III-88

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS DURING THE PERIOD JULY 1-DECEMBER 31, 1963: Report of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, Submitted June 23, 1964 (Excerpt)26

In accordance with the provisions of the Charter of Punta del Este,27 the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-ECOSOC), meeting at the ministerial level in São Paulo, November 11 to 16,28 conducted its review of the second year of operations of the Alliance for Progress in terms of the basic principles set forth in the Charter. The ministerial meeting was preceded by a meeting at the expert level in October.29

The Ministers reviewed the chief accomplishments of the Alliance during the period in the fields of self-help, development planning, primary products, economic integration, economic and social advances, and external cooperation.

The conference approved the creation of an Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (ICAP). The purpose of ICAP is to give the Alliance a more multilateral character and to help coordinate and implement Alliance policies, in accordance with the Charter of Punta del Este. Carlos Sanz de Santamaria, Finance Minister of Colombia, was subsequently chosen as Chairman of the eight-member Committee.

The Ministers also recommended the creation of (1) a special committee on Latin American coordination (SCLAC); (2) a special committee on manufactures and semimanufactures; (3) a special committee of IA-ECOSOC on labor matters; (4) an inter-American center for ministry of labor personnel; and (5) a special telecommunications commission.

In other resolutions, the Ministers urged that preferential treatment in development plans be given to the agricultural sector and to infrastructure projects. A total of thirty resolutions and recommendations was approved.

In the period of almost three years since the Alliance for Progress program was instituted in March 1961, substantial progress has been achieved. New schools, factories, housing and industrial facilities have been established and a number of countries have instituted new measures for land and tax reform. However, much remains to be done in terms of increased cooperation with other nations and with private and public institutions, and in terms of self-help and social justice.

As indicated in table 14, the United States in the July-December 1963 period authorized $385 million in economic assistance to 19 countries in Latin America to assist in furthering the goals of the

* H. Doc. 200, 88th Cong., pp. 26-28. Part VII of the NAC report.

27 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 395–409. Ante, doc. III-80.

99

Alliance for Progress. Over one-half of this amount was provided. under the Food for Peace Program. More than one-half of total assistance was in the form of loans.

D. Canadian-United States Relations

III-89

STATUS OF CANADIAN-UNITED STATES NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS: Statement Issued by the Department of State, January 30, 19631

The Department has received a number of inquiries concerning the disclosure during a recent debate in the Canadian House of Commons regarding negotiations over the past 2 or 3 months between the United States and Canadian Governments relating to nuclear weapons for Canadian armed forces.

In 1958 the Canadian Government decided to adopt the BOMARC-B weapons systems. Accordingly two BOMÂRC-B squadrons were deployed to Canada where they would serve the double purpose of protecting Montreal and Toronto as well as the U.S. deterrent force. The BOMARC-B was not designed to carry any conventional warhead. The matter of making available a nuclear warhead for it and for other nuclear-capable weapons systems acquired by Canada has been the subject of inconclusive discussions between the two Governments. The installation of the two BOMARC-B batteries in Canada without nuclear warheads was completed in 1962.

In addition to the BOMARC-B, a similar problem exists_with respect to the modern supersonic jet interceptor with which the Royal Canadian Air Force has been provided. Without nuclear air defense warheads, they operate at far less than their full potential effectiveness.

Shortly after the Cuban crisis in October 1962,2 the Canadian Government proposed confidential discussions concerning circumstances under which there might be provision of nuclear weapons for Canadian armed forces in Canada and Europe. These discussions have been exploratory in nature; the Canadian Government has not as yet proposed any arrangement sufficiently practical to contribute effectively to North American defense.

The discussions between the two Governments have also involved possible arrangements for the provision of nuclear weapons for Canadian NATO forces in Europe, similar to the arrangements which the United States has made with many of our other NATO allies.

1 Department of State press release No. 59 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 18, 1963, pp. 243–244).

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 399 ff.

3

During the debate in the House of Commons various references were made to recent discussions at Nassau. The agreements made at Nassau have been fully published. They raise no question of the appropriateness of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces in fulfilling their NATO or NORAD [North American Air Defense Command] obligations.

Reference was also made in the debate to the need of NATO for increased conventional forces. A flexible and balanced defense requires increased conventional forces, but conventional forces are not an alternative to effective NATO or NORAD defense arrangements using nuclear-capable weapons systems. NORAD is designed to defend the North American Continent against air attack. The Soviet bomber fleet will remain at least throughout this decade a significant element in the Soviet strike force. An effective continental defense against this common threat is necessary.

The provision of nuclear weapons to Canadian forces would not involve an expansion of independent nuclear capability, or an increase in the "nuclear club." As in the case of other allies, custody of U.S. nuclear weapons would remain with the United States. Joint control fully consistent with national sovereignty can be worked out to cover the use of such weapons by Canadian forces.

III-90

"WE SHALL ALWAYS RESPECT THE CLEAR DECISIONS OF CANADA AND ADAPT OUR POLICIES AS WELL AS WE CAN TO THOSE DECISIONS": Statement Read by the Secretary of State (Rusk) at a News Conference, February 1, 1963 (Excerpt)1

I wish to make a brief statement at the beginning on the criticism we have received from friends in Canada on account of the press statement issued on January 30.5 There is a strong tradition of fair play in both our countries, and our friendship is too close for a misunderstanding of this sort. I wish to say to all Canadians that we regret it if any words of ours have been so phrased as to give offense, but the need to make some clarifying statement arose from a situation not of our making.

It became necessary as the result of statements made in the course of debate in Ottawa last week. Without notice to us and we understand how this can happen in the heat of debate there was a disclosure then of confidential exchanges between our two Governments, and a number of arguments were put forward by various speakers which appeared to offer new interpretations of the policies of the United States.

As a result, a number of questions were raised with our Government

3 Text ibid., pp. 635–637.

4 Department of State press release No. 65 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 18, 1963, p. 235).

Supra.

by Canadian and American reporters, by Members of our Congress, and by ordinary citizens. It became clear that we should have to give some account of our own views. This question, after all, is one which involves the legitimate concerns of both our peoples. Our common effort for the defense of North America and our partnership in NATO necessarily involve us all. Yet we were well aware of the fact that these issues are politically very sensitive in Canada, and we did not wish to engage in discussion at a level which would seem to imply criticism of any individual or group from any leading officer of our Government. Neither did we believe that a diplomatic protest was appropriate. Such a protest indeed might have been called interference in the light of the political context in which the initial disclosure of our talks had occurred.

So we determined on a simple statement of the facts as we understand them. I have already expressed my regret if our tone was wrong, but I believe the facts of the position as we understand them were fairly set out, and certainly if the statement contains any errors, we shall be prompt to correct them.

It should be clear to all North Americans that of course all final decisions about Canada's role in our common defense are for Canada to make, and we in the United States know only too well that decisions about nuclear defense are particularly testing and painful. We shall always respect the clear decisions of Canada and adapt our policies as well as we can to those decisions, and we shall continue to believe that in the long run the friendship of our two peoples, which we value so highly, not only permits but requires open and clear explanations on great common problems."

III-91

CANADIAN-UNITED STATES DISCUSSION OF MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST: Joint Communiqué Issued at Hyannis Port, Massachusetts, by the President of the United States (Kennedy) and the Prime Minister of Canada (Pearson), May 11, 1963

7

During the past two days the President and the Prime Minister have met together in this historic State where so many of the currents of the national life of the two countries have mingled from early times. 2. Mr. Pearson's visit to Mr. Kennedy's family home took place in the atmosphere of informality and friendliness which marks so many of the relations between the people of the United States and Canada.

On Aug. 16, 1963, an agreement was concluded whereby the United States would arm the Canadian air defense system with nuclear weapons under "joint control." A supplementary agreement in Oct. provided for the supply of air-toair nuclear missiles for both U.S. and Canadian air defense forces in Canada.

7 White House press release (Hyannis, Mass.) dated May 11, 1963 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, May 27, 1963, pp. 815-817). The communiqué was issued after a two-day meeting between the President and the Prime Minister.