, but the Western Powers prevented us from reaching agreement by proposing additional conditions providing for extensive inspection of our territory.

If the Western Powers now agree to this proposal, the question of inspection will no longer arise. After all, the Western Powers have declared that no inspections are required for verifying the compliance by States with their obligations to cease nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Accordingly, the road is open to a solution of this problem. The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Western Powers, going forward to meet the aspirations of the peoples, will adopt a positive attitude towards this proposal of the Soviet Government.

The conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of tests will eliminate the danger of the radioactive poisoning of the atmosphere and will avert the threat to the health of present and future generations. The conclusion of such an agreement will undoubtedly also contribute towards a general improvement of the international climate and the easing of tension and will consequently facilitate the search for mutually acceptable decisions and the solution of other international problems.

Of course, for all the significance of such an important instrument as an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, it cannot halt the armaments race and cannot avert or even greatly reduce the threat of a thermonuclear war.

X-46

REPORT ON THE PROGRESS OF THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN DISCUSSIONS: Statement Made by the President (Kennedy) at a News Conference, July 17, 1963 71

I have a brief statement to make on the progress of the negotiations in Moscow.72 After 3 days of talks we are still hopeful that the participating countries may reach an agreement to end nuclear testing, at least in the environments in which it is agreed that on-the-ground

"The Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 5, 1963, p. 198.

72

The U.S. delegation was headed by Under Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman.

inspection is not required for reasonable security. Negotiations so far are going forward in a businesslike way. It is understood, of course, that under our constitutional procedures any agreement will be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent. It is also understood by our allies that the British and American representatives are not negotiating on other matters affecting their rights and interests. Any matter of this sort which may come under discussion will be kept open for full allied consultation.

Finally, it is clear that these negotiations, if successful, should lead on to wider discussions among other nations. The three negotiating powers constitute the nuclear test ban committee of the Geneva conference, and if the present negotiations should be successful, it will be important to reach the widest possible agreement on nuclear testing throughout the world. But all of these questions are still ahead of us, and today, while the negotiators are at work, I think we should not complicate their task by further speculation, and for that reason I do not expect to respond to further questions on this subject.

X-47

"AN AGREEMENT ON THE PROHIBITION OF TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, OUTER SPACE AND UNDER WATER, IF ACHIEVED, WILL BE AN IMPORTANT AND USEFUL STEP FORWARD": Statement Made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) at a SovietHungarian Friendship Rally, Moscow, July 19, 1963 (Excerpt)

74

A few words should be said about the exchange of views, which is taking place in Moscow between the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom, on the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and on other questions of mutual interest. We get the impression that there is now some hope for the achievement of an agreement on the prohibition of tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water, if, of course, no special change occurs in the position of the United States and United Kingdom representatives.

The Soviet Government would like to reach such an agreement as would provide for the prohibition of all tests, including underground tests. It has been proved by science and practice that the prohibition of all tests, including underground tests, can be controlled by means of national technical means of detection. But the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom continue to insist on the need for international inspection. They are unwilling to renounce aspirations which in reality have no relation to the cessation of tests. For what purpose are they doing this? Of course, in order to secure the opportunity to carry out intelligence work.

Thus a fairly clear picture appears-evidently we shall not succeed in reaching agreement at present on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests. The Soviet Government considers nevertheless that an agreement on the prohibition of tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water, if achieved, will be an important and useful step forward. Such an agreement will put an end to the

73 Reference is to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee.

"U.N. doc. ENDC/13, Aug. 23, 1963 (text as printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 247-249); for another excerpt see ante, doc. VI-25.