. . Mr. Merchant will be going ahead in about 10 days and begin discussions in Europe of a more detailed kind.1o I just want to point out that because of the enormity of the weapon and because of the circumstances under which it might be fired, there is no answer which will provide reassurance under the most extreme conditions for everyone. We feel that, however, with what we now have and what we are ready to propose, carrying out the Nassau proposal, that additional assurances can be given which we believe-which we hope will satisfy the Europeans. Now, if it doesn't, then we will be prepared to consider any other proposals that might be put forward. But in the case, for example, of France, we are not talking in that case of a European nuclear force. We are talking about a French nuclear force. So to make it a European force would require substantial political developments in Europe. That time might come and if it does, we would be glad to consider joining with them or cooperating with them in any system which they might wish to develop. Yes, I think that we ought to consider that [General Lauris Norstad's suggestion that an American-British-French executive committee be established within the North Atlantic Council, which would have the power to decide on the use of nuclear weapons].20 As you know, General de Gaulle has not been prepared to discuss a multi-NATO force.21 If he was, we would be prepared to discuss General Norstad's proposal. General Norstad's proposal, however, might not reach the needs of those countries which are not nuclear powers. But if the European countries choose to delegate their authority to General de Gaulle or to Prime Minister Macmillan, we would certainly be prepared to discuss General Norstad's proposal. But we are talking about-when we talk about Europe, we have to realize there are a good many countries of Europe, some of which are nuclear and some of which are non-nuclear. The question always is whether the arrangements between the nuclear powers will meet the genuine needs of the non-nuclear powers, or whether they are going to have to go the national deterrent route, which we believe will be both expensive and dangerous. Yes [you don't have to decide so quickly on the use of a multilateral submarine or seaborne force], but there is still the need for relatively quick time, so that I think you are still dealing-you may not be dealing in every case with five minutes, but you are dealing with--very difficult to hold a vote of all the members of NATO, take a majority vote, on firing these missiles. What we hope to do is to indicate guidelines for any action which a commander might take which will give assurance to the Western Europeans. Our feeling is very strong that 19 See ante, doc. IV-4. "Reference to an address by Gen. Lauris Norstad (ret.) before The Atlantic Council of the United States, Inc., Washington, Jan. 14, 1963. 21 See ante, doc. IV-1. they have that assurance now. The presence of 400,000 American troops and their families in Western Europe, people who we would not permit to be overrun, I think is a testament to our determination to honor our commitments. In addition, the very obvious fact that Western Europe is essentially the security of the United States. The loss of Western Europe would be destructive to the interests of the United States. So we feel that there is no question that these weapons would be used to protect the security of Western Europe. General de Gaulle has said that monopoly always serves those who benefit from it.22 I don't think that we alone benefit from it. I think Western Europe benefits from the enormous efforts which Americans have made. However, if these two factors, the presence of our troops and our security guarantees, are not good enough, we hope to be able to work out devices which will give a stronger participation to the Europeans and, therefore, strengthen their sense of participation and their common sense of allegiance to the NATO cause which we share. I must say in looking at the dangers we face, I put dangers in other areas to be higher than the prospect of a military attack on Western Europe. But Western Europe is the one that lives under the gun, and we are going to do everything we can to work out devices which will increase their sense of security. IV-8 SOVIET DRAFT NONAGGRESSION PACT BETWEEN THE WARSAW TREATY AND NATO COUNTRIES, Submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, Geneva, February 20, 1963 23 The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of May 14, 1955," on the one hand, and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949, on the other hand, 25 Being firmly resolved to take measures to eliminate international tension and to create an atmosphere of confidence in relations between States in order to help forward the consolidation of universal peace and the speediest possible achievement of agreements on the most vital problems of today and particularly on general and complete disarmament, Confirming their intention to comply strictly with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter in their relations with one another, Have agreed on the following: Article 1 The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty solemnly undertake to refrain from attack, the threat or use of force, in any manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, against one another or in their international relations in general. 22 See ibid. 23 U.N.doc. ENDC/77 (text as printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1963, pp. 57-58). 24 25 Text in American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, pp. 1239–1242. Text ibid., pp. 812-815. Article 2 All disputes that may arise between one or more States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, on the one hand, and one or more States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, on the other hand, shall be resolved by peaceful means only, through negotiations between the parties concerned or by using other means for the pacific settlement of international disputes as provided for by the United Nations Charter. Article 3 Should situations affecting the interests of both sides arise which are likely to endanger the maintenance of peace and security, the States parties to the Pact shall consult together, with a view to taking and implementing such joint measures as may, in conformity with the United Nations Charter, be considered appropriate for the peaceful settlement of such situations. Article 4 This Pact shall remain in force so long as the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance of May 14, 1955 and the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949, are valid. Article 5 This Pact shall be ratified by the signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The ratifications shall be deposited with the United Nations Secretary-General, who shall notify all the States signatories to the Pact as well as all the other States members of the United Nations, of each deposit. This Pact shall come into force on the day of the deposit of the last ratification. Article 6 This Pact, of which the Russian, English and French texts are authentic, shall be registered and remain deposited with the UN Secretariat. Duly certified copies thereof shall be communicated by the United Nations Secretary-General to the Governments of the States signatories to this Pact. In faith whereof the undersigned representatives of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty have subscribed to this Pact and thereto have affixed their seals. DONE at 1963. IV-9 UNITED STATES PREFERENCE FOR A MULTILATERAL FORCE OF SURFACE SHIPS RATHER THAN SUBMARINES: Reply Made by the President (Kennedy) to a Question Asked at a News Conference, March 6, 1963 (Excerpt)27 There are some people who are opposed in Europe to the multilateral concept because of national reasons. Now if we had come forward with a proposal for submarines, those submarines would have to be built in the United States. They would be quite expensive; they would take at least 2 years or so longer than this program would; The reply printed here is taken from pp. 241-242 of Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963. there would be elements of control by the United States inevitably because of various technical reasons, and that system would have been under attack. Now I think that if anyone will examine the argument between surface and submarine they will feel there's a good deal of merit to the surface argument. In the first place, the submarine is a very difficult weapon system to operate. We are going into what is really a unique experience, the multilateral manning. It's not easy to find merchant ships at sea. It took us more than 2 days to find that recent Venezuelan ship in the Caribbean. They are not easy to find. It took us longer to find the Portuguese ship some months ago. The ocean is a large ocean. Now we are going to be part of that multilateral force. Can you imagine a situation where the Soviets could discover every one of these ships and mark them and then attack them, destroying the American flag and the Americans aboard and not expect that that would not launch a general conflagration which would include Polaris, Minuteman, and every other weapon which might be involved? That they could isolate this force which the United States was part of and expect that they could attack the surface ships successfully without any of these ships firing a missile and not initiate the use of all the nuclear weapons? I just don't think that the logic is on the [other] side. This way the ships can be built there; the force can be built more quickly; there is not a balance of payments drain; it's much easier to operate from the surface if you are going to have a multilateral force. IV-10 UNITED STATES ESTIMATE OF THE COST OF THE PROPOSED MULTILATERAL FORCE AT $500 MILLION A YEAR OVER A 10-YEAR PERIOD: Replies Made by the Secretary of State (Rusk) to Questions Asked at a News Conference, March 8, 1963 (Excerpts)28 We are here trying to respond to the expressed interest of our friends in Europe in taking a larger part in the decisionmaking processes affecting nuclear matters. I think this has been greatly stimulated since 1955, 56, '57, when the Soviets themselves acquired a massive nuclear delivery capability against the West-Western Europe and this country. Now, here is a situation where we are ourselves trying to explore what it is the Europeans really have in mind. This is not a question on which American leadership, as it is frequently expressed, should The replies printed here are taken from p. 434 of the Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 25, 1963 (reprint of Department of State press release No. 121). be measured in terms of whether an American plan, complete in every detail, is being put forward for acceptance in every detail by our friends. Because the whole point of the exercise is to find a way to share that leadership with others, particularly in Western Europe. We want to find out in detail on dozens of specific questions what our allies think about it. Now we have made during the past year a very strong effort to provide our allies with a great deal of information in the nuclear field-technical, operational, financial. After Nassau 29 we felt that it was appropriate for us to indicate at least one of the ways in which we could proceed on a multilateral force. And Ambassador [Livingston] Merchant is now exploring the outlines of that kind of a proposal with our allies.30 But we hope and expect that our allies will themselves come back and tell us what they think about the entire range of these questions. Now, it is true that this nuclear club is an expensive club. This nuclear business is a very expensive business. We ourselves are committing in the order of $15 billion a year to this effort. We think that our European colleagues know that this is expensive. There are costs involved. And so we are talking with them about the cost of a multilateral force. These are not small costs, and they will be considering these in relation to their other necessary expenditures, in relation to their other demands upon them. But this is a question which is under discussion. We will be as responsive as possible to the views of our allies. There are many questions on which we ourselves will not come to a final view about our own opinion until we know what our allies think about it. But we are in that stage, Mr. Marder [Murray Marder, Washington Post]. I wouldn't want to go beyond it today. I would think that [$500 million a year] is an order of magnitude which is realistic, but I think those are not the exact figures in terms of both the initial cost and maintenance cost [of a multilateral force] over a [10-year] period, but those are close enough to give us a realistic chance to think about it. IV-11 "WE HAVE NO INDICATION THAT IN THE EARLY YEARS OF SUCH A [MULTILATERAL] FORCE ANY COUNTRY WOULD BE WILLING TO GIVE UP THE VETO POWER" OVER ITS USE: Statement Read and Reply Made by the Director of the Office of News (White), Department of State, to a Question Asked at a News Conference, March 11, 1963 (Excerpt) 31 the Merchant team is not negotiating in the strict sense of that term. Rather it is discussing the possible creation of a multilateral "See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 635–637. * See ante, doc. IV-4 and footnote 8 thereto. * Files of the Office of News, Department of State. Doc. IV-11 |