Government has raised the question of the multilateral force which is now under discussion within NATO. Such a force would be fully consistent with the objective of preventing the development of new national nuclear weapons programs. Such a force would be multilaterally owned and manned and not at the disposal of any one government. The organization of such a force would tend to prevent, rather than encourage, the proliferation of independent nuclear capabilities. It would be subject to the same safeguards as other NATO nuclear forces to prevent its use in an unauthorized or accidental manner. In this connection it is necessary to clarify that, contrary to the Soviet charges, vessels would not be "disguised" as merchant ships. They would be warships, in law and in fact, clearly identified as part of the Western defensive armory and no attempt would be made to camouflage these vessels as commercial ships.

The United States notes that the Soviet Union has once again made a series of unrestrained and unfounded accusations against the Federal Republic of Germany, whose democratic, freely elected government has joined with the other free nations in collective self-defense. The defense framework of the Federal Republic has been conceived and executed within the framework of NATO and is designed for the sole purpose of contributing to the Atlantic Alliance's defensive requirements to meet any possible threat to members of the Alliance. All objective observers understand that tensions and dangers in Europe do not result from the policies of the Federal Republic but, rather, from the unnatural division of Germany which is manifested in its most grotesque and inhuman form by the wall through the center of Berlin; and from the refusal of the Soviet Government to agree to grant the German people their inherent right of self-determination. It is to the correction of these injustices that the Soviet Government should devote itself, if it genuinely seeks a normalization of the situation in Central Europe.

The Soviet Government lists a number of problems in whose settlement it professes interest. The opportunities open to the Soviet Government to demonstrate a genuine willingness to achieve equitable solutions to international problems are manifold. To cite but one example: An agreement on a treaty to end the testing of nuclear weapons would have a profound effect on the international scene, would contribute materially to the slowing up of the arms race, and to the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons. Other fully practical steps to reduce the risk of war could be taken without delay along with the establishment of a direct communication link. The United States for its part will persevere in its efforts for progress in disarmament and a nuclear test ban.

61

The United States and its allies cannot and will not be diverted by threats from taking all steps necessary to safeguard their security. At the same time, the United States remains determined to pursue all paths which offer promise of reducing tension and of enlarging the prospects of peace.

61 See post, docs. X-25 et seq.

Doc. IV-19

["THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT PROPOSES THAT THE WHOLE AREA OF THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA SHOULD BE DECLARED A ZONE FREE FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS": Note Delivered to the Department of State by the Soviet Embassy in Washington, May 20, 1963 (Excerpts)-Post, doc. X-76]

IV-20

MINISTERIAL SESSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, OTTAWA, MAY 22-24, 1963: Communiqué Issued May 24, 1963 62

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session in Ottawa from 22nd to 24th May, 1963.

In their review of the international situation, the Ministers emphasized that in the world of today peace is indivisible. The enduring character of the North Atlantic Alliance, founded on the principles of interdependence and common defence, constitutes a basic guarantee for the maintenance of peace.

The Council noted with regret that the Soviet Union had so far shown little interest in seeking equitable solutions for outstanding problems.

With regard to Germany and Berlin, the threat has not disappeared. Thanks to the firm attitude maintained by the West, however, developments detrimental to the interests of Berlin and the Alliance have been effectively discouraged. In this connection, the Alliance abides by the terms of its declaration of 16th December, 1958, on Berlin.63 Outside the treaty area too, tensions and difficulties continue to exist which have a profound effect on the Alliance. Soviet military personnel remain in Cuba; and the situation there, with its repercussions in the region generally, still gives cause for concern.64 Ministers also expressed their disquiet over recent events in Laos, and stressed the importance of sustained efforts to secure respect for the Geneva Agreements.65

The Ministers reaffirmed the importance, in building a peaceful world, of progress towards general and complete disarmament by stages and under effective international control. In this connection, they noted that agreement in principle had been reached between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on measures to improve communications designed to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation. They expressed the hope that the Soviet Union's attitude

62

66

Department of State press release No. 278 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, June 10, 1963, pp. 895-896).

63 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 602–603. See ante, docs. III-10-42.

65

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1075-1083 and post, docs. IX-69-79.

66 Post, doc. VI-6.

would evolve sufficiently to permit genuine progress to be made on key disarmament questions.

The growing scope and complexity of the problems facing the Alliance make it imperative for the Council to ensure that its political consultations are as prompt and effective as they can be made. The Ministers noted the progress already achieved in this direction and expressed their determination to secure still further improvements.

The Ministers discussed NATO defence policy and approved the steps taken to organize the nuclear forces assigned or to be assigned to the Supreme Allied Command Europe (SĂCEUR),

These include notably:

(A) Assignment of the United Kingdom V-Bomber force and three U.S. Polaris submarines to SACEUR;

(B) Establishment by SACEUR on his staff of a deputy responsible to him for nuclear affairs;

(C) Arrangements for broader participation by officers of NATO member countries in nuclear activities in Allied Command Europe and in co-ordination of operational planning at Omaha;

(D) Fuller information to national authorities both political and military.

Ministers welcomed these measures to increase the effectiveness of the nuclear capability at the disposal of the Alliance and to improve co-ordination and control of its nuclear deterrent forces.

The Ministers recognized the need to achieve a satisfactory balance between nuclear and conventional arms. They directed the Council in permanent session to undertake, with the advice of the NATO military authorities, further studies of the inter-related questions of strategy, force requirements and the resources available to meet them.

The Council noted progress made in the implementation of earlier resolutions concerning the defence problems of Greece and reaffirmed its interest in the effective application of these resolutions.67

The North Atlantic Alliance seeks peace. It deplores the diversion into the military field of resources which might be used for the betterment of mankind, and in particular for increased efforts to raise living standards in developing countries. But the Free World remains faced with a continuing threat and the members of the North Atlantic Alliance have both the right and the duty to protect their freedom and independence.

The next Ministerial Meeting will be held in Paris in December 1963.

["THE [SOVIET] PROPOSAL... TO DECLARE THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE ... SEEMS TO BE DESIGNED... TO CHANGE THE EXISTING MILITARY BALANCE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES": Note From the American Embassy in Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 24, 1963-Post, doc. X-78]

"See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 541-543 and 570-572.

IV-21

"THE FUTURE OF THE WEST LIES IN ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP": Address by the President (Kennedy) at the Paulskirche, Frankfurt, June 25, 1963 (Excerpt)68

The future of the West lies in Atlantic partnership-a system of cooperation, interdependence, and harmony whose peoples can jointly meet their burdens and opportunities throughout the world. Some say this is only a dream, but I do not agree. A generation of achievement-the Marshall Plan," NATO,70 the Schuman Plan," and the Common Market-urges us up the path to greater unity.

There will be difficulties and delays. There will be doubts and discouragement. There will be differences of approach and opinion. But we have the will and the means to serve three related goals—the heritage of our countries, the unity of our continents, and the interdependence of the Western alliance.

Some say that the United States will neither hold to these purposes nor abide by its pledges that we will revert to a narrow nationalism. But such doubts fly in the face of history. For 18 years the United States has stood its watch for freedom all around the globe. The firmness of American will and the effectiveness of American strength have been shown, in support of free men and free government, in Asia, in Africa, in the Americas, and, above all, here in Europe. We have undertaken, and sustained in honor, relations of mutual trust and obligation with more than 40 allies. We are proud of this record, which more than answers doubts. But in addition these proven commitments to the common freedom and safety are assured, in the future as in the past, by one great fundamental fact-that they are deeply rooted in America's own self-interest. Our commitment to Europe is indispensable-in our interest as well as yours.

It is not in our interest to try to dominate the European councils of decision. If that were our objective, we would prefer to see Europe divided and weak, enabling the United States to deal with each fragment individually. Instead we have and now look forward to a

69 White House press release (Frankfurt) dated June 25, 1963 (as-delivered text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, July 22, 1963, pp. 118-123). For President Kennedy's itinerary, see footnote 80 to doc. IV-26, post.

09

See A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1949, pp. 1268-1327; American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, vol. II, pp. 3030-3047, 3059-3101.

To See American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents: 1950–1955, vol. I, pp. 812–873 and 1504-1660; American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, pp. 365–397; ibid., 1957, pp. 388-420; ibid., 1958, pp. 478–489; ibid., 1959, pp. 512-529; ibid., 1960, pp. 312-319; ibid., 1961, pp. 466-508; ibid., 1962, pp. 539 ff.; and ante, docs. IV-1 et seq.

"See American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 1039 1107; American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, pp. 397–398; and ibid., 1957, pp. 574–575.

72 See ibid., pp. 426–578; ibid., 1958, pp. 528-531 and 534-538; ibid., 1959. pp. 530531, 554-564, 569-570, and 572–576; ibid., 1960, pp. 351-352 and 358–359; ibid., 1961, pp. 508-509 and 511–332; ibid., 1962, pp. 574 ff.; and post, docs. IV-42 et seq.

Europe united and strong-speaking with a common voice, acting with a common will—a world power capable of meeting world problems as a full and equal partner.

This is in the interest of us all. For war in Europe, as we learned twice in 40 years, destroys peace in America. A threat to the freedom of Europe is a threat to the freedom of America. That is why no administration-no administration-in Washington can fail to respond to such a threat-not merely from good will but from necessity. And that is why we look forward to a united Europe in an Atlantic partnership an entity of interdependent parts, sharing equally both burdens and decisions and linked together in the tasks of defense as well as the arts of peace.

This is no fantasy. It will be achieved by concrete steps to solve the problems that face us all: military, economic, and political. Partnership is not a posture but a process, a continuous process that grows stronger each year as we devote ourselves to common tasks.

The first task of the Atlantic community was to assure its common defense. That defense was and still is indivisible. The United States will risk its cities to defend yours because we need your freedom to protect ours. Hundreds of thousands of our soldiers serve with yours on this continent, as tangible evidence of that pledge. Those who would doubt our pledge or deny this indivisibility-those who would separate Europe from America or split one ally from another-would only give aid and comfort to the men who make themselves our adversaries and welcome any Western disarray.

The purpose of our common military effort is not war but peace, not the destruction of nations but the protection of freedom. The forces that West Germany contributes to this effort are second to none among the Western European nations. Your nation is in the frontline of defense, and your divisions, side by side with our own, are a source of strength to us all.

These conventional forces are essential, and they are backed by the sanction of thousands of the most modern weapons here on European soil and thousands more, only minutes away, in posts around the world. Together our nations have developed for the forward defense of free Europe a deterrent far surpassing the present or prospective force of any hostile power.

Nevertheless it is natural that America's nuclear position has raised questions within the alliance. I believe we must confront these questions, not by turning the clock backward to separate nuclear deterrents but by developing a more closely unified Atlantic deterrent, with genuine European participation.

How this can best be done, and it is not easy-in some ways more difficult than to split the atom physically-how this can best be done is now under discussion with those who may wish to join in this effort. The proposal before us is for a new Atlantic force. Such a force would bring strength instead of weakness, cohesion instead of division. It would belong to all members, not one, with all participating on a

" See ante, doc. IV-4