violence is a confession of weakness, coming at a time when they are trying to pose as respectable political movements; moreover, they fear that violent tactics might produce strong counterreactions in many of these countries.

84

This shift raises interesting questions about Castro's stance in the Moscow-Peiping quarrel. It clearly puts him on record in favor of a policy line in Latin America which, while both necessary to his political future in Cuba, where he needs early successes, and congenial to his personal penchant for revolutionary violence, would appear to put him much closer to Peiping than to Moscow in what is becoming an increasingly bitter struggle. It is also not without interest that Cuba is the only Communist country tied closely to and dependent on Moscow that has not signed the nuclear test ban treaty. It is on the same side of the fence as Communist China and Albania on this issue. But we have seen how dependent Cuba is on the Soviet bloc economically. Castro's heart seems again to have shifted to Peiping, leaving his stomach in Moscow. This hardly seems a prescription for a long life.

It is interesting also that in view of the reluctance of most of the older Moscow-line Communist parties of Latin America to embark on violence, Castro has been forced to depend on assorted extremists— anarchists, Stalinists, Trotskyites, et cetera. His dogmatic imperative would appear to be violence and terror rather than any one of the Marxist ideologies.

III-34

"THE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN THE AMERICAN STATES HAVE CONTINUED TO SUCH AN ALARMING DEGREE THAT MEASURES MUST BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY TO END THIS DANGER TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THE HEMISPHERE": Report on the Work Done at the First Regular Meeting of the Special Consultative Committee on Security of the OAS, Washington, October 18, 1963 85

84 See post, docs. IX-17-27.

65 OAS doc. OEA/Ser.L/X/II.4. The Committee met from Sept. 24-Oct. 18, 1963.

III-35

"ONE OF THE THINGS THAT WORRIES US MOST ABOUT CUBA... IS THE CONTINUED EFFORT OF MR. CASTRO TO INTERFERE IN THE AFFAIRS OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN THIS HEMISPHERE": Reply Made by the Secretary of State (Rusk) to a Question Asked at a News Conference, November 8, 1963 (Excerpt) 86

. There have been substantial withdrawals of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. I would not get into a numbers game again about the precise numbers, but we do know that there have been significant withdrawals.

We also know that the situation inside of Cuba is very tight, from the economic point of view; they are having considerable difficulties. One of the things that worries us most about Cuba, about which we are concerned, is the continued effort of Mr. Castro to interfere in the affairs of other countries in this hemisphere, and the other countries and we are working very closely to meet this and to deal with it as it arises.

I am thinking, for example, of such things as that raid on the British island to recapture some refugees, whose only offense was they tried to escape the prison Mr. Castro has made out of Cuba.87

I am thinking of the training of young men from other Latin America countries in terrorist and guerrilla tactics, with the idea that they would go back and engage in terrorist activities in their own countries.

I am thinking of such things as financial subsidies to terrorists in other countries.

These are things that are disturbing the peace of the Caribbean and the inter-American system, and that is one of the focal points of our attitude toward Cuba. It just will not be permitted to happen, and we are taking many different measures to interrupt this kind of interference.

III-36

THE POLICY OF THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION TOWARD CUBA: Reply Made by the President (Kennedy) to a Question Asked at the Conclusion of an Address Before the Florida Chamber of Commerce, Tampa, Fla., November 18, 1963 88

When this administration took office, Castro, of course, was in control of Cuba, and the United States has made efforts, along with

The reply printed here is taken from p. 817 of the Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 25, 1963 (reprint of Department of State press release No. 572). 87 The Secretary was referring to the seizure of 19 Cuban refugees from a British islet and their return to Cuba by a Cuban air and naval force on Aug. 13, 1963; The New York Times, Aug. 16, 1963.

The reply printed here is taken from p. 867 of Public Papers of the Presi dents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963.

other countries of the Organization of American States, to provide for a return to democratic government in Cuba. Those efforts, of course, have not been successful. We have, however, in association with other countries of this hemisphere, joined together in an attempt to isolate the virus of communism, and in that regard we have achieved some measure of success. Only five countries in this hemisphere now recognize Cuba. In 1959, the trade of the free world with Cuba was about $1,300 million. Now, in 1963 there has been an 80 percent reduction in that trade.

There has been, for example, in the first 10 months of 1963, a 60 percent reduction, as compared to 1962, of the number of free registry, free world registered ships. And now with the recent order put out by the Greek Government, which, with British traders, were the great free world traders with Cuba, we are going to find a further sharp reduction. In addition, while there is a good deal of discontent and turmoil and danger in Latin America, I do not think that there is any doubt that Fidel Castro, as a symbol of revolt in this hemisphere, has faded badly. Every survey, every report, I think every newspaperman, every publisher, would agree that because Mr. Castro has embraced the Soviet Union and made Cuba its satellite, that the appeal that he had in the late fifties and early sixties as a national revolutionary has been so badly damaged and scarred that as a symbol, his torch is flickering. We have not been successful in removing Mr. Castro. We should realize that that task is one which involves not only the security of the United States, but other countries. It involves possibilities of war. It involves danger to people as far away as West Berlin, Germany, countries which border upon the Soviet Union in the Middle East, all the countries that are linked to us in alliance, as the Soviet Union is so intimately linked with Cuba.

So we have attempted to isolate Cuba in the hope that some day Cuba will be free and that the pressures of life in Cuba will make it more obvious to people around this hemisphere that communism does not offer a shortcut to economic well-being. The gross national product of Cuba is 25 percent below what it was in 1958. The Soviet Union today is giving $450 million worth of assistance every year to Cuba. They are pouring into Cuba-and this should be a source of concern to us, because Latin America is still before us, and the challenge of Latin America-they are giving as much aid to Cuba alone as we are giving to all of Latin America. That is not a statistic in which I take particular pride, but it does indicate how heavy is their commitment and how successful so far has been their support.

Some Soviet troops still remain, not as armed units. There has been a substantial withdrawal, but there is a good deal of unfinished business in Cuba.

In answer to your question, Mr. Castro still is in control in Cuba, and still remains a major danger to the United States.

89 Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay.

III-37

"THE UNITED STATES STANDS READY TO WORK WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN THIS HEMISPHERE IN COOPERATIVE EFFORTS TO INCREASE SURVEILLANCE AGAINST AND TO THWART FURTHER ATTEMPTS BY THE CASTRO REGIME TO EXPORT ARMS AND MEN FOR SUBVERSIVE PURPOSES": Statement Read to Correspondents by the Director, Office of News (Phillips), Department of State, November 29, 1963 90

The announcement by the Government of Venezuela [on November 28] that the weapons contained in the arms cache discovered on a beach of the Paraguana Peninsula on November 3 are of Cuban origin is further dramatic confirmation that the Castro regime is pursuing an active policy of indirect aggression in this hemisphere. It gives the lie to Castro's repeated protestations that Cuba exports its Communist revolution only by example.

The evidence presented by the Venezuelan Government demonstrates that the Castro regime is fomenting violence in other American Republics, not only with subversive propaganda, funds, and trained agents but also with weapons and ammunition.

The foreign ministers of the American Republics at their meeting in Punta del Este in January 1962 91 issued a clear warning that continental unity and the democratic institutions of the hemisphere were endangered by the subversive offensive of international communism. The discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela, while demonstrating the growing capacity of the hemisphere to detect and frustrate Cuban subversive efforts, also sounds a new alert calling for a redoubling of vigilance by the American Republics.

The foreign ministers also urged the governments "to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual or collective self-defense, and to cooperate. . . to strengthen their capacity to counteract . . . the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers. . . .'

The United States continues to take measures of its own to keep watch over the aggressive intentions and capabilities of the Castro regime and continues to assist other American governments to strengthen their internal security.

With regard to the Venezuelan intention to present the matter to the OAS [Organization of American States], the United States stands ready to work with other governments in this hemisphere in cooperative efforts to increase surveillance against and to thwart further attempts by the Castro regime to export arms and men for subversive purposes.

Text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 16, 1963, pp. 913

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 320–331.

* See infra.

III-38

CONVOCATION OF THE ORGAN OF CONSULTATION "TO CONSIDER MEASURES THAT MUST BE TAKEN TO DEAL WITH THE ACTS OF INTERVENTION AND AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT AFFECTING THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF VENEZUELA": Resolution Approved by the Council of the OAS, December 3, 1963 93

III-39

APPOINTMENT OF A COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ACTS DENOUNCED BY VENEZUELA: Resolution Adopted by the Council of the OAS Acting Provisionally as the Organ of Consultation, December 3, 1963 94

THE COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, ACTING PROVISIONALLY AS ORGAN OF CONSULTATION,

RESOLVES:

1. To authorize the Chairman of the Council of the Organization to appoint a committee to investigate and report on the acts denounced by Venezuela at the meeting of the Council held this morning."

2. To request the American governments and the Secretary General of the Organization to cooperate fully in facilitating the work of the committee, which will begin to function immediately after it is appointed.

III-40

"WE HAVE DECLARED MORE THAN ONCE AND WE DECLARE AGAIN THAT REVOLUTIONARY CUBA WILL NOT REMAIN DEFENSELESS IF THE AGGRESSIVE MILITARIST CIRCLES OF THE U.S.A. ATTACK IT”: Address by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) Before the Plenary Session of the CPSU Central Committee, Moscow, December 13, 1963 96

SOAS doc. OEA/Ser.G/III/C-sa-525.

"OAS doc. OEA/Ser.G/III/C-sa-526.

95 The Chairman appointed the Representatives of Argentina, Colombia, the United States, and Uruguay as members of the committee referred to in this resolution. The committee was in Venezuela from Dec. 8-15, 1963.

"For text of speech, see post, doc. VI−13.