Secretary of Agriculture; Mr. George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State; Mr. Christian A. Herter, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations; Mr. John M. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of the Interior; the United States Ambassador to Canada, Mr. W. W. Butterworth; Mr. Walter W. Heller, Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers; Mr. Frank Coffin, Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development and other advisers.

E. Antarctica

III-94

ANTARCTIC TREATY COUNTRIES MEETING ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, WASHINGTON, JUNE 24-28, 1963: Final Communiqué, June 28, 1963 1

1

'Text in the Department of State Bulletin, July 15, 1963, pp. 107-108. The eleven technical recommendations agreed upon are currently under consideration by the governments concerned. For text of the Antarctic Treaty, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 452–458.

Part IV

THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY AND WESTERN EUROPE

A. The Atlantic Community-NATO and the OECDEfforts To Develop Multilateral Nuclear Strategy and Economic Cooperation

IV-1

"FRANCE HAS TAKEN NOTE OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN NASSAU AGREEMENT... WE CANNOT SUBSCRIBE TO IT": Reply Made by the President of the French Republic (General de Gaulle) to a Question Asked at a News Conference, January 14, 1963 (Excerpt)1

No one in the world-particularly no one in America-can say if, where, when, how and to what extent the American nuclear weapons would be employed to defend Europe. Moreover, this does not in the least prevent the American nuclear weapons, which are the most powerful of all, from remaining the essential guarantee of world peace. This fact, and the determination with which President Kennedy used it, came in to full light out of the Cuban affair.' But it remains that the American nuclear power does not necessarily and immediately meet all the eventualities concerning Europe and France.

Thus principles and realities combine to lead France to equip itself with an atomic force of its own. This does not all exclude, of course, the combination of the action of this force with the action of the similar forces of its allies. But, for us, in this specific case, integration is something that is unimaginable. Indeed, as you know, we have begun with our own and only means to invent, test and construct atomic bombs and the vehicles for launching them.

It is completely understandable that this French undertaking does not appear to be highly satisfactory to certain American circles. In politics and in strategy, as in the economy, monopoly quite naturally appears to the person who holds it to be the best possible system. Then we hear a multiple choir of Americans— unofficial persons, experts and journalists-violently and strongly attacking our autonomous armament. "The atomic force with which France intends to equip itself is and will remain," they say, "insignificant in relation to those of the United States and Russia. To build it up is thus to waste a lot of effort and

1The reply printed here is taken from pp. 11-12 of Speeches and Press Conferences No. 185, Jan. 14, 1963, of the French Embassy Press and Information Service, New York.

2

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 399-491.

money for nothing. And then, within the Alliance, the United States has an overwhelming superiority, therefore no one should run counter to its strategy through any divergent action."

It is quite true that the number of nuclear weapons with which we can equip ourselves will not equal, far from it, the mass of those of the two giants of today. But since when has it been proved that a people should remain deprived of the most effective weapon for the reason that its chief possible adversary and its chief friend have means far superior to its own?

France, when formerly it was its turn to be a world colossus, often experienced the worth of either the resistance of a less powerful but well-equipped adversary, or the support of an ally lining up inferior but well-tempered and well-employed weapons.

Moreover, the atomic force has a feature of its own, in that it has an efficacity that is certain and to an extent that is frightening even if it does not approach the conceivable maximum. In 1945 two bombs, then elementary, led Japan, who was not able to answer back, to capitulate. I do not want to evoke here the possibilities in which Europe could suffer nuclear actions that would be localized, but whose political and psychological consequences would be immense, unless there is a certainty that retaliation to that extent would be immediately unleashed. I only want to say that the French atomic force, from the very beginning of its establishment, will have the sombre and terrible capability of de stroying in a few seconds millions and millions of men. This fact cannot fail to have at least some bearing on the intents of any possible aggressor.

Then, in the Bahamas, America and Britain concluded an agreement and we were asked to subscribe to it ourselves. Of course, I am only speaking of this proposal and agreement because they have been published and because their content is known. It is a question of constituting a so-called multilateral atomic force, in which Britain would turn over the weapons it has and will have and in which the Americans would place a few of their own. This multilateral force is assigned to the defense of Europe and is under the American NATO command. It is nevertheless understood that the British retain the possibility of withdrawing their atomic weapons for their own use should supreme national interest seem to them to demand it.

As for the bulk of American nuclear weapons, it remains outside the multilateral force and under the direct orders of the President of the United States. Furthermore and in a way by compensation, Britain may purchase from America, if it so desires, Polaris missiles which are, as you know, launched from submarines specially built for that purpose and which carry the thermonuclear warheads adapted to them for a distance of 1,100–2,000 miles. To build these submarines and warheads, the British receive privileged assistance from the Americans. You know-I say this in passing-that this assistance was never offered to us and you should know, despite what some report, that we have never asked for it.

France has taken note of the Anglo-American Nassau agreement. As it was conceived, undoubtedly no one will be surprised that we cannot subscribe to it. It truly would not be useful for us to buy Polaris missiles when we have neither the submarines to launch them nor the thermonuclear warheads to arm them. Doubtless the day will come when we will have these submarines and these warheads. But that day will be long in coming. For the World War, the invasion and their consequences have slowed us down a great deal in our atomic development. When we will one day have these submarines and these warheads, what will the Polaris missiles then be worth? At that time we will probably have missiles of our own invention. In other words, for us, in terms of technology, this affair is not the question of the moment.

But also, it does not meet with the principle about which I just spoke and which consists of disposing in our own right of our deterrent force. To turn over our weapons to a multilateral force, under a foreign command, would be to act contrary to that principle of our defense and our policy. It is true that we too can theoretically retain the ability to take back in our hands, in the supreme hypothesis, our atomic weapons incorporated in the multilateral force. But how

Text ibid., pp. 635–637.

could we do it in practice during the unheard of moments of the atomic apocalypse? And then, this multilateral force necessarily entails a web of liaisons, transmissions and interferences within itself, and on the outside a ring of obligations such that, if an integral part were suddenly snatched from it, there would be a strong risk of paralyzing it just at the moment, perhaps, when it should act.

In sum, we will adhere to the decision we have made: to construct and, if necessary, to employ our atomic force ourselves. And that without refusing, of course, cooperation, be it technological or strategic, if this cooperation is, on the other hand, desired by our allies.*

IV-2

"THE RESOURCES ESSENTIAL TO DEFENSE AGAINST THIS DANGER [OF THE COMMUNIST APPARATUS] ARE CONCENTRATED OVERWHELMINGLY IN THE... ATLANTIC ALLIANCE": Statement Read by the President (Kennedy) at a News Conference, January 24, 1963 5

IV-3

"WE ARE GOING TO PUT POLARIS SUBMARINES... IN THE MEDITERRANEAN": Reply Made by the President (Kennedy) to a Question Asked at a News Conference, January 24, 1963 €

No [there is no expectation of Soviet concessions in return for the announced withdrawal of Jupiter missile bases from Italy and Turkey]. We are going to put Polaris submarines in there, a much more

In reply to a question asked at his news conference of Jan. 24, 1963, President Kennedy stated in part the following:

"Now, there may be reasons for a country to wish a nuclear force of its own, and France has put forward its reasons. But in my judgment, it's inaccurate and not really in the Alliance interest to justify it on the grounds that the United States would fail to defend Europe by whatever means are necessary. "I think the United States over the last 15 years has given-and in fact before that, the last 20 years-has given evidence that its commitments are good. Some in some parts of Europe may not believe that commitment, but I think that Chairman Khrushchev does and I think he's right.

"In addition, once you begin to say that the United States will not come to the assistance of 'X,' can't someone say that perhaps France will not come to the assistance of Germany, and then everyone decides they must rely upon their own deterrent, and pretty soon you have as many deterrents as you have countries. "I think if France wishes to develop its own deterrent, that that's its judgment. It's done so. I have never had the slightest doubt that General de Gaulle would respond to the needs of the alliance. He responded when we were in difficulty in Cuba. I would hope that our confidence in him would be matched by his confidence in us." (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 99–100.)

6

Ibid., p. 92; also, the Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 11, 1963, p. 197. The reply printed here is taken from p. 98 of Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963.

'The Turkish Government announced its agreement to the relinquishment of the Jupiter missiles, Jan. 23; the Italian Cabinet approved the replacement of the Jupiter missiles with Polaris submarines and the creation of a multilateral force with Italian participation, Jan. 24, 1963.

modern weapon, in the Mediterranean. We feel that provides a more adequate security. The British are phasing out the Thor missile, a missile which came into existence after the Jupiter, and in favor of the Polaris also. So I think we are going to be in a stronger position.

IV-4

APPOINTMENT OF LIVINGSTON MERCHANT TO NEGOTIATE UNITED STATES PROPOSALS WITH RESPECT TO THE NATO MULTILATERAL FORCE: Statement by the President (Kennedy), Issued January 24, 1963 8

I am pleased to announce that Career Ambassador Livingston Merchant, one of our most distinguished diplomats, has agreed to take the leadership of the preparation and negotiation of United States proposals with respect to the NATO multilateral force. He will assist Ambassador [Thomas K.] Finletter in discussions in the North Atlantic Council.

The negotiations to be carried out in conjunction with the study of this subject in the North Atlantic Council are an outgrowth of the agreement between myself and Prime Minister Macmillan, at Nassau on December 21st, that our two Governments would seek the development of a multilateral NATO nuclear force in the closest consultation with other NATO allies.

The other members of the team will be Gerard C. Smith, former Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning, who headed a State Department-Department of Defense mission which visited Europe to discuss the problems of a multilateral force with our allies in the fall of 1962, and Rear Adm. John M. Lee, representing the Department of Defense, who also participated in that mission. These three principal negotiators will be supported by an appropriate staff.

s White House press release dated Jan. 24, 1963 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 11, 1963, p. 197). Ambassador Merchant visited Paris Feb. 22-Mar. 3, Rome Mar. 3-5, Brussels Mar. 5, Bonn Mar. 5-9, London Mar. 9-14, Paris Mar. 14-17, and returned to Washington via New York, Mar. 17, 1963. Upon his return to Europe, Ambassador Merchant visited London Apr. 9-15; Amsterdam Apr. 15-17, Athens Apr. 17-22, Ankara Apr. 22-25, Naples Apr. 25-26, Rome Apr. 26, and returned to Washington Apr. 26, 1963. The Merchant mission was also received by the Canadian Government in Ottawa June 6, 1963. These talks, though full and frank in all cases, were exploratory in nature, and no final decisions were expected.

'Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 635–637.