the good fortune of the free world, the dedication of Asian nations has been amply demonstrated. The Republic of Korea, with the help of United Nations forces, repelled a major Communist aggression. Malaya, the Philippines, and other nations of the area have defended themselves successfully against lesser Communist efforts. Recently we have seen India rise to the defense of its soil against the Chinese Communists.62 Both Laos and South Viet-Nam are now under active Communist assault. But they-and we-are determined that they shall not lose their independence.

In free Asia generally there is a keener understanding than there was a decade ago of Communist purposes and Communist techniques. And there is a wider realization that communism is not only brutal but inefficient.

The nuclear test ban treaty 63 is a recent development of considerable importance in man's continuing search for lasting peace. While it is no more than a beginning step toward the general and complete disarmament for which all people yearn, it is a significant contribution. An immediate advantage of this treaty to the welfare of men, women, and children everywhere is the promise it holds for reduction of the radioactive pollution of the air we breathe. The Chinese Communist reaction to the treaty has been to condemn it as a "dirty fraud." 64 They claim, in expressing this apparent indifference to the interests of humanity, that they speak for all peace-loving peoples of the world. It is clear, however, that the overwhelming majority of the people of the world have acclaimed the nuclear test ban treaty and that the Chinese Communist leaders are in a position of isolation. We hope that an awareness of the clear benefits to all mankind of the nuclear test ban treaty will eventually bring the Chinese Communists to reconsider their stand.

Perhaps at some point in the future the Chinese Communist leadership may come to realize that their policy of hostility and isolation is a barren course, perilous to them and to the whole world. Possibly the influence of time and experience will eventually persuade the leadership in Peiping to change their approach and their attitude.

Finally, I want to recall some words from President Kennedy's address "Toward a Strategy of Peace" made on June 10 at American University:

We must ... persevere in the search for peace in the hope that constructive changes within the Communist bloc might bring within reach solutions which now seem beyond us. We must conduct our affairs in such a way that it becomes in the Communists' interest to agree on a genuine peace.65

There would not appear to be any immediate likelihood of those "constructive changes," of which President Kennedy spoke, appearing on the mainland of China. But the separation between the people in mainland China and the free peoples of the Pacific is such an

62 See ibid., 1962, pp. 1015–1027.

63 Post, doc. X-69.

See post, docs. X-52-53, 61, 63.

65 Ante, doc. I−7.

apparent tragedy of the modern world that it seems reasonable to hope that it is only a temporary phenomenon. The American people surely look forward to the time when all of the Chinese people are reunited with the peoples of the Pacific and the world in friendship, cooperation, and freedom.

I am confident that the lasting values we seek, for ourselves and for the peoples of the Pacific, will prevail over the dogmas of war and struggle. To do our part to build a world of peace remains our highest aim. That is our great purpose and our strategy.

["THE GOVERNMENT IN PEIPING IS NOT PEACELOVING: IT DOES NOT CONCUR IN THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH THE CHARTER IMPOSES; AND IT IS CLEARLY NEITHER ABLE NOR WILLING TO CARRY THEM OUT": Statement Made by the U.S. Representative (Stevenson) Before the U.N. General Assembly, October 16, 1963-Ante, doc. II-32]

IX-26

CHINESE-UNITED STATES AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN COTTON TEXTILES FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 1, 1963SEPTEMBER 30, 1967, Effected by Notes Exchanged at Taipei by the American Ambassador (Wright) and the Chinese Foreign Minister (Shen), October 19, 1963 66

IX-27

"CLARIFICATION... [OF] THE [OF] THE APPARENT DIFFERENCES IN THE POLICIES WHICH WE ARE ADOPTING TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND TOWARD COMMUNIST CHINA": Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) Before the Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, December 13, 1963 (Excerpt)

67

Before I close, there is one other area in which questions have been raised about American policy and in which a clarification of this Government's position is timely. I refer to the apparent differences in the policies which we are adopting toward the Soviet Union and toward Communist China. We maintain a policy of nonrecognition and trade embargo of Communist China-at a time when we are willing to broaden contact with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union and Communist China do share the goal of communizing the world. But we see important differences in the thinking and tactics of the two. In the U.S.S.R. the Communists were developing a modern industrial society precisely when in China they were

68 TIAS 5482; 14 UST 1741.

07

Department of State press release No. 618, Dec. 12, 1963 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 6, 1964, pp. 11-17).

conducting a guerrilla war from rural bases. The Soviet leadership seems to have absorbed certain lessons from its more extended development-as to the values and priorities which one may safely pursue on a small planet and as to the price of miscalculating the nature of the outside world.

We believe that the policies which have proved their worth with Moscow are equally valid for our long-term relations with Peiping. But we also believe that our approach should be adapted to the differences in behavior between the two, as they relate to our own national objectives.

First and foremost, we fully honor our close and friendly ties with the people of the Republic of China on Taiwan and with their Government. We conceive of this relationship not as an historical accident but as a matter of basic principle. So long as Peiping insists on the destruction of this relationship as the sine qua non for any basic improvement in relations between ourselves and Communist China, there can be no prospect for such an improvement.

Our differing policies toward the Soviet Union and Communist China derive, secondly, from their differing attitudes toward negotiations, as such, even in limited areas. Faced with the realities of the nuclear age, the Soviet Union appears to recognize that certain interests-notably survival-are shared by all mankind. Peiping, however, remains wedded to a fundamentalist form of communism which emphasizes violent revolution, even if it threatens the physical ruin of the civilized world. It refuses to admit that there are common interests which cross ideological lines.

Third, United States policy is influenced by Chinese communism's obsessive suspicion of the outside world, far exceeding even that of the Soviet Union. Whereas Moscow appears to have learned that freeworld readiness to negotiate limited common interests is not a sign of weakness, Peiping regards any conciliatory gesture as evidence of weakness and an opportunity for exploitation.

Perhaps the best evidence of this paranoid view of the world came from Peiping's Foreign Minister Ch'en I, who declared, at the height of China's food crisis in 1962, that his government would never accept any aid from America because this would mean "handing our vast market over to America." Given the near-subsistence level of the society and the limited purchasing power of the government, this view of American intentions could only be conjured up by men possessed of an unremitting distrust of all external peoples and a naive sense of their own economic prospects.

Fourth are the differing circumstances and opportunities on the peripheries of the Soviet Union and Communist China. The Soviet Union and European members of its bloc border on long-established, relatively stable states defended by powerful, locally based-as well as more distant-deterrent and defensive forces. Communist China's neighbors, on the other hand, include newly established states struggling to maintain their independence, with very limited defense forces. There is a wider range of opportunities for aggression and subversion available to Peiping, which renders it even more important that in

Doc. IX-27

dealing with Peiping we not permit that regime to underestimate free-world firmness and determination.

Much speculation has turned around the question of possible commercial relations between private American firms and Communist China, especially in view of the declining trade between Communist China and its Soviet bloc partners. Peiping's own policies, however, seem crystal clear on this point. Peiping apparently wants none of it. As one of its trade officials recently declared, "We have a very clear attitude. We won't trade with the United States because the United States Government is hostile to us." The Chinese Communists follow Mao's maxim that "politics and economics are inseparable." They made this clear in their unilateral rupture of contracts with Japanese firms in 1958 and their willingness to jeopardize major industrial projects as the price for carrying on their dispute with the Soviet Union in 1960.

In sum, while respecting the right of others to view the matter otherwise, we find important differences in the willingness and ability of the Soviet Union and Communist China, at the present stage of their respective development, to reach limited agreements which can bring some reduction of the terrible dangers and tensions of our present-day world. We believe that policies of strength and firmness, accompanied by a constant readiness to negotiate-policies long and effectively pursued with the Soviet Union-will best promote the changes which must take place on the China mainland before we can hope to achieve long-sought conditions of peace, security, and progress in this half of the globe.

President Johnson said:

We will be unceasing in the search for peace; resourceful in our pursuit of areas of agreement, even with those with whom we differ. . . . We must be prepared at one and the same time for both the confrontation of power and the limitation of power. We must be ready to defend the national interest and to negotiate the common interest.

We are confronted in Communist China with a regime which presently finds no ground of common interest with those whose ideals it does not share, which has used hatred as an engine of national policy. The United States is the central figure in their demonology and the target of a sustained fury of invective. After President Kennedy's assassination, while other nations-Communist and free-shared our grief, the Chinese Communist Daily Worker published a cartoon of a man sprawled on the ground with the caption "Kennedy Bites the Dust." If this speaks for the Chinese Communist leadership, I am confident that it does not speak for most Chinese.

Americans businessmen, missionaries, diplomats have long felt a particularly close rapport with the Chinese. In World War II American pilots downed in Communist areas came out with moving accounts of Chinese helpfulness and friendliness. The Communists had not destroyed those attitudes then. I doubt they have succeeded in destroying them now.

6 See title I-XIV and ante, doc. I-16.

Reference to the Chinese Communist trade union newspaper Kungjen Jih Pao of Nov. 24, 1963.

We do not know what changes may occur in the attitudes of future Chinese leaders. But if I may paraphrase a classic canon of our past, we pursue today toward Communist China a policy of the open door: We are determined to keep the door open to the possibility of change and not to slam it shut against any developments which might advance our national good, serve the free world, and benefit the people of China. Patience is not unique to the Chinese. We too can maintain our positions without being provoked to unseemly action or despairing of what the future may hold. We will not sow the dragon's seed of hate which may bear bitter fruit in future generations of China's millions. But neither will we betray our interests and those of our allies to appease the ambitions of Communist China's leaders.

We hope that, confronted with firmness which will make foreign adventure unprofitable, and yet offered the prospect that the way back into the community of man is not closed to it, the Chinese Communist regime will eventually forsake its present venomous hatreds which spring from a rigid class view of society. We hope that they will rediscover the Chinese virtue of tolerance for a multitude of beliefs and faiths and that they will accept again a world of diversity in place of the gray monolith which seems to be communism's goal for human society.

On November 27th President Johnson said:

The time has come for Americans of all races and creeds and political beliefs to understand and respect one another. Let us put an end to the teaching and the preaching of hate and evil and violence. Let us turn away from the fanatics of the far left and the far right. . .

70

President Johnson was talking about America. But the words are valid for all mankind.

INDIA

[NOTE: Full scale fighting between Chinese and Indian forces had terminated as a result of the unilateral cease-fire announced by Communist China, effective Nov. 22, 1962 (see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1021-1022). Subsequently, the Colombo Conference, composed of representatives of Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia, and the United Arab Republic, proposed a plan (ibid., p. 1025) for the consolidation of the cease-fire and the solution of border problems between India and Communist China through discussions between those two powers.

[On Jan. 13, 1963 a set of clarifications (text in Notes, Memoranda, and Letters Exchanged Between the Governments of India and China, January 1963-July 1963 [White Paper No. IX, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 1963], pp. 185-186) was given by the Colombo Conference representatives to the original proposals, after which, on Jan. 26, Prime Minister Nehru indicated that the Colombo proposals, as clarified, were acceptable to the Government of India (ibid., pp. 186-187). On Jan. 19 Communist China's Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, accepted the Colombo proposals in principle, with the

7 Cited ante, title I-14.