Part IX

THE FAR EAST, SOUTH, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

IX-1

"OUR POLICIES TOWARD ASIA ARE MORE COMPATIBLE WITH THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE GREAT PEOPLES OF THAT AREA THAN THOSE OF OUR ENEMIES": Address by the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, June 20, 1963 (Excerpt)1

Our first goal in foreign affairs and the first responsibility of any administration in Washington is to our own security as a nation and as a people.

However, we as a people recognize that year by year, and almost day by day, we can less and less divorce our security and well-being from that of the rest of the world. Thus it is not only from the humanitarian impulses which lie so deep in our character but also from a hardheaded look at our own direct interests that we derive the fundamentals of our foreign policy. I would list first among these fundamentals a community of free and truly independent nations in which every man can live in equality and dignity, free from hunger, at peace with his neighbor, and having open opportunity to strive to attain his aspirations.

We seek these goals in Asia as elsewhere. This is not just empty rhetoric but the principles which guide our actions and programs. Upon superficial analysis these goals would appear to be easily attained because they are the same goals Asians seek. They are the same human goals which have sparked the wave of nationalism and the revolution of rising expectations still sweeping Asia in these postwar decades. There is no denying that Asians want national security, fuller prosperity, equality, dignity, peace, friendly relations based on freedom and justice, and opportunity for themselves and their posterity. In this they are no different from you and me.

Since there is such close identity between our goals and those of Asians, what then obstructs the easy attainment of these aspirations? First, as far as the Communist aspect is concerned, Premier Khrushchev has put one answer as plainly as I could when he said recently,

1

Department of State press release No. 324, June 19, 1963 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, July 15, 1963, pp. 78-82).

"Marxist-Leninists make no secret of the fact that they want to win all the people on earth for socialism. This we regard as our most important aim on the world arena." Since, as Mao Tse-tung put it, "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," the use of force to obtain Communist political control has not been ruled out. In fact, what the Communists call "wars of national liberation" are actively instigated toward this end.

2

This use of force is not new in Asia. In 1948 five Communist wars of terrorism to seize control were under way in Asia in addition to the civil war in China itself. They were in Indonesia, Burma, Malaya, the Philippines, and what was then called French Indochina. They were defeated in the first four countries, but in Indochina Communists were left in control of North Viet-Nam and two of the northern provinces of Laos. The aggression against the Republic of Korea in 1950 was a more naked use of force, as was the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958. Of present concern are Laos and South Viet-Nam and the Chinese Communist pressure along the Indian frontier.10

9

Although aggressions and "wars of national liberation" can be, and have been, deterred or defeated in Asia, the Communist aim of "winning all the people to socialism," by force if necessary, has not been abandoned. On the contrary the Communists are actively infiltrating their vanguards and operatives wherever they believe they have opportunity to seize power.

However, we also need to note that even if communism had never existed many of these countries would be wracked by the stresses and strains of building modern states and societies-the problems with which our own experience, past and present, has made us very familiar. Their relations with each other would also be beset by their long history of national rivalries and in some cases deep-seated hostility. In this, of course, the countries of Asia are by no means unique.

I trust that you will not mind my using my last foreign assignment, Thailand, a marvelous land of kindly people, as an example of what has been called "aggression by seepage" by a prominent correspondent. In the northeast provinces of Thailand live about 9 million people, nearly a third of the total population of the country. The majority of these peoples and those of Laos are very similar in culture, customs, and even language. There is also a substantial Vietnamese minority, for the most part loyal to Hanoi, living in this sparsely settled, relatively isolated area of Thailand. For the past several years Communist Pathet Lao agents, supporters of North Viet-Nam's Communist leader, Ho Chi Minh, and even a few Communist Chinese

2

See post, doc. IX-22.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, p. 769.

'See ibid.

0

See American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, vol. II, pp. 2363 ff. See ibid., vol. II, pp. 2536-2663.

'See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 1144-1204.

See post, docs. IX-69-79.

'See post, docs. IX-94-149.

19 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1015-1027.

"agitprop" men have been working in this area seeking to set up cells and encadrements. Clearly this was in preparation for further advance when Laos and the Republic of Viet-Nam were to have fallen. The Thai Government recognized the incipient danger and attempted to counter it as best it could with the very small and illequipped police units it had. We, for our part, cooperated with the Thai Government in its efforts to open up the area so that the people could begin to identify themselves with the nation and could begin to realize the benefits of progress. Through our joint programs roads were built opening up access not only to the hinterlands but to markets. Thousands of wells were dug, not only for potable water but also for irrigation. Training programs were enlarged. Today the situation in the northeast looks much more promising. The Thai border police are well officered and trained, and the routes of infiltration are no longer so open. Special mobile teams of Thai technicians and officials are energetically moving into the more remote and troubled areas. Better education is being brought to the area. Information teams are active. Communications are being extended, not just for security but also for the economic well-being of the inhabitants. Security too has been improved both by joint Thai-U.S. effort 11 and through multinational preparedness through SEATO exercises.12

The real significance of what is going on in Thailand is, I am convinced, that the free world is moving ahead with foresight, forged from bitter lessons learned elsewhere in Asia. Foresightedly, the Thais, with our cooperation, are moving toward preventing another Viet-Nam or Laos situation. They are doing so on the political, economic, and psychological plane, which calls for much more sophistication, patience, and understanding on the part of all of us than when the struggle reaches the military plane. It is always very late when the military plane is reached.

Our policies are based on the premise that nationalism is healthy and incompatible with the aims of communism. An independent national state is not always going to agree with us, but neither is it consciously going to serve the fundamental purposes of communism. We believe that government rests upon the consent of those governed, not upon the coercion of those ruled. We welcome a world of diversity and abhor enforced conformity. We seek to construct, not destroy. We seek to free men's minds so that open and honest examinations and decisions can be made, not to capture men's minds for exploitation by a single system. In short, we seek international cooperation, not world domination.

These are a few of the principles that are being rediscovered in Asia. They may sound trite to you and to me--and indeed too often we have not paid full heed to them. But as the peoples of the Far East strive to protect the independence they won and as they move ahead in exercising their responsibilities, they are discovering that communism is not the wave of the future. They are recognizing the

11 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1093-1096. 12 See post, docs. IX-2-4, and the Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 2, 1963, pp. 863-864.

political, economic, and psychological appeals for what they really

are.

All too often slow, steady, undramatic progress is buried in the screaming headlines of battles, scandals, defeats, and threats.

In Korea we see a strong urge to return to civilian government,13 and the people of Korea want to participate in the business of governing themselves. I am satisfied that they will find a way of doing so. What of Japan? Not only has it found its rightful place in the community of free nations, but also it is helping others to do so through its development programs in Southeast Asia, through its expansion of trade with the lesser developed nations, through its responsible activities in the United Nations, and through its foreign student exchange programs. Japan is a vital example to Asia of the success of a free-enterprise system in a country with a paucity of natural resources. Japan's industrial capacity, skilled manpower, functioning democracy, and willingness to assume a role in freeworld leadership will, I am sure, become even more important in the immense task of nation building all through Asia.

In these days when we are again having our "great debate" on foreign aid 14 it is perhaps useful to call Japan to mind as just one example of the returns of what I think properly should be called our investment in foreign assistance. It is not possible to measure in monetary terms the political and military value of free Japan as it exists today. However, measured in just pure dollar terms, from 1946 to 1956 we invested around $2 billion in Japan. Most of this was just plain food to keep people from starving, but a lesser part was for economic rehabilitation. As against this, there has been approximately $18 billion of trade between Japan and the United States in the last decade, and during the past 5 years the trade balance in our favor has been over $1 billion. I perhaps need not tell this audience that during the past 10 years we have exported $4.4 billion of agricultural products to Japan. In addition Japan is directly repaying $600 million of that postwar assistance.

As another example of our policy of economic cooperation with those countries of Asia seeking to move ahead, we might cite India. During the past decade approximately $1.9 billion of United States economic assistance has been invested in India's first and second 5year plans. During this same period other countries have invested around $1.5 billion. India provided from its own resources around 90 percent of the financing required for the first 5-year plan and 76 percent of that required for the second 5-year plan, for a total of the equivalent of about $11,100 million.

In this decade, while the population of India has increased by 21.5 percent, the national income has increased by 43 percent and per capita income by 17 percent. Agricultural production has increased by over 41 percent, and industrial production has nearly doubled. (We might note that during this same period per capita income, and particularly food production, has actually decreased in

13 See post, docs. IX-60–62, 66.

14 See post, docs. XII-1-18.

Communist China.) Our trade with India has increased by over 57 percent, but, above all, we and the rest of the free world are more secure and more prosperous because India has been able to move forward in freedom and prosperity.

Our policy also embraces military cooperation with countries desiring to join with us in such a relationship. We take an active role in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, embracing Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as France and the United Kingdom. We value our ANZUS treaty relationship with Australia and New Zealand 15 as well as bilateral relationships with Japan,16 the Republic of China on Taiwan," and the Philippines.18 However, this leaves room for us to assist any other free country that wants to defend itself against aggressive Communist power. As you know we have responded to the requests of India and, in cooperation with the U.K. and some other members of the Commonwealth, are assisting that country in better preparing itself to resist Chinese Communist aggression.19

At this point a word is perhaps due with respect to Viet-Nam. Our policy there is based on several premises. First is the premise that the South Vietnamese want to defend themselves. This has been amply demonstrated by the more than 5,000 men killed in action during the past year. Next is the premise that the fight must be one primarily of the Vietnamese themselves. It cannot be a war of Americans against Vietnamese. Thus, important though our role of advice, transport, communications, and supply is, it is primarily the role of an outsider assisting the Vietnamese themselves. Another important premise is that the political, social, and economic aspects of the struggle are of equal if not greater importance than the military struggle, but in any event all aspects of the struggle must be orchestrated in a unified whole. During this process both we and the Vietnamese are learning much. None of us expected or now expect that victory would be easy or quick. However, I am satisfied that solid progress is being made.

The real heart of the program in Viet-Nam in which all these various elements are brought together is in the strategic hamlet program. In these, many Vietnamese not only have the means for the first time of defending themselves but are experiencing their first taste of selfgovernment, of participation in elections and in civic affairs. They are receiving benefits in health and education heretofore not available. They are working together. They are learning that a better life does exist and is attainable. And they are willing to work for it and have shown their willingness to protect it.

18

Increasing numbers of Vietnamese are now willing to furnish in

See American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 878880.

1o See ibid., pp. 885–886, and American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 669-676.

See American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, vol. II, pp. 2470– 2471.

18 See ibid., vol. I, pp. 873-875.

19 See post, docs. IX-30, 34, 36-37.