NATO]. It does not deal with the question of the production of nuclear weapons, the deployment of nuclear weapons. This treaty itself would not prohibit our transferring nuclear weapons to another country if it did not involve explosions. We have no intention of transferring nuclear weapons to another national country under our multilateral force. We do not envisage that the multilateral force itself would conduct testing or explosions.

Therefore, this treaty has nothing to do with the multilateral force.

IV-32

UNITED KINGDOM AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS FORMATION OF A NATO MIXED-MANNED NUCLEAR FORCE OF SURFACE SHIPS WITHOUT COMMITMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN IT: Statement Issued by the Office of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (Macmillan), October 1, 1963 97

At their meeting in Nassau last December, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom agreed to use their best endeavours to develop a Nato multilateral nuclear force, to which both the United States and the United Kingdom Governments would contribute national forces."

The United Kingdom Government have assigned the V-bomber force to Nato and are pledged to make their Polaris submarines, when completed, available for inclusion in a Nato nuclear force for the purposes of international defence of the western alliance in all circumstances, except where they may decide that supreme national interests are at stake. In so doing they have fulfilled the specific obligation which they assumed at Nassau.

On the same occasion the President explained to the Prime Minister that he also intended to pursue the formation of a mixed-manned nuclear force to be assigned to Nato and to which nonnuclear powers could contribute.

The United Kingdom Government have, from the outset, recognized the importance of this further proposal. They have agreed that the conception is one which deserves examination, together with other possible means of developing the concept of a Nato multilateral nuclear force; but they have never given any undertaking to participate in the mixed-manned component although they have agreed to consider providing it, if it is formed, with operational facilities. It was in this spirit that, at their meeting at Birch Grove in July,' the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom agreed that various possible ways of promoting a closer association of the members of the Nato alliance with its nuclear deterrent should be further discussed with their allies, on the basis that such discussions should include proposals for a mixed-manned force without prejudice to the question of United Kingdom participation in it.

The terms of reference for the discussion now proposed, although specifically reserving national decisions on participation in the mixed-manned force to individual governments, state that those taking part, will be prepared "to enter into detailed discussions with that end in view".

In the light of the attitude which they have consistently adopted towards this project, as indicated above, the United Kingdom Government do not feel that they could in good faith enter these discussions on terms of reference which imply this degree of commitment in principle to participation in a mixed-manned force of surface ships, especially since the value of a force of this kind in relation to the expenditure of resources which it would entail has been publicly

"The Times, London, Oct. 2, 1963.

1

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 635–637.
See ante, doc. IV-20.

See post, doc. IV-100.

questioned and this issue is now under examination in the context of the Nato strategic review.

Therefore, if they are to take part in the discussions it must be on the clear understanding that it does not commit them to participate in such a force.

Subject to this reservation, the United Kingdom Government are prepared to join in an objective examination of the project in all its aspects and possible variations.

IV-33

AUTHORIZATION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY TO CONSTRUCT SIX SUBMARINES OF UP TO 1,000 TONS DISPLACEMENT IN ORDER TO PERMIT FULFILLMENT OF NATO REQUIREMENTS: Resolution Amending Paragraph V c) of Annex III to Protocol No. III of the Modified Brussels Treaty, Adopted by the Council of Western European Union, October 9, 1963 2

IV-34

"THE NEED FOR CLOSER PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND A UNITING EUROPE... IN POLITICAL ACTION AND DEFENSE”: Address by the Secretary of State (Rusk) at St. Paul's Church, Frankfurt, October 27, 1963 3

IV-35

THE FORCE GOALS OF THE UNITED STATES MILITARY COMMITMENT TO WESTERN EUROPE: Replies Made by the President (Kennedy) to Questions Asked at a News Conference, October 31, 1963 (Excerpts)*

The policy of the United States is to maintain 6 divisions in Germany, as long as they are required. In addition to these 6 divisions, and over and above our NATO commitments, we sent to Germany as temporary reinforcements during the Berlin crisis of 1961, 6 combat units consisting of 3 artillery battalions, 2 armored battalions, and 1 armored cavalry regiment.5

This augmentation of U.S. forces in Germany was made to help

European Yearbook, vol. XI (The Hague, Nijhoff (for the Council of Europe), 1965), pt. 1, pp. 199-200. For the text of Annex III to Protocol No. III of the Modified Brussels Treaty, adopted by the seven member states of Western European Union Oct. 23, 1954, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 982-983. This text was amended by Council of Western European Union resolutions of May 24, 1961, and Oct. 19, 1962; texts in European Yearbook, vol. IX (1962), pp. 169-171 and ibid., vol. X (1963), pt. 1, p. 309, respectively.

3

Department of State press release No. 557; the Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 11, 1963, pp. 726-731.

The replies printed here are taken from pp. 826-828 and 834 of the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 507 and 631.

Docs. IV-33, 34, 35

meet the deficiency of other NATO members in fulfilling their commitments at a very crucial time when the buildup of West Germany's own forces was incomplete. Although some of these deficiencies have been corrected, and the German force buildup is progressing, we are prepared to keep these additional combat units in Germany as long as there is a need for them.

Thus, we are not planning any reduction in United States combat units in Germany. As part of the reorganization of the Army's European logistic forces, we are planning some reduction in noncombat personnel, a matter on which of course we are in touch with our allies.

But we do not intend to bring back any units or personnel whose return would impair the military effectiveness of our forces in Germany. In short, we intend to keep our combat forces in Germany as they are today-that is, more than 6 combat divisions.

We have over, I think, 240,000 or 250,000 [troops in Western Europe], so a regiment is a very small [amount to withdraw]-less than a percent of that, so I am sure there will be movements in and out. But we are talking about the whole European theater. But, in the case of Germany, and I think it is important to make this clear, the 6 divisions which are our NATO commitment, are being kept. In addition, these other combat units are being kept in Germany also. If there is any change in personnel, and I am sure there will be some, it will be in logistic forces. There have been some changes, for example, in our logistic supply lines in France. There may be some changes in headquarters units and all the rest. They are relatively small. They may be spaced over a period of time. But our combat effectiveness, of course, is increasing as our materiel increases.

We are talking about deficiencies in 1961, when we were having a serious crisis in Berlin and where the NATO forces were inadequate. And, as you know, I think the Secretary of State made a reference to the fact that a number of our allies had not, and in some cases have not, met their NATO commitments today, with the number of forces that should be stationed in Germany for the defense of Germany.

"Secretary of State Rusk stated in part the following:

"The NATO military authorities have approved force goals whose attainment would help to give us a balanced force structure. It is important that these goals be attained. Then no one anywhere could conclude that the West is lax or indifferent to the defense of its vital interests.

"I hope that the alliance as a whole can meet its goals. In a genuine partnership burdens must be equitably borne; all countries must contribute their fair share to the total strength of the alliance. The United States is making, and will continue to make, its full contribution to this partnership. It is a source of pride that the United States has generally met or exceeded its goals, and a source of regret that certain others in the alliance have not. It is our strong conviction that the alliance as a whole should meet its commitments, and we earnestly hope it will do so." (Cited as title IV-34, supra.)

There has been a buildup since 1961, particularly among the German forces, whose target is 12 divisions. Some other countries have not met their quota. But we are keeping our forces there primarily because we believe that it emphasizes the commitment of the United States to the defense of the Federal Republic, and our concern about the defense of Europe. In addition, it should be pointed out that the Federal Republic, West Germany, is purchasing military equipment in the United States which provides an offset to our gold losses for our forces in the Federal Republic. So they are making an effort and so are we, and we are going to continue to do it.

... we not only have these divisions that I described there, but we have-after the '61 experience, we moved equipment for 2 more divisions. So during the Big Lift, we actually have 7 divisions. .

7

. it [any question of the need for United States forces in Germany] would certainly be discussed in NATO, and, of course, the country particularly affected, in this case the Federal Republic. Its views would have very heavy weight, very heavy weight. I am sure that no action would be taken which would not meet the needs of the country involved, the Federal Republic as well as our own.

IV-36

THE UNITED STATES STRATEGY OF GRADUATED DETERRENCE: Remarks Made by the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) Before the Economic Club of New York, November 18, 1963 (Excerpt)s

It is time for the maps to change by which policy is charted and justified. The old ones, which assumed a U.S. nuclear monopoly, both strategic and tactical, and a Communist monopoly of ground combat strength, are too far removed from reality to serve as even rough guides. Neither we nor our allies can afford the crudities of maps

7

Reference to Operation Big Lift, the airlift of the Second Armored Division from the United States to Germany in a 63-hour period, Oct. 22-25, 1963. In his address of Oct. 27, 1963, Secretary of State Rusk also stated in part the following:

"Does the airlift of an armored division mean the withdrawal of American troops from Germany? The answer is no-the opposite is the case. Because of this airlift we have at the moment a seventh division temporarily in Europe. Moreover, equipment is in position for still another division. Thus, the airlift capability developed by the United States at such great expense provides a major source of added strength to the alliance."

See also doc. IV-36, infra.

* Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 16, 1963, pp. 914-921.

that tell us that old policies are still forced upon us, when a true picture would show important new avenues of necessity and choice. What most needs changing is a picture of ourselves and of the Western alliance as essentially at bay, outmanned and outgunned except for nuclear arms no longer exclusively ours. We should not think of ourselves as forced by limitations of resources to rely upon strategies of desperation and threats of vast mutual destruction, compelled to deal only with the most massive and immediate challenges, letting lesser ones go by default. It would be a striking historical phenomenon if that self-image should be justified. We are the largest member of an alliance with a population of almost 450 million people, an aggregate annual product which is fast approaching a trillion dollars, and a modern and diverse technological base without parallel, facing the Soviet Union and its European satellites with their hundred million fewer people and an aggregate output no more than half that of the West.

And quite apart from ignoring the underlying strengths of the West, the outdated picture I have described takes no account of the military capabilities in being that our investments over the last decade, and specifically in the last few years, have bought for us. If new problems put strong claims on our attention and our resources today, it is very largely because we have come a large part of the way that is feasible toward solving some old ones.

Let me summarize the current status of the balance of strategic nuclear forces, that part of the military environment that has preoccupied our attention for so long. In strictly relative numerical terms, the situation is the familiar one. The U.S. force now contains more than 500 operational long-range ballistic missiles-Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, Polaris-and is planned to increase to over 1,700 by 1966. There is no doubt in our minds and none in the minds of the Soviets that these missiles can penetrate to their targets. In addition the U.S. has Strategic Air Command bombers on air alert and over 500 bombers on quick-reaction ground alert. By comparison, the consensus is that today the Soviets could place about half as many bombers over North America on a first strike. The Soviets are estimated to have today only a fraction as many intercontinental missiles as we do. Furthermore, their submarine-launched ballistic missiles are short range and generally are not comparable to our Polaris force. The Soviets pose a very large threat against Europe, including hundreds of intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles. This threat is today and will continue to be covered by the clear superiority of our strategic forces.

The most wishful of Soviet planners would have to calculate as a certainty that the most effective surprise attack they could launch would still leave us with the capability to destroy the attacker's society. What is equally pertinent is that the relative numbers and survivability of U.S. strategic forces would permit us to retaliate against all the urgent Soviet military targets that are subject to attack, thus contributing to the limitation of damage to ourselves and our allies.