us fight a war with our arsenal of nuclear weapons, so I think the Soviet Union naturally is not anxious to engage in a nuclear struggle to carry out ideological doctrines that the Chinese Communists may develop." They have a natural reluctance to see their country destroyed for that reason, as do we.

IX-24

UNITED STATES ASSESSMENT OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS "AS POTENTIALLY... MORE DANGEROUS” THAN THE RUSSIANS: Reply Made by the President (Kennedy) to a Question Asked at a News Conference, August 1, 1963 48

Well, we assess its [-Communist China's-] power at 700 million people, increasing at 14 million or 15 million a year, surrounded by countries which are, in every case but one, much smaller, which are faced with very difficult geographic and social problems, which do not have a strong national history. So that we find a great, powerful force in China, organized and directed by the government along Stalinist lines, surrounded by weaker countries. So this we regard as a menacing situation.

In addition, as I said, that government is not only Stalinist in its internal actions, but also has called for war, international war, in order to advance the final success of the Communist cause. We regard that as a menacing factor. And then you introduce into that mix, nuclear weapons. As you say, it may take some years, maybe a decade, before they become a full-fledged nuclear power, but we are going to be around in the 1970's, and we would like to take some steps now which would lessen that prospect that a future President might have to deal with.

I would regard that combination, if it is still in existence in the 1970's, of weak countries around it, 700 million people, a Stalinist internal regime, and nuclear powers, and a government determined on war as a means of bringing about its ultimate success, as potentially a more dangerous situation than any we faced since the end of the Second War, because the Russians pursued in most cases their ambitions with some caution. Even in the case of the most overt aggression, which was the North Korean invasion of South Korea, other forces were used and not the Russians.50

So what we are anxious to do, and one of the reasons why we have moved into the limited test ban,51 even though we recognize its limitations, is because we don't want to find the world in as great a danger as it could be in the 1970's, for the reasons that I have described.

47 See supra.

48 The reply printed here is taken from p. 616 of Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963.

49 See ante, title IX-21.

50

See American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. II, pp. 2536-2663.

51 Post, doc. X-69.

IX-25

THE EFFECTS OF THE POWER OF COMMUNIST CHINA ON ITS ASIAN NEIGHBORS: Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman) Before the National Legislative Conference, Honolulu, August 20, 1963 (Excerpts) 52

I turn, first, to the chief sources of danger in the Pacific community: the Communist countries and, in particular, Communist China.

Since 1949 the 700 million people of mainland China have been denied the opportunity of friendly and open interchange with the rest of the Pacific community. Their Stalinist leaders have shut the Chinese people in on themselves and ordered them to regard their neighbors with suspicion and even hate. The enormous numbers of the Chinese, their remarkable human qualities, and the glories of their ancient culture and civilization only accentuate this tragedy-the tragedy of a revolution that lost its way.

The facade of Communist China is bold and dangerous looking. The Chinese Communist leaders are addicted to reckless words. Turned to creative tasks, in cooperating with the broad mass of humanity, the numbers, energy, ability, and culture of the Chinese could be a powerful force for good in the world. But set in opposition to the rest of humanity, harnessed to the aggressive designs of a tiny, self-serving leadership, the power of China dwindles. For power is relative. The power of China when combined with the power of the rest of humanity in pursuit of common goals is quite different from the power of China in opposition to the rest of humanity and in pursuit of the selfish goals of a narrow leadership.

From one point of view the large population of Communist China may appear to be an important power asset. But from another point of view it is a grave source of weakness. The pressure of this very large population on a relatively small amount of arable land creates a most serious dilemma for the Peiping regime.

The problem is that the Chinese Communists can find a genuine solution for their agricultural problem, for example, only through methods that contradict Communist ideology and objectives. It can do so only by increasing incentives to farmers and by a major redirection of national resources away from development of industry and into agriculture. The Peiping regime moved a little way in those directions in the past year and, as a result, achieved some improvement in agriculture output. But the effort appears to be far short of the massive infusion of resources that is required. And the temporary relaxation of controls and increase in individual incentives have led the farmer to concentrate on private production and to neglect public plots. Consequently the regime recently has begun to revert to repressive practices. It is caught between irreconcilable pressures: the Government's demand for total control and the economic need for freedom.

"Department of State press release No. 429 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 9, 1963, pp. 386–393).

Meanwhile, Communist China's industrial development has dwindled and many of its factories are idle or working only part time. Its overall trade has shrunk immensely, and a very large fraction of its limited foreign exchange has been used to buy food.

It seems very unlikely that the Communist Chinese can resume industrial growth on a major scale in the visible future without the kinds of controls on farm activity that have the effect of decreasing productivity and without large-scale aid from the outside. The Soviet Union closed out its major aid program 3 years ago and is showing no interest in reviving it.

The Communist Chinese leadership itself has admitted that status as an industrial power-which in 1958 was envisaged as being just around the corner-is now perhaps 30 or 40 years away. And the Chinese Communist foreign minister has predicted that the standard of living of the Chinese people cannot be expected to rise significantly for 100 years.

What kind of model is this for the world? Who in his right mind would wish to copy such an example-especially when there are other examples in Asia of much greater success in dealing with the problems of economic development and of agricultural productivity specifically?

Let me be clear on this point: We do not gloat over the unhappy condition and dismal prospects of the people of mainland China. They are a great people, with whom we have had historic ties of friendship. In the ordeal they are suffering they have our sympathy, and their sorrow is our sorrow.

Most people realize by now that a large population can be a source of economic weakness as well as a source of economic strength. There may still be, however, a tendency to equate a large population with military strength. In the Korean war we Americans saw the Chinese Communists employing tactics involving large masses of men, with little or no regard for casualties.53 But let us not forget that in that war North Korea and Communist China had immense help in equipment and material from the Soviet Union. And even today the ability of the Chinese Communists to manufacture arms is limited to relatively simple weapons.

So it is pertinent to consider the possible military effects of the great division that has taken place in the Communist world-the schisms dramatized by the meetings in Moscow last month. It is now 3 years since the Soviet Union withdrew its military, as well as its nonmilitary, technicians and drastically curtailed its shipments of military supplies and equipment to Communist China. Consequently, to take one example, the Chinese Communist air force, which is substantial in size and was relatively modern a few years ago, is in a state of rapid obsolescence. Moreover, it is not believed that Communist China is any longer obtaining spare parts for existing Soviet-supplied equipment of any sort. If this situation continues for long, Communist China's ability to mount major military operations, especially outside its borders, will deteriorate. At the same time, basic economic

858 See American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. II, pp. 2581-2663.

problems have limited severely Communist China's ability to develop its own modern armaments industry and even its present capacity to sustain for a long period large-scale military operations.

We must take care not to overstate the point. Compared to any of its Asian neighbors except the Soviet Union, Communist China is a strong military power. It has a very large army. The leaders of Communist China care little or nothing for human life. And, although up to now they have behaved more circumspectly than they advised Chairman Khrushchev to behave, they may venture reckless, even desperate, actions. At the same time we cannot rule out the possibility that at some future time Peiping and Moscow will draw together again.

The free nations of Asia are by no means out of danger. Communist China is still capable of grave and costly mischief. But it is not a formidable military power in terms of modern technology. And it lacks the heavy industry, the economic margin-and the outside aid, which the Soviet Union had during the Second World War-for building a formidable military machine. It cannot become a major modern military power, overall, in the foreseeable future.

The Peiping regime does appear to be concentrating a good deal of scientific and technological effort on a nuclear program. We hope that it will change its mind and decide to adhere to the recently negotiated test ban treaty.54 But if it doesn't, we can anticipate that one of these days it will explode a nuclear device. What would be the meaning of that?

It should be understood, first of all, that there is a vast difference between a first test device and an ability to deliver nuclear weapons on foreign targets. As Governor Harriman has reported, Chairman Khrushchev thinks it would take quite a few years for the Chinese Communists to develop a significant nuclear force. But even if it had such a force, Peiping would be unable to calculate that the initiation of nuclear warfare would be to its advantage. For it would be within reach of main U.S. and other free-world power, while the centers of free-world power would be well beyond the reach of Communist China.

Why then is Communist China, although floundering in an economic morass, spending so much effort on trying to make nuclear weapons? One can only speculate about this. Perhaps it hopes that a nuclear capability will restore some of the prestige the regime has lost both at home and abroad. It may hope to add nuclear intimidation. to the pressures it can bring to bear on its Asian neighbors.

Objectively analyzed, the effects of a Chinese Communist nuclear explosion in the measurable future would be psychological rather than military. And the psychological results outside mainland China, at least-would be negligible if we and the free nations of Asia understand the facts about nuclear weapons that we have just discussed. The free world has the power to deter or meet aggression: it has the power to support nations under attack, as in Viet-Nam, and to help maintain their freedom; it has the determination to use this power 54 Post, doc. X-69.

should that be necessary; and it has the will to maintain that power at full strength for as long as it is needed.

Turning to the other Communist countries in Asia, we find in microcosm the same range of problems that we find in Communist China. North Viet-Nam and North Korea are both small rural countries laboring under the delusion, spawned by Communist theory, that the best route to economic development is a policy of autarky and of emphasizing the building of a heavy industrial base, including an advanced steel industry. Both suffer from high costs of industrial production, growing populations, low per capita output, and continuing difficulties with food supplies.

At the same time, North Viet-Nam, with other Communist support, has been able to mount campaigns of organized terrorism and other low-level military operations in Laos 55 and South Viet-Nam.56 These assaults threaten the independence of Laos and South Viet-Nam. The free world must not and will not let these aggressions succeed. I don't want to minimize the effort it takes to eliminate terrorist aggression based on an adjoining country. But I would suggest that meeting this challenge is less directly connected with Chinese or other Communist military power or with the attraction of Communist example than with a particular politicomilitary technique for exploiting weaknesses that are typical of most new and developing countries. The free world has learned a good deal about this technique in the course of dealing with it successfully in Greece, the Philippines,58 and Malaya. I am optimistic about the ability of the free world to deal with it not only in Laos and Viet-Nam but wherever it may occur. So much for the chief threats to the peace in the Pacific community. They are threats that have produced a resolute American commitment to the defense of those nations under Communist assault. That commitment has been tested in Korea, in the Taiwan Straits,61 and in Laos. It is now facing a long-term test in Viet-Nam. We may be sure that it will be tested elsewhere from time to time.

59

60

57

Whatever the provocation, we will stand by our defense commitments. We will do so in any case, but we will also do so in the hope that, if strength is met with strength, those who guide the policies of Asian Communist states will in time move toward more rational, peaceful relationships with their Pacific neighbors.

Such commitments have meaning, however, only where the people of a region are themselves dedicated to their own independence. To

See post, docs. IX-69-79.

See post, docs. IX-94-149.

See A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949, pp. 753-782, 1252–1264, and 1267.

58

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, p. 769.

59 See ibid.

60

See American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 724750 and vol. II, pp. 2536-2663.

See ibid., vol. I, pp. 945-949, 955-956, 963–964, ibid., vol. II, pp. 2323–2326 and 2448-2510; American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, pp. 790–800; ibid., 1957, pp. 1117-1118 and 1120; ibid., 1958, pp. 1144-1168, 1169–1180, and 1183-1204; ibid., 1959, p. 1167; ibid., 1960, pp. 659-661; ibid., 1961, p. 946; and ibid., 1962, pp. 1007-1009.